

The Complete Works of

ONASANDER

(fl. 1st century AD)



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The General

The Greek Text

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The Biography

Introduction to Onasander by William A. Oldfather

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Onasander

Complete Works

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





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




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
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

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



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
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ISBN: 978 1 91348 705 8

Delphi Classics

is an imprint of

Delphi Publishing Ltd

Hastings, East Sussex

United Kingdom

Contact: sales@delphiclassics.com



www.delphiclassics.com

The Translation



Roman soldiers on the cast of Trajan's Column, Victoria and Albert Museum, London

The General



Translated by The Illinois Greek Club for the Loeb Classical Library, 1923

Onasander was a Platonic philosopher that flourished in the first century AD. We know nothing of his life, except that he was the author of a commentary on Plato's *Republic*, now lost, though we still possess his *Strategikos* (The General), a short but comprehensive work on the duties of a general. The text is dedicated to Quintus Veranius Nepos, who was consul in AD 49 and legate of Britain. This treatise would become the chief authority for the military writings of the emperors Maurice, Leo VI, and Maurice of Saxony, who consulted it in a French translation and expressed a high opinion of the work.

Recognised as a classic in Antiquity, it is to some extent a useful handbook even today. The work opens with a *prooemium* (Preface), followed by 42 chapters, some of which are very short. It deals in plain style with the sort of morals and social and military qualities and attitudes expected of a virtuous and successful general. Onasander also reflects upon a general's optimum choice of staff, his attitude to war and the religious duties that should be carried out by a general. The treatise also analyses military formations, the challenges of difficult terrains, the construction of camps and battle formations, while finally concluding with the advised conduct of a leader after achieving a victory.



Solidus of Maurice (539-602), who was Byzantine Emperor from 582 to 602. A prominent general, Maurice fought with success against the Sasanian Empire. He is known to have made use of Onasander's 'The General'.

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A re-enactment of the testudo formation of Roman warfare, as described by Onasander in 'The General'.



A depiction of the testudo on Trajan's Column, a triumphal column in Rome, commemorating the Emperor Trajan's victory in the Dacian Wars.

PROOEMIUM

[1] It is fitting, I believe, to dedicate monographs on horsemanship, or hunting, or fishing, or farming, to men who are devoted to such pursuits, but a treatise on military science, Quintus Veranius, should be dedicated to Romans, and especially to those of the Romans who have attained senatorial dignity, and who through the wisdom of Augustus Caesar have been raised to the power of consul or general, both by reason of their military training (in which they have had no brief experience) and because of the distinction of their ancestors. [2] I have dedicated this treatise primarily to them, not as to men unskilled in generalship, but with especial confidence in this fact, that the ignorant soul is unaware even of that in which another is successful, but knowledge bears additional witness to that which is well done. [3] For this reason, if what I have composed would seem to have been already devised by many others, even then I should be pleased, because I have not only compiled precepts of generalship, but have also endeavoured to get at the art of the general and the wisdom that inheres in the precepts. I should be fortunate if I should be considered capable, before such men, of making a summary sketch of what the Romans have already accomplished by their mighty deeds.

[4] It remains for me to say with good courage of my work, that it will be a school for good generals, and an object of delight for retired commanders in these times of holy peace; and we shall know, if nothing else, for what reason some generals have stumbled and fallen, but others have prospered and been raised to fame; and we shall consider above all the valour of the Romans, how that neither king, nor state, nor nation has held a greater position of leadership, nor even equalled them in the establishment of a dominion, unshaken through so many years. [5] For it is not by chance, as it seems to me, that they have overrun the boundaries of Italy and extended their sway to the limits of the earth, but by deeds of generalship. For it is necessary to pray to Fortune to do its share, but not to consider that Fortune has entire control. [6] Stupid are those who make disasters chargeable to Fortune alone, rather than to the negligence of commanders, as well as those who attribute successes to her, and not to the skill of the generals. It is neither reasonable simply to dismiss without punishment a general who has met with complete disaster, on the ground that Fortune is responsible for all things, nor is it just to leave the

successful general so far without recognition that gratitude for everything is offered to Fortune.

[7] Now since all men naturally give credit for truthfulness to those who appear to write with professional experience, even though their style be feeble, while for inexperienced writers, even though their teachings are practicable, they feel distrust on account of their lack of reputation, I consider it necessary to say in advance, about the military principles collected in this book, that they have all been derived from experience of actual deeds, and, in fact, of exploits performed by those men from whom has been derived the whole primacy of the Romans, in race and valour, down to the present time. [8] For this treatise presents no impromptu invention of an unwarlike and youthful mind, but all the principles are taken from authentic exploits and battles, especially of the Romans. For the expedients they used in order to avoid suffering harm, and the means by which they contrived to inflict it, all this I have collected. [9] Nor have I failed to perceive that a writer, seeking greater praise from credulous readers, would prefer to have it appear that the source of all the military stratagems he described was himself and his own shrewdness rather than the sagacity of others. But I do not think that the latter diminishes one's glory. [10] For if a general after experience in the field had composed such a work, it would not be considered of less value because he introduced and commemorated in his work, not only the personal discoveries of his native wit, but also the brilliant deeds of other generals; in the same way I do not consider that I myself shall win less praise, because I admit that not everything I write springs from my own intelligence. On the contrary, I have chosen the opposite course, that I may have praise without reproach and trust without slander.

I. THE CHOICE OF A GENERAL

[1] I believe, then, that we must choose a general, not because of noble birth as priests are chosen, nor because of wealth as the superintendents of the gymnasia, but because he is temperate, self-restrained, vigilant, frugal, hardened to labour, alert, free from avarice, neither too young nor too old, indeed a father of children if possible, a ready speaker, and a man with a good reputation.

[2] The general must be temperate in order that he may not be so distracted by the pleasures of the body as to neglect the consideration of matters of the highest importance.

[3] He must be self-restrained, since he is to be a man of so great authority; for the licentious impulses, when combined with the authority which confers the power of action, become uncontrollable in the gratification of the passions.

[4] Vigilant, that he may spend wakeful nights over the most important projects; for at night, as a rule, with the mind at rest, the general perfects his plans.

[5] Frugal, since expensive attendance upon the luxurious tastes of commanders consumes time unprofitably and causes resources to waste away.

[6] Hardened to labour, that he may not be the first but the last of the army to grow weary.

[7] Alert, for the general must be quick, with swiftness of mind darting at every subject — quick, as Homer says, “as a bird, or as thought.” [Odyssey, VII.36.] For very frequently unexpected disorders arise which may compel him to decide on the spur of the moment what is expedient.

[8] Free from avarice; for this quality of freedom from avarice will be valued most highly, since it is largely responsible for the incorruptible and large-minded management of affairs. For many who can face the shields and spears of a host with courage are blinded by gold; but gold is a strong weapon against the enemy and effective for victory. [The Romans of this period enjoyed among the Greeks a singularly evil reputation for greed; see especially a striking passage in Diodorus Siculus XXXI.26.]

[9] Neither too young nor too old; since the young man does not inspire confidence, the old man is feeble, and neither is free from danger, the young

man lest he err through reckless daring, the older lest he neglect something through physical weakness. [10] The ideal lies between the two, for physical vigour is found in the man who has not yet grown old, and discretion in the man who is not too young. Those who value physical strength without discretion, or discretion without physical strength, have failed to accomplish anything. For a weak mind can contribute no valuable ideas, nor can strength unsupported bring to completion any activity. [11] Moreover, a man of good reputation is of no slight assistance to those who choose him; for if men have a spontaneous and natural love for their general, they are quick to obey his commands, they do not distrust him, and they coöperate with him in case of danger.

[12] I should prefer our general to be a father, though I would not refuse a childless man, provided he be a good man. For if he happens to have young children, they are potent spells to keep his heart loyal, availing to bind him to the fatherland, a powerful and keen incentive to a father, capable of arousing his heart against the foe. And should his children have reached manhood, they will become advisers and aides, faithful guardians of his secrets, and they will help him to bring the affairs of state to a successful issue.

[13] A ready speaker [Thus Homer felt that the great leader must be μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων (Iliad, IX.443), and the harangue before battle was a necessary formality, which a Caesar felt must be delivered even to his tenth legion and in the crisis of the unexpected attack of the Nervii (Bellum Gallicum, II.21.1 f.). Compare also Cicero, Philippica, IV.5.]; for I believe that the greatest benefit can accrue from the work of a general through this gift. For if a general is drawing up his men before battle, the encouragement of his words makes them despise the danger and covet the honour; and a trumpet-call resounding in the ears does not so effectively awaken the soul to the conflict of battle as a speech that urges to strenuous valour rouses the martial spirit to confront danger. Should some disaster befall the army, an encouraging speech will give the men's souls new strength; and a not unskilful address by the commander is far more useful in counteracting the despondency of an army in the hour of defeat than the physicians who attend to the wounded. [14] For the physicians with their medicines care only for the wounded, whereas the eloquent general not only heartens the disabled but also sets the well on their feet again. [15] Just as hidden diseases are harder

to cure than those with external symptoms, so it is more difficult by a consoling speech to cure a heart of its despondency than to minister to an obvious and manifest disease of the body. [16] No city at all will put an army in the field without generals nor choose a general who lacks the ability to make an effective speech.

[17] The general should be a man of good reputation, because the majority of men, when placed under the command of unknown generals, feel uneasy. For no one voluntarily submits to a leader or an officer who is an inferior man to himself. [18] It is absolutely essential, then, that a general be such a man, of such excellent traits of character as I have mentioned, and besides this, that he have a good reputation.

[19] A wealthy man in my opinion must not be chosen general on account of his wealth, if he has not these qualities; nor must a poor man, provided that he be competent, be rejected on account of his poverty. It is not necessary that the general be rich or poor; he may be the one or the other. Neither the one nor the other must be chosen nor rejected on account of his fortune in life, but must be tested by the standard of character. [20] Even the wealthy general who is good will surpass the noble but poor general only in the same degree that armour inlaid with gold and silver surpasses that of bronze and iron — the former have the advantage in ornamentation but the latter prove superior in efficiency — provided that he is not a man who deals in money. Were he the richest man in the world, I should not ever advise choosing a man who deals in money. I mean by this expression a usurer, a trader, a merchant, or those who are in a similar business. For these men must have petty minds; excited over gain and worried about the means of getting money, they have acquired absolutely none of the noble habits of a general.

[21] An illustrious family name we should welcome, if it be present, but if lacking it should not be demanded, nor should we judge men worthy or unworthy of commands simply by this criterion; but just as we test the pedigrees of animals in the light of the things they actually do, so we should view the pedigrees of men also. [22] For it is dangerous to consider what fine thing a general's ancestors have done, rather than what the generals now chosen will do, as if those long dead could still protect us, and as if they would maintain us in our former possessions. As a matter of fact, is it not sheer stupidity to honour soldiers for valour, not those of famous families but

those who have done some noble deed themselves, but on the other hand to select generals, even if they are incompetent, on account of their ancestors and not on account of their own worth, even if their families are unknown? [23] Of course, if a general has birth in addition to these other qualities, he is fortunate, but even if he has a famous name without the other qualities, he is useless. [24] It might perhaps be expected that those men who cannot take pride in their ancestors would become even better generals; for men who glory in their forefathers, even if they are themselves failures, believing that the fame of their family is theirs forever are often too careless as administrators, whereas those who have no ancestral renown to begin with, desiring to make up for the obscurity of their lineage by their own zeal, are more eager to take part in dangerous enterprises. [25] Just as the poor man, eager to supply what fortune omitted, will endure more than the rich man in getting a start to make his fortune, so the man who can avail himself of no inheritance of ancestral glory determines to make his own the virtue which he himself acquires.

II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD GENERAL

[1] So that general is to be praised who is good, wealthy, and well-born, but the excellent general who is not wealthy is not to be rejected, even if of humble family. [2] The general when chosen must be trustworthy, affable, prompt, calm, not so lenient as to be despised, nor so severe as to be hated, so that he may neither through favours loosen the bonds of discipline, nor estrange the army through fear. [3] He must appoint as lieutenants, captains, and colonels, as well as other officers, if it seems necessary, men who are most loyal to their country, most faithful, and most vigorous — though there is nothing to prevent their being of the greatest wealth and nobility. [4] As the number of generals to be chosen is small, they may be easily judged from their characters, even if the dignity of wealth and birth is lacking; but this is not the case with the multitude of subordinate officers. [5] And so by off-hand judgment required at a crucial moment the nobility have to be preferred, but when there is no urgency, the wealthy, since those who have abundant means can spend money on the soldiery and make them gifts; for a slight expenditure by the officers for the benefit of their men makes the rank and file better disposed; and the pledges of greater rewards can be depended upon when made by those who have more at stake — that is, if the confidence a general ought to inspire is not altogether furnished by his character.

III. THE GENERAL'S ADVISORY COUNCIL

[1] The general should either choose a staff to participate in all his councils and share in his decisions, men who will accompany the army especially for this purpose, or summon as members of his council a selected group of the most respected commanders, since it is not safe that the opinions of one single man, on his sole judgment, should be adopted. [2] For the isolated decision of one man, unsupported by others, can see no farther than his own ingenuity, but that which has the additional testimony of councillors guarantees against mistake. [3] However, the general must neither be so undecided that he entirely distrusts himself, nor so obstinate as not to think that anyone can have a better idea than his own; for such a man, either because he listens to every one else and never to himself, is sure to meet with frequent misfortune, or else, through never listening to others but always to himself, is bound to make many very costly mistakes.

IV. THE NECESSITY OF A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR WAR

[1] The causes of war, I believe, should be marshalled with the greatest care; it should be evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe. [Something of a commonplace even in antiquity; for typical expressions see Thucydides II.74; Xenophon, *Cyropedia*, I.5.13-14; Dionysius of Halicarnassus II.72.3.^o] [2] For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear, even if they are not about to face danger at the hands of the enemy. [3] On this account the general must first announce, by speeches and through embassies, what he wishes to obtain and what he is not willing to concede, in order that it may appear that, because the enemy will not agree to his reasonable demands, it is of necessity, not of his own preference, that he is taking the field. He should call heaven to witness that he is entering the war without offence, since he has not failed to consider the dangers that fall to the lot of combatants, and is not deliberately seeking, in every possible manner, to ruin the enemy. [4] He should know that not only is a firm foundation necessary for houses and walls — for if this is weak the superstructures will also collapse — , but that in war also it is only after one has prepared a firm beginning, and has laid a safe foundation, that he should take the field. For those whose cause is weak, when they take up the heavy burden of war, are quickly crushed by it and fail. [5] Just as a careful ship-captain, after he has given his ship a thorough overhauling and outfitting while in harbour, and has done everything within his own power, must then commit his craft to Fortune, so it is most disgraceful and dangerous for a general, after he has given intimations of a beginning of war, implying an immediate advance of his forces by both land and sea, then to back out. [6] For while every one laughs at folly and rashness, we despise weakness, and the enemy — whoever they may be — even if they experience no harm, have good reason to hate the would-be invaders, as men who have not lacked the will, but lacked the ability to put a matter through.

V. PROPITIATION OF THE DIVINE POWER BY THE GENERAL BEFORE LEADING THE ARMY INTO BATTLE

Before the general leads out his army he must see that it is purified, by such rites as either the laws or soothsayers direct, and must avert whatever taint there is in the state or in any citizen, by expiatory sacrifices.

VI. ON MAINTAINING MILITARY FORMATION

[1] The general must lead his entire army in military formation, even if he is not on the point of battle, but is completing a long journey and a march of many days through either a friendly or a hostile country; through a friendly country, that the soldiers may become accustomed to remaining in rank, to keeping to their own companies, and to following their own leaders; through a hostile country, to guard against sudden attacks from ambush, that the soldiers may not be thrown into disorder at a critical moment, running against and stumbling over one another, and so accomplishing nothing but rather suffering severe loss; they must proceed, prepared at the same time for marching and for battle, remembering their watchword and keeping their eyes on their comrades in the ranks. [2] The general must attempt to make the marching order of his army as compact as possible, and should lead his troops through such a country — so far as he is able — that the ranks may not be so cramped, being narrow and having no width, that they cannot be deployed to a considerable distance laterally. [3] For lines so disposed suffer more under sudden attacks of the enemy and are least effective; should the enemy with a more extended front encounter the head of the column, they would easily put it to flight, just as in battle one army, by outflanking an enemy advancing in column formation, routs it. Should the enemy attack the centre of the column from the flank, they would quickly pierce it and cut through — for if the column wheels to meet the enemy, forming a phalanx, even this, lacking depth, will make but a weak resistance — ; and, finally, should the enemy attack the rear of the column, the fighting with back to the foe would be dangerous and entail obvious destruction; and even if the soldiers in the column venture to face about and form a new front, the battle would amount to the same thing as the previous attack on the advance guard, *i.e.*, the enemy would quickly surround them. [4] Furthermore, assistance is difficult to give and ineffectual, for when those in the rear desire to give aid to the head of the column, or those at the head to those in the rear, their arrival is delayed and ill-timed, however eager they may be to cover the many stades which separate them from the van or the rear respectively.

[5] A marching formation that is compact and rectangular — not very much longer than its width — is safe and easy to manage for every emergency. A

too greatly extended line of march may at times produce panic and apprehension due to uncertainty, for sometimes the leaders, after descending from mountains into treeless and level regions, observing those in the rear still descending, have thought the enemy were attacking, so that they have been on the point of marching against their own men as enemies, and some have even come to blows.

[6] The general must place his medical equipment, pack animals, and all his baggage in the centre of his army, not outside. Should he consider that his rear is not quite secure and undisturbed he should form his rear guard of the most vigorous and courageous soldiers, realizing that, in the light of experience, the rear is no less important than the front.

[7] He must send ahead cavalry as scouts to search the roads, especially when advancing through a wooded country, or a wilderness broken up by ridges. For ambushes are frequently set by the enemy, and sometimes failure to detect them brings complete disaster to the opposing side, while their discovery, by a slight precaution, attests to the general of the enemy great prudence on the part of his adversary. [8] For in a level and treeless country a general survey is sufficient for a preliminary investigation; for a cloud of dust announces the approach of the enemy by day, and burning fires light up a near-by encampment at night.

[9] If the general is not about to form his line of battle, but is hurrying to be the first to arrive at a given point, he should lead his army by night marches also, provided he thinks it safe. But if he intends to decide the issue by battle as soon as he comes in sight of the enemy, he should at once advance slowly and not try to march too far; for in many cases, before the actual fighting, fatigue lessens men's physical fitness.

[10] When passing through the country of an ally, the general must order his troops not to lay hands on the country, nor to pillage or destroy; for every army under arms is ruthless, when it has the opportunity of exercising power, and the close view of desirable objects entices the thoughtless to greediness; while small reasons alienate allies or make them quite hostile. [11] But the country of the enemy he should ruin and burn and ravage, for loss of money and shortage of crops reduce warfare, as abundance nourishes it. But first he should let the enemy know what he intends to do; for often the expectation of impending terror has brought those who have been endangered, before they

have suffered at all, to terms which they previously would not have wished to accept; but when they have once suffered a reverse, in the belief that nothing can be worse they are careless of future perils. [12] If he intends to encamp for some time in the enemy's country, he must destroy only things of such a number and sort as he himself will not need; whatever, if preserved, will be of advantage to his friends he should spare.

[13] When the army is recruited to full strength, he must not settle down and stay either in his own country, or in that of a subject nation, or in that of an ally; for he will consume his own crops, and do more damage to his friends than to his enemies. He should lead out his forces over the frontier as soon as possible, if matters are safe at home; for from the enemy's country, if it is fertile and wealthy, he will have abundant provisions, but if it is not, he will at least not be injuring a friendly country, and he will still derive great gain even from the distress of the hostile country.

[14] He should consider the matter of supplies, and the convoying of his merchants by land and sea, that they may arrive safely at his base of supplies, and that they may without hesitation transport their cargoes of provisions.

VII. ON LEADING AN ARMY THROUGH NARROW DEFILES

[1] Whenever the general intends to march through a narrow pass, or to lead his army over mountainous and difficult country, he must send ahead part of his force to occupy the mountain-passes and the defiles, lest the enemy, coming first, make a stand on the summits and prevent the army from crossing. [2] This he should observe even if fearing an attack by the enemy. For naturally it is not advantageous to take the initiative, without also recognizing the necessity of taking precautions against injury; nor is it necessary to outstrip the enemy in making an invasion into his country, without taking measures to prevent the enemy from marching against one's own country.

VIII. ON MAKING A PALISADED CAMP

[1] When encamping in the territory of the enemy, the general should fortify his camp with a palisade and a ditch, even if planning to remain in camp but one day; for on account of sudden and unexpected attacks, a fortified camp of this sort will be safe and never regretted. He should place guards, even if he believes the enemy to be at a great distance, just as if they were at hand. [2] Whenever the enemy are not attacking, and he intends to encamp for some time, either for the purpose of ravaging the country, or to await a more advantageous time for battle, he must choose a locality that is not marshy, nor damp; for such places by their rising vapours and rank smell bring disease and infection to the army, and both impair the health of many and kill many, so that the soldiers are left few in number and weakened in strength.

IX. ON CONTINUALLY CHANGING CAMP

[1] The general will find it advantageous and healthful for his army not to remain long in the same camp, unless it is winter and the army happens to be in huts on account of the time of year; for the necessary bodily excrement, deposited in the same place, gives off rank vapours and taints all the surrounding air. [2] In winter quarters he should exercise his army and train it to be skilled in war and accustomed to danger, permitting no idleness nor relaxation; for idleness makes the body soft and weak, while relaxation makes the soul cowardly and worthless; since pleasures, capturing the passions by the enticement of daily habit, corrupt even the most courageous man. [3] For this reason the soldiers must never be without occupation. When after some time spent in idleness they are compelled to go against the enemy, they do not go willingly nor do they long stand their ground, but because they have departed from their former habits, they quickly become dismayed, even before making trial of danger, and even if they do make trial, they quickly retreat, being incapable either of feeling hope or of sustaining the stress of battle.

X. (1) THE NEED FOR CONTROLLING THE ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE

[1] On this account it is the duty of a good general to prepare what is useful for war, when the necessity of a pitched battle is not pressing. He should also assign unproductive tasks to keep the army in good condition. For it is sufficient relaxation for soldiers, even if they are very weary, to exercise in arms without the dangers involved in a real battle. The general should train his troops in some such manner as the following.

[2] First arming the soldiers, he should draw them up in military formation that they may become practised in maintaining their formation; that they may become familiar with the faces and names of one another; that each soldier may learn by whom he stands and where and after how many. In this way, by one sharp command, the whole army will immediately form ranks. Then he should instruct the army in open and close order; in turning to the left and right; the interchange, taking distance, and closing up of files; the division into files; the arrangement and extension of files to form the phalanx; withdrawing of files for greater depth of the phalanx; battle formation facing in two directions, when the rear guard turns to fight an encircling enemy; and he should instruct them thoroughly in the calls for retreat.

[3] For just as those who begin to learn to play a musical instrument, in placing their fingers on the stops of the pipe or on the strings of the lyre, often set one finger on one and then another on another, without observing the interval that produces harmony, and then, with great effort, extending their fingers, they lift them slowly and slowly place them again; whereas practised players, no longer giving any evidence of care, with disciplined hand swiftly change from one note to another, lightly checking or opening the flow of air at will or lightly plucking the strings; in just this manner men unpractised and inexperienced in military formations, with great confusion and failure to find one another, will only after loss of much time take their places; but those who are well trained in formations quickly — indeed automatically, so to speak — rush to their stations, presenting a harmonious, I may say, and beautiful sight.

[4] Next after dividing the army into two parts he should lead them against each other in a sham battle, armed with staves or the shafts of javelins; if there should be any fields covered with clods, he should command them to throw

clouds; if they have any leather straps, the soldiers should use them in the battle. [This passage is derived from Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, II.3.17-18. Compare the Introduction.] Pointing out to the soldiers ridges or hills or steep ascents, he should command them to charge and seize these places; and sometimes arming the soldiers with the weapons I have just mentioned, he should place some on the hilltops and send the others to dislodge them. He should praise those who stand firm without retreating, and those who succeed in dislodging their opponents. [5] For from such exercise and training the army is kept in good health, eating and drinking everything with heartier appetite, even if the fare is plain, desiring nothing more luxurious. For the hunger and thirst derived from toil are a sufficient relish and a sweet draught, and muscles become harder and untiring; and trained by sweating, puffing, and panting, and exposed to summer heat and the bitter cold under the open sky, the soldiers become accustomed to future hardships.

[6] In the same way the general should train his cavalry, arranging practice battles, both pursuits and hand-to-hand struggles and skirmishes in the plain and around the base of the hills, as far as it is possible to go in the broken country; for it is not possible to charge uphill nor to ride downhill.

(2) FORAGING EXPEDITIONS

[7] The general should be cautious in the matter of foraging expeditions, and not allow troops, when invading a rich hostile country, to search for plunder in an undisciplined manner; for the greatest misfortunes befall men acting in this way, since it has often happened that the enemy, falling on men scattered and without order in their eager search for booty, on account of this lack of order and the fact that they were loaded with their booty have killed many as they were retreating, unable to give aid to their comrades or to use their arms. [8] If any men do plundering without the command of the general, they should be punished. When the general himself sends out foraging parties, he should send with the light-armed and unarmed men guards, both horse and foot, who shall have nothing to do with the booty but are to remain in formation and guard the foragers, that the return to camp may be safely accomplished.

(3) SPIES

[9] If the general should at any time capture spies, he should not employ any one single method in dealing with them. If he considers that his own army is weaker than that of the enemy, he should kill them, but if he has complete equipment of arms, thorough preparation for war, a powerful army, vigorous and disciplined, excellent officers, all trained by experience, he will make no mistake if, after making the spies examine his army drawn up in battle array, he occasionally even sends them away unharmed; for reported superiority of the enemy necessarily causes fear, but reported inferiority brings courage.

(4) GUARDS BY NIGHT

[10] The general should appoint guards and a rather large number of them, that, by dividing the night into watches, some may sleep and some stand guard. Men must not be compelled to stand guard the entire night, nor even if they volunteer to do so must they be trusted; for it is only reasonable that sometimes, now the body is tired, sleep will come of its own accord, even against one's will. [11] The guards must remain standing while on duty; for seats and reclining positions, relaxing the body, are conducive to sleep, but standing erect and keeping the legs stretched makes the mind wakeful. [12] The guards must build fires at some distance from the camp. Thus because of the light they will see at a distance men advanced toward the camp, but those who come from the light will not perceive the guards, who are in the dark, until they fall into their hands.

(5) SECRET RETREAT OF THE ARMY

[13] If the general desires to withdraw his army by night without the knowledge of the enemy, either to be the first to occupy a certain position or to escape from the position he is in, or to avoid the present necessity of battle, he should retreat leaving many fires burning; for as long as the enemy see the fires they believe that the army is remaining in the same place, but if the camp becomes dark while the retreat is going on, the enemy will suspect their flight, send ahead ambushes, and follow in pursuit.

(6) PARLEYS WITH THE GENERALS OF THE ENEMY

[14] But if, while keeping his army in the same spot, he should come to a

conference with the opposing general, either to make or to receive some proposal, he should choose as an escort the strongest and finest-looking of the younger soldiers, stalwart, handsome and tall men, equipped with magnificent armour, and with these about him he should meet the enemy. For often from the view of a part the whole is judged to be like it, and a general does not determine his course of action by what he has heard, but is terrified by what he has seen.

(7) DESERTERS

[15] If any deserters arrive in camp to tell of a suitable opportunity or hour for attack, or if they offer to act as guides over a road and assert that they will lead the army along it, unseen by the enemy, the general should lead these deserters with him securely bound, making it plain to them that, if they are truthful and bring safety and victory to the army, he will set them free and present them with fitting rewards, but that if they attempt to deceive him and wish to betray his army into the hands of their own friends, at that same ‘suitable opportunity’ they will be slain in their bonds by the endangered army. Confidence may be most safely placed in the word of a deserter, when he knows that his life is not in his own hands, but in the hands of those whom he leads.

(8) ON THE INSPECTION OF THE ENEMY’S CAMP

[16] The general should skilfully inspect the camp of the enemy. If he sees a circular palisade contracted into a small circumference, lying in a plain, he should not conclude that the enemy are few in number; for every circle appears to contain less than it actually does by the theory of proportionate geometrical contents, and the space enclosed within a circle can hold more men than one would think to see it. If the sides of the palisade happen to be long and close together in certain parts, or crooked with many acute angles, he should not conclude that the camp contains a great number of men; for this type of camp appears large but has no more men within its walls in every case than circular camps have. [17] Palisades on hills and mountains, unless compact in every respect, appear greater than those in plains, but they contain fewer men than the eye judges; for many parts of such camps are bare of men, since there must be many ravines in them and many steep and precipitous banks

unsuitable for pitching tents, and as the palisade is built to defend the men, its length must be accordingly greater. [18] The general, therefore, judging merely the position and shape of a camp, should not be emboldened at the sight of a small contracted camp nor downhearted at the sight of an extended one.

[19] With this knowledge he should make use of opportune strategy. Stationing his army in a small camp, according to the above-mentioned plan, and if necessary, even crowding the soldiers together, he should not lead them from the camp nor show them to the enemy encamped opposite, nor lead them into battle if the enemy challenge, but he should even give the impression that he is afraid. [20] For often the enemy, growing bold in the belief that their opponents are few, judging by sight and not by strategic experience, behave thoughtlessly. They go forth from their camp carelessly and without discipline, believing that their opponents will not dare to come out and attack; or they even surround and blockade the palisade, unaware of the multitude of men about to pour forth upon them; and with no expectation of danger soldiers become heedless. Then, seizing a favourable opportunity, the army must rush forth from the many little gates of the palisade, and in battle array courageously grapple with the task before them.

[21] The general, having this knowledge, will know how to do his part, and even if he is out-generaled in these same matters, will be both wise in action and prudent in devising protection; for from the knowledge that instructs him in what he must do, he will know, when his opponent is trying to do this to him, what he must not himself suffer, since personal experience in inflicting damage warns of the designs of others.

(9) SECRET PLANS

[22] If the general must make a march by night or by day for some secret purpose, to seize a fortress, city, height, or pass, or to do anything else that must be done quickly without the knowledge of the enemy, which otherwise could not be done at all, he must tell no one beforehand against what place or for what purpose he is leading his army, unless he considers it necessary to warn some of the higher officers in advance. [23] But when he has reached the spot and the moment is near at hand when he must act, he must give his orders and point out what is to be done. These orders must be quick and brief, for at the same instant that the leaders receive instructions their subordinates also

know them. [24] Thoughtless and futile is he who communicates his plan to the rank and file before it is necessary; for worthless scoundrels desert to the foes especially at critical times, when, by revealing and disclosing secrets, they believe they will receive honour and reward from the enemy. There is no army in which both slaves and freemen do not desert to the other side on the many occasions that war necessarily affords.

(10) TAKING THE OMENS BEFORE BATTLE

[25] The general should neither lead his army on a journey, nor marshal it for battle, without first making a sacrifice; in fact, official sacrificers and diviners should accompany him. It is best that the general himself be able to read the omens intelligently; it is very easy to learn in a brief time, and thereby become a good counsellor to himself. [26] He should not begin any undertaking until the omens are favourable, and he should summon all his officers to inspect the offerings, that, after seeing, they may tell the soldiers to be of good courage, since the gods command them to fight. Soldiers are far more courageous when they believe they are facing dangers with the good will of the gods; for they themselves are on the alert, every man, and they watch closely for omens of sight and of sound, and an auspicious sacrifice for the whole army encourages even those who have private misgivings. [27] But if the omens are unfavourable, he must remain in the same place, and if he is hard pressed for time he must patiently submit to every inconvenience — for he can suffer nothing worse than what Fate indicates beforehand, — since, if his condition is going to improve, he must have favourable signs in a sacrifice and he must sacrifice several times on the same day; one hour, even one minute, ruins those who start too soon or too late. [28] And it seems to me that the motions of the heavenly bodies, their risings and settings, and their positions — trine, square, and in opposition — are indicated by the art of extispicy, through another form of observation, and that trifling differences in these things have, in a single day, or rather in a single hour, led to power and deification, and have made both kings and captives.

XI. (1) PURSUIT OF AN APPARENTLY FLEEING ENEMY MUST NOT BE CARELESS AND HAPHAZARD

[1] Since frequently the omens from a sacrifice are favourable for battle and yet sometimes foretell the complete destruction of the army through battle, I have considered it of the utmost necessity to say a few words on this point. [2] The topography of the inhabited world differs widely in its various parts, and it is impossible to foresee in what sort of country a war will occur. Every man is well acquainted with his own country but not with foreign countries. [3] Often a general, on hearing that the enemy are but a day's march distant, will call out his troops and lead them forward, hurrying to come to close quarters with the enemy, who, purposely retreating, do not make a stand against him; and so he assumes that they are afraid and pursues them. This continues until they come into a broken country, surrounded by the mountains on all sides, and the general, unsuspecting, still attacks them; next, as he marches against their positions, he is cut off by the enemy from the road by which he led his army in. They seize the passes in front of him, and all the heights round about, and thus confine their enemies in a sort of cage. But the general is carried away by his impetuosity, in the belief that he is pursuing a fleeing enemy, without noticing whom he is approaching; and later, on looking before and behind and on both sides, and seeing all the hillsides full of the enemy, he and his army will be destroyed by javelins, or, unable to fight and unwilling to surrender, he will cause all to die of hunger, or by surrender enable the enemy to dictate whatever terms they wish. [4] Therefore retreats on the part of the enemy should be suspected and not stupidly followed; the general should observe the country rather than the enemy, and notice through what sort of terrain he is leading his forces; and he should take into consideration that it is necessary to return by the same road by which he came, and should either refrain from advancing and turn aside from the route, or, if he does advance, he should take precautions, leaving forces to hold the mountain passes and connecting defiles in order that his return may be safe. [5] This advice is given for the purpose both of outwitting the enemy by these tactics and of not being outwitted oneself; for though it is a fine thing to be able in this fashion to ensnare the enemy, yet it is absolutely essential to avoid being ensnared

oneself.

(2) RECEIVING MESSENGERS

[6] The general should receive every man who wishes to report anything, whether slave or freeman, by night or day, on the march or in camp, while resting, in the bath, or at table. For generals who procrastinate and are difficult of access, and who order their servants to keep out those who come to see them, naturally either miss many important opportunities or even through their negligence suffer complete ruin; for often men bring information at a critical moment about something that can be frustrated in the nick of time.

XII. MEAL-TIMES

[1] The general, if encamped opposite the camp of the enemy, should not be careless of the proper time at which to serve meals. For if he considers that it lies with him to lead out his troops to battle whenever he wishes, he may set a meal hour for his troops at whatever time he wishes. But if he should chance to have come into such extremities, because of the terrain, or the weakness of his camp, or for some other reason, that it is left in the power of the enemy to attack whenever they desire, and to compel his army to seize their arms and draw up for defence, he should not hesitate to order the first meal at sunrise, lest the enemy, by a prior attack, force his men to fight while still hungry. [2] On the whole, this matter must not be considered of slight importance nor should a general neglect to pay attention to it; for soldiers who have eaten moderately, so as not to put too great a load into their stomachs, are more vigorous in battle; armies have often been overpowered for just this reason, their strength failing for lack of food — that is, whenever the decision rests, not on a moment's fighting, but when the battle lasts throughout the entire day.

XIII. COURAGE ON THE PART OF THE GENERAL WHEN IN ADVERSITY

[1] Whenever despondency or fear has fallen on an army because the enemy has received reinforcements or gained an advantage, then especially the general should show himself to his soldiers gay, cheerful, and undaunted. [2] For the appearance of the leaders brings about a corresponding change in the minds of the subordinates, and if the general is cheerful and has a joyful look, the army also takes heart, believing that there is no danger; but should he have a frightened, worried appearance, the spirits of the soldiers fall with his, in the belief that disaster is impending. [3] On this account, the general must inspire cheerfulness in the army, more by the strategy of his facial expression than by his words; for many distrust speeches on the ground that they have been concocted especially for the occasion, but believing a confident appearance to be unfeigned they are fully convinced of his fearlessness; and it is an excellent thing to understand these two points, how to say the right word and how to show the right expression.

XIV. (1) WHEN ONE'S OWN ARMY MUST BE MADE TO FEAR THE ENEMY

[1] Just as the recovery of courage at a crucial moment benefits an army, so also fear is advantageous. For whenever an army becomes idle and inclined to disobey its officers, the general should suggest the danger from the enemy, especially by representing their reserves to be formidable. It will not be possible thus to make the soldiers cowardly but only steady, since in despondency it is necessary to be of good courage, but in idleness to fear; for fear makes cowards bold and the rash cautious. [2] These two misfortunes happen to armies, to become so terrified of the enemy that they are unwilling to attempt any offensive, and so bold that they are unwilling to take any precautionary measures. With regard to each the general must arrange his plans, and know when by voice and look he must make the enemy appear weak, and when more threatening and formidable.

(2) ENCOURAGING THE FRIGHTENED ARMY

[3] On the eve of battle, when the army, uncertain of the outcome of the war, is distrustful and fearful, the general, if he is able, should manage to capture some prisoners by ambush or skirmishing, or some men who have strayed from their own camp. If he learns that they are strong in courage and in body, he should either kill them on the spot or turn them over, securely bound, to men assigned to this duty, with orders to guard them, so that not many of his own forces may see them; but if they are weak and cowardly and spiritless, after threatening them in the privacy of his own tent and enslaving their minds through fear, he should lead them, weeping and supplicating, before his army, pointing out to his soldiers how base and wretched and worthless they are, and saying that it is against such men that they are to fight, men who are so greatly afraid of death, who cling to the knees and grovel at the feet of every one. [4] The army is emboldened at all this, since they know before the conflict the appearance of the enemy and his state of mind. For what a man has never seen he always expects will be greater than it really is; so also because of his fear of the future, a man measures his apprehensions by reference to the more grievous outcome.

XV. THE DIFFERENCE IN BATTLE FORMATIONS

Battle formation is not of one but of many and various kinds, with regard to arms and soldiers and terrain and enemies. These differences the general will have to know on the occasions themselves, but what pertains in large part to many formations I shall briefly summarize, without considering the details which, in the actions themselves, must necessarily be understood.

XVI. BATTLE FORMATION WITH REGARD TO THAT OF THE ENEMY

The general will arrange his cavalry not as he wishes but rather as he is compelled; for he will oppose his own cavalry to that of the enemy. As a rule, in pitched battles he should arrange his cavalry in column formation, in order that attacking both in front and on the flanks and covering a greater amount of space (if no other soldiers are drawn up in their rear), they may thus be able to make use of their skill in cavalry fighting.

XVII. PLACING THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, JAVELIN-THROWERS, BOWMEN AND SLINGERS, BEFORE THE PHALANX

The general will assign his light-armed troops — javelin-throwers, bowmen, and slingers — to a position in front of the phalanx, for if placed in the rear they will do more damage to their own army than to the enemy, and if in among the heavy-armed, their peculiar skill will be ineffectual because they will be unable to take a step backwards in throwing their javelins or to charge forward and cast them, as other soldiers are in front of them and at their heels, nor will the slingers be able to execute the whirling of their slings, as their fellow-soldiers stand at their side and, in their turn, are caused to stumble in trying to avoid the whirling slings. If the bowmen are placed in front of the army, they will shoot their arrows at the enemy as at a target; but drawn up behind the ranks or in among the heavy-armed they will shoot high, so that the arrows have impetus only for their upward flight, and afterwards, even if they fall on the heads of the enemy, will have spent their force and cause little distress to the foe.

XVIII. DISPOSITION OF LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS IN A BROKEN COUNTRY

If the battle should happen to be in a country that is level in some places but hilly in others, then the light-armed troops should by all means be stationed in the uneven section, and then, if the general himself should have seized the plain and some part of the enemy's phalanx should possess the heights, he should send against them the light-armed troops; for from the uneven ground they can more easily hurl their weapons and retreat, or they can very easily charge up the slopes, if they are agile.

XIX. THE PHALANX SHOULD LEAVE INTERVALS FOR THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS TO RETIRE THROUGH THE RANKS

[1] There should be intervals within the ranks, so that, when the light-armed troops have discharged their weapons while the enemy is still advancing, before the two armies come to close quarters, they may about-face, pass in good order through the centre of the phalanx, and come without confusion to the rear. For it is not safe for them to go around the whole army, encircling the flanks — since the enemy would quickly anticipate them in this manoeuvre, coming to close quarters and intercepting them on the way — nor is it safe for them to force their way through the closed ranks, where they would fall over the weapons and cause confusion in the lines, one man stumbling against another. [2] Attacks of the light-armed troops on the flanks cause the enemy greater loss, since they cast their javelins from the side and of necessity strike the body where unprotected. [3] The sling is the most deadly weapon that is used by the light-armed troops, because the lead slug is the same colour as the air and is invisible in its course, so that it falls unexpectedly on the unprotected bodies of the enemy,^a and not only is the impact itself violent, but also the missile, heated by the friction of its rush through the air, penetrates the flesh very rapidly, so that it even becomes invisible and the swelling quickly closes over it.

XX. HOW TO ATTACK, WITHOUT LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, AN ENEMY WHO HAS MANY

[1] If the general himself should lack an auxiliary force of light-armed troops while the enemy has a large force of them, the front rank men should advance in close formation, with shields the height of a man, tall enough to protect the whole body, and those who follow and the ones behind them, even to the last rank, should carry their shields above their heads, while they are within bowshot of the enemy. For thus roofed in, so to speak, they will suffer no danger from missiles.^b [2] But if each army should have a number of light-armed troops, the general should order his own light-armed men to be the first to hurl their weapons against their opponents before the hand-to-hand battle; or after the clash of the phalanx, attacking from the flank, they should make use of their missiles, for thus the enemy will be forced together into a narrow space and will be greatly confused by such tactics.

XXI. THE NEEDLESSNESS OF LENGTHENING THE PHALANX IN FEAR OF AN ENCIRCLING MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY

[1] The general who wishes to guard against an encircling movement of the enemy should not so extend his forces lengthwise as utterly to weaken the phalanx by giving it no depth. For this would result in the enemy somewhere quickly breaking through; and no longer attempting an encircling movement on the flank, but piercing the centre instead, they would take their opponents in the rear; and this very manoeuvre the general should not only guard against but also strive to execute if he discovers that the enemy's phalanx is weak and thin. Nor should he contract his phalanx, drawing it out toward the rear to great depth to such an extent that the enemy would easily outflank and surround it. [2] But he should make his rear and the flanks of his wings as strong as the front ranks. For those in the rear will prevent the phalanx being encircled no less than those who are posted so as to extend the flanks, if the general, anticipating what is to happen, spreads out his rear guard and posting it on either flank of the phalanx opposes his rear to the front of the enemy, or if he commands those who are already encircled to turn their backs to the backs of the front ranks and fight on a double front.

[3] A shrewd general who sees that the enemy has many troops when he himself is about to engage with fewer, will select, or rather make it his practice to find, localities where he may prevent an encircling movement of the enemy, either by arranging his army along the bank of a river, or, by choosing a mountainous district, he will use the mountains themselves to block off those who wish to outflank him, placing a few men on the summits to prevent the enemy from climbing above the heads of the main army. [4] Not alone does knowledge of military science play a part in this matter but luck as well; for it is necessary to have the luck to find such places; one cannot prepare the terrain for oneself. To choose the better positions, however, from those at hand, and to know which will be advantageous, is the part of the wise general.

[5] It is often the custom of generals who are in command of a powerful and numerous army to march to battle in a crescent formation, believing that their opponents also wish the battle to come to close quarters, and that they will

thus induce them to fight; then, as their opponents are bent back into the road at the points of the crescent, they will intercept them with their enveloping folds, joining the extremes of their own wings to form a complete circle. [6] Against troops advancing in this fashion, one should not likewise adopt the crescent formation, but dividing his own army into three parts, the general should send two against the enemy, one against each wing, but the third division, that which faces the central hollow of the crescent, should stand still, opposite the enemy, and not advance. For if the enemy maintain this crescent formation, those drawn up in the centre of their army will be useless, standing still and doing nothing; but if marching forward they wish to advance in a body, changing from the crescent formation to a straight line, they will be crowded together and will lose their formation — for while the wings are remaining in the same position and fighting, it is impossible for a crescent to return to a straight line. Then when they are confused and their ranks disordered, the opposing general should send the third and reserve division against the men advanced in disorder from the centre of the curve. [7] But if the enemy remain in the crescent position, the general should post his light-armed troops and archers opposite them, who with their missiles will cause heavy loss. [8] However, if he advances with his whole phalanx obliquely against one wing of the enemy, he will make no mistake in attacking in this manner, as far as the encircling movement of the crescent formation is concerned; for the enemy will be prevented for a long time from coming to close quarters with their whole army, and will be thrown into confusion little by little, since only those of one wing will be fighting, that is, those who will necessarily be the first to be engaged because of the oblique attack.

[9] It is sometimes a useful stratagem for an army facing the enemy to retire gradually, as if struck by fear, or to about-face and make a retreat similar to a flight but in order, and then, suddenly turning, to attack their pursuers. For sometimes the enemy, delighted by the belief that their opponents are fleeing, break ranks and rush forward, leaping ahead of one another. There is no danger in turning to attack these men; and those who have for some time been pursuing, terrified by the very unexpectedness of this bold stand, immediately take to flight.

XXII. HOLDING RESERVES FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF EXHAUSTED TROOPS. HOLDING RESERVES IN CONCEALMENT

[1] The general should also have somewhere a picked corps, stationed apart from the phalanx as military reserves, that he may have them ready to give assistance to those detachments of his force that are exhausted. These fresh troops are of not a little advantage in attacking tired men; for, besides relieving those of their own men who are worn out, they attack in their full freshness a wearied enemy. [2] It would be even more advantageous for the general to send a certain part of his army some little distance from the encampment — as far as seems best to him, — unseen by the enemy, with orders to rise up and hasten when the battle is begun, which they will learn from scouts. This is especially to be done when expected reinforcements come too late for the battle, for the enemy believe that these are the reinforcements arriving from some place or other for their opponents; then possibly even while these reinforcements are still advancing and before they enter the battle, the enemy will take to flight, judging this force to be, not what it is, but much greater. [3] Besides, the arrival of unfamiliar hostile troops at the very moment of battle lowers the morale; for anticipating some greater misfortune than they are about to suffer, soldiers regard the future with greater fear.

[4] Most terrible, or rather most effective, of all manoeuvres, is a sudden attack against the enemy's rear. For this purpose, if in any manner it should be possible, a detachment of soldiers should be sent ahead by night, with orders for all to march around the enemy in order to come to their rear, so as to start up from ambush early the next morning, after the battle is begun, and to appear suddenly on the enemy's rear. For no hope of safety would remain for them in flight, and they would be unable to turn backwards, since the opposing army would attack, or to go forward, because of the detachment assailing their rear.

XXIII. ANNOUNCING FAVOURABLE NEWS IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE; EVEN IF FALSE IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS

[1] Sometimes the general should ride along the lines and call out to his men, if he happens to be on the right wing, “Our left wing is defeating the right wing of the enemy,” or if he is on the left he should say that his right wing is conquering, whether this is true or not, for deceit is necessary when “a great strife has arisen.” For example, when the leader of the enemy is some distance away either on one wing or holding the centre, he should call out, “The general of the enemy has been killed,” or “the king,” or whoever it may be. [2] And one should shout this in such a manner that the enemy also may hear; for his own soldiers, learning that their side is more successful, are encouraged and doubly eager to fight, while the enemy, learning of the misfortunes of their side, lose heart, so that sometimes they start into flight immediately on hearing such a report. [3] In this way it is very often useful to deceive both one’s own army and that of the enemy by false news, good for the former, but bad for the latter.

XXIV. IN THE RANKS FRIENDS MUST BE PLACED BY FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES BY ACQUAINTANCES

It is the part of a wise general to station brothers in rank beside brothers, friends beside friends, and lovers beside their favourites. For whenever that which is in danger near by is more than ordinarily dear the lover necessarily fights more recklessly for the man beside him. And of course one is ashamed not to return a favour that he has received, and is dishonoured if he abandons his benefactor and is the first to flee.

XXV. THE GENERAL MUST NOT GIVE THE SIGNAL FOR BATTLE OR ANY OTHER ACTION TO HIS ARMY IN PERSON BUT THROUGH HIS OFFICERS

[1] The general should give every command or watchword or countersign through his officers, for to come and give orders personally to the whole army is the act of an unpractised and inexperienced commander. Time is lost in passing orders down the line, and confusion arises, as all the soldiers question each other at the same time. One man through ignorance adds something to what the general has said and another omits something. [2] But one should communicate his orders to his higher officers and they should repeat them to the officers next below them, who in turn pass them to their subordinates, and so on to the lowest, the higher officers in each case telling the orders to those below them. In this manner the soldiers will learn the commands quickly with order and calmness, just as a message is carried by fire-signals. [3] For after the first signaller uplifts his fire, the second signals to the next, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth to the fifth, and the fifth to the sixth, and one by one follows the other, so that in a short time, over a distance of many stades, the message signalled by the first is known to all.

XXVI. ON GIVING BOTH WATCHWORDS AND COUNTERSIGNS

[1] He should give the countersign not by the voice but by some gesture, as a wave of the hand, or the clash of weapons, or dipping a spear, or by a side-wave of his sword, in order that when confusion arises the soldiers may not have to trust to the spoken watchword alone — for the enemy hear this so often that they are able to get it — but also to the countersign. [2] This is most useful in the case of allies who speak a different language, for, unable to speak or to understand a foreign tongue, they differentiate between friends or enemies by this countersign. One should instruct the army in these signals in camp, even if it is not about to fight, as a protection against confusion and uncertainty.

XXVII. SOLDIERS SHOULD NEVER LEAVE THE RANKS WHETHER IN FORMATION OR IN RETREAT

One should command both retreats and pursuits to be made in formation, so that, if defeated, the soldiers may suffer less injury, when in their flight they encounter the enemy, by not being scattered, man by man, and, if successful, they may inflict greater injury on the enemy by keeping their ranks and companies unbroken, appearing stronger to the fugitives, and moreover being safer themselves. For often the enemy, observing their opponents advancing without order, by a concerted plan about-face, form ranks once more and reverse the pursuit. In a word, the general should say that nothing is more advantageous to his men than remaining in rank, and nothing more dangerous than breaking ranks.

XXVIII. THE GENERAL MUST BE ATTENTIVE TO THE SPLENDOUR OF THE ARMY'S EQUIPMENT

The general should make it a point to draw up his line of battle resplendent in armour — an easy matter, requiring only a command to sharpen swords and to clean helmets and breast-plates. For the advancing companies appear more dangerous by the gleam of weapons, and the terrible sight brings fear and confusion to the hearts of the enemy.

XXIX. SHOUTING IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE

[1] One should send the army into battle shouting, and sometimes on the run, because their appearance and shouts and the clash of arms confound the hearts of the enemy. [2] The dense bands of soldiers should spread out in the attack before coming to close quarters, often waving their swords high above their heads toward the sun. The polished spear-points and flashing swords, shining in thick array and reflecting the light of the sun, send ahead a terrible lightning-flash of war. If the enemy should also do this, it is necessary to frighten them in turn, but if not, one should frighten them first.

[3] It is sometimes advantageous before a critical battle for the general not to be the first to form a line of battle but to wait within the camp for a time until he observes the battle array of the enemy, its character, arrangement, and position.

XXX. THE GENERAL MUST DECIDE BEFORE BATTLE WHO SHOULD OPPOSE WHOM AND THUS IN ORDER ARRANGE HIS OWN OFFICERS AGAINST THOSE OF THE ENEMY

Next the general must consider which troops to oppose to which of the enemy, and in what manner; just as a good doctor who foresees an illness of the body, he must bring forward his defences and arrange his forces as it seems to him most advantageous; for generals are often compelled to equip and marshal their own armies with reference to the armament, nationality, and customs of the enemy.

XXXI. NARROW PLACES MUST BE CHOSEN IF THE ENEMY ARE SUPERIOR IN CAVALRY

[1] If the enemy are superior in cavalry, the general should choose if possible a locality that is rough and hemmed in, near mountains which are least suitable for riding, or he should avoid battle so far as he may until he finds an appropriate place, adapted to his own circumstances. [2] A certain number of soldiers must be left behind at the palisade to guard the camp and the baggage in order that the general of the enemy may not discover that the camp is deserted and send men to plunder its contents and seize the place.

XXXII. THE GENERAL MUST DO NOTHING RASH

[1] Generals who destroy their own defences or cross rivers or who post their armies with steep cliffs or yawning gulfs in the rear in order that the soldiers may either stand and conquer or in their desire to escape be killed, I am not wholly able to praise nor yet to blame, for everything that is ventured rashly is rather than the part of recklessness than of wisdom, and has a greater share of luck than of good judgement. [2] For in a case when one must either win a victory and prevail, or else be defeated and lose everything, in such a case how could anyone attribute victory to foresight or defeat to deliberate choice? [3] But I do believe that certain soldiers of the army must be allowed to run desperate risks — for if they succeed they are of great assistance, but if they fail they do not cause corresponding loss, — yet I cannot countenance gambling with the entire army as the stake. [4] Most of all those generals seem to me to be at fault who make use of stratagems which in the event of victory will cause small loss to the enemy, but in defeat the greatest loss to their own army.

[5] If the destruction of one's army is evident, except through the use of some daring strategy, and if the destruction of the enemy by defeat is also evident, then I do not think a general would be at fault in cutting off the retreat of his own army. For it is better, by showing courage at a time when it is uncertain whether one will perhaps escape a severe defeat himself, to endeavour at the very same time to inflict a defeat, rather than, when it is certain that all will perish if they remain inactive, to keep quiet like cowards. [6] He should not only point this out in those localities where in actual fact there is no safety for fugitives, but also in every locality and every battle he must show by many reasons that death is certain for those who flee, since the enemy would at once press on freely, as soon as no one is able to hinder the pursuit, and could dispose of the fugitives as might suit them; but for men who stand and defend themselves, death is not certain. [7] For the men in the lines who chance to believe that if they flee they will perish shamefully while if they remain in rank they will die a glorious death, and who constantly anticipate greater dangers from breaking the ranks than from keeping them, will prove themselves the best men in the face of danger. [8] On this account it is a good plan if the general can win over his whole army to this opinion, or, if

not all, at least as many as possible, for thus he either gains an absolute victory or meets with but a slight defeat.

[9] Plans and counter-stratagems for victory that are originated at the very moment of battle are sometimes preferable to those which are conceived and contrived by generals in anticipation and before the engagement, and they are sometimes more worthy of remark, in the case of those made by men who are skilled in military science, through they are things which cannot be reduced to rules or planned beforehand. [10] For just as pilots for their voyages, before sailing from the harbour, fit their ship out with everything that a ship requires; yet when a storm blows up they do, not what they wish, but what they must, boldly staking their fortunes against the driving peril of chance and calling to their aid no memory of their past practice but assistance appropriate to the existing circumstances; just so generals will prepare their armies as they believe will be best, but when the storm of war is at hand repeatedly shattering, overthrowing, and bringing varied conditions, the sight of present circumstances demands expedients based on the exigencies of the moment, which the necessity of chance rather than the memory of experience suggests.

XXXIII. THE GENERAL SHOULD NOT HIMSELF ENTER BATTLE

[1] The general should fight cautiously rather than boldly, or should keep away altogether from a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. For even if in battle he shows that he is not to be outdone in valour, he can aid his army far less by fighting than he can harm it if he should be killed, since the knowledge of a general is far more important than his physical strength. Even a soldier can perform a great deed by bravery, but no one except the general can by his wisdom plan a greater one. [2] If a ship's captain leaving the helm should himself do what the sailors ought to do, he would endanger his ship; in the same way, if the general, leaving his function of wise direction, should descend to the duties of a simple soldier, his neglect of the whole situation, due to his lack of governing, will render useless the common soldier's mere routine service. [3] Similar, I think, is the notion which the general gets into his heart when he thus disregards the welfare of his whole force in the event of accident to himself; for if he, with whom the safety of the whole army lies, has no care lest he himself should die, he prefers that everyone should die with him, and rightly he would be censured as an unsuccessful rather than a courageous general. [4] He who has accomplished many feats of generalship through his wisdom must be satisfied with the honour for his intellectual successes, but he who is so stupid that, unless he comes to close quarters with the enemy, he believes he has accomplished nothing worthy of mention, is not brave but thoughtless and foolhardy. [5] Hence the general must show himself brave before the army, that he may call forth the zeal of his soldiers, but he must fight cautiously; he should despise death if his army is defeated, and not desire to live, but if his army is preserved he should guard his personal safety, for sometimes the death of a general lessens the glory of his army, since the defeated enemy is encouraged, perceiving that its opponents are without a general, and the successful army is discouraged, feeling the need of its own general. [6] The duty of the general is to ride by the ranks on horseback, show himself to those in danger, praise the brave, threaten the cowardly, encourage the lazy, fill up gaps, transpose a company if necessary, bring aid to wearied, anticipate the crisis, the hour, and the outcome.

XXXIV. CONFERRING REWARDS PROPORTIONAL TO THE VALOUR OF EACH

[1] On returning from battle, the general should first offer to the gods such sacrifice and festal celebrations as the circumstances permit, promising to offer the customary thank-offerings after complete victory; then he should honour those soldiers who have faced danger most bravely with the gifts and marks of distinction which are usually given, and he should punish those who have shown themselves cowards. [2] Honours should be bestowed according to tradition and custom in each case. Those bestowed by generals are the following: full equipments of armour, decorations, spoils, and appointments to commands as over fifties, over hundreds, over companies, over squads, and the other parts of command prescribed by the laws of the country in question. The bravest of the private soldiers should receive the lesser commands, and those of his officers who have distinguished themselves should have the higher commands, since these rewards strengthen the self-esteem of those who have deserved well, and encourage others who desire similar rewards. [3] Whenever honour is paid to the brave and punishment of the cowardly is not neglected, then an army must have fair expectation; the latter are afraid to be found wanting, the former are ambitious to show prowess. [4] It is not only necessary in victory to distribute rewards to individual men but also to make recompense to the army as a whole for its dangers. The soldiers should be allowed to plunder the possessions of the enemy if they should capture a camp or baggage train or fortress, or sometimes even a city, unless the general intends to put it to a more profitable use. [5] This course will serve well the interests of the future, especially if the war is not ended, since the soldiers will be more eager to enter battle, unless we are to believe that, while huntsmen must entice their dogs with the blood of wild beasts and the entrails of the animal which the dogs have caught, nevertheless it is not at all advantageous to give the possessions of the defeated enemy, as encouragement, to the victorious army.

XXXV. (1) INDISCRIMINATE PILLAGE MUST NOT ALWAYS BE PERMITTED; PRISONERS MUST NOT BE REGARDED AS LOOT, BUT MUST BE SOLD BY THE GENERAL

[1] Plundering should not be permitted after every battle nor in the case of all kinds of property, but only in the case of certain things, and least of all of prisoners, for these should be sold by the general. [2] If he lack money and resources to meet a large public expense, he should order that all the plundered property, including the live-stock, be turned over to him. [3] The general will know what is best according to the circumstances, whether to seize everything or a part or nothing, of that on which he chances; certainly it is not the characteristic of war to cause both abundance of wealth to the community and unlimited gain to the private soldiers; in fact it happens sometimes that the gains of a victorious army are proportionate to the wealth of the vanquished and the prosperity of their territory.

(2) PRISONERS

[4] Prisoners, if the war is still in progress, the general should not kill — at the very most he may kill, if he thinks best, the allies of those against whom the war is directed, but least of all those who stand in highest repute and position among the enemy, remembering the uncertainties of chance, and the reversals caused by providence, which usually brings retribution. His purpose should be, if his army should capture certain prisoners for whom there is great desire in their own country, or some stronghold, that he may be able by giving enough in exchange to redeem the property of his friends, or at least then, should the enemy not wish to deal justly with him, that he may protect himself on equal terms. [5] After successful engagements and the dangers of battle, the general should allow feasts and celebrations and holidays, in order that the soldiers, knowing what happens as the result of victory by battle, may patiently undergo all hardships necessary for such victory.

XXXVI. (1) ON THE BURIAL OF THE FALLEN

[1] The general should take thought for the burial of the dead, offering as a pretext for delay neither occasion nor time nor place nor fear, whether he happen to be victorious or defeated. Now this is both a holy act of reverence toward the dead and also a necessary example for the living. [2] For if the dead are not buried, each soldier believes that no care will be taken of his own body, should he chance to fall, observing what happens before his own eyes, and thereby judging of the future, feeling that he, likewise, if he should die, would fail of burial, waxes indignant at the contemptuous neglect of burial.

(2) ENCOURAGEMENT IN DEFEAT

[3] If the general be defeated, by encouraging the soldiers who have survived the battle, he should prepare for another bout, thinking that very likely there is at such a time an even better opportunity to retrieve defeat. [4] For, as a rule, soldiers after victory are accustomed to relax their vigilance, for their contempt for their near-by opponents causes carelessness of their own interests, and thus good fortune has often done more harm than misfortune. [5] For he who has suffered a defeat has been taught to guard in future against that from which he has suffered, but he who is inexperienced in misfortune has not even learned that it is necessary to guard his success. [6] On the other hand, if victorious, the general should take the same precautions against suffering harm through negligence which he would use in trying to inflict upon the enemy if they were off their guard. Seasonable fear is wise precaution, as ill-timed contempt is recklessness that invites attack.

XXXVII. PRECAUTIONS IN TIME OF PEACE

[1] After making a truce he should neither make an attack nor himself remain unguarded; he should, on the one hand, make no move against the enemy, as in peace, but, on the other, he should be protected against danger, as in war. [2] He must not break faith in a treaty, nor be the first to commit any sacrilegious act, but he must be suspicious enough to watch for festering deceit on the part of the enemy, for the intentions of those with whom the treaty has been concluded are uncertain. [3] Let your part be a firm resolution not to transgress, because of the sacred nature of the treaty, but suspect a breach of faith on the part of the enemy due to their hostility. That general is wise and cautious who affords the enemy, even when they desire to attack, no opportunity to break their compact. [4] Those who leave to the gods revenge for what they have suffered are piously minded but certainly do not act safely. [5] For it is absolute folly to be careless of the danger to oneself in the hope that treaty-breakers will pay the penalty — as if one would himself be saved as soon as the enemy perish! — when it is possible to make trial of the irreligion of the enemy while at the same time safeguarding one's own interests. With this precaution one will save himself from defeat if plotted against, but the enemy will commit sacrilege both if they attempt a breach of the truce and if they let it be seen that they would have done if it they could.

XXXVIII. (1) TREATMENT OF SURRENDERED CITIES WITH TRUST AND HUMANITY

[1] If any cities should open their gates in surrender early in the war, the general should treat them in a manner both humane and advantageous, for thus he would induce the other cities also to submit. The enticing hope of a similarly fortunate fate leads the majority to surrender voluntarily. [2] But he who acts in a harsh and savage manner, immediately after becoming master of a city, plundering, slaying, and destroying, makes other cities hostile, so that the war becomes laborious for him and victory difficult of attainment. [3] Since they know that the punishment of the conquered by the conqueror is merciless, they are ready to do and suffer anything rather than surrender their cities. [4] For nothing makes men so brave as the fear of what ills they will suffer if they surrender; indeed the expectation of the evils which will ensue from their subjection produces a terrible pertinacity in danger. [5] Moreover, fighting is dangerous against desperate men, who expect from surrender no amelioration of the fate which will be theirs if they continue to fight, and therefore prefer, if they can inflict much harm, also to suffer much. [6] On this account the sieges of such insensate and savage generals become wearisome and long drawn-out, sometimes even fail of accomplishment, and are extremely dangerous and precarious.

(2) HOW TO TREAT TRAITORS

[7] One should keep promises and pledges to traitors, not on account of what they have done but of what others will do, in order that these, knowing that gratitude will be due them, may choose the interests of their country's enemies and turn to the same sort of service. For he who gives to a traitor receives much more than he bestows. [8] On this account it is necessary to pay the reward cheerfully, for the general is not an avenger of the betrayed city but the commander of the army of his own country.

XXXIX. (1) ON THE GENERAL'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE COURSES OF THE STARS

[1] In night attacks and surprises of towns through treason, the general must know the heavenly courses of the stars by night, otherwise his plans will often be of no avail. [2] For instance, some traitor has appointed the third or fourth, or whatever hour of the night he considers most favourable, for opening the gates or slaying some of the opposing faction in the town or attacking the hostile garrison within the town; then one of two things has happened; the general has reached the camp of the enemy too early and has been detected before the traitors are ready and has been thwarted in his attempt, or else he has arrived too late and has thus been the cause of the traitors' being detected and put to death and of his own failure to accomplish any of his plans. [3] Accordingly he should form an estimate of the road, deciding at what point he is to set out; then he must determine the distance and the time — how much of each he will have to spend on the journey; — and finally, he must, from his observation of the stars, estimate exactly what part of the night has passed and what part remains, in order that he may arrive neither too early nor too late; then he must get there at precisely the appointed time, so that news of his attack may not reach the enemy until he is actually inside the fortifications.

(2) HOW TO CAPTURE A CITY BY DAY

[4] If setting out by day, he lead his army to capture at an appointed hour towns that are to be betrayed, he should send horsemen ahead to seize every one met on the road, that no native of the country may run ahead and warn of the approach of their enemy but that the army may appear suddenly to the enemy and catch him off his guard. [5] He must fall unexpectedly on an unsuspecting enemy, even if he is not expecting to seize the towns through treachery but to fight openly after a declaration of war, and he must not hesitate but strive in every way to attack fort or camp or town before his advance is known, especially if he knows that his own army is small and inferior to that of the enemy. [6] For unexpected appearances of an enemy, because they are unforeseen, terrify their opponents, even should the latter be stronger; but at length, if those who have been taken by surprise should observe their own forces or get the chance to plan and renew their courage, they gradually and of

necessity come to despise their foes; in this way the beginning of a war sometimes seems more terrible than the latter part. [7] On this account, armies have often so terrified their opponents by the unexpectedness of their appearance that they have either quickly subdued them against their will or else have forced them to agree to comply with their own demands.

XL. SIEGES

[1] A siege demands courage on the part of the soldiers, military science on the part of the general, and equipment of machines of war. The general must take no fewer precautions and be no less observant than the enemy; for the army attacked, when it knows just what its danger is, guards especially against the army attacking. [2] The army that believes itself out of danger does what work is at hand when it pleases, but that which is in danger strives to surprise its enemy by dealing him a blow whenever it has an opportunity. Hence it is necessary for the besieging general to fortify his camp with trenches, palisades, and guards. [3] For whatever the besiegers intend to do can be seen from the walls; but the besieged, with the wall as a shield, often without detection pour through the gates and burn the machines or kill the soldiers or do whatever damage comes to their hands.

XLI. AMBUSH LAID BY THE BESIEGER BEFORE THE GATES OF A TOWN

[1] The besieged would by no means attempt this if the besieging general should post at both large and small gates companies of soldiers to prevent sudden sallies, since otherwise the defenders might without warning attack the besiegers. [2] Attacks by night are generally advantageous to the besiegers, since the besieged are unable to see what is happening, on account of the darkness, and everything seems more terrible to them, and they are compelled to regard the attack as more dangerous than it really is. Hence tumult and confusion arise; no one is able to use sober judgement in such circumstances, but many things that are not happening are said to be happening; and the besieged is not able to know from what direction the enemy is attacking, nor in what numbers, nor with what forces, and men run hither and thither, while the shouting and consternation cause disorder and panic.

XLII. (1) FEAR IS A FALSE PROPHET

[1] Fear is a false prophet and believes that what it fears is actually coming to pass. At night every trifling occurrence seems more terrible to the besieged, for on account of the darkness no man tells what he sees but always what he hears. If one or two of the enemy appear somewhere on the walls, the defenders, believing that the whole army has already mounted the walls, turn and flee, leaving the battlements and gates undefended.

(2) THE GENERAL MUST SET A GOOD EXAMPLE TO HIS SOLDIERS

[2] If the general is in haste to finish some enterprise that he has on hand, he should not hesitate to be prominent in the work, for soldiers are not forced to activity so much by the threats of their immediate superiors as by the influence of men of higher rank. For a soldier seeing his officer the first to put his hand to the task not only realizes the need of haste too but also is ashamed not to work, and afraid to disobey orders; and the rank and file no longer feel that they are being treated as slaves under orders but are moved as though urged by one on the same footing as themselves.

(3) SIEGE ENGINES

[3] Of the many and various siege engines the general will make use according as he has opportunity. It is not my part to say that he must use battering rams or ‘city-destroyers’ or the sambuca, or wheeled towers or covered sheds or catapults; all this depends upon the luck, the wealth, and the power of the combatants, and upon the skill of the workmen who accompany the army for the purpose of building engines. [4] The task of a general’s peculiar skill, if he wishes to employ engines, is to use them at some one locality — for he would not have a sufficient supply of engines to place them in a circle completely about the wall unless the city were very small, — and, dividing his army into many parts, he should [station his engines at certain points and should] command his men to bring forward their ladders against the other parts of the wall, since in this manner the besieged are rendered helpless. [5] For if the besieged disregard the other parts of the wall and only make a defence against the attacks of the engines, all the besiegers who attack with ladders will easily

climb over the wall without opposition, but if the defenders divide their forces and send aid to each part as the battle grows more violent through the attack of these engines, those who are left and who do not venture to fight with them will be unable to repel the advancing menace. [6] On this account, just as a good wrestler, the general must make feints and threats at many points, worrying and deceiving his opponents, here and there, at many places, striving, by securing a firm hold upon one part, to overturn the whole structure of the city.

(4) ON ENDING SIEGES BY VIGOROUS ACTION

[7] If a general desire quickly to capture a fort or city or camp and his force grow weary, while he wishes not to spare one hour from attacking the defences, he should split his army into divisions, as many as he considers sufficient, according to the number of his men and the extent of the besieged city, and then he should attack immediately at nightfall with the first division, ordering the second to remain near in readiness, but the third and fourth and fifth, if there chance to be a fifth, he should order to sleep. [8] Then when the first division has attacked for some time, he should recall it and send it to its quarters to sleep, but he should give the signal to the second division to march out from the camp; at this point the commander of the third division should arouse and arm his troops. [9] After the second division has fought as long a time as the first, he will lead out his third division and order the second to rest; after this the catapults, then in order the fifth, while the soldiers in turn rest from fighting. [10] Thus, at daybreak, those who attacked first at night should again attack first at dawn, remaining at the front two hours, if there are six divisions, but a little longer if five; three hours if four divisions, and four hours if three divisions; on their return they should receive their rations in order, the first division, then the second, and so on to the last, like the revolution of a wheel. [11] With this plan, there are two results: unceasing attacks by night and day, while the attackers, taking their turns at rest, will fight freshly and vigorously. [12] But no one should believe that the besieged, even if very numerous, could use this same stratagem, for in danger no one would wish to enjoy sleep even if it were permitted, since from fear of peril, during the time at which one is resting, he lies sleepless, as though the city were on the point of capture. The besieged, moreover, even if their assailants

are few, defend themselves with all their strength, and everything within the walls of the city is in a state of excitement, in even greater terror of the future, as though if one minute detail were overlooked, they would all be lost. [13] On this account there is every reason why men wearied, without an hour's rest, tired by guard-duty and labour, and fearful for the future, should defend themselves more weakly, or should send out messengers to discuss the surrender of the city.

(5) HOW THE GENERAL SHOULD REST

[14] “But has the general himself, then,” some one may perhaps say, “been made of adamant or iron to have remained alone without sleep throughout all these deeds?” Certainly not; but during the time that he sleeps — and this must be little and cut short — he should hand over the command of the army to one of his most trusted and courageous officers, who is also second only to himself in military rank.

(6) PARTS OF A CITY SEEMINGLY MOST IMPREGNABLE ARE OFTEN EASY TO CAPTURE

[15] Sometimes those parts of a city that seem precipitous and are fortified by the sheer rocky cliffs, offer the besiegers greater chances for victory than do fortresses erected by human hands, for those places whose fortification relies upon natural strength are wont to be less carefully watched and guarded by soldiers. [16] Then the wise general considers what he must do, and encouraging a few of his bravest soldiers with promise of reward, men who are best able to climb up by using either the natural unevenness of the ground or else ladders, he accomplishes his attempt; for descending stealthily within the walls they break down a postern or open a gate.

(7) THE ADVANTAGE OF TRUMPETS

[17] Some such device as this would be of great assistance — if those who have succeeded in mounting the walls draw up trumpets after them. For a hostile trumpet heard at night from the walls brings great terror to the besieged, as if they had already been overcome by force, so that abandoning the gates and fortifications they flee. The result is that breaking down the gates and meeting

the walls by ladders is easily accomplished by soldiers on the outside since no one of the enemy resists any longer. Thus in some such way it is possible that one trumpeter, even without arms, can capture a city.

(8) CONDUCT OF A GENERAL AFTER THE CAPTURE OF A CITY

[18] If the general capture by force some city, flourishing in power and in the number of its citizens, and if he fear or suspect that the inhabitants advancing in companies and crowds may defend themselves against the invaders, or that seizing the heights and the citadel of the town they may advance from there and cause great loss to their opponents, he should command his own soldiers not to slay unarmed men of the enemy. [19] For so long as every man expects to be killed after capture, he wishes first to do some deed of bravery, and even though he suffer, yet to accomplish something, and many inhabitants of towns have driven out enemies even when introduced into the town, or, failing in this, have crowded into the fortified citadel from which they have caused great labour and loss to their adversaries, who must enter into a second . . . and longer siege, one that is sometimes more distressing and attended by great hardships. [20] But if the above-mentioned command should be published, quickly all the inhabitants, or, needless to say, at least the majority, would throw down their arms. For every one who through anger wishes to defend himself, will be compelled to lay down his arms for fear that his neighbour may not be of the same mind, so that even if all should wish to keep their weapons, on account of this suspicion of one another, each one fearing that he alone may be taken with arms on his person, hastens to give up his weapons. For a sudden emergency does not give time for the common opinion to become known. And those who are ready to protect their own lives so long as no hope of safety has been announced, strive to avert the imminent danger, if not as they wish, then as they must, but when they perceive a small hope of safety, they become suppliants instead of enemies. [21] Thus this proclamation compels even those who wish to keep their arms to throw them down. The death of soldiers in battle admits of easy consolation, for it seems to have been the price of victory, but in victory and the occupation of cities it is a matter of sorrow to the conquerors, as an evidence of thoughtlessness rather than bravery. [22] If, however, the general is revengeful toward the conquered, he should not think that no harm is done them if his men do not slay on the

spot all whom they meet, since at his leisure he will be able to plan in perfect safety his uncontested vengeance and the fate that the conquered must undergo.


(9) NECESSITY OF SENDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN INTO A CITY TO CAPTURE IT BY FAMINE

[23] If the general should despair of sacking a city by force and should settle down to a prolonged siege, believing that he will capture the city if he has pressed it hard by famine, he should take prisoners whatever persons are still in the country. Of these, to the men in the prime of life he should assign work on the defences such as seems best to him, but the women and children and feeble men and old people he should send of his own accord into the city. These will be useless in action but will consume more quickly the supplies of the besieged and will serve the purpose of enemies rather than friends.

(10) CONDUCT OF THE GENERAL AFTER VICTORY

[24] If the war should chance to turn out in everything according to the general's desire, so as to put a complete end to the enemy's activity, he should not be overweening in his good fortune, but gracious; he should not show violent stupidity but kindly goodwill; for the former excites envy, the latter causes emulation. [25] Now envy is a pain of mind that successful men cause their neighbours, but emulation is imitation of the good qualities of others; such is the difference between them that envy is the desire that another may not have good fortune, but emulation is the desire to equal the possessions of another. [26] A good man, then, will be not only a brave defender of his fatherland and a competent leader of an army but also for the permanent protection of his own reputation will be a sagacious strategist.

The Greek Text



A mosaic in Istanbul's Hagia Sophia, showing Leo VI paying homage to Christ — Leo VI, called the Wise (866-912), was the Byzantine Emperor from 886 to 912. The second ruler of the Macedonian dynasty, he was very well-read, leading to his epithet. Leo was one of many emperors to be influenced by Onasander's work.

Contents of the Greek Text



In this section of the eBook, readers can view the original Greek text of Onasander's *Strategikos*. You may wish to Bookmark this page for future reference.

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ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ

[1] Ἴππικῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ κυνηγετικῶν ἢ ἀλειτουργικῶν τε αὖ καὶ γεωργικῶν συνταγμάτων προσφώνησιν ἡγοῦμαι πρέπειν ἄνθρωποις, οἷς πόθος ἔχεσθαι τοιῶνδε ἔργων, στρατηγικῆς δὲ περὶ θεωρίας, ᾧ Κόϊντε Οὐηράνιε, Ῥωμαίοις καὶ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων τοῖς τὴν συγκλητικὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν λελογχόσι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σεβαστοῦ Καίσαρος ἐπιφροσύνην ταῖς τε ὑπάτοις καὶ στρατηγικαῖς ἐξουσίαις κοσμουμένοις διὰ τε παιδείαν, ἥς οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἔχουσιν ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ προγόνων ἀξίωσιν. [2] ἀνέθηκα δὲ πρῶτοις σφίσι τόνδε τὸν λόγον οὐχ ὡς ἀπείροις στρατηγίας, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τῇδε θαρρήσας, ἥ τὸ μὲν ἀμαθὲς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ παρ' ἄλλῳ κατορθούμενον ἡγνόησεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ τῷ καλῶς ἔχοντι προσεμαρτύρησεν. [3] ὅθεν, εἰ καὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς φανεῖη νενοημένα τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ συντεταγμένα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἡσθείην, ὅτι μὴ μόνον στρατηγικὰς συνεταξάμην ὑψηλήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγικῆς ἐστοχασάμην καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς φρονήσεως, εὐτυχοῖν τ' ἂν, εἰ, ἃ δὴ Ῥωμαίοις δυνάμει καὶ δι' ἔργων πέπρακται, ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λόγῳ περιλαβεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι παρὰ τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι δοκιμασθείην.

[4] Τὸ δὲ σύνταγμα θαρροῦντί μοι λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν ὡς στρατηγῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἄσκησις ἔσται παλαιῶν τε ἡγεμόνων κατὰ τὴν σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα, εἰσόμεθά τε καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν οἱ τε πταίσαντες ἐσφάλισαν τῶν στρατηγησάντων, οἱ τε εὐπραγῆσαντες ἐγέρθησαν εἰς δόξαν· μάλιστα δὲ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἀρετὴν ἐννοήσομεν, ὡς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε πόλις οὔτε ἔθνος μεῖζον ἡγεμονίας ἐκρατύνατο μέγεθος, ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς ἴσον ἤλασεν, ὥστε τοσοῦτοις βεβαιώσασθαι χρόνοις ἀκίνητον δυναστείαν. [5] οὐ γὰρ τύχη μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπεράραντες τοὺς τῆς Ἰταλίας ὅρους ἐπὶ πέρατα γῆς ἐκτεῖναι τὴν σφετέραν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ πράξεισι στρατηγικαῖς. συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ εὐχεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὴν τύχην, οὐ μὴν τὸ παράπαν οἶεσθαι ταύτην κρατεῖν. [6] ἀλλ' ἀνόητοι οἱ καὶ τὰ σφάλματα τῆς τύχης ἐγκλήματα μόνης ποιούμενοι, οὐ τῆς τῶν στρατηγούντων ἀμελείας, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα ταύτης, οὐ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τῶν ἡγουμένων· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς ἀνεπιτίμητον οὕτως ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν πταίοντα τοῖς ὅλοις, ὡς πάντων αἰτιᾶσθαι τὴν τύχην, οὔτε δίκαιον ἀμάρτυρον ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπαίνου τὸν κατορθοῦντα περιορᾶν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἀπάντων ἀνατιθέναι τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν.

[7] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ φύσει πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῖς μὲν δι' ἐμπειρίας συντετάχθαι δοκοῦσι, καὶ ἀσθενῶς ἀπαγγέλληται, τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀλήθειαν ἀπονέμουσιν,

τοῖς δὲ ἀπείροις, κἂν ᾗ δυνατὰ πραχθῆναι, διὰ τὸ ἀδοκίμαστον ἀπιστοῦσιν, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ στρατηγημάτων ἡθροισμένων τοσοῦτο προειπεῖν, ὅτι πάντα διὰ πείρας ἔργων ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν τοιούτων, ὧν ἀπόγονον ὑπάρχει Ῥωμαίων ἅπαν τὸ γένει καὶ ἀρετῇ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο πρωτεῦον. [8] οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐσχεδιασμένον ἀπολέμῳ καὶ νεωτέρᾳ γνώμῃ τόδε περιέχει τὸ σύνταγμα, ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ πράξεων καὶ ἀληθινῶν ἀγῶνων κεχωρηκότα μάλιστα μὲν Ῥωμαίοις· ἃ τε γὰρ ποιήσαντες ἐφυλάξαντο παθεῖν καὶ δι' ὧν ἐμηχανήσαντο δρᾶσαι, πάντα μοι συνείλεκται. [9] καίτοι οὐκ ἡγνόηκα, ὅτι μᾶλλον ἂν τις εἴλετο πάνθ' ἐαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀγχινοίας τὰ στρατηγήματα δοκεῖν εἶναι, πλείονα θηρώμενος ἔπαινον τῶν πιστευσάντων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπινοίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτ' ἐλαττοῦσθαι δοκῶ. [10] καθάπερ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐν πολέμοις αὐτὸς στρατευσάμενος συνετάξατο τοιόνδε λόγον, οὐκ ἂν παρὰ τοῦτο ἥττονος ἡξιοῦντο μαρτυρίας, ὅτι μὴ μόνον φυσικῆς ἀγχινοίας ἰδίαν εὕρεσιν εἰσηνέγκατο στρατηγημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δι' ἄλλων εὖ πραχθέντα μνήμῃ παραθέμενος εἰς σύνταξιν ἤγαγεν, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐμαυτὸν οἶομαι τοῦλαττον ἐπαινῶν οἶσεσθαι παρὰ τοῦθ', ὅτι μὴ πάντα τῆς ἐμῆς ὁμολογῶ συνέσεως εἶναι, τούναντίον δὲ προείληφα τὸν τ' ἔπαινον ἀνεπίφθονον ἔξειν καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἀσυκοφάντητον.

Ι. Περὶ αἱρέσεως στρατηγοῦ

[1] Φημὶ τοίνυν αἰρεῖσθαι τὸν στρατηγὸν οὐ κατὰ γένη κρίνοντας, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἱερέας, οὐδὲ κατ' οὐσίας, ὡς τοὺς γυμνασιάρχους, ἀλλὰ σῶφρονα, ἐγκρατῆ, νήπτην, λιτόν, διάπονον, νοερόν, ἀφιλάργυρον, μήτε νέον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, ἂν τύχη καὶ πατέρα παίδων, ἱκανὸν λέγειν, ἔνδοξον.

[2] [α'] σῶφρονα μὲν, ἵνα μὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀνθελκόμενος ἡδοναῖς ἀπολείπη τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων φροντίδα.

[3] [β'] ἐγκρατῆ δέ, ἐπειδὴ τηλικαύτης ἀρχῆς μέλλει τυγχάνειν· αἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς ὁρμαὶ προσλαβοῦσαι τὴν τοῦ δύνασθαί τι ποιεῖν ἐξουσίαν ἀκατάσχετοι γίνονται πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.

[4] [γ'] νήπτην δ', ὅπως ἐπαγρυπνῇ ταῖς μεγίσταις πράξεσιν· ἐν νυκτὶ γὰρ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ψυχῆς ἡρεμούσης στρατηγοῦ γνώμη τελειοῦται.

[5] [δ'] λιτόν δέ, ἐπειδὴ κατασκελετεύουσιν αἱ πολυτελεῖς θεραπείαι δαπανᾶσαι χρόνον ἄπρακτον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων τρυφήν.

[6] [ε'] διάπονον δ', ἵνα μὴ πρῶτος τῶν στρατευομένων, ἀλλ' ὕστατος κάμνη.

[7] [ς'] νοερόν δέ· ὁξὺν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄττοντα δι' ὠκύτητος ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν Ὅμηρον

ὥσει πτερὸν ἡ ἐ νόημα·

πολλάκις γὰρ ἀπρόληπτοι ταραχαὶ προσπεσοῦσαι σχεδιάζειν ἀναγκάζουσι τὸ συμφέρον.

[8] [ζ'] ἀφιλάργυρον δέ· ἡ γὰρ ἀφιλαργυρία δοκιμασθήσεται καὶ πρώτη τοῦ γὰρ ἀδωροδοκίῳ καὶ μεγαλοφρόνως προῖστασθαι τῶν πραγμάτων αὕτη παραιτία· πολλοὶ γάρ, κἂν διὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀσπίσι πολλαῖς καὶ δόρασιν ἀντιβλέψωσιν, περὶ τὸν χρυσὸν ἀμαυροῦνται· δεινὸν γὰρ πολεμίοις ὄπλον τοῦτο καὶ δραστήριον εἰς τὸ νικᾶν.

[9] [η'] οὔτε δὲ νέον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν ἄπιστος, ὁ δ' ἀσθενής· οὐδέτερος γὰρ ἀσφαλής, ὁ μὲν νέος, ἵνα μὴ τι διὰ τὴν ἀλόγιστον πταισῇ τόλμαν, ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτερος, ἵνα μὴ τι διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἀσθένειαν ἐλλείπῃ. [10] κρατίστη δ' αἵρεσις ἡ τοῦ μέσου· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν ἐν τῷ μηδέπως γεγηρακότι καὶ τὸ φρόνιμον ἐν τῷ μὴ πάνυ νεάζοντι, ὡς οἵτινές γε ἡ σώματος ῥώμην ἄνευ ψυχῆς ἔμφορονος ἐδοκίμασαν ἢ ψυχὴν φρόνιμον ἄνευ σωματικῆς ἔξεως, οὐδὲν ἐπέραναν· ἡ γὰρ ὑστερήσασα φρόνησις οὐδὲν ἐνόησε κρεῖττον,

ή δ' ἔλλείπουσα δύναμις οὐδὲν ἐτελείωσεν. [11] ὁ γε μὴ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐ μικρὰ τοὺς ἐλομένους ὤνησεν· ὄντινα γὰρ ἄνθρωποι φιλοῦσιν αὐτομάτῃ διανοίας ἐμπτώσει, τούτῳ ταχὺ μὲν ἐπιτάττοντι πείθονται, λέγοντι δ' οὐκ ἀπιστοῦσι, κινδυνεύοντι δὲ συναγωνίζονται.

[12] [θ'] πατέρα δὲ προῦκρινα μᾶλλον, οὐδὲ τὸν ἄπαιδα παραιτούμενος, ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾗ· ἐάν τε γὰρ ὄντες τύχῳσι νήπιοι, ψυχῆς εἰσιν ἰσχυρὰ φίλτρα περὶ τὴν εὖνοιαν ἐξομηρεύσασθαι δυνάμενα στρατηγὸν πρὸς πατρίδα, δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς μύωπες πατρός, οἳοί τε ἀναστήσαι θυμὸν ἐπὶ πολεμίους, ἂν τε τέλειοι, σύμβουλοι καὶ συστράτηγοι καὶ πιστοὶ τῶν ἀπορρήτων ὑπηρεταὶ γιγνόμενοι συγκατορθοῦσι τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα.

[13] [ι'] λέγειν δ' ἱκανόν· ἔνθεν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι τὸ μέγιστον ὠφελείας ἵζεσθαι διὰ στρατεύματος· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἐκτάττῃ πρὸς μάχην στρατηγός, ἢ τοῦ λόγου παρακέλευσις τῶν μὲν δεινῶν ἐποίησε καταφρονεῖν, τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἀκοαῖς ἐνηχοῦσα σάλπιγξ ἐγείρει ψυχὰς εἰς ἄμιλλαν μάχης, ὥς λόγος εἰς προτροπὴν ἀρετῆς ἐναγωνίου ῥηθεὶς αἰχμαζούσαν ἀνέστησε πρὸς τὰ δεῖνα τὴν διάνοιαν, ἂν τέ τι συμβῇ πταῖσμα περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἢ τοῦ λόγου παρηγορία τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνέρρωσε, καὶ πολὺ δὴ χρησιμώτερός ἐστι στρατηγοῦ λόγος οὐκ ἀδύνατος ὥστε παραμυθεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν στρατοπέδοις συμφοράς, τῶν ἐπομένων τοῖς τραυματίαις ἰατρῶν· [14] οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνους μόνους τοῖς φαρμάκοις θεραπεύουσιν, ὁ δὲ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας εὐθυμοτέρους ἐποίησεν καὶ τοὺς ἐρρωμένους ἀνέστησε· [15] καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀόρατα νοσήματα τῶν ὀρωμένων δυσχερεστέραν ἔχει τὴν θεραπείαν, οὕτως ψυχὰς ἐξ ἀθυμίας ἰάσασθαι λόγῳ παρηγορήσαντα δυσκολώτερον, ἢ σωμάτων φανεράν ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς θεραπεύσαι νόσον. [16] οὐδὲ χωρὶς στρατηγῶν οὐδὲ μία πόλις ἐκπέμψει στρατόπεδον, οὐδὲ δίχα τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν αἰρήσεται στρατηγόν.

[17] [ια'] τὸν δὲ ἔνδοξον, ὅτι τοῖς ἀδόξοις ἀσχάλλει τὸ πλῆθος ὑποταττόμενον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομένει τὸν αὐτοῦ χεῖρονα κύριον ἀναδέχεσθαι καὶ ἡγεμόνα. [18] πᾶσα δὲ ἀνάγκη τὸν τοιοῦτον ὄντα καὶ τοσαύτας ἀρετὰς ἔχοντα ψυχῆς, ὅσας εἴρηκα, καὶ ἔνδοξον εἶναι.

[19] Φημὶ δὲ μήτε τὸν πλούσιον, ἐὰν ἐκτὸς ᾗ τούτων, αἰρεῖσθαι στρατηγόν διὰ τὰ χρήματα, μήτε τὸν πένητα, ἐὰν ἀγαθὸς ᾗ, παραιτεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν· οὐ μὴν χρή γε τὸν πένητα οὐδὲ τὸν πλούσιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν πλούσιον καὶ τὸν πένητα· οὐδ' ἕτερον γὰρ οὐθ' αἰρετὸν οὐτ' ἀποδοκιμαστέον διὰ τὴν τύχην, ἀλλ' ἐλεγκτέον διὰ τὸν τρόπον. [20] οὐδὲ πλούσιος ἀγαθὸς ὢν τοσοῦτῳ διοίσει τοῦ γενναίου πένητος, ὅσον αἱ ἐπάργυροι καὶ κατάχρυσοι πανοπλῖαι τῶν

καταχάλκων καὶ σιδηρῶν — αἱ μὲν γὰρ τῷ κόσμῳ πλεονεκτοῦσιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῷ τῷ δραστηρίῳ διαγωνίζονται — , εἴ γε μὴ χρηματιστῆς εἴη· τὸν δὲ χρηματιστὴν, οὐδ' ἂν πλουσιώτατος ὢν τύχη, συμβουλεύσω ποτὲ αἰρεῖσθαι· λέγω δὲ ὀβολοστάτην, μετάβολον, ἔμπορον ἢ τοὺς παραπλήσιόν τι τούτοις πράττοντας· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοὺς τοιούτους μικρόφρονας εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὸ κέρδος ἐπτοημένους καὶ μεμεριμνημένους περὶ τὸν πορισμὸν τῶν χρημάτων ὅλως μηδὲν ἐσχηκέναι τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

[21] Προγόνων δὲ λαμπρὰν ἀξίωσιν ἀγαπᾶν μὲν δεῖ προσοῦσαν, οὐ μὴν ἀποῦσαν ἐπιζητεῖν, οὐδὲ ταύτην τινας κρίνειν ἀξίους ἢ μὴ τοῦ στρατηγεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὰ ζῶα ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων πράξεων ἐξετάζομεν, ὅπως εὐγενείας ἔχει, οὕτω χρὴ σκοπεῖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐγένειαν. [22] καὶ γὰρ ἀπερίοπτον, τί τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπράχθη καλόν, ἐξετάζειν, οὐ τί ποιήσουσιν οἱ νῦν αἰρεθέντες· ὥσπερ τῶν πάλοι γεγονότων σώζειν ἡμᾶς δυναμένων καὶ τὰ νῦν, καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν τηρησόντων ἐκείνων. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἀπαίδευτον τοὺς μὲν στρατιώτας τοῖς ἀριστείοις τιμᾶν, οὐ τοὺς ἐκ πατέρων λαμπρῶν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τι γενναῖον ἐργασαμένους, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγούς διὰ τοὺς προγόνους αἰρεῖσθαι, κἂν ὥσιν ἄχρηστοι, μὴ διὰ τὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν, κἂν μὴ γένει λαμπρύνωνται; [23] προσόντων μὲν δὴ τούτων ἐκείνοις εὐτυχῆς ὁ στρατηγός, ἀπόντων δ' ἐκείνων, κἂν παρῇ ταῦτα, ἄπρακτος. [24] ἐλπίσαι δ' ἂν τις τάχα καὶ ἀμείνους ἔσσεσθαι στρατηγούς τοὺς οὐκ ἔχοντας ἐνσεμνύνεσθαι προγόνους· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πατράσι κυδαινόμενοι, κἂν ἐλλίπωσιν, οἰόμενοι τὴν ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν εὐκλειάν σφισι φυλάττεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ ῥαθυμότερον διοικοῦσιν, οἷς δ' οὐδεμία προϋπάρχει δόξα προγόνων, οὗτοι τὴν ἐκ πατέρων ἐλάττωσιν ἐθέλοντες ἀναπληρῶσαι τῇ σφετέρᾳ προθυμίᾳ φιλοκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀμιλλῶνται. [25] καὶ καθάπερ οἱ πενέστεροι τῶν εὐπορωτέρων ταλαιπωρότερον ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου κτῆσιν ὥρμηται τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ἀναπληρῶσαι τῆς τύχης σπεύδοντες, οὕτως, οἷς μὴ πάρεστι κληρονομουμένη πατέρων ἀποχρήσασθαι δόξῃ, τὴν ἀρετὴν ιδιόκτητον οἰκειώσασθαι προαιροῦνται.

II. Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ στρατηγοῦ διαίρεσις

[1] Ζηλούσθω μὲν δὴ ἡμῖν ὁ στρατηγὸς ὁ ἀγαθὸς εὐγενὴς καὶ πλούσιος, μὴ ἀποδοκιμαζέσθω δὲ πένης μετὰ ἀρετῆς, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ λαμπρῶν. [2] αἰρεθεὶς δ' ὁ στρατηγὸς ἔστω χρηστός, εὐπροσήγορος, ἔτοιμος, ἀτάραχος, μὴ οὕτως ἐπιεικὴς ὥστε καταφρονεῖσθαι, μήτε φοβερὸς ὥστε μισεῖσθαι, ἵνα μήτε ταῖς χάρισιν ἐκλύσῃ τὸ στρατόπεδον μήτε τοῖς φόβοις ἀλλοτριώσῃ. [3] λοχαγοὺς δὲ καθιστάτω καὶ ταξιάρχους καὶ χιλιάρχους, καὶ εἴ τινων ἄλλων ἡγεμόνων προσδεῖν αὐτῷ δόξαι, τοὺς εὐνουστάτους τῇ πατρίδι, πιστοτάτους, εὐρωστοτάτους, ἔνθεν δ' οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοι καὶ τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους· [4] οὐ γάρ, ὥς ὀλίγους αἰρουμένους στρατηγοὺς ἐκ τρόπου δοκιμάσαι ῥᾶον, κἂν ἀπὴν ὁ τῶν χρημάτων μετ' εὐγενείας ὄγκος, οὕτως που καὶ λοχαγῶν καὶ ταξιάρχων πλῆθος. [5] ὅθεν τὸ μὲν εὐγενὲς ἐπὶ τούτων προκριτέον εἰς πρόχειρον ἐν ὁξεῖ καιρῷ δοκιμασίαν, τὸ δὲ ἐν εὐπορίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ ἀναλῶσαί τε καὶ δοῦναι στρατιώταις οἱ ἐκ περιουσίας δυνατοί, χορηγία δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἡγουμένων ὀλίγη πρὸς τοὺς ὑποταττομένους εὐνουστέρα παρασκευάζει τὰ πλήθη· καὶ ἀσφαλεῖς αἱ μειζόνων πίστεις πραγμάτων τοῖς περὶ πλειόνων κινδυνεύουσιν, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τὸ πιστόν, ὥς ἂν εἰ στρατηγοὶ τις, ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου παρέχοιτο.

III. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν βουλευτάς

[1] Αἰρεῖσθω δὲ ἦτοι συνέδρους, οἱ μεθεξουσιν αὐτῷ πάσης βουλῆς καὶ κοινωήσουσι γνώμης αὐτοῦ οἱ τούτου εἵνεκα ἀκολουθήσοντες, ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τοὺς ἐντιμοτάτους μεταπεμπόμενος συνεδρευέτω, ὥς, ἅ γέ τις ἂν ἐννοήσῃ μὲν μόνος, ὥς τὰ αὐτοῦ, οὐ βεβαίως οἰκείουται. [2] γνώμη γὰρ ἢ μὲν ἀνεπικούρητος μονουμένη παπταίνει περὶ τὴν ἰδίαν εὗρεσιν, ἢ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πέλας ἐπιμαρτυρηθεῖσα πιστοῦται τὸ μὴ σφαλερόν. [3] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μήθ' οὕτως ἄστατος ἔστω τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥς αὐτὸν αὐτῷ πάνπαν ἀπιστεῖν, μήθ' οὕτως αὐθάδης, ὥς μή τι καὶ παρ' ἄλλω τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ κρεῖττον οἶεσθαι νοηθῆναι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ πᾶσι προσέχοντα καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἀσύμφορα πράττειν, ἢ μηδ' ὀλίγ' ἄλλων ἀκούοντα, πάντα δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλὰ καὶ δεῖνα διαμαρτάνειν.

IV. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἐξ εὐλόγου αἰτίας ἐπάγειν

[1] Τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου μάλιστα φημι χρῆναι φρονίμως συνίστασθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου πᾶσι φανερόν γίνεσθαι πολεμοῦντα· τότε γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ συναγωνιστὰι τοῖς στρατεύουσιν εὐμενεῖς καθίστανται, καὶ ἄνθρωποι προθυμότερον ἀντιτάττονται τοῖς δεινοῖς· [2] εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλ' ἀμύνονται, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντες ἐντελὴ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται, ὡς, ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ τῷ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον, αὐτῇ τῇ οἰήσει, κἂν μὴ τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαντήσιν μέλλῃ, προκατορρωδοῦσιν. [3] διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν στρατηγόν, ὧν τε βούλεται τυχεῖν καὶ ὧν μὴ παραχωρῆσαι, λόγῳ καὶ πρεσβείαις προκαλεῖσθαι πρῶτον, ἵν' ἐν τῷ μὴ συγκαταβαίνειν τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀνάγκῃ δοκῇ, καὶ μὴ προαιρέσει τὴν δύναμιν ἐξάγειν πολεμήσουσαν, ἐπιμαρτυράμενος τὸ θεῖον, ὡς οὔτε καταφρονῶν ὧν συμβαίνει τοὺς πολεμοῦντας πάσχειν, ἀνεμεσήτως ἔπεισιν, οὔτε ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὰ δεῖνα δρᾶσαι προηρημένος τοὺς πολεμίους. [4] εἰδέναι δὲ χρῆ, καθότι οὐ μόνον οἰκίας καὶ τείχους ἐδραιότερον ὑφίστασθαι δεῖ τὸν θεμέλιον, ὡς ἀσθενοῦς γε ὄντος συγκαταρρησομένων καὶ τῶν ἐποικοδομουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολέμου τὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ κατασκευασάμενον ἰσχυρῶς καὶ κρητῖδα περιθέμενον ἀσφαλείας, οὕτως ἐξάγειν τὰς δυνάμεις· ὧν γὰρ ἀσθενῇ τὰ πράγματά ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ οὗτοι μέγα βάρος ἀναλάβωσιν πολέμου, ταχὺ θλίβονται καὶ ὑστεροῦσιν. [5] ὅθεν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸν κυβερνήτην ἐκ λιμένος ἐξαρτυσάμενον τὸ σκάφος καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ ἅπαντα ποιήσαντα, τότε ἐπιτρέπειν χρῆ τῇ τύχῃ, ὡς αἰσχιστόν γε καὶ σφαλερόν ὑποδείξαντα πολέμου κίνησιν, ὥστε καὶ διὰ θαλάττης ἤδη καὶ διὰ γῆς ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα, κἄπειτα πρύμναν κρούεσθαι· [6] τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀνοίας καὶ προπετείας ἕκαστος κατεγέλασεν, τῆς δ' ἀσθενείας κατεφρόνησεν, οἱ δ' ἐχθροί, οἵτινές ποτ' ἂν ὦσιν, κἂν μὴ πάθωσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ μὴ βουλευθέντας ἀλλ' οὐ δυνηθέντας διαθεῖναι τι δικαίως ἐμίσησαν.

V. Περὶ τοῦ ἐξιλεοῦσθαι πρῶτον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὸ θεῖον ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐξάγων εἰς πόλεμον

Ἐξαγέτω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ὁ στρατηγὸς καθαρὰς ἢ οἷς νόμοι ἱεροὶ ἢ οἷς
μάντεις ὑφηγοῦνται καθαρσίοις, πᾶσαν, εἴ τις ἢ δημοσίᾳ κηλὶς ἢ ἰδίου
μολύσματος ἐκάστῳ σύνεστιν, ἀποδιοπομπούμενος.

VI. Περὶ τοῦ ἄγειν ἐν τάξει τὸ στρατόπεδον

[1] Ἀγέτω δὲ τὸ στρατεύμα πᾶν ἐν τάξει, κἂν μήπω μέλλῃ συμβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ μακρᾶς ὁδοῦ περαιοῦσθαι καὶ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἀνύειν πορείαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ· διὰ μὲν τῆς φιλίας, ἵνα ἐθίζηται τὰ στρατεύματα μένειν ἐν τάξει καὶ συμφυλάττειν τοὺς ἰδίους λόχους καὶ ἔπεσθαι τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν, διὰ δὲ τῆς πολεμίας πρὸς τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιβουλὰς γιγνομένας, ἵνα μὴ ἐν ὄξει καιρῷ θορυβούμενοι καὶ ἐπαναθέοντες καὶ ἄλλοι πρὸς ἄλλους φερόμενοι μὴδὲν μὲν ἀνύσωσι φθασθέντες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ δεῖνα πάθωσιν, ἀλλ' ἅμα καὶ εἰς πορείαν ὧσιν ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ εἰς μάχην εὐτρεπεῖς, ἔχοντες καὶ τὸ σύνθημα καὶ ἀλλήλους ἐν τάξει βλέποντες. [2] συστέλλειν δὲ πειράσθω τὴν πορείαν τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὥς ἐνὶ μάλιστα, πρὸς ὀλίγον, καὶ διὰ τοιούτων, ἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ, χωρίων ἀγέτω τὰς τάξεις, δι' ὧν οὐκ ἂν ἐκθλιβόμεναι στεναὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσαι πλάτος ἐκ πλευρᾶς ἐπὶ μήκιστον ἐκταθεῖεν. [3] καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθέστεραι γίνονται πρὸς τὰς αἰφνιδίους τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιφανείας αἱ τοιαῦται καὶ ἥκιστα δραστήριοι· ἂν τε γάρ σφισι κατὰ μέτωπον ὑπαντήσωσιν οἱ πολέμοι πλατύτεροι τεταγμένοι, ῥαδίως αὐτοὺς τρέπονται, καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως ὄντας ἐν ταῖς μάχαις κυκλοούμενοι, ἂν τε κατὰ μέσσην τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ πλευρᾶς ἐπιβάλωσι, ταχὺ διέσπασαν αὐτῶν τὴν πορείαν καὶ διέκοψαν — ἐπιστρεψάντων γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰς φάλαγγα πρὸς ἄμυναν ἀσθενῆς ἡ μάχη γίνεται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα βάθος —, ἐάν τε τοῖς κατόπιν, ἢ κατὰ νώτου μάχῃ δεινὴ καὶ προφανὴ τὸν ὄλεθρον ἔχουσα, κἂν ἐπιστρέψαι δὲ τολμήσωσιν εἰς μέτωπον, ἢ αὐτὴ γίνεσθαι μάχῃ τοῖς ἐν τῇ πρωτοπορείᾳ τεταγμένοις· ταχὺ γὰρ αὐτοὺς περιστήσονται. [4] συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τὰς παραβοηθείας δυσχερεῖς καὶ ἀπράκτους γίνεσθαι· τῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐραγίας τοῖς εἰς τὴν πρωτοπορείαν βουλομένων βοηθεῖν ἢ τῶν πρώτων τοῖς κατόπιν βραδεῖα ἢ ἄφιξις καὶ οὐ κατὰ καιρὸν γίγνεται, διὰ πολλῶν, ὧν ὕστεροῦσιν ἢ προηγούμενοι, σταδίων ἵεσθαι προθυμouμένων.

[5] Ἡ δὲ συνεσταλμένη πορεία καὶ τετράγωνος ἢ μὴ πάνυ παραμήκης εἰς πάντα καιρὸν εὐμεταχείριστός ἐστι καὶ ἀσφαλῆς. ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ συνέβη τι τοιοῦτον ἐκ τῶν ἐκτεινομένων στρατευμάτων, ὥστε Πανικὰ καὶ πτοίας ἀμφιδόξους ἐμπίπτειν· ἐνίστε γὰρ οἱ πρῶτοι καταβεβηκότες ἐξ ὄρεινῶν εἰς ψιλὰ καὶ ἐπίπεδα χωρία θεασάμενοι τοὺς κατόπιν ἐπικαταβαίνοντας ἔδοξαν εἶναι πολεμίων ἔφοδον, ὥστε μελλῆσαι προσβάλλειν ὡς ἐχθροῖς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ εἰς χεῖρας ἔλθεῖν ἤδη.

[6] Λαμβανέτω δὲ τὴν θεραπείαν καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια καὶ τὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἅπασαν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ μὴ χωρὶς· ἂν δὲ μὴ τὰ κατόπιν ἀσφαλῇ πάνυ καὶ εἰρηναῖα νομίζῃ, καὶ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἐκ τῶν ἐρρωμενεστάτων καὶ ἀνδρειοτάτων συνιστάσθω, μηθὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν οἰόμενος πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα τῆς πρωτοπορείας.

[7] Προπεπέτω δὲ ἱππεῖς τοὺς διερευνησομένους τὰς ὁδοὺς, καὶ μάλισθ', ὅτ' ἂν ὕλωδεις καὶ περικεκλασμένας λόφοις ἐρημίας διεξίῃ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐνέδραι πολεμίων ὑποκαθέζονται, καὶ λαθοῦσαι μὲν ἔστιν ὅτε τὰ ὅλα συνέτριψαν τῶν ἐναντίων πράγματα, μὴ λαθοῦσαι δὲ διὰ μικρᾶς φροντίδος φρόνησιν μεγάλην ἐμαρτύρησαν τῷ πολεμίῳ στρατηγῷ. [8] τὴν μὲν γὰρ πεδιάδα καὶ ψιλὴν ἢ πάντων ὄψις ἱκανὴ προερευνήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ κονιορτὸς ἀναφερόμενος μέθ' ἡμέραν ἐμῆνυσεν τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἔφοδον, καὶ πυρὰ καίόμενα νύκτωρ ἐπύρσευσεν τὴν ἐγγὺς στρατοπεδεῖαν.

[9] Ἀγέτω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις, μὴ μέλλων μὲν ἐκτάξειν εἰς μάχην, ἐὰν ἐπείγηται τι φθάνειν συντομώτερον, εἰ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι νομίζοι, καὶ νύκτωρ· μέλλων δὲ κρίνειν ἅμα τῷ σύνοπτον γενέσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις εὐθὺς τὰ πράγματα διὰ μάχης σχολῇ προίτω καὶ μὴ πολλὴν ἀνυέτω· πολλάκις γὰρ πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ὁ κόπος ἐδαπάνησεν τὴν ἀκμὴν τῶν σωμάτων.

[10] Διοδεύων δὲ συμμαχίδα γῆν παραγγελλέτω τοῖς στρατεύμασιν ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς χώρας, καὶ μήτ' ἄγειν τι μήτε φθεῖρειν· ἀφειδὲς γὰρ πλῆθος ἅπαν ἐν ὅπλοις, ὅτ' ἂν ἔχῃ τὴν τοῦ δύνασθαι τι ποιεῖν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ ἡ ἐγγὺς ὄψις ἀγαθῶν δελεάζει τοὺς ἀλογίστους ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν· μικραὶ δὲ προφάσεις ἢ ἀπηλλοτριώσαν συμμάχους ἢ καὶ παντελῶς ἐξεπολέμωσαν. [11] τὴν δὲ τῶν πολεμίων φθειρέτω καὶ καιέτω καὶ τεμνέσθω· ζημία γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ καρπῶν ἔνδεια μειοῖ πόλεμον, ὥς περιουσία τρέφει. προανατεινέσθω μέντοι πρῶτον, ὃ μέλλει ποιεῖν· πολλάκις γὰρ ἡ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσσεσθαι δεινοῦ προσδοκία συνηνάγκασε, πρὶν ἢ παθεῖν, ὑποσχέσθαι τι τοὺς κινδυνεύοντας ὧν πρότερον οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν ποιεῖν· ἐπειδὰν δ' ἅπαξ πάθωσιν, ὥς οὐδὲν ἔτι χεῖρον ὁψόμενοι τῶν λοιπῶν καταφρονοῦσιν. [12] εἰ δὲ πολὺν ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ μέλλει καταστρατοπεδεύειν χρόνον, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα φθειρέτω τῆς χώρας ὧν αὐτὸς οὐχ ἔξει χρεῖαν, ἅττα δὲ ἀναγκαῖα φυλαχθέντα τοῖς φίλοις ἔσται, τούτων φειδέσθω.

[13] Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων ἐκπεπληρωμένων μήτ' ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδιοκτίτου μήτ' ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπηκόου μήτ' ἐπὶ τῆς συμμαχίδος καθεζόμενος ἐγχερονίζετω χώρας· τοὺς γὰρ ἰδίους ἀναλώσει καρποὺς καὶ ζημιώσει πλέον τοὺς φίλους ἢ τοὺς

πολεμίους· μεταγέτω δ' ὥς θᾶπτον, ἐὰν ἀκίνδυνα ἦ τὰ οἴκοι, τὰς δυνάμεις· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πολεμίας, εἰ μὲν εἴη δαψιλῆς καὶ εὐδαίμων, τροφήν ἔξει καὶ ἄφθονον, εἰ δὲ μή, τήν γε φιλίαν οὐ λυμανεῖται, πολλὰ δ' ὅμως καὶ ἀπὸ λυπρᾶς τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἔξει πλεονεκτήματα.

[14] Φροντιζέτω δὲ περὶ τε ἀγορὰς καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐμπόρων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν παραπομπῆς, ἵν' ἀκινδύνου τῆς παρουσίας σφίσιν οὔσης ἀόκνως παρακομίζωσι τὸν εἰς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια φόρτον.

VII. Περὶ τοῦ ὅταν διὰ στενῶν μέλλῃ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἄγειν

[1] Ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἦτοι διὰ στενῶν μέλλῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πάροδον ἢ δι' ὀρεινῆς καὶ δυσβάτου χώρας ἄγειν τὸν στρατόν, ἀναγκαῖον προεκπέμποντά τι μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τάς τε ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τὰς τῶν στενῶν παρόδους, μὴ φθάσαντες οἱ πολέμοι καὶ καταστάντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων κωλύσωσι τὴν διεκβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι. [2] τὸ δ' αὐτὸ πεφροντίσθω, κἂν αὐτὸς δεδίῃ πολεμίων εἰσβολήν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ δρᾶσαι μὲν χρήσιμον, φυλάξασθαι δὲ παθεῖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ φθάσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς εἰσβαλόντας εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν ἐπεῖγον, ἀποκλεῖσαι δὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐπὶ σφᾶς ἰόντας οὐ προνοητέον.

VIII. Περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν χάρακα

[1] Ἐν δὲ δὴ τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καταστρατοπεδεύων χάρακα περιβαλέσθω καὶ τάφρον, κἂν ἐφ' ἡμέραν μέλλῃ τὴν παρεμβολὴν θήσειν· ἀμετανόητος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ ἀσφαλὲς στρατοπεδεΐα διὰ τὰς αἰφνιδίους καὶ ἀπρολήπτους ἐπιβολάς. καθιστάτω δὲ φύλακας, κἂν μακρὰν εἶναι νομίζῃ τοὺς πολεμίους, ὥς ἐγγὺς ὄντων. [2] ὅποι δ' ἂν μέλλῃ πολυχρόνιον τίθεσθαι τὴν παρεμβολὴν οὐκ ἀντεπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων, ἐπὶ τῷ φθεῖρειν τὴν χώραν ποιούμενος τὴν μόνην ἢ καὶ καιροῖς ἐφεδρεύων βελτίοσιν, ἐκλεγέσθω χωρία μὴ ἐλώδη μηδὲ νοτερὰ· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ταῖς ἀναφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων δυσωδίαις νόσους καὶ λοιμοὺς ἐμβάλλει στρατεύμασι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἐκάκωσε τὰς εὐεξίας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀπώλεσεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ὀλίγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσθενὲς ἀπολείπεσθαι στράτευμα.

ΙΧ. Περὶ τοῦ συνεχῶς ὑπαλλάσσειν τὰ ἄπληκτα

[1] Χρήσιμον δέ που καὶ σωτήριον στρατοπέδῳ μὴδ' ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μένειν παρεμβολῆς, ἐὰν μὴ χειμαδεύῃ καὶ τοῖς σκηνώμασι διὰ τὴν ὥραν τοῦ καιροῦ πεπολισμένη τυγχάνῃ· αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκρίσεις ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνόμεναι χωρίων ἀτμοὺς διεφθορότας ἀναπέμπουσαι συµμεταβάλλουσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀέρος χύσιν. [2] ἐν δὲ ταῖς χειμασίαις γυμναζέτω τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ πολεμικὰ καὶ σύντροφα ποιείσθω τοῖς δεινοῖς, μήτ' ἀργεῖν ἐὼν μήτε ῥαθυμεῖν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀργία τὰ σώματα μαλθακὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆ κατασκεύασεν, ἡ δὲ ῥαθυμία τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνάνδρους καὶ δειλὰς ἐποίησεν· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ δελεάζουσιν τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν συνήθει τὰς ἐπιθυμίας διαφθείρουσι καὶ τὸν εὐτολμότατον. [3] ὅθεν οὐ μακρὰν ἀπάγειν τοὺς ἄνδρας τῶν πόνων· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ μετὰ χρόνον ἀναγκάζονται πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ χωρεῖν, οὐθ' ἡδέως ἐξίσιν οὔτ' ἐπὶ πολὺ μένουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκδεδιητημένοι ταχὺ μὲν ὀρρωδοῦσι, πρὶν ἢ καὶ πείρασαι τὰ δεινὰ, ταχὺ δὲ καὶ πειράσαντες ἀποχωροῦσιν, οὔτ' ἐλπίζειν οὔτε φέρειν τοὺς κινδύνους δυνάμενοι.

X. α'. Περὶ τοῦ δεῖν γυμνάζειν τὸν στρατὸν ἀδείας οὔσης

[1] Διόπερ ἀγαθοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα τότε κατασκευάζειν, ὅτ' οὐκ ἐπείγουσιν αἱ τῶν ἐκ παρατάξεως ἀγώνων ἀνάγκαι, καὶ τὰ ἄχρηστα διὰ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἄσκησιν ἐπιτάττειν. ἱκανὴ γὰρ στρατοπέδοις ἄνεσις, κἂν σφόδρα ταλαίπωροι ᾖσιν, ἢ μὴ διὰ τῶν δεινῶν εἰς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἀγώνισμα πεῖρα. γυμναζέτω δὲ τοιοῖσδέ τισι τρόποις.

[2] Ἐκταττέτω πρῶτον ἀναδοὺς τὰ ὅπλα πᾶσιν, ἵν' ἐν μελέτῃ σφίσιν ἦ τὸ μένειν ἐν τάξει, καὶ ταῖς ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνήθεις ἀλλήλοις γινόμενοι, τίς ὑπὸ τίνα καὶ ποῦ καὶ μετὰ πόσους, ὑπ' ὅζῳ παράγγελμα πάντες ᾧσιν ἐν τάξει· καὶ τάς τε ἐκτάσεις καὶ συστολάς καὶ ἐγκλίσεις ἐπὶ λαῖα καὶ δεξιά, καὶ λόχων μεταγωγὰς καὶ διαστήματα καὶ πυκνώσεις, καὶ τὰς δι' ἀλλήλων ἀντεξόδους καὶ εισόδους, καὶ τὰς κατὰ λόχους διαιρέσεις, καὶ τὰς καταταξεῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ φάλαγγα ἐκτείνουσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ βάθος ὑποστέλλουσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀμφιπρόσωπον μάχην, ὅτ' ἂν οἱ κατ' οὐρανὸν ἐπιστρέψαντες πρὸς τοὺς κυκλομένους μάχωνται, καὶ τὰς ἀνακλήσεις ἐκδιδασκέτω.

[3] Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν μουσικῶν ὀργάνων οἱ μὲν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες τοῦ μαθάνειν ἐπιτιθέντες τοὺς δακτύλους ἐπὶ τε τὰ τρήματα τῶν αὐλῶν καὶ διαστήματα τῶν χορδῶν πολλάκις ἄλλον ἔθεσαν ἐπ' ἄλλην καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀρμονικὴν διάστασιν, εἴτα μόλις ἐπεκτείναντες βραδὺ μὲν αἶρουσι τοὺς δακτύλους, βραδὺ δὲ τιθέασιν, οἱ δ' ἐν μελέτῃ τῆς μουσικῆς ἀνεπιτηδεύτως ἤδη ἐρρυθμισμένη τῇ χειρὶ δι' ὀξύτητος μεταφέρουσιν, ὅπῃ τε βούλονται παραθλίβει τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἀνοίξει καὶ παραψηλαῖ χορδῆς· τοῦτον δὴπου τὸν τρόπον οἱ μὲν ἀσυνήθεις καὶ ἀνάσκητοι τῆς τάξεως διὰ ταραχῶν πολλοῦ μόλις ἀλλήλων διαμαρτάνοντες ἐγκατατάσσονται πολὺν ἀναλίσκοντες χρόνον, οἱ δὲ συγκεκροτημένοι διὰ τάχους, ὥς εἰπεῖν αὐτόματοι, φέρονται πρὸς τὴν τάξιν ἐναρμόνιον τινα καὶ καλὴν ἐκπληροῦντες ὄψιν.

[4] Εἴτα διελὼν τὰ στρατεύματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀσιδήρῳ μάχῃ συναγέτω νάρθηκας ἢ στύρακας ἀκοντίων ἀναδιδούς, εἰ δὲ τινα καὶ βεβωλασμένα πεδία εἴη, βώλους τε κελεύων αἶροντας βάλλειν· ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἱμάντων ταυρείων χρήσθων ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην· δείξας δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ λόφους ἢ βουνούς ἢ ὄρηθιους τόπους κελυέντω σὺν δρόμῳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι· ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τινας τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ ἀναδοὺς ἃ μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἔφην ὅπλα, τούτους ἐκβαλοῦντας ἐτέρους ἐκπεμπέτω· καὶ ἥτοι τοὺς μείναντας ἐπαινείτω

καὶ μὴ ἐκπεσόντας ἢ τοὺς ἐκβαλόντας. [5] ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀσκήσεως καὶ γυμνασίας ὑγιαίνει μὲν τὸ στράτευμα, πᾶν δ' ὃ τι οὖν ἥδιον ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει, κἂν λιτὸν ἦ, πολυτελέστερον οὐθὲν ἐπιζητοῦν· ὁ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν πόνων λιμὸς καὶ τὸ δίψος ἱκανὸν ὄψον ἐστὶν καὶ γλυκὺ κρᾶμα, καὶ στερρότερά τε τὰ σώματά σφισι γίγνεται καὶ ἀκμῆτα, καὶ συνεθίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσι δεινοῖς, ἰδρῶτι καὶ πνεύματι καὶ ἄσθματι καὶ θάλπεσιν ἀσκιάστοις καὶ κρυμοῖς ὑπαίθοις ἐγγυμναζόμενα.

[6] Παραπλησίως δὲ γυμναζέτω καὶ τὸ ἵππικὸν ἀμίλλας ποιούμενος καὶ διώγματα καὶ συμπλοκάς καὶ ἀκροβολισμοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις καὶ περὶ αὐτάς τὰς ρίζας τῶν λόφων, ἐφ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἐστι καὶ τῶν τραχέων ἐπιψαύειν· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε βιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀνάντη καὶ κατὰ πρानοῦς ἰππάζεσθαι.

(X.) β'. Περὶ προνομῶν

[7] Σωφρονεῖτω δὲ περὶ τὰς προνομὰς καὶ μὴ ἐφίετω ταῖς δυνάμεσιν, ἐπειδὴν εἰς εὐδαίμονα πολεμίων εἰσβάλλῃ χώραν, ἀτάκτως φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ὠφελίας· αἱ γὰρ μέγισται συμφοραὶ κἂν τοιοῖσδε γίνονται· πολλάκις γὰρ ἀτάκτοις καὶ σποράσι περὶ τὴν λείαν σεσοβημένοις ἐπιτεσόντες οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀσύντακτον τοῦ πλήθους καὶ διὰ τὸ βαρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀποχωροῦντας ταῖς ὠφελείας οὔτε τοῖς ὅπλοις χρῆσθαι δυναμένους οὔτ' ἀλλήλοις ἐπικουρῆσαι πολλοὺς διέφθειραν. [8] εἰ δέ τινες δίχα τοῦ τὸν στρατηγὸν κελεῦσαι προνομεύοιεν, οὗτοι κολαζέσθων. αὐτός γε μὴν ὅτ' ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν λείαν ἐκπέμπῃ, τοῖς ψιλοῖς καὶ ἀνόπλοις συνταττέτω μαχίμους ἵππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς, οἱ περὶ μὲν τὴν λείαν οὐκ ἀσχολήσονται, μένοντες δὲ ἐν τάξει παραφυλάξουσιν τοὺς προνομεύοντας, ἔν' ἢ σφισιν ἀσφαλῆς ἢ ἀποχώρησις.

γ'. Περὶ κατασκόπων

[9] Εἰ δὲ συλλάβοι ποτὲ κατασκόπους, μὴ μιᾷ κεκρήσθω γνώμῃ· ἀλλ', ἐὰν μὲν ἀσθενέστερα τὰ ἴδια ἤπερ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων εἶναι νομίσῃ, κτεινάτω τούτους, ἂν δὲ καὶ ὀπλισμῷ καλῷ κεκρημένος ἦ καὶ παρασκευαῖς ἐντελέσι καὶ δυνάμει πολλῇ καὶ εὐεξία σωμάτων καὶ πειθηνίῳ στρατεύματι καὶ ἡγεμόσιν ἀρίστοις καὶ ἐμπειρία μεμελετημένῃ, παραλαβὼν τοὺς κατασκόπους καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπιδειξάμενος οὐκ ἂν ἀμάρτοι ποτὲ καὶ ἀθώους ἀποπέμψας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πλεονεκτήματα τῶν ἀντιπολέμων ἀγγελλόμενα φοβεῖσθαι συνηνάγκασεν, τὰ δ' ἐλαττώματα θαρρεῖν παρεστήσατο.

δ'. Περὶ νυκτοφυλάκων

[10] Φύλακας δὲ καταταττέτω καὶ πλείους, ἵν' ἐν μέρει διελόμενοι τὴν τῆς νυκτὸς ὥραν οἱ μὲν ὑπνοῦν οἱ δὲ γρηγορεῖν αἰρῶνται· οὔτε γὰρ ἀναγκαστέον οὔθ' ὑπίσχνουμένοις πιστευτέον ὅλην ἀγρυπνήσειν νύκτα τοὺς αὐτούς· εἰκὸς γὰρ ποτε καὶ παρὰ γνώμην ἐνδιδόντων τῶν μελῶν αὐτόματον ὕπνον ἐπελθεῖν. [11] ὀρθοὶ δ' ἐστῶτες φυλαττόντων· αἱ γὰρ καθέδραι καὶ ἀναπτώσεις συνεκλύουσαι τὰ σώματα μαραίνουσιν εἰς ὕπνον, ἢ δ' ἀνάστασις καὶ ὁ τόνος τῶν σκελῶν ἐγρήγορσιν ἐντίθησι τῇ διανοίᾳ. [12] καιόντων δ' οἱ φύλακες πυρὰ πορρωτέρω τῆς στρατοπεδείας· οὕτως γὰρ τοὺς μὲν προσιόντας διὰ τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκ πολλοῦ συνόψονται, τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ φωτὸς ἐν σκότῳ τυγχάνοντες οὐκ ἀθρήσονται, μέχρις ἂν εἰς χεῖρας ἔλθωσιν.

ε'. Περὶ λαθραίας ἀναχωρήσεως τοῦ στρατεύματος

[13] Εἰ δὲ βούλοιτό ποτε νύκτωρ ἀναστῆσαι τὸ στράτευμα λανθάνων τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ τόπους προκαταλαβέσθαι προαιρούμενος ἢ τοὺς ὄντας φεύγων ἢ μηδέπω βουλούμενος εἰς ἀνάγκην ἐλθεῖν τοῦ μάχεσθαι, πυρὰ πολλὰ καύσας ἀναχωρεῖτω· βλέποντες μὲν γὰρ οἱ πολέμιοι τὰ φῶτα δοκοῦσι κατὰ χώραν αὐτὸν μένειν, ἀφωτίστου δὲ μεταξὺ γενομένης τῆς παρεμβολῆς ὑπόνοιαν ἀναλαβόντες, ὡς φεύγουσιν, ἐνέδρας τε προεκπέμπουσι καὶ διώκουσιν.

ς'. Περὶ στρατηγῶν κοινολογουμένων τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων στρατηγοῖς

[14] Ἐὰν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένων εἰς ὅψιν ἔρχηται ποτε τῷ τῶν πολεμίων στρατηγῷ, κοινολογησόμενος, ὡς αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι τι βουλούμενος, ἐκλεξάμενος τοὺς κρατίστους καὶ ἀξιοπρεπεστάτους τῶν νέων, εὐρώστους καλοὺς μεγάλους, ὅπλοις διαπρεπέσι κοσμήσας ἔχων περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπαντάτω· πολλάκις γὰρ τοιόνδε τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ μέρους ὀφθέντος ἠλπίσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἤκουσεν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπέισθη, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν εἶδεν ἐφοβήθη.

ζ'. Περὶ αὐτομόλων

[15] Τῶν δὲ αὐτομόλων εἴ τινες ἢ καιρὸν ἀφικνοῦνται μηνύσοντες ἢ ὥραν ἐπιθέσεως, ἢ ὁδὸν ἐπαγγέλλονται καθηγήσασθαι καὶ διὰ σκοπῶν ἀοράτων τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄξειν, δῆσας αὐτοὺς ἀγέτω, τοῦτο ποιῶν σφισι φανερόν, ὡς, ἐὰν μὲν ἀληθεύσωσι καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καὶ νίκη πάντα ποιήσωσι τοῦ στρατεύματος, λύσει τέ σφας καὶ δωρεὰς δώσει καταξίους, ἐὰν δ'

ἐξαπατήσωσι καὶ ψεύσωνται τοῖς σφετέροις ἐγχειρίσαι βουλόμενοι τὸ στράτευμα, παρ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ὄντες ἐν δεσμοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κινδυνευόντων κατασφαγῇσονται· πίστις γὰρ αὐτομόλου τι μηνύοντος αὕτη βεβαιότητι, τὸ μὴ αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς κύριον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὀδηγούμενους.

η'. Περὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολήν

[16] Ὅρατώ δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολὴν ἐμπείρως· μήτε γάρ, ἐὰν ἐν ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ κατὰ κύκλον ἴδη κείμενον βραχὺν τὴν περίμετρον καὶ συνεσταλμένον χάρακα, δοκεῖτω τοὺς πολεμίους ὀλίγους εἶναι — πᾶς γὰρ κύκλος ἐλάττω τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ὄψιν ἔχει τῆς ἐξ ἀναλόγου στερεομετρομένης θεωρίας, καὶ πλείους δύναται δέξασθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ περιγραφόμενον εὖρος, ἢ ἰδὼν ἂν τις ὄψει τεκμήραιτο — , μήτε, ἂν αἱ πλευραὶ τοῦ χάρακος ἐπὶ μῆκος ἐκτείνωσι καὶ κατὰ τι μέρος στεναὶ τυγχάνωσιν ἢ σκολιαὶ καὶ πολυγώνιοι καὶ ὀξυγώνιοι, πολὺ πλῆθος ἐλπίζεται· τῆς μὲν γὰρ στρατοπεδείας ἢ ὄψις μεγάλη φαίνεται, τοὺς δ' ἐν αὐτῇ περιειλημμένους ἄνδρας οὐ πάντως πλείονας ἔχει τῶν ἐν κύκλῳ περιγραφομένων. [17] οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρῶν καὶ λόφων χάρακες, ἐὰν μὴ συμφυεῖς ᾧσι πάντῃ, μείζους μὲν ὁρῶνται τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις, ἐλάττους δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἄνδρας περιέχουσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἐντὸς ἀπολείπεται γυμνά μέρη· τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων τόπων ἀνάγκη πολλὰ μὲν εἶναι βάραθρα, πολλὰ δὲ κρημνώδη καὶ τραχέα καὶ ἀκατασκήνωτα, τοῦ δὲ χάρακος πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιθεμένου, τούτου τὸ μῆκος εὐλόγως ἐπεκτείνεται. [18] μήτ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴν ἴδη βραχὺν καὶ συνεσταλμένον, καταφρονεῖτω συλλογισζόμενος καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, μήτ', ἂν καὶ παραμήκη, καταπληττέσθω.

[19] Ταῦτα μέντοι γινώσκων εὐκαίρῳ ποτὲ στρατηγία χρυσάσθω, καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ κατὰ τὸ προειρημένον σχῆμα, καί, εἰ δέοι, καὶ συνθλίψας τὸ στράτευμα μὴ προαγέτω μήτε δεικνύτω τοῖς ἀντεστρατοπεδεύκοσι, καὶ δὴ προκαλουμένοις εἰς μάχην μὴ ἐξαγέτω· δοκεῖτω δὲ καὶ δεδιέναι. [20] πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ πολέμοι καταφρονήσαντες ὥς ὀλίγων ὄντων τῶν ἐναντίων, ὄψει καὶ οὐκ ἐμπειρία στρατηγικῇ τὰ πράγματα κρίνοντας, ῥαθυμότερον ἀνεστράφησαν, ἀφυλάκτως καὶ ἀτάκτως τῆς ἰδίας προϊόντες παρεμβολῆς, ὥς οὐ τολμησόντων σφίσι τῶν πολεμίων ἐπεξελεύσεσθαι, ἢ καὶ τῷ χάρακι περιστάντες πολιορκοῦσιν ἀπροσδόκητοι τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκχυθῆσεσθαι πλήθους· ἢ δ' ἀνελπιστία τῶν δεινῶν

ἀμελεστέρους ἐποίησε τοὺς στρατιώτας· ἔνθα δὲ τὸν καιρὸν ἀρπάσαντα κατὰ πολλὰς ἐκδραμόντα τοῦ χάρακος πυλίδας ἐν τάξει τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀνδρείως ἔχεσθαι πραγμάτων.

[21] Ὁ δὲ εἰδὼς οὕτως στρατηγεῖν εἴσεται, κἂν ὑπὸ τῶν πολέμιων ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καταστρατηγῇται, καὶ δρᾷσαί τι φρόνιμος ἔσται καὶ φυλάξασθαι προμηθής· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ αὐτὸς εἴσεται, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκ τούτων ἐτέρου ποιούντος γνώσεται, τί χρὴ μὴ παθεῖν· αἱ γὰρ ἰδίαι πρὸς τὸ λυπεῖν ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τὰς τῶν πέλας ἐπινοίας τεκμαίρονται.

θ'. Περὶ ἀπορρήτων

[22] Προάγειν δ' εἰ δέοι νύκτωρ ἢ μέθ' ἡμέραν ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων, ἢ φρούριον ἢ πόλιν ἢ ἄκρα ἢ παρόδους καταληγνόμενον ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων δράσοντα, ἃ διὰ τάχους λαθόντα τοὺς πολέμιους, ἄλλως δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρᾶξαι, μηδενὶ προλεγέτω, μήτ' ἐπὶ τί μῆτε τί ποιήσων ἄγει τὴν στρατιάν, εἰ μὴ τισι τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νομίζοι προειπεῖν. [23] γενόμενος δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν τόπων ἐγγὺς ὄντος τοῦ παρ' ὃν δρᾷσαί τι δεῖ καιροῦ διδόντω τὸ παράγγελμα καὶ τί δεῖ πράττειν σημαινέτω· ταχὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω καὶ δι' ὀλίγης ὥρας· ἅμα γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἀκούουσι καὶ οἱ ὑποτεταγμένοι τούτοις ἴσασιν. [24] ἄφρων δὲ καὶ ἀτελής, ὅστις ἂν πρὸ τοῦ δέοντος εἰς τὸ πλῆθος ἀνακοινώσῃται τὴν πρᾶξιν· οἱ γὰρ πονηροὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτομολοῦσι καιρούς, παρ' οὓς ἐροῦντές τι καὶ μηνύσοντες οἴονται τιμῆς καὶ δωρεὰς τεύξεσθαι παρὰ τῶν πολέμιων· οὐκ ἔστιν δ' ἄφ' οὗ στρατεύματος οὐκ ἀποδιδράσκουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους δοῦλοί τε καὶ ἐλεύθεροι κατὰ πολλὰς προφάσεις, ἃς ἀνάγκη παρέχεσθαι πόλεμον.

ι'. Περὶ τῆς πρὸ μάχης ἐπισκέψεως τῶν ἱερῶν

[25] Μῆτε δὲ εἰς πορείαν ἐξαγέτω τὸ στράτευμα μῆτε πρὸς μάχην ταττέτω, μὴ πρότερον θυσάμενος· ἄλλ' ἀκολουθούντων αὐτῷ θύται καὶ μάντιες, ἄριστον μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμπείρως ἐπισκέπτεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ ἱερά· ῥᾶστόν γε μὴν ἐν τάχει μαθεῖν ἔστιν καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ σύμβουλον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι. [26] γενομένων δὴ καλῶν τῶν ἱερῶν ἀρχέσθω πάσης πράξεως καὶ καλεῖτω τοὺς ἡγεμόνας πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν ὥσιν τῶν ἱερῶν, ἵνα θεασάμενοι τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις θαρρεῖν λέγοιεν ἀπαγγέλλοντες, ὥς οἱ θεοὶ κελεύουσι μάχεσθαι· πάνυ γὰρ ἀναθάρρουσιν αἱ δυνάμεις, ὅτ' ἂν μετὰ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ἐξιέναι νομίζωσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὀπιτεύονται κατ' ἰδίαν ἕκαστος καὶ

σημεῖα καὶ φωνὰς παρατηροῦσιν, ἡ δ' ὑπὲρ πάντων καλλιέρησις καὶ τοὺς ἰδία
δυσθυμοῦντας ἀνέρωσεν. [27] ἔὰν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον τὰ ἱερὰ γένηται, μένειν
ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, κἂν σφόδρα τι ἐπέιγῃ, πᾶν ὑπομένειν τὸ δύσχρηστον — οὐθὲν
γὰρ δύναται παθεῖν χειρόν, ὧν προμηνύει τὸ δαιμόνιον — , ὥς, ἂν γέ τι
κρεῖττον ἔσεσθαι μέλλῃ τῶν παρόντων, ἀνάγκη καλλιερεῖν, θύεσθαι δὲ τῆς
αὐτῆς ἡμέρας πολλάκις· ὥρα γὰρ μία καὶ ἀκαρῆς χρόνος ἢ φθάσαντας
ἐλύπησεν ἢ ὑστερήσαντας. [28] καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὰς κατ' οὐρανὸν ἀστέρων
κινήσεις καὶ ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις καὶ σχημάτων ἐγκλίσεις τριγώνων καὶ
τετραγώνων καὶ διαμέτρων ἢ θυτική διὰ σπλάγχχνων ἀλλοιομόρφῳ θεωρία
προσημαίνειν, ὧν αἱ παρὰ μικρὸν διαφοραὶ καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ ἀποθειώσεις ἐν
ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ μᾶλλον δὲ ὥρᾳ καὶ βασιλεῖς ἐποίησαν καὶ αἰχμαλώτους.

XI. α΄. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τῶν πολεμίων σχηματιζομένων φεύγειν μὴ ἀπλῶς καὶ ὥς ἔτυχεν ἔχεσθαι τῆς διώξεως

[1] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλάκις θυομένοις ὥς μὲν εἰς μάχην καλὰ γίγνεται τὰ ἱερά, διὰ δὲ μάχης ὅλον ἐνίοτε στρατευμάτων ὄλεθρον προσημαίνει, τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τούτου φράσαι. [2] τῆς γὰρ συμπάσης οἰκουμένης πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας εἶναι συμβέβηκεν ἰδέας τόπων, ἄδηλον δέ, ἐν ὁποίοις ἕκαστοι πολεμήσουσιν· καὶ τῆς μὲν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχουσι χώρας ἄνθρωποι, τὴν δ' ἄλλοτρίαν οὐκ ἴσασι. [3] πολλάκις δ' εἰ στρατηγὸς ἀκούσας μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁδὸν ἀπέχειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἀναστήσας ἄγει τὸν στρατόν, ἐπειγόμενος διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν τοῖς πολεμίους, τῶν δ' ὑποχωρούντων ἐπίτηδες καὶ μὴ μενόντων, ὥς κατορρωδοῦσιν ἔπεται, τῶν δὲ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο ποιοούντων, ἕως ἔλθωσιν εἰς δυσχωρίας καὶ περικεκλεισμένους ὄρεσι τόπους, ἐπικείται μηδὲν ὑφορώμενος, εἴτα ἐμβαλὼν εἰς τοὺς τόπους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπεκλείσθη τῆς εἰσβολῆς, ἥ τὸ στράτευμα εἰσῆλθε, καὶ καταλαβόμενοι τὰς τε εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν διόδους καὶ κύκλῳ τὰ μετέωρα πάντα κατασχόντες, ὥσπερ ἐν ζωγραφίῳ τινὶ συνεπέδησαν μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὁ δὲ παριὼν μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐφέρετο δοκῶν ἐπικεῖσθαι φυγομαχοῦσι τοῖς πολεμίους, οἷς προσελθὼν οὐκ ἔγνω, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περιβλεψάμενος τὰ τε πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω καὶ παρὰ πλευράν, καὶ πάντα πλήρη θεασάμενος πολεμίων ἢ συνηκοντίσθη μετὰ τοῦ στρατεύματος, ἢ ἀπομάχεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος καὶ μὴ παραδιδούς λιμῶ διέφθειρεν πάντας, ἢ παραδοὺς κυρίου ἐποίησε τοὺς πολεμίους τοῦ ὅ τι βούλονται διαθεῖναι. [4] δεῖ τοίνυν τὰς ὑποχωρήσεις ὑφορᾶσθαι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ μὴ ἀπειροκάλως ἔπεσθαι καὶ περιβλέπεσθαι δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς τόπους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ δι' ὧν ἄγει χωρίων ὀρᾶν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δ' ὅτι ταύτῃ πάλιν ὑποστρέψαι δεῖ, καὶ ἥτοι μὴδ' εἰσβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπεσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ἥτοι μὴδ' εἰσβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπεσθαι τῆς πορείας, ἢ εἰσβάλλοντα προορᾶν καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τοὺς συνάπτοντας αὐχένας τῶν ὀρῶν ἀπολείπειν τοὺς παραφυλάττοντας, ἵν' ἀσφαλῆς σφισιν ἡ ἀνακομιδὴ γίγνηται. [5] ταῦτα δ' εἰρήσθω καὶ τοῦ καταστρατηγεῖν οὕτως εἵνεκα καὶ τοῦ μὴ καταστρατηγεῖσθαι· καλὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν οὕτω δύνασθαι πολεμίους, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ληφθῆναι.

β΄. Περὶ τοῦ προσίεσθαι τοὺς ἀπαγγέλλοντάς τι

[6] Προσιέσθω δὲ καὶ πάντα τὸν βουλόμενόν τι ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ δοῦλον καὶ

ἐλεύθερον καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μέθ' ἡμέραν καὶ ἐν πορείᾳ καὶ ἐν κατασκηνώσει καὶ ἀναπαυόμενος καὶ ἐπὶ λουτροῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τροφῆς· οἱ γὰρ ἀναβαλλόμενοι καὶ δυσπρόσιτοι καὶ τοῖς ὑπηρέταις τοὺς προσιόντας ἀνακόπτειν κελεύοντες πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων εἰκότως διαμαρτάνουσι πραγμάτων, ἣ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις ῥαθυμοῦντες σφάλλονται· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ὄξει τὸ δυνάμενον καιρῷ φθασθῆναι πάρεσιν τινες μηνύοντες.

XII. Περὶ ἀριστοποιΐας

[1] Ἀντιστρατοπεδεύων δὲ πολεμίῳ χάρακι μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ καιρὸν ἀριστοποιΐας ἀμελείτω· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ νομίζῃ τὸ ὅτε βούλεται τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς μάχην ἐκτάττειν εἶναι, καὶ ἡνίκα ἂν ἐθέλῃ, παραγγελλέτω ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς τοσαύτην ἀνάγκην ἐληλυθὼς τυγχάνῃ διὰ τινος τόπους ἢ χάρακος ἀσθένειαν ἢ τινος ἄλλας αἰτίας, ὥστ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπολελεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξάγειν ὁπότε προαιροῦνται καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην σφίσιν ἐπιτιθέναι τοῦ τὰ ὅπλα λαμβάνειν καὶ ἀντιπαρατάττεσθαι, μὴ ὀκνεῖτω καὶ ἔωθεν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι σημαίνειν, μὴ φθάσωσιν νήστισιν ἐπιθέντες οἱ πολέμιοι τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ μάχεσθαι. [2] καὶ τὸ σύνολον οὐκ ἐν μικρῷ θετέον οὐδὲ παρορατέον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων πρόνοιαν· ἐμφαγόντες γὰρ στρατιῶται μετρίως, ὥστε μὴ πολὺν ἐνφορτίσασθαι τῇ γαστρὶ κόρον, δυναμικώτεροι πρὸς τὰς μάχας εἰσίν· πολλάκις καὶ παρὰ τοῦθ' ἡττήθη στρατόπεδα τῆς ἰσχύος ἐλλειπούσης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, ὅταν μὴ ἐν ὅξει καιρῷ κρίνηται τὰ τῆς μάχης, ἀλλὰ δι' ἡμέρας ὅλης λαμβάνῃ τὸ τέλος.

XIII. Περὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν εὐθυμον ἐν ταῖς δυσπραγίαις

[1] Ὅτ' ἂν δέ τις ἐμπέσῃ δυσθυμία στρατεύμασι καὶ φόβος ἢ συμμαχίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀφιγμένης ἢ προτερήματός σφισι γεγονότος, ὁ στρατηγὸς τότε δὴ μάλιστα τοῖς στρατιώταις ἰλαρὸς καὶ γεγηθὼς καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος φαινέσθω. [2] αἱ γὰρ ὄψεις τῶν ἡγεμόνων συµμετασχηματίζουσι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ὑποταττομένων, καὶ στρατηγοῦ μὲν εὐθυμουμένου καὶ ἰλαρὸν βλέποντος ἀναθαρρεῖ καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος δεινοῦ, κατεπτηχότος δὲ καὶ λυπούμενου συγκαταπίπτουσι ταῖς διανοαῖς ὡς μεγάλου σφίσι κακοῦ προφαινομένου. [3] διὸ χρὴ πλέον τῷ σχήματι τοῦ προσώπου στρατηγεῖν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους εὐθυμίαν ἢ τοῖς λόγοις παρηγορεῖν· λόγοις μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἡπίστησαν ὡς τοῦ καιροῦ πεπλασμένοις εἵνεκεν, ὅσιν δὲ θαρσοῦσαν ἀνυπόκριτον εἶναι νομίζοντες ἐπιστώσαντο τὴν ἀφοβίαν· ἀγαθὴ δὲ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τε εἰπεῖν, ἃ δεῖ, καὶ ὀφθῆναι, ὅποῖον δεῖ.

XIV. α'. Πότε δεῖ φόβον ἐμβάλλειν τῷ στρατεύματι τῷ ἰδίῳ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων

[1] Καθάπερ γε μὴν ἐν καιρῷ στρατεύματος ἀναθάρσησης ὤνησεν, οὕτως καὶ φόβος ὠφέλησεν. ὅτ' ἂν γὰρ ῥαθυμῇ στρατόπεδον καὶ ἀπειθέστερον ἢ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσημαίνειν δεῖ κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβεροποιῶντα τὴν ἐκείνων ἐφεδρείαν· οὐ γὰρ δειλοὺς ἔσται ποιεῖν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀσφαλεῖς· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δυσθυμίαις θαρρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ῥαθυμίαις φοβεῖσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δειλοὺς ἀνδρείους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ θρασεῖς προμηθεῖς. [2] ἀμφοτέρω δὲ συμβαίνει στρατοπέδοις, καὶ οὕτως καταπεπληχθαι πολεμίους ὥστε μηδὲν ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, καὶ οὕτως καταφρονεῖν ὥστε μηδὲν φυλάττεσθαι· πρὸς ἑκάτερον δὲ δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡρμόσθαι καὶ εἰδέναι, ποτε δεῖ τάντίπαλα ταπεινὰ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ σχήματι ποιεῖν, καὶ ποτ' αὐτὰ δεῖνα καὶ φοβερώτερα.

β'. Περὶ τὸ θαρρύνειν τὸ δεδιὸς στρατεύμα

[3] Μελλούσης δὲ μάχης, ὅτε ἄδηλον ἔχοντα τὰ στρατεύματα τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ πολέμου διατετάρραται τῷ φόβῳ, δυνηθεῖς πῃ λαβεῖν αἰχμαλώτους ὁ στρατηγὸς ἢ ἀπὸ ἐνέδρας ἢ διακριβολισάμενος ἢ καὶ ἀποστατοῦντας τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς, εἰ μὲν τινες γενναίους τοῖς φρονήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καταμάθοι, τούτους ἢ ἀποκτεινάτω παραχρῆμα λαβὼν ἢ δῆσας παραδότης τοῖς ἐπὶ ταῦτα τεταγμένοις φυλάττειν κελεύσας, ὅπως μὴ πολλοὶ θεάσωνται τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀγεννεῖς καὶ μικροψύχους, ἔτι καὶ προαπειλήσας σφίσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας σκηνῆς καὶ προδουλώσας σφῶν τῷ φόβῳ τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὰ πλήθη προαγέτω δακρύνοντας καὶ δεομένους, ἅμα λέγων καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος τοῖς στρατιώταις, ὡς ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ταπεινοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, καὶ ὡς πρὸς τοιούτους ἐστὶν ἄνδρας αὐτοῖς ἡ μάχη δεδιότας οὕτως τὸν θάνατον, ἀπτομένους γονάτων καὶ προκυλιόμενους τῶν ἐκάστου ποδῶν. [4] ἐπαναθαρρεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ στρατὸς ἥδη προκατανενοηκῶς τῶν πολεμίων ὄψεις τε καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς· αἰεὶ γάρ, ὃ μηδέπω τις ἐώρακεν, ἐλπίζει μείζον γενήσεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἔτι καὶ τῷ τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβῳ τὴν ἐλπίδα μετρεῖ πρὸς τὸ χαλεπώτερον.

XV. Ὅτι διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ τῶν τάξεων

Τάξεις δ' οὐ μία πολέμου, πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διάφοροι καὶ παρὰ τοὺς όπλισμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοὺς στρατευομένους καὶ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ἀντιπολέμους, ὧν τὰς διαφορὰς ό στρατηγός ἐπ' αὐτῶν εἴσεται τῶν καιρῶν· ἃ δ' ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα πολλαῖς ἀρμόζοι παρατάξεσι δίχα τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκην ἔχουσῶν νοεῖσθαι, ταῦθ' ὥς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δίδειμι.

XVI. Ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀντιπόμενον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συντάξει

Ἴππεῖς μὲν δὴ στρατηγὸς οὐχ οὕτως, ὥς βούλεται, μᾶλλον δ' ὥς ἀναγκάζεται, τάξει· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀντιπόμενον ἵππικὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον στήσει. ταπτέτω δ' ὥς τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ παρατάξεως μάχας ἐπὶ κέρως, ἵνα καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον καὶ ἐκ πλαγίων προσβάλλοντες καὶ τόπῳ μείζονι χρώμενοι, μέθ' οὓς οὐκ ἔτ' ἄλλοι τεταγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἔχουσιν ἀποχρῆσθαι τῇ τῆς ἵππικῆς ἐπιστήμῃ.

XVII. Ὅτι τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονιστὰς πρώτους στήσει τῆς φάλαγγος

Ψιλοὺς δέ, ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας, πρώτους πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος τάξει· κατόπιν μὲν γὰρ ὄντες πλείονα κακὰ διαθήσουσι τοὺς ἰδίους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐν μέσοις δ' αὐτοῖς ἄπρακτον ἔξουσι τὴν ἰδίαν ἐμπειρίαν, οὐθ' ὑποχωρεῖν ἀνὰ πόδα δυνάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἀνάτασιν τῶν ἀκοντίων, οὐτ' ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς βαλεῖν προηγουμένων ἄλλων καὶ παρὰ ποσὶν ὄντων, οὐδὲ μὴν οἱ σφενδονῆται κυκλόσε τὸν δῖνον ἀποτελεῖν τῆς σφενδόνης παρὰ πλευρὰν ἐστῶτων φιλιῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ρόμβον ἀντιπταιόντων, οἳ τε τοξόται προϊόντες μὲν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα καὶ κατὰ σκοπὸν ἐκτοξεύουσι τὰ βέλη, μετὰ δὲ τοὺς λόχους ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς μέσοις ὄντες εἰς ὕψος τοξεύουσιν, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἄνω φορὰν τόνον ἔχειν τὸ βέλος, αὐθις δέ, κἂν κατὰ κεφαλῆς πίπτῃ τῶν πολεμίων, ἐκκλεύσθαι καὶ μὴ πάνυ τι λυπεῖν τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

XVIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς τραχέσι τόποις τάττειν τοὺς ψιλοὺς

Εἰ δὲ συμβαίνοι γίνεσθαι τὴν μάχην ἐν χωρίοις τινὰς μὲν χθαμαλοὺς τινὰς δὲ βουνοειδὲς ἔχουσι τόπους, τότε δὴ μάλιστα τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἐν τοῖς τραχέσιν ταττέτω, καὶ δὴ, κἂν αὐτὸς τὰ πεδινὰ κατειλημμένος ᾖ, τῶν δὲ πολεμίων μέρη τινὰ τῆς φάλαγγος ὀχθώδεις διακατέχη τόπους, κατὰ τούτους ἐπαγέτω τοὺς ψιλοὺς· ῥᾷόν τε γὰρ βαλόντες ὑποχωροῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν τραχέων, ῥᾷστά τε τοῖς ἀνάντεσιν ἐπαναθέουσιν, ἂν ἐλαφροὶ τυγχάνωσιν.

XIX. Περὶ τοῦ χωρία ἔχειν τὰς παρατάξεις δι' ὧν ὀφείλουσιν οἱ ψιλοὶ ἐντὸς τῶν κοντῶν εἰσερχόμενοι ὑποστέλλεσθαι

[1] Ἐστω δὲ διαστήματα κατὰ τὰς τάξεις, ἵν', ἐπειδὰν ἐκκενώσωσιν ἔτι προαγόντων τῶν πολεμίων τὰ βέλη, πρὶν εἰς χεῖρας ἔλθεῖν τὰς φάλαγγας, ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐν κόσμῳ διεξίωσιν μέσσην τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ ἀταράχως ἐπὶ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἀποκομισθῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ κυκλεύειν αὐτοὺς ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα καὶ κάμπτειν κατὰ κέρας ἀσφαλές ἐστι — τάχα γὰρ που φθάσουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐν τούτῳ συμμίζαντες οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ μέσους ἀπολαβόντες — , οὔτε διὰ τῶν πεπυκνωμένων βιάζεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὰ ὅπλα ἐμπίπτοντας τάραχον ἐμποιεῖν ταῖς τάξεσιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλον ἐνσείοντος. [2] αἱ δὲ κατὰ κέρας ἔφοδοι τῶν ψιλῶν πλείονα λυμαίνονται τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐκ πλαγίων ἀκοντιζόντων καὶ εἰς τὰ γυμνὰ παραβιαζομένων παίειν. [3] ἡ δὲ τῆς σφενδόνης ἄμυνα χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἐστίν· ὃ τε γὰρ μόλιβδος ὁμόχρους ὢν τῷ ἀέρι λανθάνει φερόμενος, ὥστ' ἀπροοράτως ἀφυλάκτοις τοῖς τῶν πολεμίων ἐμπίπτειν σώμασιν, αὐτῆς τε τῆς ἐμπτώσεως σφοδρὰς οὔσης καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ροίζου τριβόμενον τῷ ἀέρι τὸ βέλος ἐκπυρωθὲν ὡς βαθυτάτῳ δύεται τῆς σαρκός, ὥστε μὴδ' ὀρᾶσθαι, ταχὺ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὄγκον ἐπιμύειν.

XX. Ὅπως δεῖ, ἐὰν ἀπορῇ ψιλῆς συμμαχίας ὁ στρατηγός, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι εὐπορῶσιν, ἐπιφέρεισθαι αὐτοῖς

[1] Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη τῆς τῶν ψιλῶν συμμαχίας, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι ταύτην πλεονεκτοῖεν, οἱ μὲν πρωτοστάται πυκνοὶ πορευέσθων ἔχοντες ἀνδρομήκεις θυρεοὺς, ὥστε σκέπειν ὅλα τὰ σώματα τοῖς μήκεσιν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ οἱ κατόπιν τούτων ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀράμενοι τοὺς θυρεοὺς τέως ἐχόντων, ἄχρι ἂν ἐντὸς γένωνται βέλους· οὕτως γάρ, ὥς εἶπεῖν, κεραμωθέντες οὐθὲν πείσονται δεινὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκηβόλων. [2] εἰ δὲ παρ' ἐκατέροις ἢ τῶν ψιλῶν εἴη βοήθεια, πρῶτοι πρὸ τῆς ἐκ χειρὸς μάχης ἀκροβολιζέσθων τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις, ἢ μετὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τῆς φάλαγγος ἐκ πλαγίων ἐπιθέοντες ἀποχρήσθων τοῖς βέλεσιν· συνελαύνονται γὰρ εἰς ὀλίγον καὶ οὐχ ἥττον θορυβοῦνται τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀμυντηρίοις.

XXI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἰς πολὺ μῆκος ἐκτείνειν τὴν φάλαγγα τὰς κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐναντίων φοβουμένου

[1] Τὰς δὲ κυκλώσεις φυλάττεσθαι βουλόμενος μὴθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ μῆκος ἐκτεινέτω τὴν δύναμιν, ὥστε ἀμπαν ἀσθενῇ καὶ ἀβαθῇ ποιῆσαι τὴν φάλαγγα — ταχὺ γάρ που συμβαίνει τοὺς πολεμίους διαρρήξαντας αὐτὴν δίοδον ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ μηκέτι παρὰ κέρας ἐνεργεῖν ταῖς κυκλώσεσιν, ἀλλὰ διεκπεσόντας μέσους κατὰ νότου γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ μὴ μόνον φυλαττέσθω παθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζητεῖται ποιεῖν, ἐὰν ἀσθενῇ καὶ λεπτὴν κατανοήσῃ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων φάλαγγα — , μὴθ' οὕτως ἐπ' οὐρὰν συσσελλέτω τὴν παράταξιν εἰς πολὺ βάθος ὑποστέλλων, ὥστ' ἐκ τοῦ ῥάστου τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπερκεράσαντας ἐντὸς αὐτὴν λαβεῖν. [2] ἰσχυροποιεῖται μέντοι γε τὴν οὐραγίαν καὶ τοὺς παρὰ πλευρὰν τῶν κεράτων μὴ ἔλαττον τῶν πρωτοστατῶν· οὐχ ἦττον γὰρ ἀποκωλύουσιν οἱ κατ' οὐρὰν τὰς κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐπὶ κέρας ἐκτεινομένων, ἐὰν ἦτοι φθάσας ὁ στρατηγὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀπλώσας τὴν οὐραγίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ κέρατα τῆς φάλαγγος ἀναβιβάσας ἐκατέρωθεν παραστήσῃ τοὺς κατόπιν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ καὶ παραγγεῖλῃ τοῖς ἐφθασμένοις ἤδη κυκλωθῆναι τὰ νῶτα τοῖς τῶν προηγουμένων νότοις ἐγκλίνοντας ἀμφίστομον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην.

[3] Ἀγχίνους μὲν στρατηγὸς τις πολλοὺς ὀρῶν τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτὸς ἐλάττοσι στρατιώταις μέλλων κινδυνεύειν ἐξελέξατο καὶ ἐπετήδευσε τοιούτων ἐπιτυχεῖν τόπων, ἐν οἷς ἢ παρὰ ποταμίαν ὄφρυν ταξάμενος ἀπαθεῖται ταύτῃ τὴν κύκλωσιν τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ παρῳρείαν ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἀποκλείσει τοὺς ὑπερκεράσαι βουλομένους, ὀλίγους ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν τοὺς ἀποκωλύσοντας ὑπὲρ κεφαλὴν ἀναβάνας γίνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους. [4] οὐ μὴν ἡ στρατηγικὴ φρόνησις ἐνταῦθα συλλαμβάνεται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τύχη· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπιτυχεῖν τοιούτων χωρίων· οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ γε κατασκευάσασθαι δυνατόν τοὺς τόπους· τῶν ὄντων μέντοι τοὺς ἀμείνους ἐκλέεσθαι καὶ τοὺς συνοίσοντας ἐννοῆσαι φρονίμου.

[5] Πολλάκις δὲ εἰώθασιν οἱ μεγάλη δυνάμει καὶ πολυάνδρῳ κεχρημένοι μνηοειδὲς σχῆμα ποιήσαντες τῆς παρατάξεως ἐπιέναι, νομίζοντες ὅτι προσάγονται τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα βουλομένους συνάπτειν, εἴτα κατὰ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς ὁδὸν κυρτουμένους ἐναπολήψονται τῷ περιέχοντι κόλπῳ, τὰς ἰδίας κεραίας ἐπισυνάπτοντες ἀλλήλαις εἰς κύκλου σχῆμα. [6] πρὸς οὓς ἀντεπακτέον οὐχ ὥδε· τριχῇ δὲ διελὼν τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν τῶν μὲν δουεῖν

ἐκατέρῳ μέρει κατὰ κέρας προσβαλλέτω τοῖς πολέμοις, τῷ δὲ ἐνί, τοῖς εἰς τὸν μέσον κόλπον τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς ἀντιπαρατεταγμένοις, ἐναντίος ἐστιάτω καὶ μὴ προαγέτω· ἢ γὰρ μένοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ κυκλοειδοῦς σχήματος οἱ κατὰ μέσην τὴν φάλαγγα τεταγμένοι τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἄπρακτοι μηδὲν δρῶντες ἐστήξονται, ἢ προϊόντες εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν, εἰ βούλονται προάγειν φαλαγγιδὸν εἰς εὐθεῖαν ἐκ τοῦ σιγματοειδοῦς ἀπλούμενοι σχήματος, ἀλλήλους ἐκθλίβουσι καὶ λύσουσι τὴν τάξιν — τῶν γὰρ ἔτι κέρως ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μενόντων χώρας καὶ μαχομένων οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς εὐθεῖαν ἀνελθεῖν — · ἔνθα δὴ τεταραγμένον αὐτῶν καὶ λελυκότων τὴν τάξιν τῷ τρίτῳ τάγματι καὶ ἐφέδρῳ προσβαλλέτω τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου κυρτώματος προάγουσιν ἀτάκτως εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν. [7] ἐὰν δὲ διαμένωσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κοίλου σχήματος, τοὺς ψιλοὺς καὶ ἐκηβόλους ἔνθα κατ' ἀντικρὺ ταττέτω· βάλλοντες γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολλὰ λυπήσουσιν. [8] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ λοξῇ πάσῃ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φάλαγγι προσβάλλει κατὰ θάτερον κέρας τῶν πολέμιων, οὐκ ἂν ἀμάρτοι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς σχήματος κύκλωσιν οὕτως ἀντεπιών· ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι πανστρατιᾷ κωλυόμενοι κατ' ὀλίγους κερασθήσονται, τῶν ἐπὶ θατέρου κέρως μόνων μαχομένων, οἳ καὶ πρῶτοι κατ' ἀνάγκην συμμίζουσι διὰ τὴν λοξὴν ἔφοδον.

[9] Οὐκ ἄχρηστον δέ ποτε καὶ ἀντιπαραταξάμενον ὑπὸ πόδα τῷ στρατεύματι χωρεῖν, ὥς καταπεπληγμένον, ἢ καὶ ἐπιστρέψαντα παραπλησίαν φυγῇ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχώρησιν ἐν τάξει, εἴτ' αὖθις μεταβαλλόμενον ἀντεπιέναι τοῖς ἐπιούσιν· ἐνίστε γὰρ ὑπὸ χαρᾶς οἱ πολέμοι δόξαντες φεύγειν τοὺς ἐναντίους λύσαντες τὰς τάξεις ἐπικέονται προπηδῶντες ἄλλων ἄλλοι, ἐφ' οὓς ἀκίνδυνον ἐπιστρέψαντας μάχεσθαι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ παρ' ἐλπίδα τοῦ στήναι θάρσει καταπληξαμένους εἰς φυγὴν αὖθις τοὺς πάλαι διώκοντας τρέπεσθαι.

XXII. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν κεχωρισμένους ἐπιλέκτους εἰς βοήθειαν τῶν καταπονουμένων. περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐγκρύματα

[1] Ἐχέτω δέ που καὶ στρατιώτας λογάδας ἰδίᾳ τεταγμένους ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ὥσπερ ἐφέδρους τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς τὰ καταπονούμενα μέρη τῆς δυνάμεως, ἵν' ἐξ ἐτοίμου τοὺς ἐπικουρήσοντας ἐπάγῃ· καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ ὀλίγον ὦνσαν ἀκμῆτες ἐπελθόντες ἤδη κεκοπιακόσι· τοὺς τε γὰρ τεταλαιπωρηκότας ἤδη τῶν φίλων ἀνέλαβον καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐκλελυμένοις ἀκμάζοντες ἐπέθεντο. [2] γίγνοιτο δ' ἂν τι καὶ τούτου χρησιμώτερον, ἐκ τῆς παρατάξεως ἀπωτέρω σταδίοις, ὅποσοις ἂν ἀποχρῆν αὐτῷ δοκῇ, ἐκπέμψαι μέρος τι τῆς αὐτοῦ στρατιᾶς ἀπροόρατον τοῖς πολεμίοις, παραγγείλας σφίσιν, ἐπειδὴν συμβάλλῃ τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τότε πυθομένους παρὰ τῶν σκοπῶν ἀναστάντας ἐπείγεσθαι· καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ποιητέον, ὅταν προσδόκιμος οὕσα συμμαχία τοῦ καιροῦ καθυστερῇ· δόξαντες γὰρ οἱ πολέμιοι τούτους ἐκείνους εἶναι καὶ συμμάχους ποθὲν ἦκειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἴσως ἂν ἔτι καὶ προσιόντων πρὶν ἢ συμμῖξαι τοὺς ἐπιβάλλοντας εἰς φυγὴν ὀρμήσαιεν, οὐ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πλεῖον ἐπιέναι πλῆθος νομίζοντες. [3] ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δεινοῖς ἐπιφανεῖαι πολεμίων ἀπειράστων ἐκπλήττουσι τὰς ψυχάς· προλαμβάνουσαι γάρ τι χειρὸν, οὗ πείσονται, φοβερώτερον ἐκδέχονται τὸ μέλλον.

[4] Ἐκπληκτικωτάτη δ', ἣ καὶ δραστικωτάτη μάλιστα πάντων, ἡ κατὰ νότου τῶν πολεμίων αἰφνίδιος ἐπιβολή, εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν γένοιτο προεκπέμψαντι στρατιωτῶν σύνταγμα νύκτωρ ἐκπεριελθεῖν κελεῦσαι τοὺς πολεμίους, ἵνα κατόπιν αὐτῶν γένωνται πάντες, ὥστε ἔωθεν ἀναστάντας ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας μετὰ τὸ συμμῖξαι πρὸς μάχην τὰ στρατεύματα κατὰ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἐπιφαίνεσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις· οὐδὲ γὰρ φεύγουσιν ἂν ἔτι σφίσιν ἐλπίς ἀπολείποιο σωτηρίας, οὐδ' εἰς τοῦπίσω δυναμένοις ἐπιστραφεῖναι διὰ τοὺς ἐξ ἐναντίας μαχομένους, οὐδ' εἰς τὸ πρόσω φέρεσθαι διὰ τοὺς κατόπιν ἐπικειμένους.

XXIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῶν καιρῶ αὐτῷ τῆς μάχης ἐκφωνεῖν χαρμόσυνα τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· εἰ καὶ ψευδῇ, ὅμως συμφέρει

[1] Καὶ δὴ ποτε παριπαζόμενος ἐμβοησάτω τοῖς φίλοις, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ τύχοι κέρως ὦν, “νικῶσιν ἄνδρες οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν πολεμίων,” εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ, νικᾶν λεγέτω τὸ φίλιον δεξιόν, ἐάν τε καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἦ τοῦτο γινόμενον ἐάν τε μή· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναγκαῖον εἶπεῖν, ὅπου “μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν.” οἷον βοηῆσαι πάλιν αὖ μακρὰν ἀποστατοῦντος τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων ἡγεμόνος ἢ ἐπὶ θατέρου κέρως ὄντος ἢ τὰ μέσα συνέχοντος τῆς φάλαγγος, “τέθνηκεν ὁ τῶν πολεμίων στρατηγός” ἢ “βασιλεύς,” ἢ ὅστις ἂν ποτε ἦ. [2] καὶ ταῦτα χρή βοᾶν οὕτως, ὥσθ’ ἅμα καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους κατακούειν· οἳ τε γὰρ φίλοι τοὺς σφετέρους ἀκούοντες ἐπικυδестέρους ἀναθαρροῦσι καὶ διπλάσιοι γίνονται ταῖς προυθμίαις, οἳ τε ἐχθροὶ τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐλαττώματα πυνθανόμενοι συγκαταπίπτουσι ταῖς διανοίαις, ὥστ’ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ εἰς φυγὴν ἅμα τῷ δέξασθαι τοιαύτην φήμην ὁρμᾷν. [3] οὕτως πολλάκις συνήνεγκεν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἅμα τοῖς πολεμίους ἐξαπατῆσαι, τοῖς μὲν τὰ κρεῖττω, τοῖς δὲ τὰ χεῖρω ψευδόμενον.

XXIV. Περὶ τοῦ οἰκείους πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρὸς γνωρίμους τάττειν

Φρονίμου δὲ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τὸ τάττειν ἀδελφοὺς παρ' ἀδελφοῖς, φίλους παρὰ φίλοις, ἐραστὰς παρὰ παιδικοῖς· ὅταν γὰρ ᾗ τὸ κινδυνεῦον τὸ πλησίον προσφιλέστερον, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀγαπῶντα φιλοκινδυνότερον ὑπὲρ τοῦ πέλας ἀγωνίζεσθαι· καὶ δὴ τις αἰδούμενος μὴ ἀποδοῦναι χάριν ὧν εὖ πέπονθεν αἰσχύνεται καταλιπὼν τὸν εὐεργετήσαντα πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἄρξαι φυγῆς.

XXV. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δι' ἑαυτοῦ διδόναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὰ σημεῖα εἴτε τῆς συμβολῆς εἴτε ἄλλης τινὸς πράξεως, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων

[1] Πᾶν δὲ παράγγελμα καὶ σύνθημα καὶ παρασύνθημα δίδωτο διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων· ἐπιόντα γὰρ κηρύττειν ἅπασιν ἰδιώτου καὶ ἀπείρου κομιδῇ καθέστηκεν, καὶ χρόνος ἐν τῷ παραγγέλλειν ἀναλίσκεται, καὶ θόρυβος ὁμοῦ πάντων ἀλλήλους ἐρωτώντων· εἴθ' ὁ μὲν προσέθηκέ τι πλεῖον ὧν ὁ στρατηγὸς εἶπεν, ὁ δ' ἀφείλετο τοῦ ῥηθέντος παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν. [2] δεῖ δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἡγεμόσιν εἰπεῖν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τοῖς μετ' αὐτούς, εἴτα τούτους τοῖς κατόπιν, εἴθ' ἐξῆς ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων, τοὺς πρώτους τοῖς ὑπὸ πόδα σημαίνοντας· οὕτως γὰρ ἐν τάχει καὶ μετὰ κόσμου καὶ μέθ' ἡσυχίας εἴσονται, παραπλησίον τοῦ παραγγέλματος τοῖς φρυκτωροῦσι γιγνομένου· [3] καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων, ὅταν ὁ πρῶτος ἄρῃ τὸν φρυκτόν, ὁ δεύτερος τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐπύρσευσεν, εἴθ' ὁ τρίτος τῷ τετάρτῳ, καὶ τέταρτος πέμπτῳ, καὶ πέμπτος ἕκτῳ καὶ καθ' ἓνα πάντες ἀλλήλοις, ὥστ' ἐν ὅξει διὰ μήκους σταδίων τὸ σημανθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου πάντα ἐπιγνῶναι.

XXVI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ μόνον συνθήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρασυνθήματα διδόναι

[1] Τὸ δὲ παρασύνθημα μὴ διὰ φωνῆς λεγέσθω, ἀλλὰ διὰ σώματος γινέσθω, ἢ νεύματι χειρὸς ἢ ὅπλων συγκρούσει ἢ ἐγκλίσει δορατίου ἢ παραφορᾷ ξίφους, ἵνα μὴ μόνον γενομένης ποτὲ ταραχῆς πιστεύσωσι τῷ λεγομένῳ συνθήματι — τοῦτο γὰρ δύνανται καὶ πολέμιοι καταλαβέσθαι πολλάκις ἀκούοντες — , ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ παρασυνθήματι. [2] χρησιμώτατον δέ που τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑτερογλώσσους συμμαχίας τῶν ἐθνῶν· οὔτε γὰρ λέγειν οὔτε ξυνιέναι δυνάμενοι φωνῆς ἀλλοτρίας αὐτῷ τῷ παρασυνθήματι κρίνουνσι τό τε φίλιον καὶ τὸ πολέμιον. διδόντων δὲ ταῦτα, κἂν μὴ μάχεσθαι μέλλωσιν, ἐν ταῖς παρεμβολαῖς πρὸς τὰς ἀδήλους ταραχάς.

XXVII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ λύειν τὰς τάξεις μήτε ἐν ταῖς διατάξεσι μήτε ἐν ταῖς ὑποχωρήσεσι

Παραγγελλέτω δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑποχωρήσεις ἐν τάξει ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς διώξεις, ἵνα ἡττόν τε σφαλλόμενοι βλάπτωνται μὴ κατ' ἄνδρα σποράδες ἐν ταῖς φυγαῖς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς πολεμίοις, πλεονά τε κατορθοῦντες βλάπτωσι κατὰ τάξεις καὶ λόχους ἰσχυρότεροι τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπιφαινόμενοι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλέστεροι· πολλάκις γὰρ ἀτάκτως ἐπιφερομένους οἱ πολέμιοι θεασάμενοι συμφρονήσαντες αὐθις ἐκ μεταβολῆς αὐτῶν καταστάντες εἰς τάξιν παλίντροπον ἐποίησαντο τὴν δίωξιν· ὅλως δὲ μηδὲν σφισιν ἄμεινον εἶναι λεγέτω τοῦ μένειν ἐν τάξει μὴδ' ἐπισφαλέστερον τοῦ λύειν.

XXVIII. Περὶ τοῦ δι' ἐπιμελείας ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν λαμπρὸν ἐκτάττειν τὸ στράτευμα

Μεμελημένον δ' ἔστω τῷ στρατηγῷ λαμπρὸν ἐκτάττειν τὸ στράτευμα τοῖς ὅπλοις, ῥάδια δ' ἢ φροντὶς αὕτη παρακαλέσαντι τὰ ξίφη θήγειν καὶ τὰς κόρυθας καὶ τοὺς θώρακας σμήχειν· δεινότεροι γὰρ οἱ ἐπιόντες φαίνονται λόχοι τοῖς τῶν ὅπλων αἰθύγμασι, καὶ πολλὰ τὰ δι' ὧσεως δείματα προεμπίπτοντα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ταραττεῖ τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον.

XXIX. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἀλαλάζειν

[1] Ἐπαγέτω δὲ τὸ στράτευμα καὶ σὺν ἀλαλαγμῷ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σὺν δρόμῳ· καὶ γὰρ ὄψις καὶ βοή καὶ πάταγος ὄπλων ἐξίστησι τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας. [2] ἀνατεινόντων δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐφόδους ἄθροοι, πρὶν εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν, ὑπὲρ τὰς κεφαλὰς μετέωρα τὰ ξίφη πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον θαμὰ παρεγκλίνοντες· ἐσμηγμέναι γὰρ αἰχμαὶ καὶ λαμπρὰ ξίφη καὶ ἐπάλληλα παραμαρμαίροντα πρὸς ἀνταύγειαν ἡλίου δεινὴν ἀστραπὴν πολέμου προεκπέμπει· καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν εἰ γίγνοιτο καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀντικαταπλήττειν ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ δὲ μή, προεκπλήττειν.

[3] Ἐνίστε δέ ποτε χρήσιμον ἐν καιρῷ μὴ φθάνειν ἐκτάττοντα τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ τέως ἐντὸς τοῦ χάρακος κατέχειν, ἄχρι ἂν κατοπτέυσῃ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παράταξιν, ὅποια τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς τέτακται καὶ ἐφ' οἷων ἴσταται χωρίων.

**XXX. Ὅτι δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου
συλλογίζεσθαι, τίς ὀφείλει ὑπαντῆσαι κατὰ τὴν
συμβολὴν τῷ δεῖνι καὶ τίς τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ οὕτως καθεξῆς
ἐξετάζειν τοὺς ἰδίους ἄρχοντας πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων**

Εἴτά που τότε συλλογισάμενον, τίνας τίσιν ἀντιτάττειν χρή καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸν ἱατρὸν προκατανοήσαντα νόσον σώματος ἀντεπάγειν τὰ ἀλεξήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐκτάττειν, ὡς ἂν ἄριστ' αὐτῷ δόξαι συμφέρειν· ἀναγκάζονται γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὀπλισμοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔθνη καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἥθη τὰ ἰδία στρατεύματα κοσμεῖν καὶ παρατάττειν.

XXXI. Περὶ τοῦ, ἐὰν οἱ ἐναντίοι προτερεύωσι τῷ ἵππικῳ, ἐκλέγεσθαι στενοὺς τόπους

[1] Ἴπποκρατούντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων, ἐὰν ἢ δυνατόν, ἐπιλεγέσθω χωρία τραχέα καὶ στενὰ καὶ παρ' ὄρη, ἃ ἥκιστα ἱππάσιμα, ἢ φυγομαχείτω κατὰ δύναμιν, ἕως ἂν ἐπιτηδεῖους εὖρη τόπους καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀρμόζοντας πράγμασιν. [2] ἀπολελείφθων δέ τινες καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρακος οἱ παραφυλάττοντες τὴν παρεμβολὴν στρατιῶται καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοὺς ἀποσκευῆς φυλακὴν, ἵνα μὴ κατανοήσας ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἔρημον ὄντα πέμψη τοὺς ἀρπασομένους τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ καταληψομένους τὸ χωρίον.

XXXII. Περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν παρακεκινδυνευμένον ποιεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν

[1] Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἢ τὰ ἰδία καθαιροῦντας ἐρύματα στρατηγούς ἢ ποταμούς διαβαίνοντας ἢ κρημνοὺς καὶ βάραθρα κατόπιν ποιουμένους τῶν φίλων, ἴν' ἢ μένοντες νικῶσιν ἢ βουληθέντες φεύγειν ἀπόλωνται, οὔτε πάμπαν ἐπαινεῖν οὔτε ψέγειν ἔχω. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ παρακεκινδυνευμένον μᾶλλον τόλμης ἐστὶν ἢ γνώμης καὶ τῇ τύχῃ κεκοινώνηκε πλεῖον ἢ τῇ κρίσει. [2] ὅπου γὰρ ἢ νικῶντα δεῖ κρατεῖν ἢ ἡττηθέντα τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφάλθαι, πῶς ἐνταῦθ' ἂν τις ἢ φρονήσει τὸ νικᾶν ἢ προαιρέσει τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι μαρτυρήσειεν; [3] ἐγὼ δὲ στρατιώταις μὲν ἐκ στρατεύματος φιλοτόλμως κινδυνεύειν ἐπιτρεπτέον εἶναι νομίζω — καὶ γὰρ δρῶντές τι μεῖζον ὦνησαν καὶ παθόντες οὐθὲν τοσοῦτον ἐλύπησαν — , στρατεύματι δὲ παντὶ τὴν ἄδηλον ἐκκυβεύειν τύχην οὐ δοκιμάζω. [4] μάλιστα δ' ἁμαρτάνειν οὐτοί μοι δοκοῦσιν, οἳ τινες ἐν μὲν τῷ νικᾶν ὀλίγα λυπήσειν μέλλοντες τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐν δὲ τῶν ἡττᾶσθαι μεγάλα βλάψειν τοὺς φίλους ἀποχρῶνται τοιοῦτοις στρατηγήμασιν.

[5] Εἰ δὲ πρόδηλος μὲν σφισιν ὁ ὄλεθρος εἴη, κἂν μὴ παραβόλοις ἐγχειρήσωσι στρατηγίαις, πρόδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν πολεμίων ἡττηθέντων ἀπώλεια, τότε οὐκ ἂν μοι δόξειεν ἁμαρτάνειν ἀποφράττων τὰς φυγὰς τῶν φίλων· ἄμεινον γὰρ ἐν τῶν τολμᾶν ἐπ' ἀδήλῳ τῷ τάχα μηδὲ πείσεσθαι τι δεινὸν ἅμα καὶ δρᾶσαι ζητεῖν, ἢ ἐπὶ προδήλῳ τῷ μηδὲν δρῶντας ἀπολέσθαι πάντας ἀτόλμως ἡσυχάζειν. [6] ὑποδεικνύτω μέντοι μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις χωρίοις, ὅπου κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρία τοῖς φεύγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ καὶ πάσῃ μάχῃ διδασκέτω διὰ πλειόνων, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν φεύγουσι πρόδηλος ὁ ὄλεθρος, ὥς ἂν ἤδη μετ' ἐξουσίας ἐπικειμένων τῶν πολεμίων μηδενὸς ἔτι δυναμένου διακωλύειν τοὺς διώκοντας πᾶν ὃ βούλονται διαθεῖναι τοὺς φεύγοντας, τοῖς δὲ μένουσιν ἄδηλος ὁ θάνατος ἀμυνομένοις. [7] οἳ τινες γὰρ πεπεισμένοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν, ὥς φεύγοντες μὲν αἰσchrῶς ἀπολοῦνται, μένοντες δ' εὐκλεῶς τεθνήξονται, καὶ χεῖρον' ἀεὶ προσδοκῶσιν ἐκ τοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ φυλάττειν, ἄριστοι κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ἄνδρες ἐξετάζονται. [8] διόπερ ἀγαθὸν μὲν, εἰ πάντας οὕτως ἔχειν γνώμης πεῖσαι στρατηγός, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ μέντοι γ' ὥς πλείστους· ἢ γὰρ παντελεῖς περιεποιήσατο νίκας ἢ μικροῖς ἐλαττώμασι περιέπεσε.

[9] Τῶν δ' ἐκ προλήψεως καὶ πρὶν ἢ συμβαλεῖν ἐπινοουμένων στρατηγοῖς αἱ παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρὸν ἐπινοοίαι νίκης καὶ ἀντιστρατηγήσεις ἔστιν

ὅτε καὶ πλείους καὶ θαυμασιώτεροι γίνονται τοῖς τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἡσκηκόσιν, ἃς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑποσημῆναι λόγῳ ἢ προβουλεῦσαι. [10] ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ κυβερνῆται πρὸς μὲν τὸν πλοῦν ἐκ λιμένων ἀνάγονται πάντα ἐξηρτυμένοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν ναῦν, ἐπειδὴν δ' ἐμπέσῃ χειμῶν, οὐχ ὁ βούλονται ποιῶσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀναγκάζονται, πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐπείγοντα κίνδυνον εὐτόλμως παραβαλλόμενοι, καὶ οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς μελέτης εἰσφερόμενοι μνήμην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν βοήθειαν· οὕτως οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐκτάξουσιν, ὅπως σφίσι νομίζουσι συνοίσειν, ἐπειδὴν δ' ὁ τοῦ πολέμου περιστῇ χειμῶν πολλὰ θραύων καὶ παραλλάττων καὶ ποικίλας ἐπάγων περιστάσεις, ἢ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψις ἐπιζητεῖ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ἐπινοίας, ἃς ἢ ἀνάγκη τῆς τύχης μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ μνήμη τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑποβάλλει.

XXXIII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτοχειρὶ πολεμεῖν

[1] Μαχέσθω δὲ ὁ στρατηγὸς αὐτὸς προμηθέστερον ἢ τολμηρότερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀπεχέσθω τοῦ τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἀνυπέρβλητον ἀνδρίαν εἰσενέγκαιτο, τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ὠφελῆσαι δύναται στράτευμα μαχόμενος, ὅσον ἀποθανὼν βλάψαι· στρατηγοῦ γὰρ ἡ γνώμη πλεον ἰσχύει τῆς ῥώμης· σώματος μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρία δρᾶσαι τι μετὰ καὶ στρατιώτης δύναται, γνώμης δὲ προμηθεΐα βουλευσάι τι κρεῖττον οὐκ ἄλλος.

[2] ὄνπερ δ' ἂν τρόπον, εἰ κυβερνήτης ἀφειμένος τῶν οἰάκων, ἃ δεῖ τοὺς ναύτας ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς πράττοι, κινδυνεύειν ἂν συμβαίῃ τὸ σκάφος, τοῦτον, εἰ στρατηγὸς ἀποστάς τοῦ γνώμῃ τι βουλεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν καταβαίνειν χρεΐας, ἢ τῶν ὅλων ἀκυβέρνητος ἀμελεία τὴν ἀναγκαιοτέραν ἄπρακτον ποιήσει βοήθειαν. [3] ὅμοιον δὴ κρίνω τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐμπαρβαλέσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ τῷ τῆς συμπάσης, εἰ πείσεται τι, δυνάμεως ἀκηδεῖν· εἰ γάρ, ἐν ᾧ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἡ σωτηρία στρατεύματός ἐστιν, οὗτος οὐδὲν εἰ τεθνήξεται πεφρόντικε, τὸ πᾶν αἰρεῖται συνδιαφθεῖραι, καὶ ὀρθῶς δ' ἂν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τοῦτον ὡς ἄπρακτον στρατηγὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνδρεῖον. [4] ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολλὰ γνώμῃ στρατηγήσας ἀρκεσθήσεται σεμνυνόμενος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς εὐπραγίαις, ὅστις δ' οὕτως ἀπειρόκαλός ἐστιν, ὥστ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ διὰ μάχης εἰ χεῖρας ἔλθοι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἄξιον εἰργᾶσθαι νομίζειν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖος, ἀλλὰ ἄλογος καὶ τολμηρός ἐστιν. [5] ὅθεν ἐπιφαίνειν μὲν δεῖ τῷ πλήθει τὸ φιλοκίνδυνον, ἵνα τὴν προθυμίαν ἐκκαλῇται τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ἀγωνίζεσθαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον, καὶ τοῦ θανάτου μὲν καταφρονεῖν, εἴ τι πάσχοι τὸ στράτευμα, μὴδ' αὐτὸν αἰρούμενον ζῆν, σωζομένου δὲ καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν φυλάττειν ψυχὴν· ἥδη γὰρ ἐπικυδέστερα τὰ τῶν φιλίων ὄντα ποτὲ στρατηγὸς ἀποθανὼν ἐμείωσεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πταίοντες ἐπανεθάρρηνσαν τὸ ἀντίπαλον ἀστρατήγητον ἰδόντες, οἱ δ' εὐτυχοῦντες ἐδυσθύμησαν τὸν ἴδιον ἡγεμόνα ζητοῦντες. [6] στρατηγοῦ δ' ἔστι τὸ παριπλάζεσθαι ταῖς τάξεσιν, ἐπιφαίνεσθαι τοῖς κινδυνεύουσιν, ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς ἀνδριζομένους, ἀπειλεῖν τοῖς ἀποδειλιῶσι, παρακαλεῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας, ἀναπληροῦν τὸ ἐλλεῖπον, ἀντιμετάγειν εἰ δέοι λόχον, ἐπαμύνειν τοῖς κάμνουσι, προορᾶσθαι τὸν καιρόν, τὴν ὥραν, τὸ μέλλον.

XXXIV. Περὶ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν κατὰ τὸ μέτρον ἓνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνδραγαθούντων

[1] Ἀνακαλεσάμενος δ' ἐκ τῆς μάχης πρῶτον μὲν ἀποδιδότω τοῖς θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ πομπάς, αἷς ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ χρῆσθαι πάρεστι, τὰ νομιζόμενα χαριστήρια μετὰ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου παντελεῖ νίκην ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἔπειτα τοὺς μὲν ἀρίστους ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐξετασθέντας τιμάτω δωρεαῖς καὶ τιμαῖς, αἷς νόμος, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς φανέντας κολαζέτω. [2] τιμαὶ δ' ἔστωσαν μὲν καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ κατὰ τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις νόμιμα· στρατηγικαὶ δὲ αὗται· πανοπλῖαι, κόσμοι, λαφύρων δόσεις, πεντηκονταρχίαι, ἑκατονταρχίαι, λοχαγίαι, τάξεων ἀφηγήσεις, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ νόμους παρ' ἐκάστοις ἡγεμονίαι· τῶν μὲν ιδιωτῶν τοῖς ἀνδραγαθήσασιν αἱ ἥττους ἐξουσίαι, τῶν δὲ ἡγεμόνων τοῖς ἀριστεύσασιν αἱ μείζους ἡγεμονίαι· αὗται γὰρ ἀμοιβαὶ τε μεγάλωψυχοι τοῖς ἤδη τὸ γενναῖον εἰργασμένοις προτροπαὶ τε ἀναγκαῖαι τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. [3] ὅπου δὲ τιμὴ μὲν ἀποδίδεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, τιμωρία δ' οὐ παραπέμπεται τῶν κακῶν, ἐνταῦθα καλὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὸ στρατόπεδον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβήθησαν ἀμαρτάνειν, οἱ δὲ ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀνδραγαθεῖν. [4] ἔνθα μέντοι χρὴ καὶ νικῶντα μὴ κατ' ἄνδρα μόνον ἀμοιβὰς ἐκτίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ σύμπαντι στρατεύματι τῶν κινδύνων ἐπικαρπῖαν ἀποδιδόναι· τὰ γὰρ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιτρεπέτω τοῖς στρατιώταις διαρπάζειν, εἰ χάρακος ἢ ἀποσκευῆς ἢ φρουρίου κυριεύσειεν, ὅτε δὲ καὶ πόλεως, εἰ μὴ τι μέλλοι περὶ αὐτῆς χρηστότερον βουλευεῖν. [5] οὕτως γὰρ ἂν καὶ μάλιστα μήπω τέλος εἰληφότος τοῦ πολέμου συνοίσοι πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα προθυμότερον ἐπὶ τὰς μάχας αὐτῶν ἐξιόντων, εἰ μὴ νομίζομεν τοὺς μὲν θηρευτικούς κύνας δελεάζειν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῖς κυνηγοῖς αἵματι θηρίων καὶ τοῖς τοῦ συλληφθέντος ζώου σπλάγχχοις, τοῖς δὲ νικῶσι στρατιώταις τὰ τῶν ἡττημένων εἰς προτροπὴν οὐ μάλα δὴ τι συμφέρον ἀποδιδόναι.

XXXV. α'. Ὅτι οὐ χρή πάντοτε ἐπιτρέπειν τὰς ἀρπαγὰς, καὶ ὅτι τὰ σώματα οὐ χρή ἀρπάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν πιπράσκειν

[1] Τὰς δ' ἀρπαγὰς οὐτ' ἐπὶ πάσης μάχης ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐδ' αἰεὶ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὦν μὲν, ὦν δ' οὐ, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων ἥκιστα· ταῦτα δὲ πιπράσκειν τὸν στρατηγόν. [2] εἰ δὲ χρημάτων δέοι καὶ δαπάνης κοινῆς καὶ μεγάλης, καὶ ὅσα ἄγεται καὶ φέρεται πάνθ' ὥς αὐτὸν ἀναπέμπεσθαι κηρυττέτω. [3] γνώῃ δ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἄριστα πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς, εἰ τὰ πάντα δέοι λαμβάνειν, εἴτ' ἐκ μέρους, εἴτε μηθὲν ὧν ἔτυχεν· οὐ γέ μιν ἔστι πολέμου καὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς εἶναι χρημάτων δαψίλειαν καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀνεπικώλυτον ὠφέλειαν· ἥδη δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἡττημένων πλούτους καὶ παρὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων εὐδαιμονίας αἰ ὠφέλειαι σφισι δαψιλέστεραι γίνονται.

β'. Περὶ αἰχμαλώτων

[4] Τοὺς δὲ αἰχμαλώτους, ἐὰν ὁ πόλεμος ἔτι συνεστῶς ᾖ, μὴ κτεινέτω, μάλιστα μὲν τῶν πρὸς οὓς ἐστὶν ὁ πόλεμος, κἂν δοκῇ οἱ, τοὺς συμμάχους ἀναιρεῖν, ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους καὶ λαμπροὺς παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐνθυμούμενος τὰ ἄδηλα τῆς τύχης καὶ τὸ παλίντροπον τοῦ δαιμονίου φιλοῦντος ὥς τὰ πολλὰ νεμεσᾶν, ἵν' εἴ τινων αὐτοὶ ἢ σωμάτων, ὧν πολὺς πόθος, ἢ φρουρίου κρατήσαιεν, ἱκανὰ ἀντικαταλλάγματα δοὺς ἔχη κομίσασθαι τὰ τῶν φίλων, ἢ τότε γέ μὴ βουλομένων ἐνδίκως εἰς ἴσον ἀμύνηται. [5] μετὰ δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐπιτρέπέσθων αὐτοῖς εὐωχίαι τε καὶ κλισίαι καὶ πόνων ἀνέσεις, ἵν' εἰδότες, οἷον τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦ μαχομένου νικᾶν, ὑπομένωσι τὰ δυσχερῆ πάντα πρὸ τοῦ νικᾶν.

XXXVI. α'. Περὶ τοῦ θάπτειν τοὺς ἐν πολέμῳ ἀναιρουμένους

[1] Προνοεῖσθω δὲ τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν κηδείας, μήτε καιρὸν μήθ' ὥραν μήτε τόπον μήτε φόβον προφασιζόμενος, ἅν τε τύχῃ νικῶν, ἅν τε ἡττώμενος· ὅσῃ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποικομένους εὐσέβεια, ἀναγκαῖα δὲ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας ἀπόδειξις. [2] ἕκαστος γὰρ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὡς αὐτὸς ἀμελούμενος, εἰ πεσὼν ἔτυχεν, παρ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀρῶν τὴν τύχην καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος καταμαντευόμενος, ὡς οὐδ' αὐτός, εἰ τεθναίῃ, ταφησόμενος ἐπαχθῶς φέρει τὴν ἀτύμβευτον ὕβριν.

β'. Περὶ τοῦ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι τὴν ἐλάττωσιν

[3] Εἰ δὲ ἡττῶτο, παραμυθησάμενος τοὺς ἀνασωθέντας ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἐφεδρευέτω, καιρὸν ἔνθα πού καὶ μᾶλλον οἰόμενος ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐλάττωσιν. [4] εἰώθασι γὰρ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ μετ' εὐπραγίας οἱ στρατιῶται ῥαθυμότερον ἐκλύεσθαι περὶ τὰς φυλακάς· ἡ γὰρ τῶν πέλας καταφρόνησις ἀμελείας σφίσι γίνεταί αἰτία τῶν οἰκείων, οὕτως τε πολλάκις τὰ εὐτυχήματα πλεῖον ἔβλαψε τῷ δυστυχημάτων. [5] ὁ μὲν γὰρ πταίσας ἐδιδάχθη καὶ φυλάξασθαι τὸ μέλλον, ἐξ ὧν ἔπαθεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ δυστυχεῖν ἄπειρος οὐδ', ὡς δεῖ φυλάξαι τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἔμαθεν. [6] εἴτ' αὖ νικῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχέτω προμήθειαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν ἀμελῶν, ἣν ἂν εἰς τὸ δρᾶσαι τι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ῥαθυμοῦντας εἰσενέγκαιτο. φόβος γὰρ εὐκαιρος ἀσφάλεια προμηθείας, ὡς καὶ καταφρόνησις ἄκαιρος ἐνεπιβούλευτος τόλμα.

XXXVII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν καιρῷ εἰρήνης μὴ ἀφυλάκτως εἶναι

[1] Ἀνοχὰς δὲ ποιησάμενος μὴδ' ἐπιτιθέσθω μὴδ' αὐτὸς ἀφύλακτος ἔστω· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἥσυχον ἐχέτω πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ὡς ἐν εἰρήνῃ, τὸ δ' ἀσφαλὲς εἰς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν, ὡς ἐν πολέμῳ. [2] δεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἀσύνθηκον ἐν σπονδαῖς εἶναι οὔτ' αὐτόν τι φθάνειν ἀσεβὲς δρῶντα, ἀλλ' ὑποπτον, ὡς φυλάττεσθαι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ὑπουλον· ἄδηλοι γὰρ αἱ τῶν σπεισασμένων γνῶμαι. [3] καὶ παρὰ σοι μὲν ἔστω τὸ βέβαιον τοῦ μὴ ἀδικῆσαι διὰ τὸ εὐσεβές, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπονοεῖσθω τὸ μὴ πιστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀπεχθές· ἀσφαλὲς γὰρ οὗτος καὶ προμηθής, ὃς οὐδὲ βουληθεῖσι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐπιθέσθαι τὸν τοῦ δύνασθαι παρασπονδήσαι καιρὸν ἀπολείπει. [4] οἵτινες δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ποιοῦνται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πάθωσιν ἐκδικίαν, εὐσεβὲς μὲν φρονοῦσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀσφαλῆ ποιοῦσιν. [5] κομιδῇ γὰρ ἀνοήτων ἐστὶν ἐλπίδι τοῦ τοὺς παρασπονδήσαντας ἐκτίσειν δίκας ἀπρονοήτους ἔχειν τοὺς περὶ σφῶν κινδύνους, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς σώζεσθαι μέλλοντας ἅμα τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐξὸν μετὰ τῆς τῶν ἰδίων πραγμάτων ἀσφαλείας πεῖραν λαμβάνειν τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἀσεβείας· οὕτως γὰρ αὐτοὶ τε διὰ τὸ προμηθὲς οὐκ ἂν παύσαιεν ἐπιβουλευθέντες, ἀσεβήσουσί τε οἱ πολέμοι τῷ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ δοκεῖν πεποιηκέναι ἂν, εἰ ἐδυνήθησαν.

XXXVIII. α'. Περὶ τοῦ τὰς προσαγόμενος πόλεις ἐν ἀδείᾳ ἔχειν καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ

[1] Ταῖς δὲ προσχωρούσαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τινες ἐπιτρέποιεν αὐτὰς ἀρξάμεναι, φιλανθρώπως καὶ χρηστῶς προσφερέσθω· προσαγάγοιτο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας· ἡ γὰρ ἐλπίς τοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι δελεάζουσα προσάγεται τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐκόντας ἐγχειρίζειν. [2] ὅστις δὲ πικρῶς εὐθὺς καὶ πολεμικῶς προσφέρεται κύριος γενόμενος πόλεως ἢ διαρπάζων ἢ κτείνων ἢ κατασκάπτων, ἄλλοτριωτέρας διατίθῃ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ὥστε καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτῷ ἐπίπονον καὶ τὴν νίκην δύσελπιν κατασκευάζειν· [3] εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς ἀπαραίτητόν ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ὑποχειρίων πρὸς τοῦ κρατήσαντος τιμωρία, πᾶν ὅτιοῦν ὑπομένουσι καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παραδοῦναι τὰς πόλεις. [4] οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτως κατασκευάζει γενναίους, ὡς φόβος ὧν μέλλουσι πείσεσθαι κακῶν εἴξαντες· ἡ γὰρ προσδοκία τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ καθυφεῖσθαι τὰ σφέτερα δεινὴν ἐντίθησι φιλοτιμίαν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. [5] χαλεπαὶ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπεγνωσμένους πεῖραι μάχης· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρηστότερον ἐλπίζοντες ἐκ τοῦ παραχωρεῖν ὧν πείσονται κινδυνεύοντες αἰροῦνται μετὰ τοῦ πολλὰ δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν. [6] ὅθεν αἱ πολιορκίαι τοῖς ὧδε στρατηγοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ τεθριωμένοις ταλαίπωροι γίνονται καὶ πολυχρόνιοι, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἀτελεῖς, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ σφαλεραί τε καὶ ἐπικίνδυναι.

β'. Πῶς χρηστὸν προδόταις

[7] Τοῖς δὲ προδόταις τὰς τε πίστεις καὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας φυλαττέτω, μὴ διὰ τοὺς γεγονότας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐσομένους, ἵν' εἰδότες, ὡς ὀφείλεται σφισι χάρις, ἐλόμενοι τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς εὐεργεσίας τρέπωνται· λαμβάνει γάρ τι μᾶλλον ὁ προδότῃ διδοὺς ἢ χαρίζεται. [8] διὸ χρή προθύμως ἐκτίνειν τὰς ἀμοιβάς· οὐ γὰρ δικαστὴς τῆς ἀδικηθείσης πόλεως ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ στρατηγὸς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος.

XXXIX. α'. Περὶ τοῦ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐν γνώσει εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἄστρον κινήσεως

[1] Πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ προδοσίας νυκτερινὰς καταλήψεις τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἄπειρον εἶναι δεῖ τῆς ὑπεργείου κατὰ τὴν νύκτα φορᾶς τῶν ἀπλανῶν, ἐπεὶ πολλάκις ἀπράκτους ἔξει τὰς ἐπιβολάς. [2] ἔστιν γὰρ ὅτε συντέτακταί τις τῶν προδοτῶν τρίτην ἢ τετάρτην ἢ ὀπόστην ἂν τις εὐκαιρον ὥραν νομίζῃ τῆς νυκτός, ἀνοίξιν τὰς πύλας ἢ τινὰς κατασφάξιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντιπραττόντων ἢ φρουρᾷ τῶν ἔνδον πολεμίῳ ἐπιθήσεσθαι· κἄπειτα δεῦν θάτερον συμβέβηκεν, ἥτοι θᾶπτον ἢ ἔδει προσπελάσαντα τὸν τῶν πολεμίῳ στρατὸν κατάφωρον γενέσθαι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς προδότας ἐτοίμους εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως ἀποκωλυθῆναι τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ὑστερήσαντα τοῖς μὲν προδόταις αἴτιον γενέσθαι θανάτου φωραθεῖσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ μηδὲν τῶν προκειμένων ἀνύσαι. [3] διόπερ χρὴ καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τεκμαιρόμενον, ὅθεν ἐξοδεῦσαι δεῖ, καὶ τῶν σταδίων καὶ τῆς ὥρας στοχαζόμενον, ὅσον εἰς τὴν πορείαν ἀναλώσει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρον ὀρῶντα, πόσον τὸ παρωχηκὸς ἤδη καὶ πόσον τὸ ἀπολειπόμενον μέρος, οὕτως ἀκριβῶς συλλογισάμενον, ἵνα μήτε φθάσῃ μήτε βραδύνη, πρὸς αὐτὴν ἥκειν τὴν ὥραν τοῦ συντεταγμένου καιροῦ καὶ ἔτι προσιόντα ἀκούεσθαι καὶ ἐντὸς εἶναι τῶν τειχῶν.

β'. Πῶς ἡμέρας αἶρειν χρὴ πόλιν

[4] Εἰ δ' ἡμέρας ἀναστήσας ἄγοι στράτευμα πόλεις ἐκ προδοσίας ληψόμενος κατὰ τὴν συγκεκλιμένην ὥραν, τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑποπίπτοντας ἅπαντας προαποστελλὼν ἱππεῖς συλλαμβανέτω, μή τις τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας φθάσας ἀποδραμῶν μηνύσῃ τὴν ἔφοδον τῶν πολεμίῳ, ἀλλ' αἰφνιδίως ἀφυλάκτοις ἢ ἐπιφάνεια γένηται τοῦ στρατεύματος. [5] ἐπελθόντα δ' ἐξαίφνης ἀπροσδοκῆτοις χρή, κἂν μὴ κατὰ προδοσίαν μέλλῃ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ προρρήσεως ἀγωνίζεσθαι διὰ μάχης, μὴ ἀναβάλλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥς ὅτι μάλιστα φθάνειν προσβάλλοντα εἴτε φρουρίῳ εἴτε χάρακι εἴτε πόλει, μάλιστα δ' ὅτ' ἂν ὀλίγον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ φίλιον στράτευμα καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐλαττούμενον· [6] αἱ γὰρ ἀπρόληπτοι τῶν πολεμίῳ ἐπιφανεῖαι διὰ τὸ παράλογον ἐκπλήττουσι τοὺς ἐναντίους, κἂν ὥσι κρείττους, ἕως, ἂν γε συνθεωρήσωσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ βουλεύσασθαι καὶ ἀναθαρρῆσαι καιρὸν λάβωσι, κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναγκάζονται καταφρονεῖν· οὕτως ἐνίοτε τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀρχόμενα φοβερωτέρα τῶν χρονιζομένων εἶναι δοκεῖ. [7] διὸ πολλάκις ἤδη τινὲς τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς

ἐπιφανείας καταπληζάμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους ἢ ταχὺ καὶ ἄκοντας ὑπέταξαν ἢ
ποιεῖν ἐκόντας ἠνάγκασαν τὰ προσταττόμενα.

XL. Περὶ πολιορκίας

[1] Πολιορκία δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀνδρίαν ἐπιζητεῖ καὶ στρατηγικὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ μηχανημάτων παρασκευήν· ἀσφαλῆς μέντοι καὶ μὴ ἦττον ἀπροόρατος τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἔστω· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιβουλευόμενον, ὅτ' ἂν οἱ κακοῦ τυγχάνει γινώσκη, τηρεῖ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐπιβουλευόν· [2] ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔξω κινδύνου δοκῶν εἶναι πράττει τι τῶν προκειμένων, ὁπότε' ἂν αὐτῷ δόξη, ὁ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κινδυνεύειν ὑπάρχων ζητεῖ φθάσας δρᾶσαι, ὁπότε' ἂν καιρὸν λάβῃ· διὸ χρὴ τὸν πολιορκοῦντα καὶ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι καὶ φυλακαῖς τὸ ἴδιον ἀσφαλίζεσθαι στρατόπεδον. [3] καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολιορκοῦντες, ὅ τι ἂν μέλλωσι πράττειν, ὁρῶνται τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους, οἱ δὲ πολιορκούμενοι πρόβλημα τὸ τεῖχος ἔχοντες ἀόρατοι πολλάκις ἐκχυθέντες διὰ πυλῶν ἢ μηχανὰς ἐνέπρησαν ἢ στρατιώτας ἐφόνευσαν ἢ, ὅ τι κατὰ χειρὰς σφισιν εἴη, τοῦτο ἐποίησαν.

XLI. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐνέδρας τὸν πολιορκοῦντα πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν

[1] Ἦκιστα δ' ἂν τοῦτο τολμήσαιεν, εἰ παρὰ πύλαις καὶ πυλίσιν μικραῖς λόχους ὁ πολιορκῶν προκαθίσῃ στρατηγὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰφνιδίους ἐκδρομὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκωλύσοντας, ἐπεὶ κἂν πολλάκις λάθοιεν ἐπιθέμενοι τοῖς ἐκτός.

[2] χρήσιμοι δὲ τὰ πολλὰ νύκτωρ τοῖς πολιορκοῦσιν αἱ προσβολαί· τοῖς γὰρ ἔνδον οὐ δυναμένοις ὁρᾶν τὰ γινόμενα διὰ τὸ σκότος δεινότερα δοκεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα, καὶ τὴν πρόληψιν ἀναγκάζονται χαλεπωτέραν ἔχειν τῶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐνεργουμένων, ὅθεν ταραχαί τε καὶ θόρυβοι γίνονται οὐδενὸς δυναμένου σωφρονεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν οὐ δρωμένων ὥς γίγνεται λεγόντων, οὔθ' ὅπῃ προσβαλοῦσιν εἰδέναι δυναμένων, οὔθ' ὅποσοι, οὔθ' ὁποίοις μέρεσι, διαδρομαὶ δὲ δεῦρο κάκεῖσε καὶ βοαὶ καὶ θάμβη Πανικὸν ἔχοντα τάραχον.

XLII. α'. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ὁ φόβος ψευδῆς μάντις ἐστίν

[1] Ὁ γὰρ φόβος ψευδῆς μάντις, ἃ δέδοικε, ταῦτ' οἰήσεται καὶ γίνεσθαι, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐν νυκτί, κἂν μικρὸν ἦ, φοβερώτερον τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις· οὐδεὶς γάρ, ὃ βλέπει, λέγει διὰ τὸ σκότος, ἀλλὰ πᾶς, ὃ ἀκούει· καὶ ἐνός που φανέντος ἢ δυεῖν ἐπὶ τείχους πολεμίων τὸ πᾶν ἤδη στράτευμα τῶν τειχῶν ἐπιβεβηκέναι δόξαντες ἀπετράπησαν, ἐρήμους καταλιπόντες ἐπάλξεις καὶ πύλας.

β'. Ὅτι αὐτὸν χρὴ παράδειγμα τὸν στρατηγὸν γίνεσθαι τοῖς στρατιώταις

[2] Εἰ δέ τι διὰ χειρὸς ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐξεργάσασθαι σπεύδοι, μὴ ὀκνεῖτω πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὀφθῆναι ποιῶν· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπειλαῖς ἀναγκαζόμενοι τι ποιῶσιν, ὥς ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν σεμνοτέρων διατροπαῖς· ἰδὼν γάρ τις τὸν ἡγεμόνα πρῶτον ἐγχειροῦντα καὶ ὅτι δεῖ σπεύδειν ἔμαθε καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἠδέσθῃ καὶ ἀπειθεῖν ἐφοβήθῃ· καὶ οὐκ ἔθ' ὥς δοῦλον ἐπιταττόμενον διετέθῃ τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐξ ἴσου παρακαλούμενον διετράπη.

γ'. Περὶ πολιορκητηρίων μηχανημάτων

[3] Πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ποικίλων ἐκ τῶν μηχανῶν πολιορκητηρίων χρῆσεται κατὰ δύναμιν ὁ στρατηγός. οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι δεῖ κριοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἐλεπόλεις ἢ σαμβύκας ἢ πύργους ὑποτρόχους ἢ χελώνας χωστρίδας ἢ καταπέλτας· τῆς γὰρ τῶν πολεμούντων τύχης καὶ πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεως ἴδια ταῦτα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐπομένων ἀρχιτεκτόνων ἐπινοίας εἰς τὰς ὀργανικὰς κατασκευάς. [4] στρατηγοῦ δ' ἰδίας ἀγχινοίας ἔργον τοιόνδε ἂν εἴη, εἰ βούλοιτο προσβάλλειν μηχανάς· καθ' ἓν μὲν ἀποχρήσθω μέρος τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλως ἂν τις εὐπορήσειεν ἐν κύκλῳ παντὶ τῷ τείχει περιστῆσαι μηχανάς, εἰ μὴ πάνυ μικρὰ πόλις εἴη — , εἰς πολλὰ δὲ τάγματα διελὼν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ τείχους μέρη κελευέτω τὰς κλίμακας προσφέρειν· οὕτως γὰρ εἰς ἀμηχανίαν οἱ πολιορκούμενοι πολλὴν ἐμπίπτουσιν· [5] ἂν τε γὰρ ἀμελήσαντες τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὰς προσβολὰς τῶν μηχανῶν ἀμύνωσιν, ἅπαντες οἱ κατὰ τὰς κλίμακας μηδενὸς ἀποκωλύοντος ῥαδίως ἐπιβαίνουνσι τῶν τειχῶν, ἂν τε διελόντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπιβοηθήσωσι κατὰ μέρη, σφοδροτέρας ἐνεργείας γιγνομένης κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς τῶν ὀργάνων οἱ καταλειφθέντες οὐδὲ μάχεσθαι τούτοις τολμήσαντες ἀδυνατήσουσι τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον κακὸν ἀποκρούεσθαι. [6] διόπερ καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν παλαιστὴν προδεικνύειν μὲν καὶ σκιάζειν εἰς πολλὰ μέρη δεῖ

περισπῶντα καὶ ἐπισφάλλοντα δεῦρο κάκεισε πρὸς πολλὰ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους, ἐνὸς δὲ ζητεῖν ἐγκρατῶς λαβόμενον ἀνατρέψαι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα τῆς πόλεως.

δ'. Πῶς χρή διατελεῖν ἐπείγοντα τὰ τῆς πολιορκίας

[7] Εἰ δ' ἐν τάχει σπεύδοι τις ἐξελεῖν φρούριον ἢ πόλιν ἢ χάρακα καὶ αὐτῷ κάμνοι ἢ δύναμις μηδὲ μίαν ὥραν ἀποστῆναι βουλομένῳ τῶν ἐρυμάτων, εἰς τάγματα διελὼν τὸ στράτευμα, ὅς' ἂν ἱκανὰ εἶναι οἱ δοκῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ πλήθους καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πολιορκουμένης πόλεως, νυκτὸς ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ προσβαλλέτω τάγματι τῷ δευτέρῳ κελεύσας ἐφεδρεῦειν καὶ ἐτοίμῳ εἶναι, τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ, καὶ εἰ τύχοι πέμπτον ὄν, παραγγελλέτω τρέπεσθαι κατὰ κοῖτον. [8] εἴτα, ὅταν τῷ πρώτῳ καταπειράσῃ τινα χρόνον, τούτους μὲν ἀνακαλεσάμενος ἀποπεμπέτω κοιμησομένους, σημαίνέτω δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ προῖέναι τοῦ χάρακος, ὁ δὲ τρίτος ταγματάρχης ἀναστήσας ἐν τούτῳ καθοπλιζέτω τὸ ὕψ' ἑαυτὸν τάγμα. [9] καὶ μετὰ τοὺς δευτέρους τὴν ἴσην ὥραν τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἄξι τὸ τρίτον, κοιμάσθω δὲ τὸ δεύτερον τάγμα, μετὰ τοῦτο δ' αὖ τὸ τέταρτον, εἴθ' ἐξῆς τὸ πέμπτον, ἐν μέρει τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀναπαυομένων. [10] ὁμοίως δ' ἐπισυναπτούσης τῆς ἡμέρας οἱ πρῶτοι τῇ νυκτὶ προσβαλόντες ἔωθεν πάλιν πρῶτοι προσαγόντων· εἴθ' ὥρας, εἰ μὲν ἐξ εἴη τάγματα, δύο κινδυνεύσαντες, εἰ δὲ πέντε, δυσὶν ἔτι μικρὸν ἐπιθέντες, εἰ δὲ τέτταρα, τρεῖς, εἰ δὲ τρία, τέτταρας, ἀπλέοντες ἀριστοποιείσθω, ἐξῆς δ' οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πάλιν οἱ μετὰ τούτους ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων, ὥστε κύκλον τινὰ περιάγεσθαι. [11] τούτου γὰρ συμβαίνοντος ἀμφοτέρω ἂν γίγνοιτο. καὶ αἱ προσβολαὶ καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μέθ' ἡμέραν ἀδιάλειπτοι προσαχθήσονται, καὶ οἱ προσβάλλοντες ἀκμήτες καὶ νεαροὶ τὰς ἀναπαύσεις ἐν μέρει ποιούμενοι μαχοῦνται. [12] τοὺς μέντοι πολιορκουμένους, μηδ' ἂν πάνυ πολλοὶ τυγχάνωσιν, οἰέσθω τις τὸ αὐτὸ στρατήγημα ἀντεισοίσεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ κινδυνεῦον, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιτρέπη τις, ὕψω χαρίζεσθαι βούλεται· φόβῳ γὰρ τῷ δεινοῦ, παρ' ὃν ἀναπαύεται χρόνον, ὥς ἀλωσομένης τῆς πόλεως ἐγρήγορε· καὶ τὸ πολιορκούμενον, κἂν ὀλίγον ἢ τὸ πολιορκοῦν αὐτό, πασσυδὶ προσαμύνει, καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἐντειχιδιδόν ἐστι κεκίνηται, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον φοβερώτερον, ὥς, εἰ παρὰ μικρὸν ἀμελήσαιεν, ἀπολούμενοι πάντες. [13] ὅθεν δὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τρυχομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ μηδὲ μίαν ὥραν ἀνάπαυλαν ἴσχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγρυπνίας καὶ πόνοις κάμνοντας, εἴτα καὶ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τεταλαιπωρηκότας ἀσθενέστερον τοῖς σφετέροις προσαμύνειν ἢ τοὺς δεησομένους καὶ παραδώσοντας τὴν πόλιν ἐκπέμπειν.

ε΄. Πῶς χρή τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀναπαύεσθαι

[14] Αὐτὸς οὖν ὁ στρατηγός, ἴσως φήσῃ τις, ἐξ ἀδάμαντος ἢ σιδήρου κεχάλκευται μόνος ἄγρυπνος ἐστὼς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔργοις; οὐ δῆτα· ἀλλὰ παρ' ὃν ἀναπαύεται χρόνον — οὗτος δ' ὀλίγος ἔστω καὶ σύντομος —, ἓνα τῶν ἐν δόξῃ πιστοτάτων καὶ ἀνδρειοτάτων ἡγεμόνα τῶν καὶ τὰ δευτέρα τῆς στρατηγικῆς ἀρχῆς ἐχόντων ἐπιστησάτω τοῖς ἔργοις.

ζ΄. Πῶς τὰ δοκοῦντα τῆς πόλεως μέρη ἀνάλωτα εἶναι πολλάκις εὐάλωτα γίνονται

[15] Ἐνίοτε δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα μέρη πόλεως εἶναι κρημνώδη καὶ πέτραις ἀποτόμοις ὠχυρωμένα τῶν διὰ χειρὸς ἀνεστηκότων τειχῶν ἔδωκε τοῖς πολιορκοῦσιν ἀφορμὰς μείζονας εἰς τὸ νικᾶν· εἴωθεν γάρ πως ὥς τὰ πολλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πόλεων, ὅσα φύσει πιστεύεται τὸ ἐρυμνόν, ἀφυλακτεῖσθαι καὶ ἥκιστα φροντίδι παραγρυπνεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν. [16] ἔνθα στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐνόησεν ὃ δεῖ ποιῆσαι, καὶ τινὰς τῶν εὐτολμοτάτων παρακαλέσας ἐπαγγελίαις καὶ τιμαῖς ὀλίγους, οἷς ῥᾶον ἀναβαίνειν εἴτε δι' αὐτῆς τῆς δυσχωρίας, εἴτε διὰ κλιμάκων, ἐκράτησε τῆς πράξεως ὑποκαταβάντες γὰρ ἐντὸς τείχους ἢ πυλίδα διέκοψαν ἢ πύλην ἀνέφωξαν.

ζ΄. Περὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν σαλπίγγων ὠφελείας

[17] Μέγα δ' ἂν ὀνήσειε καὶ τι τοιόνδε συνεπινοηθέν, εἰ καὶ σαλπικτὰς οἱ φθάσαντες ἐπιβῆναι τοῦ τείχους ἀνιμήσαιεν· ἀκουσθεῖσα γὰρ πολεμία σάλπιγξ ἀπὸ τειχῶν ἐν νυκτὶ πολλὴν ἐκπληξιν ἐπιφέρει τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις ὥς ἡδὴ κατὰ κράτος ἐαλωκόσιν, ὥστε τὰς πύλας καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπολιπόντας φεύγειν· ὅθεν δήπου συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἔξω στρατιώταις ῥαδίαν τὴν τε τῶν πυλῶν ἐκκοπὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τεῖχη διὰ τῶν κλιμάκων ἀνάβασιν, οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν πολεμίων ἀπείργοντος· οὕτως που δυνατὸν ἐνὶ καὶ ἀνόπλῳ σαλπικτῇ πόλιν ἀλῶναι.

η΄. Τί χρή ποιεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν μετὰ τὸ ἐλεῖν τὴν πόλιν

[18] Εἰ δὲ δὴ τινὰ ἀκμάζουσιν ἔτι πλήθει τε καὶ δυνάμει πόλιν ἐρρωμένως ἐλὼν εἰς φόβον ἢ ὑπόνοιαν ἦκοι, μὴ ποτε κατὰ τάγματα καὶ συστροφὰς ὑπαντιάζοντες ἀμύνωνται τοὺς ἐπεισιπτόντας ἢ τὰ μετέωρα καταλαμβανόμενοι καὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς πόλεως ἐνθεν ἀντεπίοιεν ἐπὶ πολὺ

κακώσοντες τοὺς πολεμίους, κηρυττέτω τοὺς ἀνόπλους μὴ κτεῖναι. [19] ἔως γὰρ ἕκαστος ἐλπίζει ληφθεὶς τεθνήξεσθαι, βούλεται φθάνειν δράσας καὶ πάσχων ἀλλὰ τι καὶ δρᾶν, πολλοὶ τε ἤδη πολεμίους εἰσκεχυμένους ἐξήλασαν ἢ καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἐρυμνὴν κατελιήθησαν, ἔνθεν αὖθις εἰς πόνον καὶ τάλαιπωρίαν κατέστησαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὥστε δευτέραν ἐπαναιρεῖσθαι πολιορκίαν . . . ἢ καὶ πολυχρονιωτέραν, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε καὶ ἐπαλγεστέραν μετὰ πολλῆς πείρας κακῶν. [20] εἰ δὲ διαβοηθείη τότε τὸ κήρυγμα, τάχα μὲν καὶ πάντες, ὥς δὲ πρόδηλον εἶπεῖν, οἳ γε πλείους τὰ ὅπλα ρίψουσι· τῶν τε γὰρ βουλομένων δι' ὀργῆς ἕκαστος εἰς ἄμυναν ἰέναι δεδιὼς τὸν πέλας, μὴ ποτε οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ταῦτα φρονῇ, ρίπτειν ἀναγκασθήσεται, ὥστε, κἂν πάντες βούλονται τὰ ὅπλα φυλάττειν, διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπόνοιαν αὐτὸν ἕκαστον δεδιότα, μὴ μόνος ὥπλισμένος ληφθῇ, σπεύδειν ἀποτιθέμενον — οἳ γὰρ ὀξεῖς καιροὶ τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην φανεράν οὐκ ἔωσι γίγνεσθαι — , οἳ τε ἔτοιμοι πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι, μέχρι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλπίδα κεκήρυκται σωτηρίας, εἰ καὶ μὴ γνώμη, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐπιὸν ἀμύνονται κακόν, ἐπειδὴν δὲ μικρὰν ἐλπίδα τοῦ σώζεσθαι λάβωσιν, ἰκέται τὸ λοιπὸν ἀντὶ πολέμιων ὑπαντῶσιν. [21] οὕτως τε ὁ μὲν κηρύξας καὶ τοὺς τὰ ὅπλα φυλάττειν βουλομένους ρίπτειν αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζει· στρατιωτῶν δὲ θάνατος ἐν μὲν μάχαις εὐπαραμύθητος — δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῦ νικᾶν ἕνεκεν γεγονέναι — , ἐν δὲ νίκαις καὶ καταλήψεσι πόλεων τοῖς νικῶσιν οἰκτιστος, ἀφροσύνης τε μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνδρίας μαρτύριον· [22] εἰ μέντοι μνησικάκως ἔχοι τοῖς ἡττημένοις στρατηγός, μὴ παρὰ τούτοις οἰέσθω τι φέρεσθαι βλάβος, ὅτι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μὴ εὐθύς κτενοῦσι· σχολῇ γὰρ βουλευσεται μετὰ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τὴν ἄμυναν ἀνανταγώνιστον ἔχων, τί χρὴ διαθεῖναι τοὺς ἐαλωκότας.

Θ'. Τὸν λιμῷ μέλλοντα πόλιν αἰρήσειν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀσθενεῖς εἰς αὐτὴν χρὴ πέμπειν

[23] Εἰ δὲ τὴν κατὰ κράτος ἀπεγνωκὼς ἐκπόρθησιν εἰς χρόνιον καταβαίνοι πολιορκίαν οἰόμενος λιμῷ πιέσας τὴν πόλιν αἰρήσειν, ἃ τίνα ἂν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας ἔτι καταλάβῃ σώματα, τούτων τὰ μὲν ἐρρωμένα καὶ ἀκμάζοντα ταῖς ἡλικίαις εἰς ἄμυναν πολέμου λαβὼν, ὃ τι περ ἂν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, διαθέσθω, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρια καὶ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώπους καὶ γεγηρακότας ἐκὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀποπεμπέτω· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄχρηστα μὲν εἰς τὰς πράξεις ἔσται, τὰς δὲ παρεσκευασμένας τοῖς ἔνδον τροφὰς θάττον συναναλώσει, καὶ πολέμιων μᾶλλον ἢ φιλίων ἐφέξει τρόπον.

[24] Εἰ δέ τῳ πάντα κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ νοῦν χωρήσειεν, ὥστε τοῖς ὅλοις ἐπιθεῖναι τοῦ πολέμου πράγμασι τέλος, ἔστω μὴ βαρὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐπραγίαις, ἀλλ' εὐφορτος, μηδὲ τῦφον ἀπήνη περιφέρων, ἀλλ' εὐμένειαν προσφιλεῖ ἔχων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φθόνον ἐγέννησε, αὕτη δὲ ζῆλον ἐπεσπάσατο. [25] φθόνος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὀδύνη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀγαθῶν, ζῆλος δὲ μίμησις τῶν παρ' ἄλλοις καλῶν, τοσοῦτόν τε διενήνοχεν ἀλλήλων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φθονεῖν εὐχὴν εἶναι τοῦ καὶ παρ' ἄλλω τι καλὸν μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ζηλοῦν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς τῶν ἴσων κτήσεως. [26] ἀνὴρ οὖν ἀγαθὸς οὐ μόνον πατρίδος τε καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ πλήθους ἄριστος ἡγεμὼν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν εἰς αἰεὶ εὐδοξίας ἀκινδύνου οὐκ ἀνόητος στρατηγός.

The Dual Text



Another great admirer of Onasander's work, Maurice (1521-1553) was Duke (1541–47) and later Elector (1547–53) of Saxony. His intelligent manipulation of alliances and disputes gained the Albertine branch of the Wettin dynasty extensive lands and the electoral dignity.

Dual Greek and English Text



Translated by The Illinois Greek Club, 1923

In this section, readers can view a section by section text of Onasander's work, alternating between the original Greek and the English translation.

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PROOEMIUM

[1] Ἰππικῶν μὲν λόγων ἢ κυνηγετικῶν ἢ ἀλιευτικῶν τε αὖ καὶ γεωργικῶν συνταγμάτων προσφώνησιν ἡγοῦμαι πρέπειν ἀνθρώποις, οἷς πόθος ἔχεσθαι τοιῶνδε ἔργων, στρατηγικῆς δὲ περὶ θεωρίας, ὃ Κόϊντε Οὐηράνιε, Ῥωμαίοις καὶ μάλιστα Ῥωμαίων τοῖς τὴν συγκλητικὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν λελογχόσι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Σεβαστοῦ Καίσαρος ἐπιφροσύνην ταῖς τε ὑπάτοις καὶ στρατηγικαῖς ἐξουσίαις κοσμουμένοις διὰ τε παιδεΐαν, ἥς οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἔχουσιν ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ προγόνων ἀξιώσιν.

[1] It is fitting, I believe, to dedicate monographs on horsemanship, or hunting, or fishing, or farming, to men who are devoted to such pursuits, but a treatise on military science, Quintus Veranius, should be dedicated to Romans, and especially to those of the Romans who have attained senatorial dignity, and who through the wisdom of Augustus Caesar have been raised to the power of consul or general, both by reason of their military training (in which they have had no brief experience) and because of the distinction of their ancestors.

[2] ἀνέθηκα δὲ πρῶτοις σφίσι τόνδε τὸν λόγον οὐχ ὥς ἀπείροις στρατηγίας, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τῇδε θαρρήσας, ἥ τὸ μὲν ἀμαθὲς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ παρ' ἄλλω κατορθούμενον ἡγνόησεν, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ τῷ καλῶς ἔχοντι προσεμαρτύρησεν.

[2] I have dedicated this treatise primarily to them, not as to men unskilled in generalship, but with especial confidence in this fact, that the ignorant soul is unaware even of that in which another is successful, but knowledge bears additional witness to that which is well done.

[3] ὅθεν, εἰ καὶ παρὰ πολλοῖς φανείη νενοημένα τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ συντεταγμένα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἂν ἡσθεΐην, ὅτι μὴ μόνον στρατηγικὰς συνεταξάμην ὑφηγήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγικῆς ἐστοχασάμην καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς φρονήσεως, εὐτυχίην τ' ἂν, εἰ, ἃ δὴ Ῥωμαίοις δυνάμει καὶ δι' ἔργων πέπρακται, ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λόγῳ περιλαβεῖν ἱκανὸς εἶναι παρὰ τοιούτοις ἀνδράσι δοκιμασθεΐην.

[3] For this reason, if what I have composed would seem to have been already devised by many others, even then I should be pleased, because I have not only compiled precepts of generalship, but have also endeavoured to get at the art of the general and the wisdom that inheres in the precepts. I should be

fortunate if I should be considered capable, before such men, of making a summary sketch of what the Romans have already accomplished by their mighty deeds.

[4] Τὸ δὲ σύνταγμα θαρροῦντί μοι λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν ὡς στρατηγῶν τε ἀγαθῶν ἄσκησις ἔσται παλαιῶν τε ἡγεμόνων κατὰ τὴν σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα, εἰσόμεθά τε καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν οἱ τε πταίσαντες ἐσφάλησαν τῶν στρατηγησάντων, οἱ τε εὐπραγῆσαντες ἐγέρθησαν εἰς δόξαν· μάλιστα δὲ τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἀρετὴν ἐννοήσομεν, ὡς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε πόλις οὔτε ἔθνος μεῖζον ἡγεμονίας ἐκρατύνατο μέγεθος, ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἰς ἴσον ἤλασεν, ὥστε τοσοῦτοις βεβαιώσασθαι χρόνοις ἀκίνητον δυναστείαν.

[4] It remains for me to say with good courage of my work, that it will be a school for good generals, and an object of delight for retired commanders in these times of holy peace; and we shall know, if nothing else, for what reason some generals have stumbled and fallen, but others have prospered and been raised to fame; and we shall consider above all the valour of the Romans, how that neither king, nor state, nor nation has held a greater position of leadership, nor even equalled them in the establishment of a dominion, unshaken through so many years.

[5] οὐ γὰρ τύχη μοι δοκοῦσιν ὑπεράραντες τοὺς τῆς Ἰταλίας ὄρους ἐπὶ πέρατα γῆς ἐκτεῖναι τὴν σφετέραν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ πράξεισι στρατηγικαῖς. συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ εὐχεσθαι δεῖ καὶ τὴν τύχην, οὐ μὴν τὸ παράπαν οἶεσθαι ταύτην κρατεῖν.

[5] For it is not by chance, as it seems to me, that they have overrun the boundaries of Italy and extended their sway to the limits of the earth, but by deeds of generalship. For it is necessary to pray to Fortune to do its share, but not to consider that Fortune has entire control.

[6] ἀλλ' ἀνόητοι οἱ καὶ τὰ σφάλματα τῆς τύχης ἐγκλήματα μόνης ποιούμενοι, οὐ τῆς τῶν στρατηγούντων ἀμελείας, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα ταύτης, οὐ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τῶν ἡγουμένων· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς ἀνεπιτίμητον οὕτως ἀπολιπεῖν τὸν πταίοντα τοῖς ὅλοις, ὡς πάντων αἰτιᾶσθαι τὴν τύχην, οὔτε δίκαιον ἀμάρτυρον ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐπαίνου τὸν κατορθοῦντα περιορᾶν, ἐφ' ὅσον ἀπάντων ἀνατιθέναι τῇ τύχῃ τὴν χάριν.

[6] Stupid are those who make disasters chargeable to Fortune alone, rather than to the negligence of commanders, as well as those who attribute successes to her, and not to the skill of the generals. It is neither reasonable simply to dismiss without punishment a general who has met with complete disaster, on the ground that Fortune is responsible for all things, nor is it just to leave the successful general so far without recognition that gratitude for everything is offered to Fortune.

[7] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ φύσει πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῖς μὲν δι' ἐμπειρίας συντετάχθαι δοκοῦσι, κἂν ἀσθενῶς ἀπαγγέλληται, τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀλήθειαν ἀπονέμουσιν, τοῖς δὲ ἀπείροις, κἂν ἥ δυνατὰ πραχθῆναι, διὰ τὸ ἀδοκίμαστον ἀπιστοῦσιν, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ στρατηγημάτων ἡθροισμένον τοσοῦτο προειπεῖν, ὅτι πάντα διὰ πείρας ἔργων ἐλήλυθεν καὶ ὑπὸ ἀνδρῶν τοιούτων, ὧν ἀπόγονον ὑπάρχει Ῥωμαίων ἅπαν τὸ γένει καὶ ἀρετῇ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο πρωτεῦον.

[7] Now since all men naturally give credit for truthfulness to those who appear to write with professional experience, even though their style be feeble, while for inexperienced writers, even though their teachings are practicable, they feel distrust on account of their lack of reputation, I consider it necessary to say in advance, about the military principles collected in this book, that they have all been derived from experience of actual deeds, and, in fact, of exploits performed by those men from whom has been derived the whole primacy of the Romans, in race and valour, down to the present time.

[8] οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐσχεδισμένον ἀπολέμῳ καὶ νεωτέρᾳ γνώμῃ τόδε περιέχει τὸ σύνταγμα, ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ πράξεων καὶ ἀληθινῶν ἀγώνων κεχωρηκότα μάλιστα μὲν Ῥωμαίοις· ἃ τε γὰρ ποιήσαντες ἐφυλάζαντο παθεῖν καὶ δι' ὧν ἐμηχανήσαντο δρᾶσαι, πάντα μοι συνείλεκται.

[8] For this treatise presents no impromptu invention of an unwarlike and youthful mind, but all the principles are taken from authentic exploits and battles, especially of the Romans. For the expedients they used in order to avoid suffering harm, and the means by which they contrived to inflict it, all this I have collected.

[9] καίτοι οὐκ ἠγνόηκα, ὅτι μᾶλλον ἂν τις εἴλετο πάνθ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀγχινοίας τὰ στρατηγήματα δοκεῖν εἶναι, πλείονα θηρώμενος ἔπαινον τῶν

πιστευσάντων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἐπινοίας· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ παρὰ τοῦτ' ἐλαττοῦσθαι δοκῶ.

[9] Nor have I failed to perceive that a writer, seeking greater praise from credulous readers, would prefer to have it appear that the source of all the military stratagems he described was himself and his own shrewdness rather than the sagacity of others. But I do not think that the latter diminishes one's glory.

[10] καθάπερ γάρ, εἴ τις ἐν πολέμοις αὐτὸς στρατευσάμενος συνετάξατο τοιόνδε λόγον, οὐκ ἂν παρὰ τοῦτο ἥττονος ἡξιοῦντο μαρτυρίας, ὅτι μὴ μόνον φυσικῆς ἀγχινοίας ἰδίαν εὔρεσιν εἰσηνέγκατο στρατηγημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ δι' ἄλλων εὖ πραχθέντα μνήμη παραθέμενος εἰς σύνταξιν ἤγαγεν, οὕτως οὐδ' ἐμαυτὸν οἶομαι τοῦλαττον ἐπαινῶν οἶσεσθαι παρὰ τοῦθ', ὅτι μὴ πάντα τῆς ἐμῆς ὁμολογῶ συνέσεως εἶναι, τούναντίον δὲ προείληφα τὸν τ' ἔπαινον ἀνεπίφθονον ἔξειν καὶ τὴν πίστιν ἀσυκοφάντητον.

[10] For if a general after experience in the field had composed such a work, it would not be considered of less value because he introduced and commemorated in his work, not only the personal discoveries of his native wit, but also the brilliant deeds of other generals; in the same way I do not consider that I myself shall win less praise, because I admit that not everything I write springs from my own intelligence. On the contrary, I have chosen the opposite course, that I may have praise without reproach and trust without slander.

I. Περὶ αἰρέσεως στρατηγοῦ

I. THE CHOICE OF A GENERAL

[1] Φημὶ τοίνυν αἰρεῖσθαι τὸν στρατηγὸν οὐ κατὰ γένη κρίνοντας, ὥσπερ τοὺς ἱερέας, οὐδὲ κατ' οὐσίας, ὡς τοὺς γυμνασιάρχους, ἀλλὰ σώφρονα, ἐγκρατῆ, νήπτην, λιτόν, διάπονον, νοερόν, ἀφιλάργυρον, μήτε νέον μήτε πρεσβύτερον, ἂν τύχη καὶ πατέρα παίδων, ἱκανὸν λέγειν, ἔνδοξον.

[1] I believe, then, that we must choose a general, not because of noble birth as priests are chosen, nor because of wealth as the superintendents of the gymnasia, but because he is temperate, self-restrained, vigilant, frugal, hardened to labour, alert, free from avarice, neither too young nor too old, indeed a father of children if possible, a ready speaker, and a man with a good reputation.

[2] [α'] σώφρονα μέν, ἵνα μὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀνθελκόμενος ἡδοναῖς ἀπολείπη τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν μεγίστων φροντίδα.

[2] The general must be temperate in order that he may not be so distracted by the pleasures of the body as to neglect the consideration of matters of the highest importance.

[3] [β'] ἐγκρατῇ δέ, ἐπειδὴ τηλικαύτης ἀρχῆς μέλλει τυγχάνειν· αἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς ὁρμαὶ προσλαβοῦσαι τὴν τοῦ δύνασθαί τι ποιεῖν ἐξουσίαν ἀκατάσχετοι γίνονται πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας.

[3] He must be self-restrained, since he is to be a man of so great authority; for the licentious impulses, when combined with the authority which confers the power of action, become uncontrollable in the gratification of the passions.

[4] [γ'] νήπτην δ', ὅπως ἐπαγρυπνῇ ταῖς μεγίσταις πράξεσιν· ἐν νυκτὶ γὰρ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ψυχῆς ἡρεμούσης στρατηγοῦ γνώμη τελειοῦται.

[4] Vigilant, that he may spend wakeful nights over the most important projects; for at night, as a rule, with the mind at rest, the general perfects his plans.

[5] [δ'] λιτόν δέ, ἐπειδὴ κατασκελετεύουσιν αἱ πολυτελεῖς θεραπείαι δαπανᾶσαι χρόνον ἄπρακτον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων τρυφήν.

[5] Frugal, since expensive attendance upon the luxurious tastes of commanders consumes time unprofitably and causes resources to waste away.

[6] [ε'] διάπονον δ', ἵνα μὴ πρῶτος τῶν στρατευομένων, ἀλλ' ὕστατος κάμνη.

[6] Hardened to labour, that he may not be the first but the last of the army to grow weary.

[7] [ζ'] νοερὸν δέ· ὁξὺν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἄττοντα δι' ὠκύτητος ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸν Ὅμηρον

ὥσει πτερὸν ἢ νόημα·

πολλάκις γὰρ ἀπρόληπτοι ταραχαὶ προσπεσοῦσαι σχεδιάζειν ἀναγκάζουσι τὸ συμφέρον.

[7] Alert, for the general must be quick, with swiftness of mind darting at every subject — quick, as Homer says, “as a bird, or as thought.” For very frequently unexpected disorders arise which may compel him to decide on the spur of the moment what is expedient.

[8] [ζ'] ἀφιλάργυρον δέ· ἡ γὰρ ἀφιλαργυρία δοκιμασθήσεται καὶ πρώτη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀδωροδοκίως καὶ μεγαλοφρόνως προΐστασθαι τῶν πραγμάτων αὕτη παραιτία· πολλοὶ γάρ, κἂν διὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἀσπίσι πολλαῖς καὶ δόρασιν ἀντιβλέψωσιν, περὶ τὸν χρυσὸν ἀμαυροῦνται· δεινὸν γὰρ πολεμίους ὄπλον τοῦτο καὶ δραστήριον εἰς τὸ νικᾶν.

[8] Free from avarice; for this quality of freedom from avarice will be valued most highly, since it is largely responsible for the incorruptible and large-minded management of affairs. For many who can face the shields and spears of a host with courage are blinded by gold; but gold is a strong weapon against the enemy and effective for victory.

[9] [η'] οὔτε δὲ νέον οὔτε πρεσβύτερον, ἐπειδὴ ὁ μὲν ἄπιστος, ὁ δ' ἀσθενής· οὐδέτερος γὰρ ἀσφαλής, ὁ μὲν νέος, ἵνα μὴ τι διὰ τὴν ἀλόγιστον πταίσις τόλμαν, ὁ δὲ πρεσβύτερος, ἵνα μὴ τι διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ἀσθένειαν ἐλλείπη.

[9] Neither too young nor too old; since the young man does not inspire confidence, the old man is feeble, and neither is free from danger, the young man lest he err through reckless daring, the older lest he neglect something

through physical weakness.

[10] κρατίστη δ' αἴρεσις ἡ τοῦ μέσου· καὶ γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν ἐν τῷ μηδέπως γεγηρακότι καὶ τὸ φρόνιμον ἐν τῷ μὴ πάνυ νεάζοντι, ὥς οἵτινές γε ἡ σώματος ῥώμην ἄνευ ψυχῆς ἔμφορονος ἐδοκίμασαν ἢ ψυχὴν φρόνιμον ἄνευ σωματικῆς ἕξεως, οὐδὲν ἐπέραναν· ἡ γὰρ ὑστερήσασα φρόνησις οὐδὲν ἐνόησε κρεῖττον, ἡ δ' ἐλλείπουσα δύναμις οὐδὲν ἐτελείωσεν.

[10] The ideal lies between the two, for physical vigour is found in the man who has not yet grown old, and discretion in the man who is not too young. Those who value physical strength without discretion, or discretion without physical strength, have failed to accomplish anything. For a weak mind can contribute no valuable ideas, nor can strength unsupported bring to completion any activity.

[11] ὁ γε μὴ εὐδοκιμῶν οὐ μικρὰ τοὺς ἐλομένους ὤνησεν· ὄντινα γὰρ ἄνθρωποι φιλοῦσιν αὐτομάτῃ διανοίᾳ ἐμπτώσει, τούτῳ ταχὺ μὲν ἐπιτάττοντι πείθονται, λέγοντι δ' οὐκ ἀπιστοῦσι, κινδυνεύοντι δὲ συναγωνίζονται.

[11] Moreover, a man of good reputation is of no slight assistance to those who choose him; for if men have a spontaneous and natural love for their general, they are quick to obey his commands, they do not distrust him, and they coöperate with him in case of danger.

[12] [θ'] πατέρα δὲ προῦκρινα μᾶλλον, οὐδὲ τὸν ἄπαιδα παραιτούμενος, ἂν ἀγαθὸς ᾖ· ἐάν τε γὰρ ὄντες τύχωσι νήπιοι, ψυχῆς εἰσιν ἰσχυρὰ φίλτρα περὶ τὴν εὐνοίαν ἐξομηρεύσασθαι δυνάμενα στρατηγὸν πρὸς πατρίδα, δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς μύωπες πατρός, οἳοί τε ἀναστήσαι θυμὸν ἐπὶ πολεμίους, ἂν τε τέλειοι, σύμβουλοι καὶ συστράτηγοι καὶ πιστοὶ τῶν ἀπορρήτων ὑπηρετὰ γιγνόμενοι συγκατορθοῦσι τὰ κοινὰ πράγματα.

[12] I should prefer our general to be a father, though I would not refuse a childless man, provided he be a good man. For if he happens to have young children, they are potent spells to keep his heart loyal, availing to bind him to the fatherland, a powerful and keen incentive to a father, capable of arousing his heart against the foe. And should his children have reached manhood, they will become advisers and aides, faithful guardians of his secrets, and they will help him to bring the affairs of state to a successful issue.

[13] [1'] λέγειν δ' ἰκανόν· ἔνθεν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι τὸ μέγιστον ὠφελείας ἵζεσθαι διὰ στρατεύματος· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἐκτάτῃ πρὸς μάχην στρατηγός, ἢ τοῦ λόγου παρακέλευσις τῶν μὲν δεινῶν ἐποίησε καταφρονεῖν, τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἀκοαῖς ἐνηχοῦσα σάλπιγξ ἐγείρει ψυχὰς εἰς ἄμυλλαν μάχης, ὥς λόγος εἰς προτροπὴν ἀρετῆς ἐναγωνίου ῥηθεὶς αἰχμαζούσαν ἀνέστησε πρὸς τὰ δεῖνα τὴν διάνοιαν, ἃν τέ τι συμβῇ πταῖσμα περὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, ἢ τοῦ λόγου παρηγορία τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνέρωσε, καὶ πολὺ δὴ χρησιμώτερός ἐστι στρατηγοῦ λόγος οὐκ ἀδύνατος ὥστε παραμυθεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν στρατοπέδοις συμφοράς, τῶν ἐπομένων τοῖς τραυματίαις ἰατρῶν·

[13] A ready speaker; for I believe that the greatest benefit can accrue from the work of a general through this gift. For if a general is drawing up his men before battle, the encouragement of his words makes them despise the danger and covet the honour; and a trumpet-call resounding in the ears does not so effectively awaken the soul to the conflict of battle as a speech that urges to strenuous valour rouses the martial spirit to confront danger. Should some disaster befall the army, an encouraging speech will give the men's souls new strength; and a not unskilful address by the commander is far more useful in counteracting the despondency of an army in the hour of defeat than the physicians who attend to the wounded.

[14] οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκεῖνους μόνους τοῖς φαρμάκοις θεραπεύουσιν, ὁ δὲ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας εὐθυμοτέρους ἐποίησεν καὶ τοὺς ἐρρωμένους ἀνέστησε·

[14] For the physicians with their medicines care only for the wounded, whereas the eloquent general not only heartens the disabled but also sets the well on their feet again.

[15] καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ ἀόρατα νοσήματα τῶν ὀρωμένων δυσχερεστέραν ἔχει τὴν θεραπείαν, οὕτως ψυχὰς ἐξ ἀθυμίας ἰάσασθαι λόγῳ παρηγορήσαντα δυσκολώτερον, ἢ σωμάτων φανεράν ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς θεραπεύσαι νόσον.

[15] Just as hidden diseases are harder to cure than those with external symptoms, so it is more difficult by a consoling speech to cure a heart of its despondency than to minister to an obvious and manifest disease of the body.

[16] οὐδὲ χωρὶς στρατηγῶν οὐδὲ μία πόλις ἐκπέμψει στρατόπεδον, οὐδὲ δίχα τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν αἰρήσεται στρατηγόν.

[16] No city at all will put an army in the field without generals nor choose a general who lacks the ability to make an effective speech.

[17] [ια'] τὸν δὲ ἔνδοξον, ὅτι τοῖς ἀδόξοις ἀσχάλλει τὸ πλῆθος ὑποταπτόμενον· οὐθεις γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομένει τὸν αὐτοῦ χείρονα κύριον ἀναδέχεσθαι καὶ ἡγεμόνα.

[17] The general should be a man of good reputation, because the majority of men, when placed under the command of unknown generals, feel uneasy. For no one voluntarily submits to a leader or an officer who is an inferior man to himself.

[18] πᾶσα δὲ ἀνάγκη τὸν τοιοῦτον ὄντα καὶ τοσαύτας ἀρετὰς ἔχοντα ψυχῆς, ὅσας εἴρηκα, καὶ ἔνδοξον εἶναι.

[18] It is absolutely essential, then, that a general be such a man, of such excellent traits of character as I have mentioned, and besides this, that he have a good reputation.

[19] Φημί δὲ μήτε τὸν πλούσιον, ἐὰν ἐκτὸς ᾗ τούτων, αἰρεῖσθαι στρατηγὸν διὰ τὰ χρήματα, μήτε τὸν πένητα, ἐὰν ἀγαθὸς ᾗ, παραιτεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν· οὐ μὴν γὰρ τὸν πένητα οὐδὲ τὸν πλούσιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν πλούσιον καὶ τὸν πένητα· οὐδ' ἕτερον γὰρ οὐθ' αἰρετὸν οὐτ' ἀποδοκιμαστέον διὰ τὴν τύχην, ἀλλ' ἐλεγκτέον διὰ τὸν τρόπον.

[19] A wealthy man in my opinion must not be chosen general on account of his wealth, if he has not these qualities; nor must a poor man, provided that he be competent, be rejected on account of his poverty. It is not necessary that the general be rich or poor; he may be the one or the other. Neither the one nor the other must be chosen nor rejected on account of his fortune in life, but must be tested by the standard of character.

[20] οὐδὲ πλούσιος ἀγαθὸς ὢν τοσοῦτα διοίσει τοῦ γενναίου πένητος, ὅσον αἱ ἐπάργυροι καὶ κατὰχρυσοὶ πανοπλῖαι τῶν καταχάλακων καὶ σιδηρῶν — αἱ μὲν γὰρ τῷ κόσμῳ πλεονεκτοῦσιν, αἱ δ' αὐτῷ τῷ δραστηρίῳ διαγωνίζονται — , εἴ γε μὴ χρηματιστὴς εἴη· τὸν δὲ χρηματιστὴν, οὐδ' ἂν πλουσιώτατος ὢν τύχη, συμβουλευσώ ποτε αἰρεῖσθαι· λέγω δὲ ὀβολοστάτην, μετάβολον, ἔμπορον ἢ τοὺς παραπλήσιόν τι τούτοις πράττοντας· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τοὺς τοιούτους μικρόφρονας εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὸ κέρδος ἐπτοημένους καὶ μεμερμνημένους περὶ

τὸν πορισμὸν τῶν χρημάτων ὅλως μὴδὲν ἐσχηκέναι τῶν καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

[20] Even the wealthy general who is good will surpass the noble but poor general only in the same degree that armour inlaid with gold and silver surpasses that of bronze and iron — the former have the advantage in ornamentation but the latter prove superior in efficiency — provided that he is not a man who deals in money. Were he the richest man in the world, I should not ever advise choosing a man who deals in money. I mean by this expression a usurer, a trader, a merchant, or those who are in a similar business. For these men must have petty minds; excited over gain and worried about the means of getting money, they have acquired absolutely none of the noble habits of a general.

[21] Προγόνων δὲ λαμπρὰν ἀξίωσιν ἀγαπᾶν μὲν δεῖ προσοῦσαν, οὐ μὴν ἀποῦσαν ἐπιζητεῖν, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ τινὰς κρίνειν ἀξίους ἢ μὴ τοῦ στρατηγεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὰ ζῷα ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων πράξεων ἐξετάζομεν, ὅπως εὐγενείας ἔχει, οὕτω χρὴ σκοπεῖν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὐγένειαν.

[21] An illustrious family name we should welcome, if it be present, but if lacking it should not be demanded, nor should we judge men worthy or unworthy of commands simply by this criterion; but just as we test the pedigrees of animals in the light of the things they actually do, so we should view the pedigrees of men also.

[22] καὶ γὰρ ἀπερίοπτον, τί τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπράχθη καλόν, ἐξετάζειν, οὐ τί ποιήσουσιν οἱ νῦν αἰρεθέντες· ὥσπερ τῶν πάλαι γεγονότων σώζειν ἡμᾶς δυναμένων καὶ τὰ νῦν, καὶ τὰ πρόσθεν τηρησόντων ἐκείνων. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οὐκ ἀπαίδευτον τοὺς μὲν στρατιώτας τοῖς ἀριστείοις τιμᾶν, οὐ τοὺς ἐκ πατέρων λαμπρῶν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τι γενναῖον ἐργασαμένους, τοὺς δὲ στρατηγούς διὰ τοὺς προγόνους αἰρεῖσθαι, κἂν ὧσιν ἄχρηστοι, μὴ διὰ τὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴν, κἂν μὴ γένει λαμπρύνωνται;

[22] For it is dangerous to consider what fine thing a general's ancestors have done, rather than what the generals now chosen will do, as if those long dead could still protect us, and as if they would maintain us in our former possessions. As a matter of fact, is it not sheer stupidity to honour soldiers for valour, not those of famous families but those who have done some noble

deed themselves, but on the other hand to select generals, even if they are incompetent, on account of their ancestors and not on account of their own worth, even if their families are unknown?

[23] προσόντων μὲν δὴ τούτων ἐκείνοις εὐτυχῆς ὁ στρατηγός, ἀπόντων δ' ἐκείνων, κἂν παρῇ ταῦτα, ἄπρακτος.

[23] Of course, if a general has birth in addition to these other qualities, he is fortunate, but even if he has a famous name without the other qualities, he is useless.

[24] ἐλπίσαι δ' ἂν τις τάχα καὶ ἀμείνους ἔσεσθαι στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἔχοντας ἐνσεμνύνεσθαι προγόνοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ πατράσι κυδαινόμενοι, κἂν ἐλλίπωσιν, οἴομενοι τὴν ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν εὐκλειάν σφισι φυλάττεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ ῥαθυμότερον διοικοῦσιν, οἷς δ' οὐδεμία προϋπάρχει δόξα προγόνων, οὗτοι τὴν ἐκ πατέρων ἐλάττωσιν ἐθέλοντες ἀναπληρῶσαι τῇ σφετέρᾳ προθυμίᾳ φιλοκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀμιλλῶνται·

[24] It might perhaps be expected that those men who cannot take pride in their ancestors would become even better generals; for men who glory in their forefathers, even if they are themselves failures, believing that the fame of their family is theirs forever are often too careless as administrators, whereas those who have no ancestral renown to begin with, desiring to make up for the obscurity of their lineage by their own zeal, are more eager to take part in dangerous enterprises.

[25] καὶ καθάπερ οἱ πενέστεροι τῶν εὐπορωτέρων ταλαιπωρότερον ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου κτῆσιν ὥρμηται τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ἀναπληρῶσαι τῆς τύχης σπεύδοντες, οὕτως, οἷς μὴ πάρεστι κληρονομουμένη πατέρων ἀποχρήσασθαι δόξῃ, τὴν ἀρετὴν ιδιόκτητον οἰκειώσασθαι προαιροῦνται.

[25] Just as the poor man, eager to supply what fortune omitted, will endure more than the rich man in getting a start to make his fortune, so the man who can avail himself of no inheritance of ancestral glory determines to make his own the virtue which he himself acquires.

II. Περί ἀγαθοῦ στρατηγοῦ διαίρεσις

II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD GENERAL

[1] Ζηλούσθω μὲν δὴ ἡμῖν ὁ στρατηγὸς ὁ ἀγαθὸς εὐγενὴς καὶ πλούσιος, μὴ ἀποδοκιμαζέσθω δὲ πένης μετὰ ἀρετῆς, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ λαμπρῶν.

[1] So that general is to be praised who is good, wealthy, and well-born, but the excellent general who is not wealthy is not to be rejected, even if of humble family.

[2] αἰρεθεὶς δ' ὁ στρατηγὸς ἔστω χρηστός, εὐπροσήγορος, ἔτοιμος, ἀτάραχος, μὴ οὕτως ἐπιεικὴς ὥστε καταφρονεῖσθαι, μήτε φοβερὸς ὥστε μισεῖσθαι, ἵνα μήτε ταῖς χάρισιν ἐκλύσῃ τὸ στρατόπεδον μήτε τοῖς φόβοις ἀλλοτριώσῃ.

[2] The general when chosen must be trustworthy, affable, prompt, calm, not so lenient as to be despised, nor so severe as to be hated, so that he may neither through favours loosen the bonds of discipline, nor estrange the army through fear.

[3] λοχαγοὺς δὲ καθιστάτω καὶ ταξιάρχους καὶ χιλιάρχους, καὶ εἴ τινων ἄλλων ἡγεμόνων προσδεῖν αὐτῷ δόξαι, τοὺς εὐνουστάτους τῇ πατρίδι, πιστοτάτους, εὐρωστοτάτους, ἔνθεν δ' οὐδὲν ἂν κωλύοι καὶ τοὺς εὐπορωτάτους καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεστάτους·

[3] He must appoint as lieutenants, captains, and colonels, as well as other officers, if it seems necessary, men who are most loyal to their country, most faithful, and most vigorous — though there is nothing to prevent their being of the greatest wealth and nobility.

[4] οὐ γάρ, ὡς ὀλίγους αἰρουμένους στρατηγοὺς ἐκ τρόπου δοκιμάσαι ῥᾶον, κἂν ἀπὴ ὁ τῶν χρημάτων μετ' εὐγενείας ὄγκος, οὕτως που καὶ λοχαγῶν καὶ ταξιάρχων πλῆθος.

[4] As the number of generals to be chosen is small, they may be easily judged from their characters, even if the dignity of wealth and birth is lacking; but this is not the case with the multitude of subordinate officers.

[5] ὅθεν τὸ μὲν εὐγενὲς ἐπὶ τούτων προκριτέον εἰς πρόχειρον ἐν ὧς καὶ καιρῷ δοκιμασίαν, τὸ δὲ ἐν εὐπορίᾳ, ἐπειδὴ ἀναλῶσαί τε καὶ δοῦναι στρατιώταις οἱ

ἐκ περιουσίας δυνατοί, χορηγία δ' ἀπὸ τῶν ἡγουμένων ὀλίγη πρὸς τοὺς ὑποταττομένους εὐνουστέρα παρασκευάζει τὰ πλήθη· καὶ ἀσφαλεῖς αἱ μειζόνων πίστεις πραγμάτων τοῖς περὶ πλειόνων κινδυνεύουσιν, εἰ μὴ πάνυ τὸ πιστόν, ὥς ἂν εἰ στρατηγοὶ τις, ἐκ τοῦ τρόπου παρέχοιτο.

[5] And so by off-hand judgment required at a crucial moment the nobility have to be preferred, but when there is no urgency, the wealthy, since those who have abundant means can spend money on the soldiery and make them gifts; for a slight expenditure by the officers for the benefit of their men makes the rank and file better disposed; and the pledges of greater rewards can be depended upon when made by those who have more at stake — that is, if the confidence a general ought to inspire is not altogether furnished by his character.

III. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν βουλευτάς

III. THE GENERAL'S ADVISORY COUNCIL

[1] Αἰρεῖσθω δὲ ἥτοι συνέδρους, οἱ μεθεξουσιν αὐτῷ πάσης βουλῆς καὶ κοινωνήσουσι γνώμης αὐτοῦ οἱ τούτου εἵνεκα ἀκολουθήσοντες, ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἡγεμόνων τοὺς ἐντιμοτάτους μεταπεμπόμενος συνεδρευέτω, ὥς, ἃ γέ τις ἂν ἐννοήσῃ μὲν μόνος, ὥς τὰ αὐτοῦ, οὐ βεβαίως οἰκειοῦται.

[1] The general should either choose a staff to participate in all his councils and share in his decisions, men who will accompany the army especially for this purpose, or summon as members of his council a selected group of the most respected commanders, since it is not safe that the opinions of one single man, on his sole judgment, should be adopted.

[2] γνώμη γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἀνεπικούρητος μονομένη παπταίνει περὶ τὴν ἰδίαν εὕρεσιν, ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πέλας ἐπιμαρτυρηθεῖσα πιστοῦται τὸ μὴ σφαλερόν.

[2] For the isolated decision of one man, unsupported by others, can see no farther than his own ingenuity, but that which has the additional testimony of councillors guarantees against mistake.

[3] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ μήθ' οὕτως ἄστατος ἔστω τὴν διάνοιαν, ὥς αὐτὸν αὐτῷ πάμπαν ἀπιστεῖν, μήθ' οὕτως αὐθάδης, ὥς μή τι καὶ παρ' ἄλλω τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ κρεῖττον οἶεσθαι νοηθῆναι· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἢ πᾶσι προσέχοντα καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἀσύμφορα πράττειν, ἢ μὴδ' ὀλίγ' ἄλλων ἀκούοντα, πάντα δ' αὐτοῦ, πολλὰ καὶ δεῖνα διαμαρτάνειν.

[3] However, the general must neither be so undecided that he entirely distrusts himself, nor so obstinate as not to think that anyone can have a better idea than his own; for such a man, either because he listens to every one else and never to himself, is sure to meet with frequent misfortune, or else, through never listening to others but always to himself, is bound to make many very costly mistakes.

IV. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πολέμου ἐξ εὐλόγου αἰτίας ἐπάγειν

IV. THE NECESSITY OF A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR WAR

[1] Τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου μάλιστά φημι χρῆναι φρονίμως συνίστασθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου πᾶσι φανερόν γίγνεσθαι πολεμοῦντα· τότε γὰρ καὶ θεοὶ συναγωνιστὰι τοῖς στρατεύουσιν εὐμενεῖς καθίστανται, καὶ ἄνθρωποι προθυμότερον ἀντιτάττονται τοῖς δεινοῖς·

[1] The causes of war, I believe, should be marshalled with the greatest care; it should be evident to all that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, become comrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe.

[2] εἰδότες γάρ, ὥς οὐκ ἄρχουσιν ἀλλ' ἀμύνονται, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀσυνειδήτους κακῶν ἔχοντες ἐντελῇ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰσφέρονται, ὥς, ὅσοι γε νομίζουσι νεμεσήσειν τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ τῷ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐκφέρειν πόλεμον, αὐτῇ τῇ οἴησει, κἂν μὴ τι δεινὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαντήσιν μέλλῃ, προκατορρωδοῦσιν.

[2] For with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with consciences free from evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear, even if they are not about to face danger at the hands of the enemy.

[3] διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν στρατηγόν, ὃν τε βούλεται τυχεῖν καὶ ὃν μὴ παραχωρῆσαι, λόγῳ καὶ πρεσβεΐαις προκαλεῖσθαι πρῶτον, ἵν' ἐν τῷ μὴ συγκαταβαίνειν τοῖς ἀξιουμένοις τοὺς ἐναντίους ἀνάγκη δοκῇ, καὶ μὴ προαιρέσει τὴν δύναμιν ἐξάγειν πολεμήσουσαν, ἐπιμαρτυράμενος τὸ θεῖον, ὥς οὔτε καταφρονῶν ὢν συμβαίνει τοὺς πολεμοῦντας ἀσχεῖν, ἀνεμεσήτως ἔπεισιν, οὔτε ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὰ δεῖνα δρᾶσαι προηρημένος τοὺς πολεμίους.

[3] On this account the general must first announce, by speeches and through embassies, what he wishes to obtain and what he is not willing to concede, in order that it may appear that, because the enemy will not agree to his reasonable demands, it is of necessity, not of his own preference, that he is

taking the field. He should call heaven to witness that he is entering the war without offence, since he has not failed to consider the dangers that fall to the lot of combatants, and is not deliberately seeking, in every possible manner, to ruin the enemy.

[4] εἰδέναι δὲ χρή, καθότι οὐ μόνον οἰκίας καὶ τείχους ἐδραιότερον ὑφίστασθαι δεῖ τὸν θεμέλιον, ὥς ἀσθενοῦς γε ὄντος συγκαταρρηγομένων καὶ τῶν ἐποικοδομουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολέμου τὰς ἀρχὰς δεῖ κατασκευασάμενον ἰσχυρῶς καὶ κρηπίδα περιθέμενον ἀσφαλείας, οὕτως ἐξάγειν τὰς δυνάμεις· ὦν γὰρ ἀσθενῇ τὰ πράγματα ἐστίν, ἐπειδὰν οὗτοι μέγα βάρος ἀναλάβωσιν πολέμου, ταχὺ θλίβονται καὶ ὑστεροῦσιν.

[4] He should know that not only is a firm foundation necessary for houses and walls — for if this is weak the superstructures will also collapse — , but that in war also it is only after one has prepared a firm beginning, and has laid a safe foundation, that he should take the field. For those whose cause is weak, when they take up the heavy burden of war, are quickly crushed by it and fail.

[5] ὅθεν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸν κυβερνήτην ἐκ λιμένος ἐξαρτυσάμενον τὸ σκάφος καὶ τὰ παρ' αὐτῷ ἅπαντα ποιήσαντα, τότε ἐπιτρέπειν χρή τῇ τύχῃ, ὥς αἰσχιστόν γε καὶ σφαλερὸν ὑποδείξαντα πολέμου κίνησιν, ὥστε καὶ διὰ θαλάττης ἤδη καὶ διὰ γῆς ἄγειν τὸ στράτευμα, κᾶπειτα πρύμναν κρούεσθαι·

[5] Just as a careful ship-captain, after he has given his ship a thorough overhauling and outfitting while in harbour, and has done everything within his own power, must then commit his craft to Fortune, so it is most disgraceful and dangerous for a general, after he has given intimations of a beginning of war, implying an immediate advance of his forces by both land and sea, then to back out.

[6] τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀνοίας καὶ προπετείας ἕκαστος κατεγέλασεν, τῆς δ' ἀσθενείας κατεφρόνησεν, οἱ δ' ἐχθροί, οἵτινές ποτ' ἂν ὦσιν, κἂν μὴ πάθωσιν, ὥς οὐχὶ μὴ βουληθέντας ἀλλ' οὐ δυνηθέντας διαθεῖναι τι δικαίως ἐμίσησαν.

[6] For while every one laughs at folly and rashness, we despise weakness, and the enemy — whoever they may be — even if they experience no harm, have good reason to hate the would-be invaders, as men who have not lacked the will, but lacked the ability to put a matter through.

V. Περὶ τοῦ ἐξιλεοῦσθαι πρῶτον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὸ θεῖον ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐξάγων εἰς πόλεμον

Ἐξαγέτω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις ὁ στρατηγὸς καθαρὰς ἢ οἷς νόμοι ἱεροὶ ἢ οἷς μάντεις
ὑφηγοῦνται καθαρσίους, πᾶσαν, εἴ τις ἢ δημοσίᾳ κηλὶς ἢ ἰδίου μολύσματος
ἐκάστω συνέστιν, ἀποδιοπομπούμενος.

V. PROPITIATION OF THE DIVINE POWER BY THE GENERAL BEFORE LEADING THE ARMY INTO BATTLE

Before the general leads out his army he must see that it is purified, by such
rites as either the laws or soothsayers direct, and must avert whatever taint
there is in the state or in any citizen, by expiatory sacrifices.

VI. Περὶ τοῦ ἄγειν ἐν τάξει τὸ στρατόπεδον

VI. ON MAINTAINING MILITARY FORMATION

[1] Ἀγέτω δὲ τὸ στρατεύμα πᾶν ἐν τάξει, κἂν μήπω μέλλῃ συμβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ μακρᾶς ὁδοῦ περαιοῦσθαι καὶ πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἀνύειν πορείαν, καὶ ἐν τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ· διὰ μὲν τῆς φιλίας, ἵνα ἐθίζηται τὰ στρατεύματα μένειν ἐν τάξει καὶ συμφυλάττειν τοὺς ἰδίους λόχους καὶ ἔπεσθαι τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν, διὰ δὲ τῆς πολεμίας πρὸς τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐπιβουλὰς γιγνομένας, ἵνα μὴ ἐν ὄξει καιρῷ θορυβούμενοι καὶ ἐπαναθέοντες καὶ ἄλλοι πρὸς ἄλλους φερόμενοι μηδὲν μὲν ἀνύσωσι φθασθέντες, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ δεῖνα πάθωσιν, ἀλλ' ἅμα καὶ εἰς πορείαν ὧσιν ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ εἰς μάχην εὐτρεπεῖς, ἔχοντες καὶ τὸ σύνθημα καὶ ἀλλήλους ἐν τάξει βλέποντες.

[1] The general must lead his entire army in military formation, even if he is not on the point of battle, but is completing a long journey and a march of many days through either a friendly or a hostile country; through a friendly country, that the soldiers may become accustomed to remaining in rank, to keeping to their own companies, and to following their own leaders; through a hostile country, to guard against sudden attacks from ambush, that the soldiers may not be thrown into disorder at a critical moment, running against and stumbling over one another, and so accomplishing nothing but rather suffering severe loss; they must proceed, prepared at the same time for marching and for battle, remembering their watchword and keeping their eyes on their comrades in the ranks.

[2] συστέλλειν δὲ πειράσθω τὴν πορείαν τοῦ στρατεύματος, ὥς ἐνὶ μάλιστα, πρὸς ὀλίγον, καὶ διὰ τοιούτων, ἂν δυνατόν ᾖ, χωρίων ἀγέτω τὰς τάξεις, δι' ὧν οὐκ ἂν ἐκθλιβόμεναι στεναὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσai πλάτος ἐκ πλευρᾶς ἐπὶ μήκιστον ἐκταθεῖεν·

[2] The general must attempt to make the marching order of his army as compact as possible, and should lead his troops through such a country — so far as he is able — that the ranks may not be so cramped, being narrow and having no width, that they cannot be deployed to a considerable distance laterally.

[3] καὶ γὰρ εὐπαθέστεραι γίνονται πρὸς τὰς αἰφνιδίους τῶν πολεμίων

ἐπιφανείας αἱ τοιαῦται καὶ ἥκιστα δραστήριοι· ἂν τε γὰρ σφισι κατὰ μέτωπον ὑπαντήσωσιν οἱ πολέμοι πλατύτεροι τεταγμένοι, ῥαδίως αὐτοὺς τρέπονται, καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς ἐπὶ κέρως ὄντας ἐν ταῖς μάχαις κυκλούμενοι, ἂν τε κατὰ μέσσην τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ πλευρᾶς ἐπιβάλωσι, ταχὺ διέσπασαν αὐτῶν τὴν πορείαν καὶ διέκοψαν — ἐπιστρεψάντων γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰς φάλαγγα πρὸς ἄμυναν ἀσθενῆς ἢ μάχη γίνεται καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα βάθος — , ἐάν τε τοῖς κατόπιν, ἢ κατὰ νότου μάχη δεινὴ καὶ προφανὴ τὸν ὄλεθρον ἔχουσα, κἂν ἐπιστρέψαι δὲ τολμήσωσιν εἰς μέτωπον, ἢ αὐτὴ γίγνεται μάχη τοῖς ἐν τῇ πρωτοπορείᾳ τεταγμένοις· ταχὺ γὰρ αὐτοὺς περιστήσονται.

[3] For lines so disposed suffer more under sudden attacks of the enemy and are least effective; should the enemy with a more extended front encounter the head of the column, they would easily put it to flight, just as in battle one army, by outflanking an enemy advancing in column formation, routs it. Should the enemy attack the centre of the column from the flank, they would quickly pierce it and cut through — for if the column wheels to meet the enemy, forming a phalanx, even this, lacking depth, will make but a weak resistance — ; and, finally, should the enemy attack the rear of the column, the fighting with back to the foe would be dangerous and entail obvious destruction; and even if the soldiers in the column venture to face about and form a new front, the battle would amount to the same thing as the previous attack on the advance guard, *i.e.*, the enemy would quickly surround them.

[4] συμβαίνει δὲ καὶ τὰς παραβοηθείας δυσχερεῖς καὶ ἀπράκτους γίνεσθαι· τῶν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐραγίας τοῖς εἰς τὴν πρωτοπορείαν βουλομένων βοηθεῖν ἢ τῶν πρώτων τοῖς κατόπιν βραδεῖα ἢ ἄφιξις καὶ οὐ κατὰ καιρὸν γίγνεται, διὰ πολλῶν, ὧν ὑστεροῦσιν ἢ προηγοῦνται, σταδίων ἰέναι προθυμουμένων.

[4] Furthermore, assistance is difficult to give and ineffectual, for when those in the rear desire to give aid to the head of the column, or those at the head to those in the rear, their arrival is delayed and ill-timed, however eager they may be to cover the many stades which separate them from the van or the rear respectively.

[5] Ἡ δὲ συνεσταλμένη πορεία καὶ τετράγωνος ἢ μὴ πάνυ παραμήκης εἰς πάντα καιρὸν εὐμεταχείριστός ἐστι καὶ ἀσφαλής. ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ συνέβη τι τοιοῦτον ἐκ τῶν ἐκτεινομένων στρατευμάτων, ὥστε Πανικὰ καὶ πτοίας

ἀμφιδόξους ἐμπίπτειν· ἐνίστε γὰρ οἱ πρῶτοι καταβεβηκότες ἐξ ὄρεινῶν εἰς ψιλὰ καὶ ἐπίπεδα χωρία θεασάμενοι τοὺς κατόπιν ἐπικαταβαίνοντας ἔδοξαν εἶναι πολεμίων ἔφοδον, ὥστε μελλῆσαι προσβάλλειν ὡς ἐχθροῖς, τινὰς δὲ καὶ εἰς χεῖρας ἐλθεῖν ἤδη.

[5] A marching formation that is compact and rectangular — not very much longer than its width — is safe and easy to manage for every emergency. A too greatly extended line of march may at times produce panic and apprehension due to uncertainty, for sometimes the leaders, after descending from mountains into treeless and level regions, observing those in the rear still descending, have thought the enemy were attacking, so that they have been on the point of marching against their own men as enemies, and some have even come to blows.

[6] Λαμβανέτω δὲ τὴν θεραπείαν καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια καὶ τὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἅπασαν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ μὴ χωρὶς· ἂν δὲ μὴ τὰ κατόπιν ἀσφαλῇ πάνυ καὶ εἰρηναῖα νομίζῃ, καὶ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἐκ τῶν ἐρρωμενεστάτων καὶ ἀνδρειοτάτων συνιστάσθω, μηθὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν οἰόμενος πρὸς τὰ συμβαίνοντα τῆς πρωτοπορείας.

[6] The general must place his medical equipment, pack animals, and all his baggage in the centre of his army, not outside. Should he consider that his rear is not quite secure and undisturbed he should form his rear guard of the most vigorous and courageous soldiers, realizing that, in the light of experience, the rear is no less important than the front.

[7] Προπεμπέτω δὲ ἱππεῖς τοὺς διερευνησομένους τὰς ὁδοὺς, καὶ μάλισθ', ὅτ' ἂν ὑλώδεις καὶ περικεκλασμένες λόφοις ἐρημίας διεξίῃ· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐνέδραι πολεμίων ὑποκαθέζονται, καὶ λαθοῦσαι μὲν ἔστιν ὅτε τὰ ὅλα συνέτριψαν τῶν ἐναντίων πράγματα, μὴ λαθοῦσαι δὲ διὰ μικρᾶς φροντίδος φρόνησιν μεγάλην ἐμαρτύρησαν τῷ πολεμίῳ στρατηγῷ.

[7] He must send ahead cavalry as scouts to search the roads, especially when advancing through a wooded country, or a wilderness broken up by ridges. For ambushes are frequently set by the enemy, and sometimes failure to detect them brings complete disaster to the opposing side, while their discovery, by a slight precaution, attests to the general of the enemy great prudence on the part of his adversary.

[8] τὴν μὲν γὰρ πεδιάδα καὶ ψιλὴν ἢ πάντων ὄψις ἱκανὴ προερευνήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ κονιορτὸς ἀναφερόμενος μέθ' ἡμέραν ἐμήνυσεν τὴν τῶν πολεμίων ἔφοδον, καὶ πυρὰ καίόμενα νύκτωρ ἐπύρσευσεν τὴν ἐγγὺς στρατοπεδεΐαν.

[8] For in a level and treeless country a general survey is sufficient for a preliminary investigation; for a cloud of dust announces the approach of the enemy by day, and burning fires light up a near-by encampment at night.

[9] Ἀγέτω δὲ τὰς δυνάμεις, μὴ μέλλων μὲν ἐκτάξειν εἰς μάχην, ἐὰν ἐπείγηται τι φθάνειν συντομώτερον, εἰ ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι νομίζοι, καὶ νύκτωρ· μέλλων δὲ κρίνειν ἅμα τῷ σύνοπτον γενέσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις εὐθύς τὰ πράγματα διὰ μάχης σχολῇ προΐτω καὶ μὴ πολλὴν ἀνυέτω· πολλάκις γὰρ πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ὁ κόπος ἐδαπάνησεν τὴν ἀκμὴν τῶν σωμάτων.

[9] If the general is not about to form his line of battle, but is hurrying to be the first to arrive at a given point, he should lead his army by night marches also, provided he thinks it safe. But if he intends to decide the issue by battle as soon as he comes in sight of the enemy, he should at once advance slowly and not try to march too far; for in many cases, before the actual fighting, fatigue lessens men's physical fitness.

[10] Διοδεύων δὲ συμμαχίδα γῆν παραγγελλέτω τοῖς στρατεύμασιν ἀπέχεσθαι τῆς χώρας, καὶ μὴτ' ἄγειν τι μήτε φθεῖρειν· ἀφειδὲς γὰρ πλῆθος ἅπαν ἐν ὅπλοις, ὅτ' ἂν ἔχη τὴν τοῦ δύνασθαι τι ποιεῖν ἐξουσίαν, καὶ ἡ ἐγγὺς ὄψις ἀγαθῶν δελεάζει τοὺς ἀλογίστους ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν· μικραὶ δὲ προφάσεις ἢ ἀπηλλοτριώσαν συμμαχοὺς ἢ καὶ παντελῶς ἐξεπολέμωσαν.

[10] When passing through the country of an ally, the general must order his troops not to lay hands on the country, nor to pillage or destroy; for every army under arms is ruthless, when it has the opportunity of exercising power, and the close view of desirable objects entices the thoughtless to greediness; while small reasons alienate allies or make them quite hostile.

[11] τὴν δὲ τῶν πολεμίων φθειρέτω καὶ καιέτω καὶ τεμνέσθω· ζημία γὰρ χρημάτων καὶ καρπῶν ἔνδεια μειοῖ πόλεμον, ὥς περιουσία τρέφει. προανατεινέσθω μέντοι πρῶτον, ὃ μέλλει ποιεῖν· πολλάκις γὰρ ἡ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσσεσθαι δεινοῦ προσδοκία συνηνάγκασε, πρὶν ἢ παθεῖν, ὑποσχέσθαι τι τοὺς κινδυνεύοντας ὧν πρότερον οὐκ ἐβουλήθησαν ποιεῖν.

ἐπειδὴν δ' ἅπαξ πάθωσιν, ὥς οὐδὲν ἔτι χεῖρον ὀψόμενοι τῶν λοιπῶν καταφρονοῦσιν.

[11] But the country of the enemy he should ruin and burn and ravage, for loss of money and shortage of crops reduce warfare, as abundance nourishes it. But first he should let the enemy know what he intends to do; for often the expectation of impending terror has brought those who have been endangered, before they have suffered at all, to terms which they previously would not have wished to accept; but when they have once suffered a reverse, in the belief that nothing can be worse they are careless of future perils.

[12] εἰ δὲ πολὺν ἐν τῇ πολεμίᾳ μέλλει καταστρατοπεδεύειν χρόνον, τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα φθειρέτω τῆς χώρας ὧν αὐτὸς οὐχ ἔξει χρεῖαν, ἅττα δὲ ἀναγκαῖα φυλαχθέντα τοῖς φίλοις ἔσται, τούτων φειδέσθω.

[12] If he intends to encamp for some time in the enemy's country, he must destroy only things of such a number and sort as he himself will not need; whatever, if preserved, will be of advantage to his friends he should spare.

[13] Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων ἐκπεπληρωμένων μήτ' ἐπὶ τῆς ιδιοκτῆτου μήτ' ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπηκόου μήτ' ἐπὶ τῆς συμμαχίδος καθεζόμενος ἐγγχρονίζετω χώρας· τοὺς γὰρ ἰδίους ἀναλώσει καρποὺς καὶ ζημιώσει πλέον τοὺς φίλους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους· μεταγέτω δ' ὥς θᾶπτον, ἐὰν ἀκίνδυνα ᾖ τὰ οἴκοι, τὰς δυνάμεις· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς πολεμίας, εἰ μὲν εἴη δαψιλῆς καὶ εὐδαίμων, τροφήν ἔξει καὶ ἄφθονον, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν γε φιλίαν οὐ λυμανεῖται, πολλὰ δ' ὁμως καὶ ἀπὸ λυπρᾶς τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἔξει πλεονεκτήματα.

[13] When the army is recruited to full strength, he must not settle down and stay either in his own country, or in that of a subject nation, or in that of an ally; for he will consume his own crops, and do more damage to his friends than to his enemies. He should lead out his forces over the frontier as soon as possible, if matters are safe at home; for from the enemy's country, if it is fertile and wealthy, he will have abundant provisions, but if it is not, he will at least not be injuring a friendly country, and he will still derive great gain even from the distress of the hostile country.

[14] Φροντιζέτω δὲ περὶ τε ἀγορὰς καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐμπόρων καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν παραπομπῆς, ἵν' ἀκινδύνου τῆς παρουσίας σφίσιν οὔσης ἀόκνως

παρακομίζωσι τὸν εἰς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια φόρτον.

[14] He should consider the matter of supplies, and the convoying of his merchants by land and sea, that they may arrive safely at his base of supplies, and that they may without hesitation transport their cargoes of provisions.

VII. Περὶ τοῦ ὅταν διὰ στενῶν μέλλῃ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἄγειν

VII. ON LEADING AN ARMY THROUGH NARROW DEFILES

[1] Ἐπειδὴν δὲ ἦτοι διὰ στενῶν μέλλῃ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πάροδον ἢ δι' ὀρεινῆς καὶ δυσβάτου χώρας ἄγειν τὸν στρατόν, ἀναγκαῖον προεκπέμποντά τι μέρος τῆς δυνάμεως προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὰς τε ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τὰς τῶν στενῶν παρόδους, μὴ φθάσαντες οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ καταστάντες ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων κωλύσωσι τὴν διεκβολὴν ποιεῖσθαι.

[1] Whenever the general intends to march through a narrow pass, or to lead his army over mountainous and difficult country, he must send ahead part of his force to occupy the mountain-passes and the defiles, lest the enemy, coming first, make a stand on the summits and prevent the army from crossing.

[2] τὸ δ' αὐτὸ πεφροντίσθω, κἂν αὐτὸς δεδίῃ πολέμιων εἰσβολήν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ δρᾶσαι μὲν χρήσιμον, φυλάξασθαι δὲ παθεῖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ φθάσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς εἰσβαλόντας εἰς τὴν πολέμιαν ἐπεῖγον, ἀποκλεῖσαι δὲ τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐπὶ σφῶς ἰόντας οὐ προνοητέον.

[2] This he should observe even if fearing an attack by the enemy. For naturally it is not advantageous to take the initiative, without also recognizing the necessity of taking precautions against injury; nor is it necessary to outstrip the enemy in making an invasion into his country, without taking measures to prevent the enemy from marching against one's own country.

VIII. Περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν χάρακα

VIII. ON MAKING A PALISADED CAMP

[1] Ἐν δὲ δὴ τῇ τῶν ἐχθρῶν καταστρατοπεδεύων χάρακα περιβαλέσθω καὶ τάφρον, κἂν ἐφ' ἡμέραν μέλλῃ τὴν παρεμβολὴν θήσειν· ἀμετανόητος γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ ἀσφαλὲς στρατοπεδεΐα διὰ τὰς αἰφνιδίους καὶ ἀπρολήπτους ἐπιβολάς. καθιστάτω δὲ φύλακας, κἂν μακρὰν εἶναι νομίζῃ τοὺς πολεμίους, ὥς ἐγγυὲς ὄντων.

[1] When encamping in the territory of the enemy, the general should fortify his camp with a palisade and a ditch, even if planning to remain in camp but one day; for on account of sudden and unexpected attacks, a fortified camp of this sort will be safe and never regretted. He should place guards, even if he believes the enemy to be at a great distance, just as if they were at hand.

[2] ὅποι δ' ἂν μέλλῃ πολυχρόνιον τίθεσθαι τὴν παρεμβολὴν οὐκ ἀντεπιδόντων τῶν πολεμίων, ἐπὶ τῷ φθεῖρειν τὴν χώραν ποιούμενος τὴν μόνην ἣ καὶ καιροῖς ἐφεδρεύων βελτίοσιν, ἐκλεγέσθω χωρία μὴ ἐλώδη μηδὲ νοτερά· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ταῖς ἀναφοραῖς καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν τόπων δυσωδίαις νόσους καὶ λοιμοὺς ἐμβάλλει στρατεύμασι, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν ἐκάκωσε τὰς εὐεξίας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀπώλεσεν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον ὀλίγον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσθενὲς ἀπολείπεσθαι στρατεύμα.

[2] Whenever the enemy are not attacking, and he intends to encamp for some time, either for the purpose of ravaging the country, or to await a more advantageous time for battle, he must choose a locality that is not marshy, nor damp; for such places by their rising vapours and rank smell bring disease and infection to the army, and both impair the health of many and kill many, so that the soldiers are left few in number and weakened in strength.

IX. Περὶ τοῦ συνεχῶς ὑπαλλάσσειν τὰ ἄπληκτα

IX. ON CONTINUALLY CHANGING CAMP

[1] Χρήσιμον δέ που καὶ σωτήριον στρατοπέδῳ μὴδ' ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μένειν παρεμβολῆς, ἐὰν μὴ χειμαδεύῃ καὶ τοῖς σκηνώμασι διὰ τὴν ὥραν τοῦ καιροῦ πεπολισμένη τυγχάνῃ· αἱ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐκκρίσεις ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνόμεναι χωρίων ἀτμοὺς διεφθορότας ἀναπέμπουσαι συμμεταβάλλουσιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ περιέχοντος ἀέρος χύσιν.

[1] The general will find it advantageous and healthful for his army not to remain long in the same camp, unless it is winter and the army happens to be in huts on account of the time of year; for the necessary bodily excrement, deposited in the same place, gives off rank vapours and taints all the surrounding air.

[2] ἐν δὲ ταῖς χειμασίαις γυμναζέτω τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ πολεμικὰ καὶ σύντροφα ποιείσθω τοῖς δεινοῖς, μὴτ' ἀργεῖν ἐὼν μήτε ῥαθυμεῖν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀργία τὰ σώματα μαλθακὰ καὶ ἀσθενῇ κατεσκεύασεν, ἡ δὲ ῥαθυμία τὰς ψυχὰς ἀνάνδρους καὶ δειλὰς ἐποίησεν· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ δελεάζουσιν τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν συνήθει τὰς ἐπιθυμίας διαφθείρουσι καὶ τὸν εὐτολμώτατον.

[2] In winter quarters he should exercise his army and train it to be skilled in war and accustomed to danger, permitting no idleness nor relaxation; for idleness makes the body soft and weak, while relaxation makes the soul cowardly and worthless; since pleasures, capturing the passions by the enticement of daily habit, corrupt even the most courageous man.

[3] ὅθεν οὐ μακρὰν ἀπάγειν τοὺς ἄνδρας τῶν πόνων· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ μετὰ χρόνον ἀναγκάζωνται πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ χωρεῖν, οὐθ' ἡδέως ἐξίσσιν οὔτ' ἐπὶ πολὺ μένουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκδεδιητημένοι ταχὺ μὲν ὀρρωδοῦσι, πρὶν ἢ καὶ πείρασαι τὰ δεινὰ, ταχὺ δὲ καὶ πειράσαντες ἀποχωροῦσιν, οὔτ' ἐλπίζειν οὔτε φέρειν τοὺς κινδύνους δυνάμενοι.

[3] For this reason the soldiers must never be without occupation. When after some time spent in idleness they are compelled to go against the enemy, they do not go willingly nor do they long stand their ground, but because they have departed from their former habits, they quickly become dismayed, even before

making trial of danger, and even if they do make trial, they quickly retreat, being incapable either of feeling hope or of sustaining the stress of battle.

X. α'. Περὶ τοῦ δεῖν γυμνάζειν τὸν στρατὸν ἀδείας οὔσης

X. (1) THE NEED FOR CONTROLLING THE ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE

[1] Διόπερ ἀγαθοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τὰ χρήσιμα τότε κατασκευάζειν, ὅτ' οὐκ ἐπείγουσιν αἱ τῶν ἐκ παρατάξεως ἀγώνων ἀνάγκαι, καὶ τὰ ἄχρηστα διὰ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἄσκησιν ἐπιτάττειν. ἱκανὴ γὰρ στρατοπέδοις ἄνεσις, κἂν σφόδρα ταλαίπωροι ᾖσιν, ἢ μὴ διὰ τῶν δεινῶν εἰς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἀγώνισμα πεῖρα. γυμναζέτω δὲ τοιοῖσδέ τισι τρόποις.

[1] On this account it is the duty of a good general to prepare what is useful for war, when the necessity of a pitched battle is not pressing. He should also assign unproductive tasks to keep the army in good condition. For it is sufficient relaxation for soldiers, even if they are very weary, to exercise in arms without the dangers involved in a real battle. The general should train his troops in some such manner as the following.

[2] Ἐκταττέτω πρῶτον ἀναδοὺς τὰ ὅπλα πᾶσιν, ἵν' ἐν μελέτῃ σφίσιν ἢ τὸ μένειν ἐν τάξει, καὶ ταῖς ὄψεσι καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνήθεις ἀλλήλοις γινόμενοι, τίς ὑπὸ τίνα καὶ ποῦ καὶ μετὰ πόσους, ὑπ' ὅξυ παράγγελμα πάντες ᾖσιν ἐν τάξει· καὶ τὰς τε ἐκτάσεις καὶ συστολάς καὶ ἐγκλίσεις ἐπὶ λαῖα καὶ δεξιά, καὶ λόχων μεταγωγὰς καὶ διαστήματα καὶ πυκνώσεις, καὶ τὰς δι' ἀλλήλων ἀντεξόδους καὶ εισόδους, καὶ τὰς κατὰ λόχους διαιρέσεις, καὶ τὰς καταταξεῖς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ φάλαγγα ἐκτείνουσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ βάθος ὑποστέλλουσιν, καὶ τὴν ἀμφιπρόσωπον μάχην, ὅτ' ἂν οἱ κατ' οὐρὰν ἐπιστρέψαντες πρὸς τοὺς κυκλουμένους μάχωνται, καὶ τὰς ἀνακλήσεις ἐκδιδασκέτω.

[2] First arming the soldiers, he should draw them up in military formation that they may become practised in maintaining their formation; that they may become familiar with the faces and names of one another; that each soldier may learn by whom he stands and where and after how many. In this way, by one sharp command, the whole army will immediately form ranks. Then he should instruct the army in open and close order; in turning to the left and right; the interchange, taking distance, and closing up of files; the division into files; the arrangement and extension of files to form the phalanx;

withdrawing of files for greater depth of the phalanx; battle formation facing in two directions, when the rear guard turns to fight an encircling enemy; and he should instruct them thoroughly in the calls for retreat.

[3] Καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν μουσικῶν ὀργάνων οἱ μὲν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντες τοῦ μαθάνειν ἐπιτιθέντες τοὺς δακτύλους ἐπὶ τε τὰ τρήματα τῶν αὐλῶν καὶ διαστήματα τῶν χορδῶν πολλάκις ἄλλον ἔθεσαν ἐπ' ἄλλην καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἁρμονικὴν διάστασιν, εἴτα μόλις ἐπεκτείναντες βραδὺ μὲν αἶρουσι τοὺς δακτύλους, βραδὺ δὲ τιθέασιν, οἱ δ' ἐν μελέτῃ τῆς μουσικῆς ἀνεπιτηδεύτως ἤδη ἐρρυθμισμένη τῇ χειρὶ δι' ὀξύτητος μεταφέρουσιν, ὅπῃ τε βούλονται παραθλίψαι τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ἀνοῖξαι καὶ παραψηλαί χορδῆς· τοῦτον δῆπου τὸν τρόπον οἱ μὲν ἀσυνήθεις καὶ ἀνάσκητοι τῆς τάξεως διὰ ταράχου πολλοῦ μόλις ἀλλήλων διαμαρτάνοντες ἐγκατατάσσονται πολὺν ἀναλίσκοντες χρόνον, οἱ δὲ συγκεκροτημένοι διὰ τάχους, ὥς εἰπεῖν αὐτόματοι, φέρονται πρὸς τὴν τάξιν ἐναρμόνιον τινα καὶ καλὴν ἐκπληροῦντες ὄψιν.

[3] For just as those who begin to learn to play a musical instrument, in placing their fingers on the stops of the pipe or on the strings of the lyre, often set one finger on one and then another on another, without observing the interval that produces harmony, and then, with great effort, extending their fingers, they lift them slowly and slowly place them again; whereas practised players, no longer giving any evidence of care, with disciplined hand swiftly change from one note to another, lightly checking or opening the flow of air at will or lightly plucking the strings; in just this manner men unpractised and inexperienced in military formations, with great confusion and failure to find one another, will only after loss of much time take their places; but those who are well trained in formations quickly — indeed automatically, so to speak — rush to their stations, presenting a harmonious, I may say, and beautiful sight.

[4] Εἴτα διελὼν τὰ στρατεύματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀσιδήρῳ μάχῃ συναγέτω νάρθηκας ἢ στύρακας ἀκοντίων ἀναδιδούς, εἰ δὲ τινα καὶ βεβλασμένα πεδία εἴη, βώλους τε κελεύων αἶροντας βάλλειν· ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἱμάντων ταυρείων χρήσθων ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην· δείξας δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ λόφους ἢ βουνούς ἢ ὄρητους τόπους κελευέτω σὺν δρόμῳ καταλαμβάνεσθαι· ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ αὐτῶν τινας τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ ἀναδοὺς ἃ μικρῶ πρόσθεν ἔφην ὅπλα, τούτους ἐκβαλοῦντας ἐτέρους ἐκπεμπέτω· καὶ ἤτοι τοὺς μείναντας ἐπαινείτω καὶ μὴ ἐκπεσόντας ἢ τοὺς ἐκβαλόντας.

[4] Next after dividing the army into two parts he should lead them against each other in a sham battle, armed with staves or the shafts of javelins; if there should be any fields covered with clods, he should command them to throw clods; if they have any leather straps, the soldiers should use them in the battle. Pointing out to the soldiers ridges or hills or steep ascents, he should command them to charge and seize these places; and sometimes arming the soldiers with the weapons I have just mentioned, he should place some on the hilltops and send the others to dislodge them. He should praise those who stand firm without retreating, and those who succeed in dislodging their opponents.

[5] ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀσκήσεως καὶ γυμνασίας ὑγιαίνει μὲν τὸ στράτευμα, πᾶν δ' ὃ τι οὖν ἥδιον ἐσθίει καὶ πίνει, κἂν λιτὸν ἦ, πολυτελέστερον οὐθὲν ἐπιζητοῦν· ὁ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν πόνων λιμὸς καὶ τὸ δίψος ἱκανὸν ὄψον ἐστὶν καὶ γλυκὺ κρᾶμα, καὶ στερρότερά τε τὰ σώματά σφισι γίγνεται καὶ ἀκμῆτα, καὶ συνεθίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσι δεινοῖς, ἰδρῶτι καὶ πνεύματι καὶ ἄσθματι καὶ θάλπεσιν ἀσκιάστοις καὶ κρυμοῖς ὑπαίθοις ἐγγυμναζόμενα.

[5] For from such exercise and training the army is kept in good health, eating and drinking everything with heartier appetite, even if the fare is plain, desiring nothing more luxurious. For the hunger and thirst derived from toil are a sufficient relish and a sweet draught, and muscles become harder and untiring; and trained by sweating, puffing, and panting, and exposed to summer heat and the bitter cold under the open sky, the soldiers become accustomed to future hardships.

[6] Παραπλησίως δὲ γυμναζέτω καὶ τὸ ἵππικὸν ἀμίλλας ποιούμενος καὶ διώγματα καὶ συμπλοκάς καὶ ἀκροβολισμοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις καὶ περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς ρίζας τῶν λόφων, ἐφ' ὅσον δυνατόν ἐστι καὶ τῶν τραχέων ἐπιναύειν· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε βιάζεσθαι πρὸς ἀνάντη καὶ κατὰ πρανοῦς ἰππάζεσθαι.

[6] In the same way the general should train his cavalry, arranging practice battles, both pursuits and hand-to-hand struggles and skirmishes in the plain and around the base of the hills, as far as it is possible to go in the broken country; for it is not possible to charge uphill nor to ride downhill.

(X.) β'. Περί προνομῶν

(2) FORAGING EXPEDITIONS

[7] Σωφρονεῖτω δὲ περὶ τὰς προνομὰς καὶ μὴ ἐφίετω ταῖς δυνάμεσιν, ἐπειδὴν εἰς εὐδαίμονα πολεμίων εἰσβάλλῃ χώραν, ἀτάκτως φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὰς ὠφελίας· αἱ γὰρ μέγισται συμφοραὶ κἂν τοιοῖσδε γίνονται· πολλάκις γὰρ ἀτάκτοις καὶ σποράσι περὶ τὴν λείαν σεσοβημένοις ἐπιπεσόντες οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀσύντακτον τοῦ πλήθους καὶ διὰ τὸ βαρεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀποχωροῦντας ταῖς ὠφελείας οὔτε τοῖς ὅπλοις χρῆσθαι δυναμένους οὔτ' ἀλλήλοις ἐπικουρῆσαι πολλοὺς διέφθειραν.

[7] The general should be cautious in the matter of foraging expeditions, and not allow troops, when invading a rich hostile country, to search for plunder in an undisciplined manner; for the greatest misfortunes befall men acting in this way, since it has often happened that the enemy, falling on men scattered and without order in their eager search for booty, on account of this lack of order and the fact that they were loaded with their booty have killed many as they were retreating, unable to give aid to their comrades or to use their arms.

[8] εἰ δέ τινες δίχα τοῦ τὸν στρατηγὸν κελεῦσαι προνομεύοιεν, οὗτοι κολαζέσθων. αὐτός γε μὴν ὅτ' ἂν ἐπὶ τὴν λείαν ἐκπέμπῃ, τοῖς ψιλοῖς καὶ ἀνόπλοις συνταττέτω μαχίμους ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὺς, οἱ περὶ μὲν τὴν λείαν οὐκ ἀσχολήσονται, μένοντες δὲ ἐν τάξει παραφυλάξουσιν τοὺς προνομεύοντας, ἵν' ἦ σφισιν ἀσφαλὴς ἡ ἀποχώρησις.

[8] If any men do plundering without the command of the general, they should be punished. When the general himself sends out foraging parties, he should send with the light-armed and unarmed men guards, both horse and foot, who shall have nothing to do with the booty but are to remain in formation and guard the foragers, that the return to camp may be safely accomplished.

γ'. Περὶ κατασκόπων

(3) SPIES

[9] Εἰ δὲ συλλάβοι ποτὲ κατασκόπους, μὴ μιᾷ κεκρήσθω γνώμῃ· ἀλλ', ἔαν μὲν ἀσθενέστερα τὰ ἴδια ἢ περὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων εἶναι νομίσῃ, κτεινάτω τούτους, ἂν δὲ καὶ ὀπλισμῷ καλῶ κεκρημένος ἦ καὶ παρασκευαῖς ἐντελέσι καὶ δυνάμει πολλῇ καὶ εὐεξίᾳ σωμάτων καὶ πειθηνίῳ στρατεύματι καὶ ἡγεμόσιν ἀρίστοις καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ μεμελετημένῃ, παραλαβὼν τοὺς κατασκόπους καὶ ἐν

κόσμῳ τὴν στρατιὰν ἐπιδειξάμενος οὐκ ἂν ἁμάρτοι ποτὲ καὶ ἀθώους ἀποπέμψας. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πλεονεκτήματα τῶν ἀντιπολέμων ἀγγελλόμενα φοβεῖσθαι συνηνάγκασεν, τὰ δ' ἐλαττώματα θαρρεῖν παρεστήσατο.

[9] If the general should at any time capture spies, he should not employ any one single method in dealing with them. If he considers that his own army is weaker than that of the enemy, he should kill them, but if he has complete equipment of arms, thorough preparation for war, a powerful army, vigorous and disciplined, excellent officers, all trained by experience, he will make no mistake if, after making the spies examine his army drawn up in battle array, he occasionally even sends them away unharmed; for reported superiority of the enemy necessarily causes fear, but reported inferiority brings courage.

δ'. Περὶ νυκτοφυλάκων

(4) GUARDS BY NIGHT

[10] Φύλακας δὲ καταταπτέτω καὶ πλείους, ἵν' ἐν μέρει διελόμενοι τὴν τῆς νυκτὸς ὥραν οἱ μὲν ὑπνοῦν οἱ δὲ γρηγορεῖν αἰρῶνται· οὔτε γὰρ ἀναγκαστέον οὔθ' ὑπισχνουμένοις πιστευτέον ὅλην ἀγρυπνήσειν νύκτα τοὺς αὐτοὺς· εἰκὸς γὰρ ποτε καὶ παρὰ γνώμην ἐνδιδόντων τῶν μελῶν αὐτόματον ὕπνον ἐπελθεῖν.

[10] The general should appoint guards and a rather large number of them, that, by dividing the night into watches, some may sleep and some stand guard. Men must not be compelled to stand guard the entire night, nor even if they volunteer to do so must they be trusted; for it is only reasonable that sometimes, now the body is tired, sleep will come of its own accord, even against one's will.

[11] ὀρθοὶ δ' ἐστῶτες φυλαττόντων· αἱ γὰρ καθέδραι καὶ ἀναπτώσεις συνεκλύουσαι τὰ σώματα μαραίνουσιν εἰς ὕπνον, ἢ δ' ἀνάστασις καὶ ὁ τόνος τῶν σκελῶν ἐγγήγορσιν ἐντίθησι τῇ διανοίᾳ.

[11] The guards must remain standing while on duty; for seats and reclining positions, relaxing the body, are conducive to sleep, but standing erect and keeping the legs stretched makes the mind wakeful.

[12] καίωντων δ' οἱ φύλακες πυρὰ πορρωτέρω τῆς στρατοπεδείας· οὕτως γὰρ τοὺς μὲν προσιόντας διὰ τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκ πολλοῦ συνόψονται, τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ

φωτὸς ἐν σκότῳ τυγχάνοντες οὐκ ἀθρήσονται, μέχρις ἂν εἰς χεῖρας ἔλθωσιν.

[12] The guards must build fires at some distance from the camp. Thus because of the light they will see at a distance men advanced toward the camp, but those who come from the light will not perceive the guards, who are in the dark, until they fall into their hands.

ε΄. Περὶ λαθραίας ἀναχωρήσεως τοῦ στρατεύματος

(5) SECRET RETREAT OF THE ARMY

[13] Εἰ δὲ βούλοιτό ποτε νύκτωρ ἀναστῆσαι τὸ στράτευμα λανθάνων τοὺς πολεμίους, ἢ τόπους προκαταλαβέσθαι προαιρούμενος ἢ τοὺς ὄντας φεύγων ἢ μηδέπω βουλόμενος εἰς ἀνάγκην ἐλθεῖν τοῦ μάχεσθαι, πυρὰ πολλὰ καύσας ἀναχωρεῖτω· βλέποντες μὲν γὰρ οἱ πολέμιοι τὰ φῶτα δοκοῦσι κατὰ χώραν αὐτὸν μένειν, ἀφωτίστου δὲ μεταξὺ γενομένης τῆς παρεμβολῆς ὑπόνοιαν ἀναλαβόντες, ὡς φεύγουσιν, ἐνέδρας τε προεκπέμπουσι καὶ διώκουσιν.

[13] If the general desires to withdraw his army by night without the knowledge of the enemy, either to be the first to occupy a certain position or to escape from the position he is in, or to avoid the present necessity of battle, he should retreat leaving many fires burning; for as long as the enemy see the fires they believe that the army is remaining in the same place, but if the camp becomes dark while the retreat is going on, the enemy will suspect their flight, send ahead ambushes, and follow in pursuit.

ς΄. Περὶ στρατηγῶν κοινολογουμένων τοῖς τῶν ἐναντίων στρατηγοῖς

(6) PARLEYS WITH THE GENERALS OF THE ENEMY

[14] Ἐὰν δ' ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν μένων εἰς ὅψιν ἔρχηται ποτε τῷ τῶν πολεμίων στρατηγῷ, κοινολογησόμενος, ὡς αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι τι βουλόμενος, ἐκλεξάμενος τοὺς κρατίστους καὶ ἀξιοπρεπεστάτους τῶν νέων, εὐρώστους καλοὺς μεγάλους, ὅπλοις διαπρεπέσι κοσμήσας ἔχων περὶ αὐτὸν ἀπαντάτω· πολλάκις γὰρ τοιόνδε τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ μέρους ὀφθέντος ἠλπίσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἤκουσεν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπείσθη, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν εἶδεν ἐφοβήθη.

[14] But if, while keeping his army in the same spot, he should come to a conference with the opposing general, either to make or to receive some proposal, he should choose as an escort the strongest and finest-looking of the

younger soldiers, stalwart, handsome and tall men, equipped with magnificent armour, and with these about him he should meet the enemy. For often from the view of a part the whole is judged to be like it, and a general does not determine his course of action by what he has heard, but is terrified by what he has seen.

ζ'. Περὶ αὐτομόλων

(7) DESERTERS

[15] Τῶν δὲ αὐτομόλων εἴ τινες ἢ καιρὸν ἀφικνοῦνται μηνύσοντες ἢ ὥραν ἐπιθέσεως, ἢ ὁδὸν ἐπαγγέλλονται καθηγήσασθαι καὶ διὰ σκοπῶν ἀοράτων τοῖς πολεμίοις ἄξειν, δήσας αὐτοὺς ἀγέτω, τοῦτο ποιῶν σφισι φανερόν, ὥς, ἐὰν μὲν ἀληθεύσωσι καὶ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ καὶ νίκη πάντα ποιήσωσι τοῦ στρατεύματος, λύσει τέ σφας καὶ δωρεὰς δώσει καταξίους, ἐὰν δ' ἐξαπατήσωσι καὶ ψεύσωνται τοῖς σφετέροις ἐγχειρίσαι βουλόμενοι τὸ στράτευμα, παρ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν ὄντες ἐν δεσμοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κινδυνευόντων κατασφαγήσονται· πίστις γὰρ αὐτομόλου τι μηνύοντος αὕτη βεβαιότατη, τὸ μὴ αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς κύριον, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὀδηγουμένους.

[15] If any deserters arrive in camp to tell of a suitable opportunity or hour for attack, or if they offer to act as guides over a road and assert that they will lead the army along it, unseen by the enemy, the general should lead these deserters with him securely bound, making it plain to them that, if they are truthful and bring safety and victory to the army, he will set them free and present them with fitting rewards, but that if they attempt to deceive him and wish to betray his army into the hands of their own friends, at that same 'suitable opportunity' they will be slain in their bonds by the endangered army. Confidence may be most safely placed in the word of a deserter, when he knows that his life is not in his own hands, but in the hands of those whom he leads.

η'. Περὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολήν

(8) ON THE INSPECTION OF THE ENEMY'S CAMP

[16] Ὅράτω δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολήν ἐμπείρως· μήτε γάρ, ἐὰν ἐν ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ κατὰ κύκλον ἴδη κείμενον βραχὺν τὴν περίμετρον καὶ

συνεσταλμένον χάρακα, δοκείτω τοὺς πολεμίους ὀλίγους εἶναι — πᾶς γὰρ κύκλος ἐλάττω τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ὄψιν ἔχει τῆς ἐξ ἀναλόγου στερεομετρομένης θεωρίας, καὶ πλείους δύναται δέξασθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ περιγραφόμενον εὖρος, ἢ ἰδὼν ἂν τις ὄψει τεκμήριαιτο — , μήτε, ἂν αἱ πλευραὶ τοῦ χάρακος ἐπὶ μῆκος ἐκτείνωσι καὶ κατὰ τι μέρος στεναὶ τυγχάνωσιν ἢ σκολιαὶ καὶ πολυγώνιοι καὶ ὀξυγώνιοι, πολὺ πλῆθος ἐλπίζέτω· τῆς μὲν γὰρ στρατοπεδείας ἢ ὄψις μεγάλη φαίνεται, τοὺς δ' ἐν αὐτῇ περιειλημμένους ἄνδρας οὐ πάντως πλείονας ἔχει τῶν ἐν κύκλῳ περιγραφομένων.

[16] The general should skilfully inspect the camp of the enemy. If he sees a circular palisade contracted into a small circumference, lying in a plain, he should not conclude that the enemy are few in number; for every circle appears to contain less than it actually does by the theory of proportionate geometrical contents, and the space enclosed within a circle can hold more men than one would think to see it. If the sides of the palisade happen to be long and close together in certain parts, or crooked with many acute angles, he should not conclude that the camp contains a great number of men; for this type of camp appears large but has no more men within its walls in every case than circular camps have.

[17] οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρων καὶ λόφων χάρακες, εἰ μὴ συμφνεῖς ὥσι πάντῃ, μείζους μὲν ὄρωνται τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις, ἐλάττους δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἄνδρας περιέχουσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἐντὸς ἀπολείπεται γυμνά μέρη· τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων τόπων ἀνάγκη πολλὰ μὲν εἶναι βάραθρα, πολλὰ δὲ κρημνώδη καὶ τραχέα καὶ ἀκατασκήνωτα, τοῦ δὲ χάρακος πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιθεμένου, τούτου τὸ μῆκος εὐλόγως ἐπεκτείνεται.

[17] Palisades on hills and mountains, unless compact in every respect, appear greater than those in plains, but they contain fewer men than the eye judges; for many parts of such camps are bare of men, since there must be many ravines in them and many steep and precipitous banks unsuitable for pitching tents, and as the palisade is built to defend the men, its length must be accordingly greater.

[18] μήτ' οὖν, ἐπειδὴν ἴδη βραχὺν καὶ συνεσταλμένον, καταφρονεῖτω συλλογιζόμενος καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, μήτ', ἂν καὶ παραμήκη,

καταπληττέσθω.

[18] The general, therefore, judging merely the position and shape of a camp, should not be emboldened at the sight of a small contracted camp nor downhearted at the sight of an extended one.

[19] Ταῦτα μέντοι γινώσκων εὐκαίρῳ ποτὲ στρατηγία χρησάσθω, καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ κατὰ τὸ προειρημένον σχῆμα, καί, εἰ δέοι, καὶ συνθλίψας τὸ στράτευμα μὴ προαγέτω μήτε δεικνύτω τοῖς ἀντεστρατοπεδεύκοσι, καὶ δὴ προκαλουμένοις εἰς μάχην μὴ ἐξαγέτω· δοκεῖτω δὲ καὶ δεδιέναι.

[19] With this knowledge he should make use of opportune strategy. Stationing his army in a small camp, according to the above-mentioned plan, and if necessary, even crowding the soldiers together, he should not lead them from the camp nor show them to the enemy encamped opposite, nor lead them into battle if the enemy challenge, but he should even give the impression that he is afraid.

[20] πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ πολέμοι καταφρονήσαντες ὡς ὀλίγων ὄντων τῶν ἐναντίων, ὄψει καὶ οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ στρατηγικῇ τὰ πράγματα κρίνοντες, ῥαθυμότερον ἀνεστράφησαν, ἀφυλάκτως καὶ ἀτάκτως τῆς ἰδίας προϊόντες παρεμβολῆς, ὡς οὐ τολμησόντων σφίσι τῶν πολεμίων ἐπεξελεύσεσθαι, ἥ καὶ τῷ χάρακι περιστάντες πολιορκοῦσιν ἀπροσδόκητοι τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκχυθήσεσθαι πλήθους· ἢ δ' ἀνελπιστία τῶν δεινῶν ἀμελεστέρους ἐποίησε τοὺς στρατιώτας. ἔνθα δεῖ τὸν καιρὸν ἀρπάσαντα κατὰ πολλὰς ἐκδραμόντα τοῦ χάρακος πυλίδας ἐν τάξει τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀνδρείως ἔχεσθαι πραγμάτων.

[20] For often the enemy, growing bold in the belief that their opponents are few, judging by sight and not by strategic experience, behave thoughtlessly. They go forth from their camp carelessly and without discipline, believing that their opponents will not dare to come out and attack; or they even surround and blockade the palisade, unaware of the multitude of men about to pour forth upon them; and with no expectation of danger soldiers become heedless. Then, seizing a favourable opportunity, the army must rush forth from the many little gates of the palisade, and in battle array courageously grapple with the task before them.

[21] Ὁ δὲ εἰδὼς οὕτως στρατηγεῖν εἴσεται, κἂν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καταστρατηγῇται, καὶ δρᾶσαί τι φρόνιμος ἔσται καὶ φυλάξασθαι προμηθής· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ αὐτὸς εἴσεται, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκ τούτων ἐτέρου ποιοῦντος γινώσκεται, τί χρὴ μὴ παθεῖν· αἱ γὰρ ἰδία πρὸς τὸ λυπεῖν ἐμπειρία καὶ τὰς τῶν πέλας ἐπινοίας τεκμαίρονται.

[21] The general, having this knowledge, will know how to do his part, and even if he is out-generaled in these same matters, will be both wise in action and prudent in devising protection; for from the knowledge that instructs him in what he must do, he will know, when his opponent is trying to do this to him, what he must not himself suffer, since personal experience in inflicting damage warns of the designs of others.

θ'. Περὶ ἀπορρήτων

(9) SECRET PLANS

[22] Προάγειν δ' εἰ δέοι νύκτωρ ἢ μέθ' ἡμέραν ἐπὶ τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων, ἢ φρούριον ἢ πόλιν ἢ ἄκρα ἢ παρόδους καταληψόμενον ἢ τι τῶν ἄλλων δράσοντα, ἃ διὰ τάχους λαθόντα τοὺς πολεμίους, ἄλλως δ' οὐκ ἔστι πράξαι, μηδενὶ προλεγέτω, μήτ' ἐπὶ τί μήτε τί ποιήσων ἄγει τὴν στρατιάν, εἰ μὴ τισι τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νομίζοι προειπεῖν.

[22] If the general must make a march by night or by day for some secret purpose, to seize a fortress, city, height, or pass, or to do anything else that must be done quickly without the knowledge of the enemy, which otherwise could not be done at all, he must tell no one beforehand against what place or for what purpose he is leading his army, unless he considers it necessary to warn some of the higher officers in advance.

[23] γενόμενος δ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν τόπων ἐγγὺς ὄντος τοῦ παρ' ὃν δρᾶσαί τι δεῖ καιροῦ διδότην τὸ παράγγελμα καὶ τί δεῖ πράττειν σημαινέτω· ταχὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω καὶ δι' ὀλίγης ὥρας· ἅμα γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἀκούουσι καὶ οἱ ὑποτεταγμένοι τούτοις ἴσασιν.

[23] But when he has reached the spot and the moment is near at hand when he must act, he must give his orders and point out what is to be done. These orders must be quick and brief, for at the same instant that the leaders receive instructions their subordinates also know them.

[24] ἄφρων δὲ καὶ ἀτελής, ὅστις ἂν πρὸ τοῦ δέοντος εἰς τὸ πλῆθος ἀνακοινώσῃται τὴν πρᾶξιν· οἱ γὰρ πονηροὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτομολοῦσι καιροὺς, παρ' οὓς ἐροῦντές τι καὶ μηνύσοντες οἶονται τιμῆς καὶ δωρεᾶς τεύξεσθαι παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων· οὐκ ἔστιν δ' ἄφ' οὗ στρατεύματος οὐκ ἀποδιδράσκουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους δοῦλοί τε καὶ ἐλεύθεροι κατὰ πολλὰς προφάσεις, αἷς ἀνάγκη παρέχεσθαι πόλεμον.

[24] Thoughtless and futile is he who communicates his plan to the rank and file before it is necessary; for worthless scoundrels desert to the foes especially at critical times, when, by revealing and disclosing secrets, they believe they will receive honour and reward from the enemy. There is no army in which both slaves and freemen do not desert to the other side on the many occasions that war necessarily affords.

ι'. Περὶ τῆς πρὸ μάχης ἐπισκέψεως τῶν ἱερῶν

(10) TAKING THE OMENS BEFORE BATTLE

[25] Μῆτε δὲ εἰς πορείαν ἐξαγέτω τὸ στράτευμα μῆτε πρὸς μάχην ταπτέτω, μὴ πρότερον θυσάμενος· ἀλλ' ἀκολουθούντων αὐτῷ θύται καὶ μάντις. ἄριστον μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμπείρως ἐπισκέπτεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ ἱερά· ῥᾶστόν γε μὴν ἐν τάχει μαθεῖν ἐστίν καὶ αὐτὸν αὐτῷ σύμβουλον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.

[25] The general should neither lead his army on a journey, nor marshal it for battle, without first making a sacrifice; in fact, official sacrificers and diviners should accompany him. It is best that the general himself be able to read the omens intelligently; it is very easy to learn in a brief time, and thereby become a good counsellor to himself.

[26] γενομένων δὴ καλῶν τῶν ἱερῶν ἀρχέσθω πάσης πράξεως καὶ καλείτω τοὺς ἡγεμόνας πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν ὄψιν τῶν ἱερῶν, ἵνα θεασάμενοι τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις θαρρεῖν λέγοιεν ἀπαγγέλλοντες, ὥς οἱ θεοὶ κελεύουσι μάχεσθαι· πάνν γὰρ ἀναθάρρουσιν αἱ δυνάμεις, ὅτ' ἂν μετὰ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ἐξίεναι νομίζωσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὀπιτεύονται κατ' ἰδίαν ἕκαστος καὶ σημεῖα καὶ φωνὰς παρατηροῦσιν, ἢ δ' ὑπὲρ πάντων καλλιέρησις καὶ τοὺς ἰδία δυσθυμοῦντας ἀνέρρωσεν.

[26] He should not begin any undertaking until the omens are favourable, and he should summon all his officers to inspect the offerings, that, after seeing,

they may tell the soldiers to be of good courage, since the gods command them to fight. Soldiers are far more courageous when they believe they are facing dangers with the good will of the gods; for they themselves are on the alert, every man, and they watch closely for omens of sight and of sound, and an auspicious sacrifice for the whole army encourages even those who have private misgivings.

[27] ἐὰν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον τὰ ἱερὰ γένηται, μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, κἂν σφόδρα τι ἐπείγῃ, πᾶν ὑπομένειν τὸ δύσχρηστον — οὐθὲν γὰρ δύναται παθεῖν χειρόν, ὢν προμηνύει τὸ δαιμόνιον — , ὥς, ἂν γέ τι κρεῖττον ἔσεσθαι μέλλῃ τῶν παρόντων, ἀνάγκη καλλιιερεῖν, θύεσθαι δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας πολλάκις· ὥρα γὰρ μία καὶ ἀκαρῆς χρόνος ἢ φθάσαντας ἐλύπησεν ἢ ὑστερήσαντας.

[27] But if the omens are unfavourable, he must remain in the same place, and if he is hard pressed for time he must patiently submit to every inconvenience — for he can suffer nothing worse than what Fate indicates beforehand, — since, if his condition is going to improve, he must have favourable signs in a sacrifice and he must sacrifice several times on the same day; one hour, even one minute, ruins those who start too soon or too late.

[28] καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὰς κατ' οὐρανὸν ἀστέρων κινήσεις καὶ ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις καὶ σχημάτων ἐγκλίσεις τριγώνων καὶ τετραγώνων καὶ διαμέτρων ἢ θυτική διὰ σπλάγχχνων ἀλλοιομόρφῳ θεωρίᾳ προσημαίνειν, ὢν αἱ παρὰ μικρὸν διαφοραὶ καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ ἀποθειώσεις ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ μᾶλλον δὲ ὥρᾳ καὶ βασιλεῖς ἐποίησαν καὶ αἰχμαλώτους.

[28] And it seems to me that the motions of the heavenly bodies, their risings and settings, and their positions — trine, square, and in opposition — are indicated by the art of extispicy, through another form of observation, and that trifling differences in these things have, in a single day, or rather in a single hour, led to power and deification, and have made both kings and captives.

XI. α'. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τῶν πολεμίων σχηματιζομένων φεύγειν μὴ ἀπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχεσθαι τῆς διώξεως

XI. (1) PURSUIT OF AN APPARENTLY FLEEING ENEMY MUST NOT BE CARELESS AND HAPHAZARD

[1] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλάκις θυομένοις ὥς μὲν εἰς μάχην καλὰ γίγνεται τὰ ἱερά, διὰ δὲ μάχης ὅλον ἐνίστε στρατευμάτων ὄλεθρον προσημαίνει, τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τούτου φράσαι.

[1] Since frequently the omens from a sacrifice are favourable for battle and yet sometimes foretell the complete destruction of the army through battle, I have considered it of the utmost necessity to say a few words on this point.

[2] τῆς γὰρ συμπάσης οἰκουμένης πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας εἶναι συμβέβηκεν ιδέας τόπων, ἄδηλον δέ, ἐν ὁποίοις ἕκαστοι πολεμήσουσιν· καὶ τῆς μὲν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχουσι χώρας ἄνθρωποι, τὴν δ' ἄλλοτριαν οὐκ ἴσασι.

[2] The topography of the inhabited world differs widely in its various parts, and it is impossible to foresee in what sort of country a war will occur. Every man is well acquainted with his own country but not with foreign countries.

[3] πολλάκις δ' εἰ στρατηγὸς ἀκούσας μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁδὸν ἀπέχειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἀναστήσας ἄγει τὸν στρατόν, ἐπειγόμενος διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, τῶν δ' ὑποχωρούντων ἐπίτηδες καὶ μὴ μενόντων, ὡς κατορρωδοῦσιν ἔπεται, τῶν δὲ ταῦτ' οὗτο ποιοούντων, ἕως ἔλθωσιν εἰς δυσχωρίας καὶ περικεκλεισμένους ὄρεσι τόπους, ἐπικείται μηδὲν ὑφορώμενος, εἴτα ἐμβάλων εἰς τοὺς τόπους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπεκλείσθη τῆς εἰσβολῆς, ἣ τὸ στράτευμα εἰσῆλθε, καὶ καταλαβόμενοι τάς τε εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν διόδους καὶ κύκλῳ τὰ μετέωρα πάντα κατασχόντες, ὥσπερ ἐν ζωγραφίῳ τινὶ συνεπέδησαν μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὁ δὲ παριὼν μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ὀρμῆς ἐφέρετο δοκῶν ἐπικεῖσθαι φυγομαχοῦσι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οἷς προσελθὼν οὐκ ἔγνω, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περιβλεψάμενος τάς τε πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω καὶ παρὰ πλευράν, καὶ πάντα πλήρη θεασάμενος πολεμίων ἢ συνηκοντίσθη μετὰ τοῦ στρατεύματος, ἢ ἀπομάχεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος καὶ μὴ παραδιδούς λιμῶ διέφθειρεν πάντας, ἢ παραδοὺς κυρίου ἐποίησε τοὺς πολεμίους τοῦ ὅτι βούλονται διαθεῖναι.

[3] Often a general, on hearing that the enemy are but a day's march distant, will call out his troops and lead them forward, hurrying to come to close quarters with the enemy, who, purposely retreating, do not make a stand against him; and so he assumes that they are afraid and pursues them. This continues until they come into a broken country, surrounded by the mountains on all sides, and the general, unsuspecting, still attacks them; next, as he marches against their positions, he is cut off by the enemy from the road by which he led his army in. They seize the passes in front of him, and all the heights round about, and thus confine their enemies in a sort of cage. But the general is carried away by his impetuosity, in the belief that he is pursuing a fleeing enemy, without noticing whom he is approaching; and later, on looking before and behind and on both sides, and seeing all the hillsides full of the enemy, he and his army will be destroyed by javelins, or, unable to fight and unwilling to surrender, he will cause all to die of hunger, or by surrender enable the enemy to dictate whatever terms they wish.

[4] δεῖ τοίνυν τὰς ὑποχωρήσεις ὑφορᾶσθαι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ μὴ ἀπειροκάλως ἔπεσθαι καὶ περιβλέπεσθαι δὲ μᾶλλον τοὺς τόπους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ δι' ὧν ἄγει χωρίων ὁρᾶν, ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δ' ὅτι ταύτη πάλιν ὑποστρέψαι δεῖ, καὶ ἥτοι μὴδ' εἰσβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπεσθαι δεῖ, καὶ ἥτοι μὴδ' εἰσβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ἀποτρέπεσθαι τῆς πορείας, ἢ εἰσβάλλοντα προορᾶν καὶ εἰς τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ τοὺς συνάπτοντας αὐχένας τῶν ὁρῶν ἀπολείπειν τοὺς παραφυλάττοντας, ἵν' ἀσφαλῆς σφισιν ἡ ἀνακομιδὴ γίγνηται.

[4] Therefore retreats on the part of the enemy should be suspected and not stupidly followed; the general should observe the country rather than the enemy, and notice through what sort of terrain he is leading his forces; and he should take into consideration that it is necessary to return by the same road by which he came, and should either refrain from advancing and turn aside from the route, or, if he does advance, he should take precautions, leaving forces to hold the mountain passes and connecting defiles in order that his return may be safe.

[5] ταῦτα δ' εἰρήσθω καὶ τοῦ καταστρατηγεῖν οὕτως εἵνεκα καὶ τοῦ μὴ καταστρατηγεῖσθαι· καλὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ λαβεῖν οὕτω δύνασθαι πολεμίους, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ ληφθῆναι.

[5] This advice is given for the purpose both of outwitting the enemy by these tactics and of not being outwitted oneself; for though it is a fine thing to be able in this fashion to ensnare the enemy, yet it is absolutely essential to avoid being ensnared oneself.

β'. Περὶ τοῦ προσίεσθαι τοὺς ἀπαγγέλλοντάς τι

(2) RECEIVING MESSENGERS

[6] Προσιέσθω δὲ καὶ πάντα τὸν βουλόμενόν τι ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ δοῦλον καὶ ἐλεύθερον καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μέθ' ἡμέραν καὶ ἐν πορείᾳ καὶ ἐν κατασκηνώσει καὶ ἀναπαυόμενος καὶ ἐπὶ λουτροῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τροφῆς· οἱ γὰρ ἀναβαλλόμενοι καὶ δυσπρόσιτοι καὶ τοῖς ὑπηρέταις τοὺς προσιόντας ἀνακόπτειν κελεύοντες πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων εἰκότως διαμαρτάνουσι πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις ῥαθυμοῦντες σφάλλονται· πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ὧρει τὸ δυνάμενον καιρῷ φθασθῆναι πάρεισιν τινες μηνύοντες.

[6] The general should receive every man who wishes to report anything, whether slave or freeman, by night or day, on the march or in camp, while resting, in the bath, or at table. For generals who procrastinate and are difficult of access, and who order their servants to keep out those who come to see them, naturally either miss many important opportunities or even through their negligence suffer complete ruin; for often men bring information at a critical moment about something that can be frustrated in the nick of time.

I. Περὶ ἀριστοποιῖας

XII. MEAL-TIMES

[1] Ἀντιστρατοπεδεύων δὲ πολεμίῳ χάρακι μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ καιρὸν ἀριστοποιῖας ἀμελείτω· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ νομίζῃ τὸ ὅτε βούλεται τὸ στράτευμα πρὸς μάχην ἐκτάττειν εἶναι, καὶ ἡνίκα ἂν ἐθέλῃ, παραγγελλέτω ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι· ἐὰν δὲ εἰς τοσαύτην ἀνάγκην ἐληλυθὼς τυγχάνῃ διὰ τινας τόπους ἢ χάρακος ἀσθένειαν ἢ τινας ἄλλας αἰτίας, ὥστ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀπολελεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξάγειν ὅποτε προαιροῦνται καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην σφίσιν ἐπιτιθέναι τοῦ τὰ ὅπλα λαμβάνειν καὶ ἀντιπαρατάττεσθαι, μὴ ὀκνεῖτω καὶ ἔωθεν ἀριστοποιεῖσθαι σημαίνειν, μὴ φθάσωσιν νήσισιν ἐπιθέντες οἱ πολέμιοι τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ μάχεσθαι.

[1] The general, if encamped opposite the camp of the enemy, should not be careless of the proper time at which to serve meals. For if he considers that it lies with him to lead out his troops to battle whenever he wishes, he may set a meal hour for his troops at whatever time he wishes. But if he should chance to have come into such extremities, because of the terrain, or the weakness of his camp, or for some other reason, that it is left in the power of the enemy to attack whenever they desire, and to compel his army to seize their arms and draw up for defence, he should not hesitate to order the first meal at sunrise, lest the enemy, by a prior attack, force his men to fight while still hungry.

[2] καὶ τὸ σύνολον οὐκ ἐν μικρῷ θετέον οὐδὲ παρορατέον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων πρόνοιαν· ἐμφαγόντες γὰρ στρατιῶται μετρίως, ὥστε μὴ πολὺν ἐνφορτίσασθαι τῇ γαστρὶ κόρον, δυναμικώτεροι πρὸς τὰς μάχας εἰσίν· πολλάκις καὶ παρὰ τοῦθ' ἡττήθη στρατόπεδα τῆς ἰσχύος ἐλλειπούσης διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, ὅταν μὴ ἐν ὄξει καιρῷ κρῖνηται τὰ τῆς μάχης, ἀλλὰ δι' ἡμέρας ὅλης λαμβάνῃ τὸ τέλος.

[2] On the whole, this matter must not be considered of slight importance nor should a general neglect to pay attention to it; for soldiers who have eaten moderately, so as not to put too great a load into their stomachs, are more vigorous in battle; armies have often been overpowered for just this reason, their strength failing for lack of food — that is, whenever the decision rests, not on a moment's fighting, but when the battle lasts throughout the entire day.

XIII. Περὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸν στρατηγὸν εὐθυμον ἐν ταῖς δυσπραγίαις

XIII. COURAGE ON THE PART OF THE GENERAL WHEN IN ADVERSITY

[1] Ὅτ' ἂν δέ τις ἐμπέσῃ δυσθυμία στρατεύμασι καὶ φόβος ἢ συμμαχίας τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀφιγμένης ἢ προτερήματός σφισι γεγονότος, ὁ στρατηγὸς τότε δὴ μάλιστα τοῖς στρατιώταις ἱλαρὸς καὶ γεγηθὼς καὶ ἀκατάπληκτος φανέσθω.

[1] Whenever despondency or fear has fallen on an army because the enemy has received reinforcements or gained an advantage, then especially the general should show himself to his soldiers gay, cheerful, and undaunted.

[2] αἱ γὰρ ὄψεις τῶν ἡγεμόνων συμετασχηματίζουσι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ὑποταττομένων, καὶ στρατηγοῦ μὲν εὐθυμουμένου καὶ ἱλαρὸν βλέποντος ἀναθαρρεῖ καὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ὡς οὐδενὸς ὄντος δεινοῦ, κατεπτηχότος δὲ καὶ λυπουμένου συγκαταπίπτουσι ταῖς διανοίαις ὡς μεγάλου σφίσι κακοῦ προφαινομένου.

[2] For the appearance of the leaders brings about a corresponding change in the minds of the subordinates, and if the general is cheerful and has a joyful look, the army also takes heart, believing that there is no danger; but should he have a frightened, worried appearance, the spirits of the soldiers fall with his, in the belief that disaster is impending.

[3] διὸ χρὴ πλεον τῷ σχήματι τοῦ προσώπου στρατηγεῖν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους εὐθυμίαν ἢ τοῖς λόγοις παρηγορεῖν· λόγοις μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ ἠπίστησαν ὡς τοῦ καιροῦ πεπλασμένοις εἵνεκεν, ὅψιν δὲ θαρσοῦσαν ἀνυπόκριτον εἶναι νομίζοντες ἐπιστώσαντο τὴν ἀφοβίαν· ἀγαθὴ δὲ ἢ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τε εἰπεῖν, ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὀφθῆναι, ὅποιον δεῖ.

[3] On this account, the general must inspire cheerfulness in the army, more by the strategy of his facial expression than by his words; for many distrust speeches on the ground that they have been concocted especially for the occasion, but believing a confident appearance to be unfeigned they are fully convinced of his fearlessness; and it is an excellent thing to understand these two points, how to say the right word and how to show the right expression.

XIV. α'. Πότε δεῖ φόβον ἐμβάλλειν τῷ στρατεύματι τῷ ιδίῳ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων

XIV. (1) WHEN ONE'S OWN ARMY MUST BE MADE TO FEAR THE ENEMY

[1] Καθάπερ γε μὴν ἐν καιρῷ στρατεύματος ἀναθάρσησις ὤνησεν, οὕτως καὶ φόβος ὠφέλησεν. ὅτ' ἂν γὰρ ῥαθυμῇ στρατόπεδον καὶ ἀπειθέστερον ἢ τοῖς ἡγουμένοις, τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ὑποσημαίνειν δεῖ κίνδυνον, οὐχ ἥκιστα φοβεροποιῶντα τὴν ἐκείνων ἐφεδρείαν· οὐ γὰρ δειλοὺς ἔσται ποιεῖν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ ἀσφαλεῖς· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δυσθυμίαις θαρρεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ῥαθυμίαις φοβεῖσθαι· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δειλοὺς ἀνδρείους ποιεῖ, τοὺς δὲ θρασεῖς προμηθεῖς.

[1] Just as the recovery of courage at a crucial moment benefits an army, so also fear is advantageous. For whenever an army becomes idle and inclined to disobey its officers, the general should suggest the danger from the enemy, especially by representing their reserves to be formidable. It will not be possible thus to make the soldiers cowardly but only steady, since in despondency it is necessary to be of good courage, but in idleness to fear; for fear makes cowards bold and the rash cautious.

[2] ἀμφοτέρα δὲ συμβαίνει στρατοπέδοις, καὶ οὕτως καταπεπληχθαι πολεμίους ὥστε μηδὲν ἐθέλειν τολμᾶν, καὶ οὕτως καταφρονεῖν ὥστε μηδὲν φυλάττεσθαι· πρὸς ἑκάτερον δὲ δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἡρμόσθαι καὶ εἰδέναι, ποτε δεῖ τάντιπαλα ταπεινὰ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ σχήματι ποιεῖν, καὶ ποτ' αὐτὰ δεῖνα καὶ φοβερώτερα.

[2] These two misfortunes happen to armies, to become so terrified of the enemy that they are unwilling to attempt any offensive, and so bold that they are unwilling to take any precautionary measures. With regard to each the general must arrange his plans, and know when by voice and look he must make the enemy appear weak, and when more threatening and formidable.

β'. Περὶ τὸ θαρρύνειν τὸ δεδιὸς στρατεύμα

(2) ENCOURAGING THE FRIGHTENED ARMY

[3] Μελλούσης δὲ μάχης, ὅτε ἄδηλον ἔχοντα τὰ στρατεύματα τὴν κρίσιν τοῦ

πολέμου διατετάρακται τῷ φόβῳ, δυνηθεῖς πῃ λαβεῖν αἰχμαλώτους ὁ στρατηγὸς ἢ ἀπὸ ἐνέδρας ἢ διακριβολισάμενος ἢ καὶ ἀποστατοῦντας τῆς ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς, εἰ μὲν τινας γενναίους τοῖς φρονήμασι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καταμάθοι, τούτους ἢ ἀποκτεινάτω παραχρῆμα λαβὼν ἢ δήσας παραδότω τοῖς ἐπὶ ταῦτα τεταγμένοις φυλάττειν κελεύσας, ὅπως μὴ πολλοὶ θεάσωνται τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἰ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ ἀγεννεῖς καὶ μικροψύχους, ἔτι καὶ προαπειλήσας σφίσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἰδίας σκηνῆς καὶ προδουλώσας σφῶν τῷ φόβῳ τὰς ψυχὰς εἰς τὰ πλήθη προαγέτω δακρύοντας καὶ δεομένους, ἅμα λέγων καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος τοῖς στρατιώταις, ὡς ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ταπεινοὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι, καὶ ὡς πρὸς τοιούτους ἐστὶν ἄνδρας αὐτοῖς ἡ μάχη δεδιότας οὕτως τὸν θάνατον, ἀπομένους γονάτων καὶ προκυλιομένους τῶν ἐκάστου ποδῶν.

[3] On the eve of battle, when the army, uncertain of the outcome of the war, is distrustful and fearful, the general, if he is able, should manage to capture some prisoners by ambush or skirmishing, or some men who have strayed from their own camp. If he learns that they are strong in courage and in body, he should either kill them on the spot or turn them over, securely bound, to men assigned to this duty, with orders to guard them, so that not many of his own forces may see them; but if they are weak and cowardly and spiritless, after threatening them in the privacy of his own tent and enslaving their minds through fear, he should lead them, weeping and supplicating, before his army, pointing out to his soldiers how base and wretched and worthless they are, and saying that it is against such men that they are to fight, men who are so greatly afraid of death, who cling to the knees and grovel at the feet of every one.

[4] ἐπαναθαρρεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ στρατὸς ἤδη προκατανενοηκῶς τῶν πολεμίων ὅψεις τε καὶ πάθη ψυχῆς· αἰεὶ γάρ, ὃ μηδέπω τις ἐώρακεν, ἐλπίζει μεῖζον γενήσεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας, ἔτι καὶ τῷ τοῦ μέλλοντος φόβῳ τὴν ἐλπίδα μετρεῖ πρὸς τὸ χαλεπώτερον.

[4] The army is emboldened at all this, since they know before the conflict the appearance of the enemy and his state of mind. For what a man has never seen he always expects will be greater than it really is; so also because of his fear of the future, a man measures his apprehensions by reference to the more grievous outcome.

XV. Ὅτι διαφοραὶ πολλαὶ τῶν τάξεων

Τάξις δ' οὐ μία πολέμου, πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ διάφοροι καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὀπλισμοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοὺς στρατευομένους καὶ παρὰ τοὺς τόπους καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ἀντιπολέμους, ὧν τὰς διαφορὰς ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπ' αὐτῶν εἴσεται τῶν καιρῶν· ἃ δ' ἂν οὐχ ἥκιστα πολλαῖς ἀρμόζοι παρατάξεσι δίχα τῶν ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκην ἔχουσιν νοεῖσθαι, ταῦθ' ὥς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δίδειμι.

XV. THE DIFFERENCE IN BATTLE FORMATIONS

Battle formation is not of one but of many and various kinds, with regard to arms and soldiers and terrain and enemies. These differences the general will have to know on the occasions themselves, but what pertains in large part to many formations I shall briefly summarize, without considering the details which, in the actions themselves, must necessarily be understood.

XVI. Ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον συντάξει

Ἴππεῖς μὲν δὴ στρατηγὸς οὐχ οὕτως, ὥς βούλεται, μᾶλλον δ' ὥς ἀναγκάζεται, τάξει· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον ἵππικὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον στήσει. ταττέτω δ' ὥς τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἐκ παρατάξεως μάχας ἐπὶ κέρως, ἵνα καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον καὶ ἐκ πλαγίων προσβάλλοντες καὶ τόπῳ μείζονι χρώμενοι, μέθ' οὓς οὐκ ἔτ' ἄλλοι τεταγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἔχουσιν ἀποχρηθῆσαι τῇ τῆς ἵππικῆς ἐπιστήμῃ.

XVI. BATTLE FORMATION WITH REGARD TO THAT OF THE ENEMY

The general will arrange his cavalry not as he wishes but rather as he is compelled; for he will oppose his own cavalry to that of the enemy. As a rule, in pitched battles he should arrange his cavalry in column formation, in order that attacking both in front and on the flanks and covering a greater amount of space (if no other soldiers are drawn up in their rear), they may thus be able to make use of their skill in cavalry fighting.

XVII. Ὅτι τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονιστὰς πρώτους στήσει τῆς φάλαγγος

Ψιλοὺς δέ, ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας, πρώτους πρὸ τῆς φάλαγγος τάξει· κατόπιν μὲν γὰρ ὄντες πλείονα κακὰ διαθήσουσι τοὺς ἰδίους ἢ τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐν μέσοις δ' αὐτοῖς ἄπρακτον ἔξουσι τὴν ἰδίαν ἐμπειρίαν, οὐθ' ὑποχωρεῖν ἀνὰ πόδα δυνάμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἀνάτασιν τῶν ἀκοντίων, οὐτ' ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς βαλεῖν προηγουμένων ἄλλων καὶ παρὰ ποσὶν ὄντων, οὐδὲ μὴν οἱ σφενδονῆται κυκλόσε τὸν δῖνον ἀποτελεῖν τῆς σφενδόνης παρὰ πλευρὰν ἐστώτων φίλιων ὀπλιτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ρόμβον ἀντιπταιόντων, οἱ τε τοξόται προΐόντες μὲν τῶν ἄλλων εἰς αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα καὶ κατὰ σκοπὸν ἐκτοξεύουσι τὰ βέλη, μετὰ δὲ τοὺς λόχους ἢ ἐν αὐτοῖς μέσοις ὄντες εἰς ὕψος τοξεύουσιν, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἄνω φορὰν τόνον ἔχειν τὸ βέλος, αὔθις δέ, κἂν κατὰ κεφαλῆς πίπτῃ τῶν πολεμίων, ἐκκλεύσθαι καὶ μὴ πάνυ τι λυπεῖν τοὺς ἐχθρούς.

XVII. PLACING THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, JAVELIN-THROWERS, BOWMEN AND SLINGERS, BEFORE THE PHALANX

The general will assign his light-armed troops — javelin-throwers, bowmen, and slingers — to a position in front of the phalanx, for if placed in the rear they will do more damage to their own army than to the enemy, and if in among the heavy-armed, their peculiar skill will be ineffectual because they will be unable to take a step backwards in throwing their javelins or to charge forward and cast them, as other soldiers are in front of them and at their heels, nor will the slingers be able to execute the whirling of their slings, as their fellow-soldiers stand at their side and, in their turn, are caused to stumble in trying to avoid the whirling slings. If the bowmen are placed in front of the army, they will shoot their arrows at the enemy as at a target; but drawn up behind the ranks or in among the heavy-armed they will shoot high, so that the arrows have impetus only for their upward flight, and afterwards, even if they fall on the heads of the enemy, will have spent their force and cause little distress to the foe.

XVIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τοῖς τραχέσι τόποις τάττειν τοὺς ψιλοὺς

Εἰ δὲ συμβαίνοι γίγνεσθαι τὴν μάχην ἐν χωρίοις τινὰς μὲν χθαμαλοὺς τινὰς δὲ βουνοειδὲς ἔχουσι τόπους, τότε δὴ μάλιστα τοὺς ψιλοὺς ἐν τοῖς τραχέσιν ταττέτω, καὶ δὴ, κἂν αὐτὸς τὰ πεδινὰ κατειλημμένος ᾗ, τῶν δὲ πολεμίων μέρη τινὰ τῆς φάλαγγος ὀχθώδεις διακατέχη τόπους, κατὰ τούτους ἐπαγέτω τοὺς ψιλοὺς· ῥᾷόν τε γὰρ βαλόντες ὑποχωροῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν τραχέων, ῥᾷστά τε τοῖς ἀνάντεσιν ἐπαναθέουσιν, ἂν ἐλαφροὶ τυγχάνωσιν.

XVIII. DISPOSITION OF LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS IN A BROKEN COUNTRY

If the battle should happen to be in a country that is level in some places but hilly in others, then the light-armed troops should by all means be stationed in the uneven section, and then, if the general himself should have seized the plain and some part of the enemy's phalanx should possess the heights, he should send against them the light-armed troops; for from the uneven ground they can more easily hurl their weapons and retreat, or they can very easily charge up the slopes, if they are agile.

XIX. Περὶ τοῦ χωρία ἔχειν τὰς παρατάξεις δι' ὧν οφείλουσιν οἱ ψιλοὶ ἐντὸς τῶν κοντῶν εἰσερχόμενοι ὑποστέλλεσθαι

XIX. THE PHALANX SHOULD LEAVE INTERVALS FOR THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS TO RETIRE THROUGH THE RANKS

[1] Ἔστω δὲ διαστήματα κατὰ τὰς τάξεις, ἵν', ἐπειδὴν ἐκκενώσωσιν ἔτι προαγόντων τῶν πολεμίων τὰ βέλη, πρὶν εἰς χεῖρας ἔλθεῖν τὰς φάλαγγας, ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐν κόσμῳ διεξίωσιν μέσῃν τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ ἀταράχως ἐπὶ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἀποκομισθῶσιν· οὔτε γὰρ κυκλεύειν αὐτοὺς ἅπαν τὸ στράτευμα καὶ κάμπτειν κατὰ κέρας ἀσφαλές ἐστι — τάχα γάρ που φθάσουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐν τούτῳ συμμίζαντες οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ μέσους ἀπολαβόντες — , οὔτε διὰ τῶν πεπυκνωμένων βιάζεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὰ ὅπλα ἐμπίπτοντας τάραχον ἐμποιεῖν ταῖς τάξεσιν ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλον ἐνσείοντος.

[1] There should be intervals within the ranks, so that, when the light-armed troops have discharged their weapons while the enemy is still advancing, before the two armies come to close quarters, they may about-face, pass in good order through the centre of the phalanx, and come without confusion to the rear. For it is not safe for them to go around the whole army, encircling the flanks — since the enemy would quickly anticipate them in this manoeuvre, coming to close quarters and intercepting them on the way — nor is it safe for them to force their way through the closed ranks, where they would fall over the weapons and cause confusion in the lines, one man stumbling against another.

[2] αἱ δὲ κατὰ κέρας ἔφοδοι τῶν ψιλῶν πλείονα λυμαίνονται τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐκ πλαγίων ἀκοντιζόντων καὶ εἰς τὰ γυμνὰ παραβιαζομένων παίειν.

[2] Attacks of the light-armed troops on the flanks cause the enemy greater loss, since they cast their javelins from the side and of necessity strike the body where unprotected.

[3] ἡ δὲ τῆς σφενδόνης ἄμυνα χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἐν τοῖς ψιλοῖς ἐστίν· ὁ τε γὰρ μόλιβδος ὁμόχρους ὦν τῷ ἀέρι λανθάνει φερόμενος, ὥστ' ἀπροοράτως ἀφυλάκτοις τοῖς τῶν πολεμίων ἐμπίπτειν σώμασιν, αὐτῆς τε τῆς ἐμπτώσεως σφοδρὰς οὔσης καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ρόιζου τριβόμενον τῷ ἀέρι τὸ βέλος ἐκπυρωθὲν

ὥς βαθυτάτῳ δύνεται τῆς σαρκός, ὥστε μηδ' ὁρᾶσθαι, ταχὺ δὲ καὶ τὸν ὄγκον ἐπιμύειν.

[3] The sling is the most deadly weapon that is used by the light-armed troops, because the lead slug is the same colour as the air and is invisible in its course, so that it falls unexpectedly on the unprotected bodies of the enemy, and not only is the impact itself violent, but also the missile, heated by the friction of its rush through the air, penetrates the flesh very rapidly, so that it even becomes invisible and the swelling quickly closes over it.

XX. Ὅπως δεῖ, ἐὰν ἀπορῇ ψιλῆς συμμαχίας ὁ στρατηγός, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι εὐπορῶσιν, ἐπιφέρεισθαι αὐτοῖς

XX. HOW TO ATTACK, WITHOUT LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, AN ENEMY WHO HAS MANY

[1] Εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐνδεὴς εἴη τῆς τῶν ψιλῶν συμμαχίας, οἱ δὲ πολέμιοι ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖεν, οἱ μὲν πρωτοστάται πυκνοὶ πορευέσθων ἔχοντες ἀνδρομήκεις θυρεοὺς, ὥστε σκέπειν ὅλα τὰ σώματα τοῖς μήκεσιν, οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ οἱ κατόπιν τούτων ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς ἀράμενοι τοὺς θυρεοὺς τέως ἐχόντων, ἄχρι ἂν ἐντὸς γένωνται βέλους· οὕτως γάρ, ὥς εἶπεῖν, κεραμωθέντες οὐθὲν πείσσονται δεινὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκηβόλων.

[1] If the general himself should lack an auxiliary force of light-armed troops while the enemy has a large force of them, the front rank men should advance in close formation, with shields the height of a man, tall enough to protect the whole body, and those who follow and the ones behind them, even to the last rank, should carry their shields above their heads, while they are within bowshot of the enemy. For thus roofed in, so to speak, they will suffer no danger from missiles.b

[2] εἰ δὲ παρ' ἐκατέροις ἡ τῶν ψιλῶν εἴη βοήθεια, πρῶτοι πρὸ τῆς ἐκ χειρὸς μάχης ἀκροβολιζέσθων τοῖς ἀντιπάλοις, ἢ μετὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν τῆς φάλαγγος ἐκ πλαγίων ἐπιθέοντες ἀποχρήσθων τοῖς βέλεσιν· συνελαύνονται γὰρ εἰς ὀλίγον καὶ οὐχ ἥττον θορυβοῦνται τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀμυντηρίοις.

[2] But if each army should have a number of light-armed troops, the general should order his own light-armed men to be the first to hurl their weapons against their opponents before the hand-to-hand battle; or after the clash of the phalanx, attacking from the flank, they should make use of their missiles, for thus the enemy will be forced together into a narrow space and will be greatly confused by such tactics.

XXI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἰς πολὺ μῆκος ἐκτείνειν τὴν φάλαγγα τὰς κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐναντίων φοβουμένους

XXI. THE NEEDLESSNESS OF LENGTHENING THE PHALANX IN FEAR OF AN ENCIRCLING MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY

[1] Τὰς δὲ κυκλώσεις φυλάττεσθαι βουλόμενος μήθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ μῆκος ἐκτεινέτω τὴν δύναμιν, ὥστε πάμπαν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀβαθὴ ποιῆσαι τὴν φάλαγγα — ταχὺ γάρ που συμβαίνει τοὺς πολεμίους διαρρήξαντας αὐτὴν διόδον ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ μηκέτι παρὰ κέρας ἐνεργεῖν ταῖς κυκλώσεσιν, ἀλλὰ διεκπεσόντας μέσους κατὰ νότου γίνεσθαι τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ μὴ μόνον φυλαττέσθω παθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζητεῖται ποιεῖν, ἐὰν ἀσθενῇ καὶ λεπτὴν κατανοήσῃ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων φάλαγγα — , μήθ' οὕτως ἐπ' οὐρὰν συστελλέτω τὴν παράταξιν εἰς πολὺ βάθος ὑποστέλλων, ὥστ' ἐκ τοῦ ῥάστου τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπερκεράσαντας ἐντὸς αὐτὴν λαβεῖν.

[1] The general who wishes to guard against an encircling movement of the enemy should not so extend his forces lengthwise as utterly to weaken the phalanx by giving it no depth. For this would result in the enemy somewhere quickly breaking through; and no longer attempting an encircling movement on the flank, but piercing the centre instead, they would take their opponents in the rear; and this very manoeuvre the general should not only guard against but also strive to execute if he discovers that the enemy's phalanx is weak and thin. Nor should he contract his phalanx, drawing it out toward the rear to great depth to such an extent that the enemy would easily outflank and surround it.

[2] ἰσχυροποιεῖται μέντοι γε τὴν οὐραγίαν καὶ τοὺς παρὰ πλευρὰν τῶν κεράτων μὴ ἔλαττον τῶν πρωτοστατῶν· οὐχ ἥττον γὰρ ἀποκωλύουσιν οἱ κατ' οὐρὰν τὰς κυκλώσεις τῶν ἐπὶ κέρας ἐκτεινομένων, ἐὰν ᾗτοι φθάσας ὁ στρατηγὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀπλώσας τὴν οὐραγίαν καὶ παρὰ τὰ κέρατα τῆς φάλαγγος ἀναβιβάσας ἐκατέρωθεν παραστήσῃ τοὺς κατόπιν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ καὶ παραγγεῖλῃ τοῖς ἐφθασμένοις ἤδη κυκλωθῆναι τὰ νῶτα τοῖς τῶν προηγουμένων νότοις ἐγκλίνοντας ἀμφίστομον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μάχην.

[2] But he should make his rear and the flanks of his wings as strong as the front ranks. For those in the rear will prevent the phalanx being encircled no

less than those who are posted so as to extend the flanks, if the general, anticipating what is to happen, spreads out his rear guard and posting it on either flank of the phalanx opposes his rear to the front of the enemy, or if he commands those who are already encircled to turn their backs to the backs of the front ranks and fight on a double front.

[3] Ἀγχίνους μὲν στρατηγός τις πολλοὺς ὄρων τοὺς πολεμίους αὐτὸς ἐλάττοσι στρατιώταις μέλλων κινδυνεύειν ἐξελέξατο καὶ ἐπετήδευσε τοιούτων ἐπιτυχεῖν τόπων, ἐν οἷς ἢ παρὰ ποταμίαν ὄφρυν ταξάμενος ἀπωθεῖται ταύτη τὴν κύκλωσιν τῶν πολεμίων, ἢ παρῳρείαν ἐκλεξάμενος αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὄρεσιν ἀποκλείσει τοὺς ὑπερκεράσαι βουλομένους, ὀλίγους ἐπιστήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν τοὺς ἀποκωλύσοντας ὑπὲρ κεφαλὴν ἀναβάνας γίνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους.

[3] A shrewd general who sees that the enemy has many troops when he himself is about to engage with fewer, will select, or rather make it his practice to find, localities where he may prevent an encircling movement of the enemy, either by arranging his army along the bank of a river, or, by choosing a mountainous district, he will use the mountains themselves to block off those who wish to outflank him, placing a few men on the summits to prevent the enemy from climbing above the heads of the main army.

[4] οὐ μὲν ἡ στρατηγικὴ φρόνησις ἐνταῦθα συλλαμβάνεται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τύχη· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπιτυχεῖν τοιούτων χωρίων· οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ γε κατασκευάσασθαι δυνατόν τοὺς τόπους· τῶν ὄντων μέντοι τοὺς ἀμείνους ἐκλέξασθαι καὶ τοὺς συνοίσοντας ἐννοῆσαι φρονίμου.

[4] Not alone does knowledge of military science play a part in this matter but luck as well; for it is necessary to have the luck to find such places; one cannot prepare the terrain for oneself. To choose the better positions, however, from those at hand, and to know which will be advantageous, is the part of the wise general.

[5] Πολλάκις δὲ εἰώθασιν οἱ μεγάλη δυνάμει καὶ πολυάνδρῳ κεχρημένοι μνηοειδὲς σχῆμα ποιήσαντες τῆς παρατάξεως ἐπιέναι, νομίζοντες ὅτι προσάγονται τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα βουλομένους συνάπτειν, εἴτα κατὰ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς ὁδὸν κυρτουμένους ἐναπολήψονται τῷ περιέχοντι κόλπῳ, τὰς ἰδίας κεραίας ἐπισυνάπτοντες ἀλλήλαις εἰς κύκλου σχῆμα.

[5] It is often the custom of generals who are in command of a powerful and numerous army to march to battle in a crescent formation, believing that their opponents also wish the battle to come to close quarters, and that they will thus induce them to fight; then, as their opponents are bent back into the road at the points of the crescent, they will intercept them with their enveloping folds, joining the extremes of their own wings to form a complete circle.

[6] πρὸς οὓς ἀντεπακτέον οὐχ ὥδε· τριχῇ δὲ διελὼν τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν τῶν μὲν δυεῖν ἑκατέρῳ μέρει κατὰ κέρασ προσβαλλέτω τοῖς πολεμίοις, τῷ δὲ ἐνί, τοῖς εἰς τὸν μέσον κόλπον τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς ἀντιπαρατεταγμένοις, ἐναντίος ἐστάτω καὶ μὴ προαγέτω· ἥ γὰρ μένοντες ἐπὶ τοῦ κυκλοειδοῦς σχήματος οἱ κατὰ μέσῃν τὴν φάλαγγα τεταγμένοι τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἄπρακτοι μηδὲν δρῶντες ἐστήξονται, ἢ προϊόντες εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν, εἰ βούλονται προάγειν φαλαγγιδὸν εἰς εὐθεῖαν ἐκ τοῦ σιγματοειδοῦς ἀπλούμενοι σχήματος, ἀλλήλους ἐκθλίβουσι καὶ λύσουσι τὴν τάξιν — τῶν γὰρ ἔτι κέρως ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μενόντων χώρας καὶ μαχομένων οὐχ οἷόν τε τὸ ἡμικύκλιον εἰς εὐθεῖαν ἀνελθεῖν — · ἔνθα δὲ τεταραγμένων αὐτῶν καὶ λελυκότων τὴν τάξιν τῷ τρίτῳ τάγματι καὶ ἐφέδρῳ προσβαλλέτω τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου κυρτώματος προάγουσιν ἀτάκτως εἰς τοῦμπροσθεν.

[6] Against troops advancing in this fashion, one should not likewise adopt the crescent formation, but dividing his own army into three parts, the general should send two against the enemy, one against each wing, but the third division, that which faces the central hollow of the crescent, should stand still, opposite the enemy, and not advance. For if the enemy maintain this crescent formation, those drawn up in the centre of their army will be useless, standing still and doing nothing; but if marching forward they wish to advance in a body, changing from the crescent formation to a straight line, they will be crowded together and will lose their formation — for while the wings are remaining in the same position and fighting, it is impossible for a crescent to return to a straight line. Then when they are confused and their ranks disordered, the opposing general should send the third and reserve division against the men advanced in disorder from the centre of the curve.

[7] ἐὰν δὲ διαμένωσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κοίλου σχήματος, τοὺς ψιλοὺς καὶ ἐκηβόλους ἔνθα κατ' ἀντικρὺ ταττέτω· βάλλοντες γὰρ αὐτοὺς πολλὰ λυπήσουσιν.

[7] But if the enemy remain in the crescent position, the general should post his light-armed troops and archers opposite them, who with their missiles will cause heavy loss.

[8] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ λοξῇ πάσῃ τῇ ἰδίᾳ φάλαγγι προσβάλλει κατὰ θάτερον κέρας τῶν πολεμίων, οὐκ ἂν ἀμάρτοι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μηνοειδοῦς σχήματος κύκλωσιν οὕτως ἀντεπιών· ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ οἱ ἐξ ἐναντίας εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι πανστρατιᾷ κωλύόμενοι κατ' ὀλίγους κερασθήσονται, τῶν ἐπὶ θατέρου κέρως μόνων μαχομένων, οἳ καὶ πρῶτοι κατ' ἀνάγκην συμμίζουσι διὰ τὴν λοξὴν ἔφοδον.

[8] However, if he advances with his whole phalanx obliquely against one wing of the enemy, he will make no mistake in attacking in this manner, as far as the encircling movement of the crescent formation is concerned; for the enemy will be prevented for a long time from coming to close quarters with their whole army, and will be thrown into confusion little by little, since only those of one wing will be fighting, that is, those who will necessarily be the first to be engaged because of the oblique attack.

[9] Οὐκ ἄχρηστον δέ ποτε καὶ ἀντιπααρατάζαμενον ὑπὸ πόδα τῷ στρατεύματι χωρεῖν, ὥς καταπεπληγμένον, ἢ καὶ ἐπιστρέψαντα παραπλησίαν φυγῇ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἐπιχώρησιν ἐν τάξει, εἴτ' αὖθις μεταβαλόμενον ἀντεπιέναι τοῖς ἐπιούσιν· ἐνίστε γὰρ ὑπὸ χαρᾶς οἱ πολέμοιοι δόξαντες φεύγειν τοὺς ἐναντίους λύσαντες τὰς τάξεις ἐπικέονται προπηδῶντες ἄλλων ἄλλοι, ἐφ' οὓς ἀκίνδυνον ἐπιστρέψαντας μάχεσθαι καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ παρ' ἐλπίδα τοῦ στῆναι θάρσει καταπληξαμένους εἰς φυγὴν αὖθις τοὺς πάλαι διώκοντας τρέπεσθαι.

[9] It is sometimes a useful stratagem for an army facing the enemy to retire gradually, as if struck by fear, or to about-face and make a retreat similar to a flight but in order, and then, suddenly turning, to attack their pursuers. For sometimes the enemy, delighted by the belief that their opponents are fleeing, break ranks and rush forward, leaping ahead of one another. There is no danger in turning to attack these men; and those who have for some time been pursuing, terrified by the very unexpectedness of this bold stand, immediately take to flight.

XXII. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν κεχωρισμένους ἐπιλέκτους εἰς βοήθειαν τῶν καταπονουμένων. περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐγκρύμματα

XXII. HOLDING RESERVES FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF EXHAUSTED TROOPS. HOLDING RESERVES IN CONCEALMENT

[1] Ἐχέτω δέ που καὶ στρατιώτας λογάδας ἰδίᾳ τεταγμένους ἀπὸ τῆς φάλαγγος ὥσπερ ἐφέδρους τοῦ πολέμου πρὸς τὰ καταπονούμενα μέρη τῆς δυνάμεως, ἵν' ἐξ ἐτοίμου τοὺς ἐπικουρήσοντας ἐπάγῃ· καὶ ἄλλως οὐκ ὀλίγον ὤνησαν ἀκμῆτες ἐπελθόντες ἤδη κεκοπιακóσι· τοὺς τε γὰρ τεταλαιπωρηκóτας ἤδη τῶν φίλων ἀνέλαβον καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐκλελυμένοις ἀκμάζοντες ἐπέθεντο.

[1] The general should also have somewhere a picked corps, stationed apart from the phalanx as military reserves, that he may have them ready to give assistance to those detachments of his force that are exhausted. These fresh troops are of not a little advantage in attacking tired men; for, besides relieving those of their own men who are worn out, they attack in their full freshness a wearied enemy.

[2] γίγνοιτο δ' ἂν τι καὶ τούτου χρησιμώτερον, ἐκ τῆς παρατάξεως ἀπωτέρω σταδίοις, ὅποσοις ἂν ἀποχρῆν αὐτῷ δοκῇ, ἐκπέμψαι μέρος τι τῆς αὐτοῦ στρατιᾶς ἀπροόρατον τοῖς πολεμίοις, παραγγείλας σφίσιν, ἐπειδὰν συμβάλλῃ τοῖς ἐναντίοις, τότε πυθομένους παρὰ τῶν σκοπῶν ἀναστάντας ἐπείγεσθαι· καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ποιητέον, ὅταν προσδόκιμος οὖσα συμμαχία τοῦ καιροῦ καθυστερῇ· δόξαντες γὰρ οἱ πολέμιοι τούτους ἐκείνους εἶναι καὶ συμμάχους ποθὲν ἦκειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἴσως ἂν ἔτι καὶ προσιόντων πρὶν ἢ συμμῖξαι τοὺς ἐπιβάλλοντας εἰς φυγὴν ὀρμήσαιεν, οὐ τοσοῦτον, ὅσον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πλεῖον ἐπιέναι πλῆθος νομίζοντες.

[2] It would be even more advantageous for the general to send a certain part of his army some little distance from the encampment — as far as seems best to him, — unseen by the enemy, with orders to rise up and hasten when the battle is begun, which they will learn from scouts. This is especially to be done when expected reinforcements come too late for the battle, for the enemy believe that these are the reinforcements arriving from some place or other for their opponents; then possibly even while these reinforcements are

still advancing and before they enter the battle, the enemy will take to flight, judging this force to be, not what it is, but much greater.

[3] ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δεινοῖς ἐπιφανείαι πολέμιων ἀπειράστων ἐκπλήττουσι τὰς ψυχάς· προλαμβάνουσαι γάρ τι χεῖρον, οὗ πείσονται, φοβερώτερον ἐκδέχονται τὸ μέλλον.

[3] Besides, the arrival of unfamiliar hostile troops at the very moment of battle lowers the morale; for anticipating some greater misfortune than they are about to suffer, soldiers regard the future with greater fear.

[4] Ἐκπληκτικωτάτη δ', ἣ καὶ δραστικωτάτη μάλιστα πάντων, ἡ κατὰ νότου τῶν πολέμιων αἰφνίδιος ἐπιβολή, εἴ πῃ δυνατόν γένοιτο προεκπέμψαντι στρατιωτῶν σύνταγμα νύκτωρ ἐκπεριελθεῖν κελεῦσαι τοὺς πολέμιους, ἵνα κατόπιν αὐτῶν γένωνται πάντες, ὥστε ἔωθεν ἀναστάντας ἐκ τῆς ἐνέδρας μετὰ τὸ συμμῖξαι πρὸς μάχην τὰ στρατεύματα κατὰ τὴν οὐραγίαν ἐπιφαίνεσθαι τοῖς πολέμοις· οὐδὲ γὰρ φεύγουσιν ἂν ἔτι σφίσιν ἐλπίς ἀπολείποιτο σωτηρίας, οὐδ' εἰς τοῦπίσω δυναμένοις ἐπιστραφεῖναι διὰ τοὺς ἐξ ἐναντίας μαχομένους, οὐδ' εἰς τὸ πρόσω φέρεσθαι διὰ τοὺς κατόπιν ἐπικειμένους.

[4] Most terrible, or rather most effective, of all manoeuvres, is a sudden attack against the enemy's rear. For this purpose, if in any manner it should be possible, a detachment of soldiers should be sent ahead by night, with orders for all to march around the enemy in order to come to their rear, so as to start up from ambush early the next morning, after the battle is begun, and to appear suddenly on the enemy's rear. For no hope of safety would remain for them in flight, and they would be unable to turn backwards, since the opposing army would attack, or to go forward, because of the detachment assailing their rear.

XXIII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῶν καιρῶ αὐτῷ τῆς μάχης ἐκφωνεῖν χαρμόσυνα τοῖς ὑπηκόοις· εἰ καὶ ψευδῇ, ὅμως συμφέρει

XXIII. ANNOUNCING FAVOURABLE NEWS IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE; EVEN IF FALSE IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS

[1] Καὶ δὴ ποτε παριππαζόμενος ἐμβοησάτω τοῖς φίλοις, εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ τύχοι κέρως ὦν, “νικῶσιν ἄνδρες οἱ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν πολεμίων,” εἰ δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ, νικᾷν λεγέτω τὸ φίλιον δεξιόν, ἐάν τε καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἦ τοῦτο γινόμενον ἐάν τε μή· καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν, ὅπου “μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν·” οἷον βοῆσαι πάλιν αὖ μακρὰν ἀποστατοῦντος τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων ἡγεμόνος ἢ ἐπὶ θατέρου κέρως ὄντος ἢ τὰ μέσα συνέχοντος τῆς φάλαγγος, “τέθνηκεν ὁ τῶν πολεμίων στρατηγός” ἢ “βασιλεύς,” ἢ ὅστις ἂν ποτε ἦ.

[1] Sometimes the general should ride along the lines and call out to his men, if he happens to be on the right wing, “Our left wing is defeating the right wing of the enemy,” or if he is on the left he should say that his right wing is conquering, whether this is true or not, for deceit is necessary when “a great strife has arisen.” For example, when the leader of the enemy is some distance away either on one wing or holding the centre, he should call out, “The general of the enemy has been killed,” or “the king,” or whoever it may be.

[2] καὶ ταῦτα χρὴ βοᾶν οὕτως, ὥσθ’ ἅμα καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους κατακούειν· οἳ τε γὰρ φίλοι τοὺς σφετέρους ἀκούοντες ἐπικυδεστέρους ἀναθαρροῦσι καὶ διπλάσιοι γίνονται ταῖς προθυμίαις, οἳ τε ἐχθροὶ τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐλαττώματα πυνθανόμενοι συγκαταπίπτουσι ταῖς διανοίαις, ὥστ’ ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ εἰς φυγὴν ἅμα τῷ δέξασθαι τοιαύτην φήμην ὁρμᾷν.

[2] And one should shout this in such a manner that the enemy also may hear; for his own soldiers, learning that their side is more successful, are encouraged and doubly eager to fight, while the enemy, learning of the misfortunes of their side, lose heart, so that sometimes they start into flight immediately on hearing such a report.

[3] οὕτως πολλάκις συνήνεγκεν καὶ τοὺς φίλους ἅμα τοῖς πολεμίους ἐξαπατῆσαι, τοῖς μὲν τὰ κρεῖττω, τοῖς δὲ τὰ χείρω ψευδόμενον.

[3] In this way it is very often useful to deceive both one's own army and that of the enemy by false news, good for the former, but bad for the latter.

XXIV. Περὶ τοῦ οἰκείου πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρὸς γνωρίμους τάττειν

Φρονίμου δὲ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τὸ τάττειν ἀδελφοὺς παρ' ἀδελφοῖς, φίλους παρὰ φίλοις, ἐραστὰς παρὰ παιδικοῖς· ὅταν γὰρ ᾗ τὸ κινδυνεῦον τὸ πλησίον προσφιλέστερον, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀγαπῶντα φιλοκινδυνότερον ὑπὲρ τοῦ πέλας ἀγωνίζεσθαι· καὶ δὴ τις αἰδούμενος μὴ ἀποδοῦναι χάριν ὣν εὖ πέπονθεν αἰσχύνεται καταλιπὼν τὸν εὐεργετήσαντα πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἄρξαι φυγῆς.

XXIV. IN THE RANKS FRIENDS MUST BE PLACED BY FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES BY ACQUAINTANCES

It is the part of a wise general to station brothers in rank beside brothers, friends beside friends, and lovers beside their favourites. For whenever that which is in danger near by is more than ordinarily dear the lover necessarily fights more recklessly for the man beside him. And of course one is ashamed not to return a favour that he has received, and is dishonoured if he abandons his benefactor and is the first to flee.

**XXV. Περί τοῦ μὴ δι' ἑαυτοῦ διδόναι τὸν στρατηγὸν τὰ
σημεῖα εἴτε τῆς συμβολῆς εἴτε ἄλλης τινὸς πράξεως,
ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων**

**XXV. THE GENERAL MUST NOT GIVE THE SIGNAL FOR BATTLE
OR ANY OTHER ACTION TO HIS ARMY IN PERSON BUT
THROUGH HIS OFFICERS**

[1] Πᾶν δὲ παράγγελμα καὶ σύνθημα καὶ παρασύνθημα διδὼτω διὰ τῶν ἡγεμόνων· ἐπιόντα γὰρ κηρύττειν ἅπασιν ιδιώτου καὶ ἀπείρου κομιδῇ καθέστηκεν, καὶ χρόνος ἐν τῷ παραγγέλλειν ἀναλίσκεται, καὶ θόρυβος ὁμοῦ πάντων ἀλλήλους ἐρωτώντων· εἴθ' ὁ μὲν προσέθηκέ τι πλεῖον ὧν ὁ στρατηγὸς εἶπεν, ὁ δ' ἀφείλετο τοῦ ρηθέντος παρὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν.

[1] The general should give every command or watchword or countersign through his officers, for to come and give orders personally to the whole army is the act of an unpractised and inexperienced commander. Time is lost in passing orders down the line, and confusion arises, as all the soldiers question each other at the same time. One man through ignorance adds something to what the general has said and another omits something.

[2] δεῖ δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἡγεμόσιν εἰπεῖν, ἐκείνους δὲ ἀπαγγεῖλαι τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦς, εἴτα τούτους τοῖς κατόπιν, εἴθ' ἐξῆς ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων, τοὺς πρώτους τοῖς ὑπὸ πόδα σημαίνοντας· οὕτως γὰρ ἐν τάχει καὶ μετὰ κόσμου καὶ μέθ' ἡσυχίας εἴσονται, παραπλησίον τοῦ παραγγέλματος τοῖς φρυκτωροῦσι γιγνομένου·

[2] But one should communicate his orders to his higher officers and they should repeat them to the officers next below them, who in turn pass them to their subordinates, and so on to the lowest, the higher officers in each case telling the orders to those below them. In this manner the soldiers will learn the commands quickly with order and calmness, just as a message is carried by fire-signals.

[3] καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων, ὅταν ὁ πρῶτος ἄρῃ τὸν φρυκτόν, ὁ δεύτερος τῷ μετ' αὐτὸν ἐπύρσευσεν, εἴθ' ὁ τρίτος τῷ τετάρτῳ, καὶ τέταρτος πέμπτῳ, καὶ πέμπτος ἕκτῳ καὶ καθ' ἓνα πάντες ἀλλήλοις, ὥστ' ἐν ὄξει διὰ μήκους σταδίῳ τὸ σημανθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου πάντας ἐπιγνῶναι.

[3] For after the first signaller uplifts his fire, the second signals to the next, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth to the fifth, and the fifth to the sixth, and one by one follows the other, so that in a short time, over a distance of many stades, the message signalled by the first is known to all.

XXVI. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ μόνον συνθήματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρασυνθήματα διδόναι

XXVI. ON GIVING BOTH WATCHWORDS AND COUNTERSIGNS

[1] Τὸ δὲ παρασύνθημα μὴ διὰ φωνῆς λεγέσθω, ἀλλὰ διὰ σώματος γινέσθω, ἢ νεύματι χειρὸς ἢ ὅπλων συγκρούσει ἢ ἐγκλίσει δορατίου ἢ παραφορᾷ ξίφους, ἵνα μὴ μόνον γενομένης ποτὲ ταραχῆς πιστεύσωσι τῷ λεγομένῳ συνθήματι — τοῦτο γὰρ δύνανται καὶ πολέμιοι καταλαβέσθαι πολλάκις ἀκούοντες — , ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ παρασυνθήματι.

[1] He should give the countersign not by the voice but by some gesture, as a wave of the hand, or the clash of weapons, or dipping a spear, or by a side-wave of his sword, in order that when confusion arises the soldiers may not have to trust to the spoken watchword alone — for the enemy hear this so often that they are able to get it — but also to the countersign.

[2] χρησιμώτατον δέ που τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑτερογλώσσους συμμαχίας τῶν ἐθνῶν· οὔτε γὰρ λέγειν οὔτε ξυνιέναι δυνάμενοι φωνῆς ἀλλοτρίας αὐτῷ τῷ παρασυνθήματι κρίνουνσι τό τε φίλιον καὶ τὸ πολέμιον. διδόσθω δὲ ταῦτα, κἂν μὴ μάχεσθαι μέλλωσιν, ἐν ταῖς παρεμβολαῖς πρὸς τὰς ἀδήλους ταραχάς.

[2] This is most useful in the case of allies who speak a different language, for, unable to speak or to understand a foreign tongue, they differentiate between friends or enemies by this countersign. One should instruct the army in these signals in camp, even if it is not about to fight, as a protection against confusion and uncertainty.

XXVII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ λύειν τὰς τάξεις μήτε ἐν ταῖς διατάξεσι μήτε ἐν ταῖς ὑποχωρήσεσι

Παραγγελλέτω δὲ καὶ τὰς ὑποχωρήσεις ἐν τάξει ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς διώξεις, ἵνα ἥττον τε σφαλλόμενοι βλάπτωνται μὴ κατ' ἄνδρα σποράδες ἐν ταῖς φυγαῖς ὑποπίπτοντες τοῖς πολεμίοις, πλεονά τε κατορθοῦντες βλάπτωσι κατὰ τάξεις καὶ λόχους ἰσχυρότεροι τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐπιφαινόμενοι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀσφαλέστεροι· πολλάκις γὰρ ἀτάκτως ἐπιφερομένους οἱ πολέμιοι θεασάμενοι συμφρονήσαντες αὐθις ἐκ μεταβολῆς αὐτῶν καταστάντες εἰς τάξιν παλίντροπον ἐποίησαντο τὴν δίωξιν· ὅλως δὲ μηδὲν σφισιν ἄμεινον εἶναι λεγέτω τοῦ μένειν ἐν τάξει μηδ' ἐπισφαλέστερον τοῦ λύειν.

XXVII. SOLDIERS SHOULD NEVER LEAVE THE RANKS WHETHER IN FORMATION OR IN RETREAT

One should command both retreats and pursuits to be made in formation, so that, if defeated, the soldiers may suffer less injury, when in their flight they encounter the enemy, by not being scattered, man by man, and, if successful, they may inflict greater injury on the enemy by keeping their ranks and companies unbroken, appearing stronger to the fugitives, and moreover being safer themselves. For often the enemy, observing their opponents advancing without order, by a concerted plan about-face, form ranks once more and reverse the pursuit. In a word, the general should say that nothing is more advantageous to his men than remaining in rank, and nothing more dangerous than breaking ranks.

XXVIII. Περὶ τοῦ δι' ἐπιμελείας ἔχειν τὸν στρατηγὸν λαμπρὸν ἐκτάττειν τὸ στράτευμα

Μεμελημένον δ' ἔστω τῷ στρατηγῷ λαμπρὸν ἐκτάττειν τὸ στράτευμα τοῖς ὅπλοις, ῥάδια δ' ἢ φροντὶς αὕτη παρακαλέσαντι τὰ ξίφη θήγειν καὶ τὰς κόρυθας καὶ τοὺς θώρακας σμήχειν· δεινότεροι γὰρ οἱ ἐπιόντες φαίνονται λόχοι τοῖς τῶν ὅπλων αἰθύγμασι, καὶ πολλὰ τὰ δι' ὧσεως δείματα προεμπίπτοντα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ταράττει τὸ ἀντιπόλεμον.

XXVIII. THE GENERAL MUST BE ATTENTIVE TO THE SPLENDOUR OF THE ARMY'S EQUIPMENT

The general should make it a point to draw up his line of battle resplendent in armour — an easy matter, requiring only a command to sharpen swords and to clean helmets and breast-plates. For the advancing companies appear more dangerous by the gleam of weapons, and the terrible sight brings fear and confusion to the hearts of the enemy.

XXIX. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τῆς συμβολῆς ἀλαλάζειν

XXIX. SHOUTING IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE

[1] Ἐπαγέτω δὲ τὸ στράτευμα καὶ σὺν ἀλαλαγμῷ, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ σὺν δρόμῳ· καὶ γὰρ ὄψις καὶ βοή καὶ πάταγος ὄπλων ἐξίστησι τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

[1] One should send the army into battle shouting, and sometimes on the run, because their appearance and shouts and the clash of arms confound the hearts of the enemy.

[2] ἀνατεινόντων δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐφόδους ἄθροοι, πρὶν εἰς χεῖρας ἔλθεῖν, ὑπὲρ τὰς κεφαλὰς μετέωρα τὰ ξίφη πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον θαμὰ παρεγκλίνοντες· ἐσμηγμένα γὰρ αἰχμαὶ καὶ λαμπρὰ ξίφη καὶ ἐπάλληλα παραμαρμαίροντα πρὸς ἀνταύγειαν ἡλίου δεινὴν ἀστραπὴν πολέμου προεκπέμπει· καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν εἰ γίγνοιτο καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀντικαταπλήττειν ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ δὲ μή, προεκπλήττειν.

[2] The dense bands of soldiers should spread out in the attack before coming to close quarters, often waving their swords high above their heads toward the sun. The polished spear-points and flashing swords, shining in thick array and reflecting the light of the sun, send ahead a terrible lightning-flash of war. If the enemy should also do this, it is necessary to frighten them in turn, but if not, one should frighten them first.

[3] Ἐνίστε δὲ ποτε χρήσιμον ἐν καιρῷ μὴ φθάνειν ἐκτάπτοντα τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ τέως ἐντὸς τοῦ χάρακος κατέχειν, ἄχρι ἂν κατοπτεύσῃ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παράταξιν, ὅποια τίς ἐστὶ καὶ ὡς τέτακται καὶ ἐφ' οἷων ἴσταται χωρίων.

[3] It is sometimes advantageous before a critical battle for the general not to be the first to form a line of battle but to wait within the camp for a time until he observes the battle array of the enemy, its character, arrangement, and position.

**XXX. Ὅτι δεῖ τὸν στρατηγὸν πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου
συλλογίζεσθαι, τίς ὀφείλει ὑπαντῆσαι κατὰ τὴν
συμβολὴν τῷ δεῖνι καὶ τίς τῷ ἄλλῳ καὶ οὕτως καθεξῆς
ἐξετάζειν τοὺς ἰδίους ἄρχοντας πρὸς τοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων**

Εἴτα πού τότε συλλογισάμενον, τίνας τίσιν ἀντιτάττειν χρὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸν ἱατρὸν προκατανοήσαντα νόσον σώματος ἀντεπάγειν τὰ ἀλεξήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐκτάττειν, ὡς ἂν ἄριστ' αὐτῷ δόξαι συμφέρειν· ἀναγκάζονται γὰρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὀπλισμοὺς τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἔθνη καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἥθη τὰ ἰδία στρατεύματα κοσμεῖν καὶ παρατάττειν.

**XXX. THE GENERAL MUST DECIDE BEFORE BATTLE WHO
SHOULD OPPOSE WHOM AND THUS IN ORDER ARRANGE HIS
OWN OFFICERS AGAINST THOSE OF THE ENEMY**

Next the general must consider which troops to oppose to which of the enemy, and in what manner; just as a good doctor who foresees an illness of the body, he must bring forward his defences and arrange his forces as it seems to him most advantageous; for generals are often compelled to equip and marshal their own armies with reference to the armament, nationality, and customs of the enemy.

XXXI. Περὶ τοῦ, ἐὰν οἱ ἐναντίοι προτερεῦωσι τῷ ἱππικῷ, ἐκλέγεσθαι στενοὺς τόπους

XXXI. NARROW PLACES MUST BE CHOSEN IF THE ENEMY ARE SUPERIOR IN CAVALRY

[1] Ἴπποκρατούντων δὲ τῶν πολεμίων, ἐὰν ἢ δυνατόν, ἐπιλεγέσθω χωρία τραχέα καὶ στενὰ καὶ παρ' ὄρη, ἃ ἥκιστα ἱππάσιμα, ἢφυγομαχείτω κατὰ δύναμιν, ἕως ἂν ἐπιτηδεῖους εὖρη τόπους καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀρμόζοντας πράγμασιν.

[1] If the enemy are superior in cavalry, the general should choose if possible a locality that is rough and hemmed in, near mountains which are least suitable for riding, or he should avoid battle so far as he may until he finds an appropriate place, adapted to his own circumstances.

[2] ἀπολελείφθων δέ τινες καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χάρακος οἱ παραφυλάττοντες τὴν παρεμβολὴν στρατιῶται καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοὺς ἀποσκευῆς φυλακὴν, ἵνα μὴ κατανοήσας ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἔρημον ὄντα πέμψη τοὺς ἀρπασομένους τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ καταληψομένους τὸ χωρίον.

[2] A certain number of soldiers must be left behind at the palisade to guard the camp and the baggage in order that the general of the enemy may not discover that the camp is deserted and send men to plunder its contents and seize the place.

XXXII. Περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν παρακεκινδυνευμένον ποιεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν

XXXII. THE GENERAL MUST DO NOTHING RASH

[1] Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἢ τὰ ἰδία καθαιροῦντας ἐρύματα στρατηγούς ἢ ποταμούς διαβαίνοντας ἢ κρημνοὺς καὶ βάραθρα κατόπιν ποιουμένους τῶν φίλων, ἴν' ἢ μένοντες νικῶσιν ἢ βουληθέντες φεύγειν ἀπόλωνται, οὔτε πάμπαν ἐπαινεῖν οὔτε ψέγειν ἔχω. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ παρακεκινδυνευμένον μᾶλλον τόλμης ἐστὶν ἢ γνώμης καὶ τῇ τύχῃ κεκοινώνηκε πλεῖον ἢ τῇ κρίσει.

[1] Generals who destroy their own defences or cross rivers or who post their armies with steep cliffs or yawning gulfs in the rear in order that the soldiers may either stand and conquer or in their desire to escape be killed, I am not wholly able to praise nor yet to blame, for everything that is ventured rashly is rather than the part of recklessness than of wisdom, and has a greater share of luck than of good judgement.

[2] ὅπου γὰρ ἢ νικῶντα δεῖ κρατεῖν ἢ ἡττηθέντα τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσφάλλαι, πῶς ἐνταῦθ' ἂν τις ἢ φρονήσῃ τὸ νικᾶν ἢ προαιρέσῃ τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι μαρτυρήσειεν;

[2] For in a case when one must either win a victory and prevail, or else be defeated and lose everything, in such a case how could anyone attribute victory to foresight or defeat to deliberate choice?

[3] ἐγὼ δὲ στρατιώταις μὲν ἐκ στρατεύματος φιλοτόλμως κινδυνεύειν ἐπιτρεπτέον εἶναι νομίζω — καὶ γὰρ δρῶντές τι μεῖζον ὦνησαν καὶ παθόντες οὐθὲν τοσοῦτον ἐλύπησαν — , στρατεύματι δὲ παντὶ τὴν ἄδηλον ἐκκυβεύειν τύχην οὐ δοκιμάζω.

[3] But I do believe that certain soldiers of the army must be allowed to run desperate risks — for if they succeed they are of great assistance, but if they fail they do not cause corresponding loss, — yet I cannot countenance gambling with the entire army as the stake.

[4] μάλιστα δ' ἁμαρτάνειν οὗτοί μοι δοκοῦσιν, οἳ τινες ἐν μὲν τῷ νικᾶν ὀλίγα λυπήσειν μέλλοντες τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐν δὲ τῶν ἡττᾶσθαι μεγάλα βλάψειν τοὺς φίλους ἀποχρῶνται τοιούτοις στρατηγήμασιν.

[4] Most of all those generals seem to me to be at fault who make use of stratagems which in the event of victory will cause small loss to the enemy, but in defeat the greatest loss to their own army.

[5] Εἰ δὲ πρόδηλος μὲν σφισιν ὁ ὄλεθρος εἴη, κἂν μὴ παραβόλοις ἐγχειρήσωσι στρατηγίαις, πρόδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν πολεμίων ἡττηθέντων ἀπώλεια, τότε οὐκ ἂν μοι δόξειεν ἀμαρτάνειν ἀποφράττων τὰς φυγὰς τῶν φιλίων· ἄμεινον γὰρ ἐν τῶν τολμᾶν ἐπ' ἀδήλῳ τῷ τάχα μηδὲ πείσεσθαι τι δεινὸν ἅμα καὶ δρᾶσαι ζητεῖν, ἢ ἐπὶ προδήλῳ τῷ μηδὲν δρῶντας ἀπολέσθαι πάντας ἀτόλμως ἡσυχάζειν.

[5] If the destruction of one's army is evident, except through the use of some daring strategy, and if the destruction of the enemy by defeat is also evident, then I do not think a general would be at fault in cutting off the retreat of his own army. For it is better, by showing courage at a time when it is uncertain whether one will perhaps escape a severe defeat himself, to endeavour at the very same time to inflict a defeat, rather than, when it is certain that all will perish if they remain inactive, to keep quiet like cowards.

[6] ὑποδεικνύτω μέντοι μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις χωρίοις, ὅπου κατ' ἀλήθειαν οὐκ ἔστι σωτηρία τοῖς φεύγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ καὶ πάσῃ μάχῃ διδασκέτω διὰ πλειόνων, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν φεύγουσι πρόδηλος ὁ ὄλεθρος, ὡς ἂν ἤδη μετ' ἐξουσίας ἐπικειμένων τῶν πολεμίων μηδενὸς ἔτι δυναμένου διακωλύειν τοὺς διώκοντας πᾶν ὃ βούλονται διαθεῖναι τοὺς φεύγοντας, τοῖς δὲ μένουσιν ἄδηλος ὁ θάνατος ἀμυνομένοις.

[6] He should not only point this out in those localities where in actual fact there is no safety for fugitives, but also in every locality and every battle he must show by many reasons that death is certain for those who flee, since the enemy would at once press on freely, as soon as no one is able to hinder the pursuit, and could dispose of the fugitives as might suit them; but for men who stand and defend themselves, death is not certain.

[7] οἳ τινες γὰρ πεπεισμένοι τυγχάνουσιν ἐν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν, ὡς φεύγοντες μὲν αἰσχυρῶς ἀπολοῦνται, μένοντες δ' εὐκλεῶς τεθνήξονται, καὶ χειρὸν' αἰεὶ προσδοκῶσιν ἐκ τοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν ἢ ἐκ τοῦ φυλάττειν, ἄριστοι κατὰ τοὺς κινδύνους ἄνδρες ἐξετάζονται.

[7] For the men in the lines who chance to believe that if they flee they will perish shamefully while if they remain in rank they will die a glorious death, and who constantly anticipate greater dangers from breaking the ranks than from keeping them, will prove themselves the best men in the face of danger.

[8] διόπερ ἀγαθὸν μὲν, εἰ πάντας οὕτως ἔχειν γνώμης πεῖσαι στρατηγός, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ μέντοι γ' ὥς πλείστους· ἥ γὰρ παντελεῖς περιεποιήσατο νίκας ἢ μικροῖς ἐλαττώμασι περιέπεσε.

[8] On this account it is a good plan if the general can win over his whole army to this opinion, or, if not all, at least as many as possible, for thus he either gains an absolute victory or meets with but a slight defeat.

[9] Τῶν δ' ἐκ προλήψεως καὶ πρὶν ἢ συμβαλεῖν ἐπινοουμένων στρατηγοῖς αἱ παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς μάχης καιρὸν ἐπινοοῖαι νίκης καὶ ἀντιστρατηγήσεις ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ πλείους καὶ θαυμασιώτεροι γίνονται τοῖς τὴν στρατηγικὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἡσκηκόσιν, ἃς οὐκ ἔστιν ὑποσημῆναι λόγῳ ἢ προβουλεῦσαι.

[9] Plans and counter-stratagems for victory that are originated at the very moment of battle are sometimes preferable to those which are conceived and contrived by generals in anticipation and before the engagement, and they are sometimes more worthy of remark, in the case of those made by men who are skilled in military science, through they are things which cannot be reduced to rules or planned beforehand.

[10] ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ κυβερνῆται πρὸς μὲν τὸν πλοῦν ἐκ λιμένων ἀνάγονται πάντα ἐξηρτυμένοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν ναῦν, ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐμπέσῃ χειμῶν, οὐχ ὁ βούλονται ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἀναγκάζονται, πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης ἐπείγοντα κίνδυνον εὐτόλμως παραβαλλόμενοι, καὶ οὐ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς μελέτης εἰσφερόμενοι μνήμην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν βοήθειαν· οὕτως οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν ἐκτάξουσιν, ὅπως σφίσι νομίζουσι συνοίσειν, ἐπειδὰν δ' ὁ τοῦ πολέμου περιστῇ χειμῶν πολλὰ θραύων καὶ παραλλάττων καὶ ποικίλας ἐπάγων περιστάσεις, ἢ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψις ἐπιζητεῖ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν ἐπινοίας, ἃς ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς τύχης μᾶλλον ἢ ἡ μνήμη τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑποβάλλει.

[10] For just as pilots for their voyages, before sailing from the harbour, fit their ship out with everything that a ship requires; yet when a storm blows up they

do, not what they wish, but what they must, boldly staking their fortunes against the driving peril of chance and calling to their aid no memory of their past practice but assistance appropriate to the existing circumstances; just so generals will prepare their armies as they believe will be best, but when the storm of war is at hand repeatedly shattering, overthrowing, and bringing varied conditions, the sight of present circumstances demands expedients based on the exigencies of the moment, which the necessity of chance rather than the memory of experience suggests.

XXXIII. Περὶ τοῦ μὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτοχειρὶ πολεμεῖν

XXXIII. THE GENERAL SHOULD NOT HIMSELF ENTER BATTLE

[1] Μαχέσθω δὲ ὁ στρατηγὸς αὐτὸς προμηθέστερον ἢ τολμηρότερον, ἢ καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀπεχέσθω τοῦ τοῖς πολεμίοις εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι· καὶ γὰρ εἰ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἀνυπέρβλητον ἀνδρίαν εἰσενέγκαιτο, τοσοῦτον οὐδὲν ὠφελῆσαι δύναται στράτευμα μαχόμενος, ὅσον ἀποθανὼν βλάψαι· στρατηγοῦ γὰρ ἡ γνώμη πλεον ἰσχύει τῆς ῥώμης· σώματος μὲν γὰρ ἀνδρία δρᾶσαι τι μετὰ καὶ στρατιώτης δύναται, γνώμης δὲ προμηθεῖα βουλευῶσαι τι κρεῖττον οὐκ ἄλλος.

[1] The general should fight cautiously rather than boldly, or should keep away altogether from a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. For even if in battle he shows that he is not to be outdone in valour, he can aid his army far less by fighting than he can harm it if he should be killed, since the knowledge of a general is far more important than his physical strength. Even a soldier can perform a great deed by bravery, but no one except the general can by his wisdom plan a greater one.

[2] ὅνπερ δ' ἂν τρόπον, εἰ κυβερνήτης ἀφειμένος τῶν οἰάκων, ἃ δεῖ τοὺς ναύτας ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς πράττοι, κινδυνεύειν ἂν συμβαίῃ τὸ σκάφος, τοῦτον, εἰ στρατηγὸς ἀποστάς τοῦ γνώμῃ τι βουλεύειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν στρατιωτῶν καταβαίνειν χρείας, ἢ τῶν ὅλων ἀκυβέρνητος ἀμελεία τὴν ἀναγκαιοτέραν ἄπρακτον ποιήσει βοήθειαν.

[2] If a ship's captain leaving the helm should himself do what the sailors ought to do, he would endanger his ship; in the same way, if the general, leaving his function of wise direction, should descend to the duties of a simple soldier, his neglect of the whole situation, due to his lack of governing, will render useless the common soldier's mere routine service.

[3] ὅμοιον δὲ κρίνω τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐμπαρβαλέσθαι τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ τῷ τῆς συμπάσης, εἰ πείσεται τι, δυνάμεως ἀκηδεῖν· εἰ γὰρ, ἐν ᾧ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἡ σωτηρία στρατεύματός ἐστιν, οὗτος οὐδὲν εἰ τεθνήξεται πεφρόντικε, τὸ πᾶν αἰρεῖται συνδιαφθεῖραι, καὶ ὀρθῶς δ' ἂν τις αἰτιάσαιτο τοῦτον ὡς ἄπρακτον στρατηγὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνδρεῖον.

[3] Similar, I think, is the notion which the general gets into his heart when he

thus disregards the welfare of his whole force in the event of accident to himself; for if he, with whom the safety of the whole army lies, has no care lest he himself should die, he prefers that everyone should die with him, and rightly he would be censured as an unsuccessful rather than a courageous general.

[4] ὁ μὲν γὰρ πολλὰ γνώμη στρατηγήσας ἀρκεσθήσεται σεμνυνόμενος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς εὐπραγίας, ὅστις δ' οὕτως ἀπειρόκαλός ἐστιν, ὥστ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ διὰ μάχης εἰ χεῖρας ἔλθοι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐδὲν αὐτὸν ἄξιον εἰργᾶσθαι νομίζειν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖος, ἀλλὰ ἄλογος καὶ τολμηρός ἐστιν.

[4] He who has accomplished many feats of generalship through his wisdom must be satisfied with the honour for his intellectual successes, but he who is so stupid that, unless he comes to close quarters with the enemy, he believes he has accomplished nothing worthy of mention, is not brave but thoughtless and foolhardy.

[5] ὅθεν ἐπιφαίνειν μὲν δεῖ τῷ πλήθει τὸ φιλοκίνδυνον, ἵνα τὴν προθυμίαν ἐκκαλῇται τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ἀγωνίζεσθαι δὲ ἀσφαλέστερον, καὶ τοῦ θανάτου μὲν καταφρονεῖν, εἴ τι πάσχοι τὸ στράτευμα, μηδ' αὐτὸν αἰρούμενον ζῆν, σωζομένου δὲ καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν φυλάττειν ψυχὴν· ἥδη γὰρ ἐπικυδέστερα τὰ τῶν φίλων ὄντα ποτὲ στρατηγὸς ἀποθανὼν ἐμείωσεν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ πταίοντες ἐπανεθάρρηνσαν τὸ ἀντίπαλον ἀστρατήγητον ἰδόντες, οἱ δ' εὐτυχοῦντες ἐδυσθύμησαν τὸν ἴδιον ἡγεμόνα ζητοῦντες.

[5] Hence the general must show himself brave before the army, that he may call forth the zeal of his soldiers, but he must fight cautiously; he should despise death if his army is defeated, and not desire to live, but if his army is preserved he should guard his personal safety, for sometimes the death of a general lessens the glory of his army, since the defeated enemy is encouraged, perceiving that its opponents are without a general, and the successful army is discouraged, feeling the need of its own general.

[6] στρατηγοῦ δ' ἔστι τὸ παριπάζεσθαι ταῖς τάξεσιν, ἐπιφαίνεσθαι τοῖς κινδυνεύουσιν, ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς ἀνδριζομένους, ἀπειλεῖν τοῖς ἀποδεδειγμένοις, παρακαλεῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας, ἀναπληροῦν τὸ ἐλλεῖπον, ἀντιμετάγειν εἰ δέοι λόχον, ἐπαμύνειν τοῖς κάμνουσι, προορᾶσθαι τὸν καιρὸν, τὴν ὥραν, τὸ μέλλον.

[6] The duty of the general is to ride by the ranks on horseback, show himself to those in danger, praise the brave, threaten the cowardly, encourage the lazy, fill up gaps, transpose a company if necessary, bring aid to wearied, anticipate the crisis, the hour, and the outcome.

XXXIV. Περὶ τοῦ εὐεργετεῖν κατὰ τὸ μέτρον ἓνα ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνδραγαθούντων

XXXIV. CONFERRING REWARDS PROPORTIONAL TO THE VALOUR OF EACH

[1] Ἀνακαλεσάμενος δ' ἐκ τῆς μάχης πρῶτον μὲν ἀποδιδότω τοῖς θεοῖς θυσίας καὶ πομπάς, αἷς ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ χρῆσθαι πάρεστι, τὰ νομιζόμενα χαριστήρια μετὰ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου παντελῇ νίκην ἐπαγγελλόμενος ἀποδώσειν· ἔπειτα τοὺς μὲν ἀρίστους ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐξετασθέντας τιμάτω δωρεαῖς καὶ τιμαῖς, αἷς νόμος, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς φανέντας κολαζέτω.

[1] On returning from battle, the general should first offer to the gods such sacrifice and festal celebrations as the circumstances permit, promising to offer the customary thank-offerings after complete victory; then he should honour those soldiers who have faced danger most bravely with the gifts and marks of distinction which are usually given, and he should punish those who have shown themselves cowards.

[2] τιμαὶ δ' ἔστωσαν μὲν καὶ αἱ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ κατὰ τὰ παρ' ἑκάστοις νόμιμα· στρατηγικαὶ δὲ αὗται· πανοπλῖαι, κόσμοι, λαφύρων δόσεις, πεντηκονταρχίαι, ἑκατονταρχίαι, λοχαγίαι, τάξεων ἀφηγήσεις, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ νόμους παρ' ἑκάστοις ἡγεμονίαι· τῶν μὲν ἰδιωτῶν τοῖς ἀνδραγαθήσασιν αἱ ἥττους ἐξουσίαι, τῶν δὲ ἡγεμόνων τοῖς ἀριστεύσασιν αἱ μείζους ἡγεμονίαι· αὗται γὰρ ἀμοιβαὶ τε μεγάλῳ ψυχοι τοῖς ἤδη τὸ γενναῖον εἰργασμένοις προτροπαὶ τε ἀναγκαῖαι τοῖς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

[2] Honours should be bestowed according to tradition and custom in each case. Those bestowed by generals are the following: full equipments of armour, decorations, spoils, and appointments to commands as over fifties, over hundreds, over companies, over squads, and the other parts of command prescribed by the laws of the country in question. The bravest of the private soldiers should receive the lesser commands, and those of his officers who have distinguished themselves should have the higher commands, since these rewards strengthen the self-esteem of those who have deserved well, and encourage others who desire similar rewards.

[3] ὅπου δὲ τιμὴ μὲν ἀποδίδεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, τιμωρία δ' οὐ παραπέμπεται τῶν

κακῶν, ἐνταῦθα καλὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὸ στρατόπεδον· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοβήθησαν ἀμαρτάνειν, οἱ δὲ ἐφιλοτιμήθησαν ἀνδραγαθεῖν.

[3] Whenever honour is paid to the brave and punishment of the cowardly is not neglected, then an army must have fair expectation; the latter are afraid to be found wanting, the former are ambitious to show prowess.

[4] ἔνθα μέντοι χρὴ καὶ νικῶντα μὴ κατ' ἄνδρα μόνον ἀμοιβὰς ἐκτίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ σύμπαντι στρατεύματι τῶν κινδύνων ἐπικαρπίαν ἀποδιδόναι· τὰ γὰρ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιτρεπέτω τοῖς στρατιώταις διαρπάζειν, εἰ χάρακος ἢ ἀποσκευῆς ἢ φρουρίου κυριεύσειεν, ὅτε δὲ καὶ πόλεως, εἰ μὴ τι μέλλοι περὶ αὐτῆς χρηστότερον βουλεύειν.

[4] It is not only necessary in victory to distribute rewards to individual men but also to make recompense to the army as a whole for its dangers. The soldiers should be allowed to plunder the possessions of the enemy if they should capture a camp or baggage train or fortress, or sometimes even a city, unless the general intends to put it to a more profitable use.

[5] οὕτως γὰρ ἂν καὶ μάλιστα μήπω τέλος εἰληφότος τοῦ πολέμου συνοίσοι πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα προθυμότερον ἐπὶ τὰς μάχας αὐτῶν ἐξιόντων, εἰ μὴ νομίζομεν τοὺς μὲν θηρευτικοὺς κύνας δελεάζειν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῖς κυνηγοῖς αἵματι θηρίων καὶ τοῖς τοῦ συλληφθέντος ζώου σπλάγχνοις, τοῖς δὲ νικῶσι στρατιώταις τὰ τῶν ἡττημένων εἰς προτροπὴν οὐ μάλα δὴ τι συμφέρον ἀποδιδόναι.

[5] This course will serve well the interests of the future, especially if the war is not ended, since the soldiers will be more eager to enter battle, unless we are to believe that, while huntsmen must entice their dogs with the blood of wild beasts and the entrails of the animal which the dogs have caught, nevertheless it is not at all advantageous to give the possessions of the defeated enemy, as encouragement, to the victorious army.

**XXXV. α'. Ὅτι οὐ χρή πάντοτε ἐπιτρέπειν τὰς ἀρπαγὰς,
καὶ ὅτι τὰ σώματα οὐ χρή ἀρπάζειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν
πιπράσκειν**

**XXXV. (1) INDISCRIMINATE PILLAGE MUST NOT ALWAYS BE
PERMITTED; PRISONERS MUST NOT BE REGARDED AS LOOT,
BUT MUST BE SOLD BY THE GENERAL**

[1] Τὰς δ' ἀρπαγὰς οὐτ' ἐπὶ πάσης μάχης ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐδ' αἰεὶ πάντων, ἀλλ' ὧν μὲν, ὧν δ' οὐ, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων ἥκιστα· ταῦτα δὲ πιπράσκειν τὸν στρατηγόν.

[1] Plundering should not be permitted after every battle nor in the case of all kinds of property, but only in the case of certain things, and least of all of prisoners, for these should be sold by the general.

[2] εἰ δὲ χρημάτων δέοι καὶ δαπάνης κοινῆς καὶ μεγάλης, καὶ ὅσα ἄγεται καὶ φέρεται πάνθ' ὡς αὐτὸν ἀναπέμπεσθαι κηρυττέτω.

[2] If he lack money and resources to meet a large public expense, he should order that all the plundered property, including the live-stock, be turned over to him.

[3] γνώη δ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἄριστα πρὸς τοὺς καιρούς, εἰ τὰ πάντα δέοι λαμβάνειν, εἴτ' ἐκ μέρους, εἴτε μηθὲν ὧν ἔτυχεν· οὐ γὰρ μὴν ἔστι πολέμου καὶ τοῖς κοινοῖς εἶναι χρημάτων δαψίλειαν καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ἀνεπικώλυτον ὠφέλειαν· ἥδη δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοὺς τῶν ἡττημένων πλούτους καὶ παρὰ τὰς τῶν τόπων εὐδαιμονίας αἱ ὠφέλειαί σφισι δαψιλέστεραι γίνονται.

[3] The general will know what is best according to the circumstances, whether to seize everything or a part or nothing, of that on which he chances; certainly it is not the characteristic of war to cause both abundance of wealth to the community and unlimited gain to the private soldiers; in fact it happens sometimes that the gains of a victorious army are proportionate to the wealth of the vanquished and the prosperity of their territory.

β'. Περὶ αἰχμαλώτων

(2) PRISONERS

[4] Τοὺς δὲ αἰχμαλώτους, ἐὰν ὁ πόλεμος ἔτι συνεστῶς ᾖ, μὴ κτεινέτω, μάλιστα μὲν τῶν πρὸς οὓς ἐστὶν ὁ πόλεμος, κἂν δοκῇ οἱ, τοὺς συμμαχοὺς ἀναιρεῖν, ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐνδοξοτάτους καὶ λαμπροὺς παρὰ τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἐνθυμούμενος τὰ ἄδηλα τῆς τύχης καὶ τὸ παλίντροπον τοῦ δαιμονίου φιλοῦντος ὥς τὰ πολλὰ νεμεσᾶν, ἵν' εἴ τινων αὐτοῖ ἢ σωμάτων, ὧν πολὺς πόθος, ἢ φρουρίου κρατήσαιεν, ἱκανὰ ἀντικαταλλάγματα δοὺς ἔχῃ κομίσασθαι τὰ τῶν φίλων, ἢ τότε γε μὴ βουλομένων ἐνδίκως εἰς ἴσον ἀμύνηται.

[4] Prisoners, if the war is still in progress, the general should not kill — at the very most he may kill, if he thinks best, the allies of those against whom the war is directed, but least of all those who stand in highest repute and position among the enemy, remembering the uncertainties of chance, and the reversals caused by providence, which usually brings retribution. His purpose should be, if his army should capture certain prisoners for whom there is great desire in their own country, or some stronghold, that he may be able by giving enough in exchange to redeem the property of his friends, or at least then, should the enemy not wish to deal justly with him, that he may protect himself on equal terms.

[5] μετὰ δὲ τὰ κατορθώματα καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ἐπιτρεπέσθων αὐτοῖς εὐωχίαι τε καὶ κλισίαι καὶ πόνων ἀνέσεις, ἵν' εἰδότες, οἷον τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦ μαχομένου νικᾶν, ὑπομένωσι τὰ δυσχερῆ πάντα πρὸ τοῦ νικᾶν.

[5] After successful engagements and the dangers of battle, the general should allow feasts and celebrations and holidays, in order that the soldiers, knowing what happens as the result of victory by battle, may patiently undergo all hardships necessary for such victory.

XXXVI. α'. Περὶ τοῦ θάπτειν τοὺς ἐν πολέμῳ ἀναιρουμένους

XXXVI. (1) ON THE BURIAL OF THE FALLEN

[1] Προνοεῖσθω δὲ τῆς τῶν νεκρῶν κηδείας, μήτε καιρὸν μήθ' ὥραν μήτε τόπον μήτε φόβον προφασιζόμενος, ἅν τε τύχη νικῶν, ἅν τε ἡττώμενος· ὅσια μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ἀποικοινομένους εὐσέβεια, ἀναγκαῖα δὲ καὶ ἡ πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντας ἀπόδειξις.

[1] The general should take thought for the burial of the dead, offering as a pretext for delay neither occasion nor time nor place nor fear, whether he happen to be victorious or defeated. Now this is both a holy act of reverence toward the dead and also a necessary example for the living.

[2] Ἐκαστος γὰρ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὡς αὐτὸς ἀμελούμενος, εἰ πεσὼν ἔτυχεν, παρ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρῶν τὴν τύχην καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος καταμαντευόμενος, ὡς οὐδ' αὐτός, εἰ τεθναίῃ, ταφησόμενος ἐπαχθῶς φέρει τὴν ἀτύμβευτον ὕβριν.

[2] For if the dead are not buried, each soldier believes that no care will be taken of his own body, should he chance to fall, observing what happens before his own eyes, and thereby judging of the future, feeling that he, likewise, if he should die, would fail of burial, waxes indignant at the contemptuous neglect of burial.

β'. Περὶ τοῦ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι τὴν ἐλάττωσιν

(2) ENCOURAGEMENT IN DEFEAT

[3] Εἰ δὲ ἡττῶτο, παραμυθησάμενος τοὺς ἀνασωθέντας ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἐφεδρενέτω, καιρὸν ἔνθα πού καὶ μᾶλλον οἰόμενος ἐπανορθώσασθαι τὴν ἐλάττωσιν.

[3] If the general be defeated, by encouraging the soldiers who have survived the battle, he should prepare for another bout, thinking that very likely there is at such a time an even better opportunity to retrieve defeat.

[4] εἰώθασι γὰρ ὡς τὰ πολλὰ μετ' εὐπραγίας οἱ στρατιῶται ῥαθυμότερον ἐκλύεσθαι περὶ τὰς φυλακάς· ἡ γὰρ τῶν πέλας καταφρόνησις ἀμελείας σφίσι γίγνεται αἰτία τῶν οἰκείων, οὕτως τε πολλάκις τὰ εὐτυχήματα πλεῖον ἔβλαψεν

τῷ δυστυχημάτων.

[4] For, as a rule, soldiers after victory are accustomed to relax their vigilance, for their contempt for their near-by opponents causes carelessness of their own interests, and thus good fortune has often done more harm than misfortune.

[5] ὁ μὲν γὰρ πταίσας ἐδιδάχθη καὶ φυλάσσασθαι τὸ μέλλον, ἐξ ὧν ἔπαθεν, ὁ δὲ τοῦ δυστυχεῖν ἄπειρος οὐδ', ὥς δεῖ φυλάσσει τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἔμαθεν.

[5] For he who has suffered a defeat has been taught to guard in future against that from which he has suffered, but he who is inexperienced in misfortune has not even learned that it is necessary to guard his success.

[6] εἴτ' αὖ νικῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐχέτω προμήθειαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παθεῖν ἀμελῶν, ἣν ἂν εἰς τὸ δρᾶσαι τι τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ῥαθυμοῦντας εἰσενέγκαιτο. φόβος γὰρ εὐκαιρος ἀσφάλεια προμηθείας, ὥς καὶ καταφρόνησις ἄκαιρος εὐεπιβούλευτος τόλμα.

[6] On the other hand, if victorious, the general should take the same precautions against suffering harm through negligence which he would use in trying to inflict upon the enemy if they were off their guard. Seasonable fear is wise precaution, as ill-timed contempt is recklessness that invites attack.

XXXVII. Περὶ τοῦ ἐν καιρῷ εἰρήνης μὴ ἀφυλάκτως εἶναι

XXXVII. PRECAUTIONS IN TIME OF PEACE

[1] Ἀνοχὰς δὲ ποιησάμενος μηδ' ἐπιτιθέσθω μηδ' αὐτὸς ἀφύλακτος ἔστω· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἥσυχον ἐχέτω πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ὡς ἐν εἰρήνῃ, τὸ δ' ἀσφαλὲς εἰς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν, ὡς ἐν πολέμῳ.

[1] After making a truce he should neither make an attack nor himself remain unguarded; he should, on the one hand, make no move against the enemy, as in peace, but, on the other, he should be protected against danger, as in war.

[2] δεῖ γὰρ οὐκ ἀσύνθηκον ἐν σπονδαῖς εἶναι οὔτ' αὐτόν τι φθάνειν ἀσεβὲς δρῶντα, ἀλλ' ὑποπτον, ὡς φυλάττεσθαι τὸ ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ὑπουλον· ἄδηλοι γὰρ αἱ τῶν σπεισασμένων γνώμαι.

[2] He must not break faith in a treaty, nor be the first to commit any sacrilegious act, but he must be suspicious enough to watch for festering deceit on the part of the enemy, for the intentions of those with whom the treaty has been concluded are uncertain.

[3] καὶ παρὰ σοι μὲν ἔστω τὸ βέβαιον τοῦ μὴ ἀδικῆσαι διὰ τὸ εὐσεβές, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπονοεῖσθω τὸ μὴ πιστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀπεχθές· ἀσφαλὲς γὰρ οὗτος καὶ προμηθής, ὃς οὐδὲ βουλευθεῖσι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐπιθέσθαι τὸν τοῦ δύνασθαι παρασπονδῆσαι καιρὸν ἀπολείπει.

[3] Let your part be a firm resolution not to transgress, because of the sacred nature of the treaty, but suspect a breach of faith on the part of the enemy due to their hostility. That general is wise and cautious who affords the enemy, even when they desire to attack, no opportunity to break their compact.

[4] οἵτινες δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ποιοῦνται τὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πάθωσιν ἐκδικίαν, εὐσεβὲς μὲν φρονοῦσιν, οὐ μὴν ἀσφαλῇ ποιοῦσιν.

[4] Those who leave to the gods revenge for what they have suffered are piously minded but certainly do not act safely.

[5] κοιμῆ γὰρ ἀνοήτων ἐστὶν ἐλπίδι τοῦ τοὺς παρασπονδήσαντας ἐκτίσειν δίκας ἀπρονοήτους ἔχειν τοὺς περὶ σφῶν κινδύνους, ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς σώζεσθαι

μέλλοντας ἅμα τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἐξὸν μετὰ τῆς τῶν ιδίων πραγμάτων ἀσφαλείας πεῖραν λαμβάνειν τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἀσεβείας· οὕτως γὰρ αὐτοί τε διὰ τὸ προμηθεῖς οὐκ ἂν πταίσαιεν ἐπιβουλευθέντες, ἀσεβήσουσί τε οἱ πολέμιοι τῷ ἐπιχειρῆσαι καὶ δοκεῖν πεποιηκέναι ἄν, εἰ ἐδυνήθησαν.

[5] For it is absolute folly to be careless of the danger to oneself in the hope that treaty-breakers will pay the penalty — as if one would himself be saved as soon as the enemy perish! — when it is possible to make trial of the irreligion of the enemy while at the same time safeguarding one's own interests. With this precaution one will save himself from defeat if plotted against, but the enemy will commit sacrilege both if they attempt a breach of the truce and if they let it be seen that they would have done if it they could.

XXXVIII. α'. Περὶ τοῦ τὰς προσαγόμενος πόλεις ἐν ἀδείᾳ ἔχειν καὶ φιланθρωπία

XXXVIII. (1) TREATMENT OF SURRENDERED CITIES WITH TRUST AND HUMANITY

[1] Ταῖς δὲ προσχωρούσαις πόλεσιν, εἴ τινες ἐπιτρέποιεν αὐτὰς ἀρξάμεναι, φιλανθρώπως καὶ χρηστῶς προσφερέσθω· προσαγάγοιτο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. ἡ γὰρ ἐλπίς τοῦ τῶν αὐτῶν τεύξεσθαι δελεάζουσα προσάγεται τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐκόντας ἐγχειρίζειν.

[1] If any cities should open their gates in surrender early in the war, the general should treat them in a manner both humane and advantageous, for thus he would induce the other cities also to submit. The enticing hope of a similarly fortunate fate leads the majority to surrender voluntarily.

[2] ὅστις δὲ πικρῶς εὐθὺς καὶ πολεμικῶς προσφέρεται κύριος γενόμενος πόλεως ἢ διαρπάζων ἢ κτείνων ἢ κατασκάπτων, ἄλλοτριωτέρας διατίθῃ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ὥστε καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτῷ ἐπίπονον καὶ τὴν νίκην δύσελπιν κατασκευάζειν·

[2] But he who acts in a harsh and savage manner, immediately after becoming master of a city, plundering, slaying, and destroying, makes other cities hostile, so that the war becomes laborious for him and victory difficult of attainment.

[3] εἰδότες γάρ, ὡς ἀπαραίτητόν ἐστιν ἡ τῶν ὑποχειρίων πρὸς τοῦ κρατήσαντος τιμωρία, πᾶν ὅτιοῦν ὑπομένουσι καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παραδοῦναι τὰς πόλεις.

[3] Since they know that the punishment of the conquered by the conqueror is merciless, they are ready to do and suffer anything rather than surrender their cities.

[4] οὐθὲν γὰρ οὕτως κατασκευάζει γενναίους, ὡς φόβος ὧν μέλλουσι πείσεσθαι κακῶν εἰζαντες· ἡ γὰρ προσδοκία τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ καθυφεῖσθαι τὰ σφέτερα δεινὴν ἐντίθησι φιλοτιμίαν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις.

[4] For nothing makes men so brave as the fear of what ills they will suffer if

they surrender; indeed the expectation of the evils which will ensue from their subjection produces a terrible pertinacity in danger.

[5] χαλεπαὶ δὲ αἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπεγνωσμένους πεῖραι μάχης· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρηστότερον ἐλπίζοντες ἐκ τοῦ παραχωρεῖν ὧν πείσονται κινδυνεύοντες αἰροῦνται μετὰ τοῦ πολλὰ δρᾶν καὶ πάσχειν.

[5] Moreover, fighting is dangerous against desperate men, who expect from surrender no amelioration of the fate which will be theirs if they continue to fight, and therefore prefer, if they can inflict much harm, also to suffer much.

[6] ὅθεν αἱ πολιορκίαι τοῖς ὧδε στρατηγοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ τεθριωμένοις ταλαίπωροι γίνονται καὶ πολυχρόνιοι, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἀτελεῖς, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ σφαλεραί τε καὶ ἐπικίνδυναι.

[6] On this account the sieges of such insensate and savage generals become wearisome and long drawn-out, sometimes even fail of accomplishment, and are extremely dangerous and precarious.

β'. Πῶς χρηστέον προδόταις

(2) HOW TO TREAT TRAITORS

[7] Τοῖς δὲ προδόταις τὰς τε πίστεις καὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας φυλαττέτω, μὴ διὰ τοὺς γεγονότας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοὺς ἐσομένους, ἵν' εἰδότες, ὡς ὀφείλεται σφισι χάρις, ἐλόμενοι τὰ τῶν πολεμίων ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς εὐεργεσίας τρέπωνται· λαμβάνει γάρ τι μᾶλλον ὁ προδότης διδοὺς ἢ χαρίζεται.

[7] One should keep promises and pledges to traitors, not on account of what they have done but of what others will do, in order that these, knowing that gratitude will be due them, may choose the interests of their country's enemies and turn to the same sort of service. For he who gives to a traitor receives much more than he bestows.

[8] διὸ χρὴ προθύμως ἐκτίνειν τὰς ἀμοιβάς· οὐ γὰρ δικαστὴς τῆς ἀδικηθείσης πόλεως ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ στρατηγὸς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος.

[8] On this account it is necessary to pay the reward cheerfully, for the general is not an avenger of the betrayed city but the commander of the army of his own country.

XXXIX. α'. Περὶ τοῦ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐν γνώσει εἶναι τῆς τῶν ἄστρον κινήσεως

XXXIX. (1) ON THE GENERAL'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE COURSES OF THE STARS

[1] Πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐπιθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ προδοσίας νυκτερινὰς καταλήψεις τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἄπειρον εἶναι δεῖ τῆς ὑπεργείου κατὰ τὴν νύκτα φορᾶς τῶν ἀπλανῶν, ἐπεὶ πολλακίς ἀπράκτους ἔξει τὰς ἐπιβολάς.

[1] In night attacks and surprises of towns through treason, the general must know the heavenly courses of the stars by night, otherwise his plans will often be of no avail.

[2] ἔστιν γὰρ ὅτε συντέτακται τις τῶν προδοτῶν τρίτην ἢ τετάρτην ἢ ὅποστην ἂν τις εὐκαιρον ὥραν νομίζῃ τῆς νυκτός, ἀνοίξῃ τὰς πύλας ἢ τινὰς κατασφάξῃ τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀντιπραττόντων ἢ φρουρᾶ τῶν ἔνδον πολεμίων ἐπιθήσεσθαι· κᾶπειτα δυεῖν θάτερον συμβέβηκεν, ἥτοι θάπτον ἢ ἔδει προσπελάσαντα τὸν τῶν πολεμίων στρατὸν κατάφωρον γενέσθαι, πρὶν ἢ τοὺς προδότας ἐτοίμους εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως ἀποκωλυθῆναι τῆς πράξεως, ἢ ὑστερήσαντα τοῖς μὲν προδόταις αἴτιον γενέσθαι θανάτου φωραθεῖσιν, αὐτὸν δὲ μηδὲν τῶν προκειμένων ἀνύσαι.

[2] For instance, some traitor has appointed the third or fourth, or whatever hour of the night he considers most favourable, for opening the gates or slaying some of the opposing faction in the town or attacking the hostile garrison within the town; then one of two things has happened; the general has reached the camp of the enemy too early and has been detected before the traitors are ready and has been thwarted in his attempt, or else he has arrived too late and has thus been the cause of the traitors' being detected and put to death and of his own failure to accomplish any of his plans.

[3] διόπερ χρὴ καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν τεκμαιρόμενον, ὅθεν ἐξοδεῦσαι δεῖ, καὶ τῶν σταδίων καὶ τῆς ὥρας στοχαζόμενον, ὅσον εἰς τὴν πορείαν ἀναλώσει, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρον ὀρῶντα, πόσον τὸ παρῳχηκὸς ἤδη καὶ πόσον τὸ ἀπολειπόμενον μέρος, οὕτως ἀκριβῶς συλλογισάμενον, ἵνα μήτε φθάσῃ μήτε βραδύνη, πρὸς αὐτὴν ἥκειν τὴν ὥραν τοῦ συντεταγμένου καιροῦ καὶ ἔτι προσιόντα ἀκούεσθαι καὶ ἐντὸς εἶναι τῶν τειχῶν.

[3] Accordingly he should form an estimate of the road, deciding at what point he is to set out; then he must determine the distance and the time — how much of each he will have to spend on the journey; — and finally, he must, from his observation of the stars, estimate exactly what part of the night has passed and what part remains, in order that he may arrive neither too early nor too late; then he must get there at precisely the appointed time, so that news of his attack may not reach the enemy until he is actually inside the fortifications.

β'. Πῶς ἡμέρας αἶρειν χρῆ πόλιν

(2) HOW TO CAPTURE A CITY BY DAY

[4] Εἰ δ' ἡμέρας ἀναστήσας ἄγοι στράτευμα πόλεις ἐκ προδοσίας ληψόμενος κατὰ τὴν συγκεκριμένην ὥραν, τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ὑποπίπτοντας ἅπαντας προαποστέλλων ἵππεῖς συλλαμβανέτω, μή τις τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας φθάσας ἀποδραμῶν μηνύσῃ τὴν ἔφοδον τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλ' αἰφνιδίως ἀφυλάκτοις ἢ ἐπιφάνεια γένηται τοῦ στρατεύματος.

[4] If setting out by day, he lead his army to capture at an appointed hour towns that are to be betrayed, he should send horsemen ahead to seize every one met on the road, that no native of the country may run ahead and warn of the approach of their enemy but that the army may appear suddenly to the enemy and catch him off his guard.

[5] ἐπελθόντα δ' ἐξαίφνης ἀπροσδοκῆτοις χρή, κἂν μὴ κατὰ προδοσίαν μέλλῃ λαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐκ προρρησεως ἀγωνίζεσθαι διὰ μάχης, μὴ ἀναβάλλεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥς ὅτι μάλιστα φθάνειν προσβάλλοντα εἴτε φρουρίῳ εἴτε χάρακι εἴτε πόλει, μάλιστα δ' ὅτ' ἂν ὀλίγον εἶναι δοκῇ τὸ φύλιον στράτευμα καὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐλαττούμενον·

[5] He must fall unexpectedly on an unsuspecting enemy, even if he is not expecting to seize the towns through treachery but to fight openly after a declaration of war, and he must not hesitate but strive in every way to attack fort or camp or town before his advance is known, especially if he knows that his own army is small and inferior to that of the enemy.

[6] αἱ γὰρ ἀπρόληπτοι τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιφανεῖαι διὰ τὸ παράλογον ἐκπλήττουσι τοὺς ἐναντίους, κἂν ὧσι κρείττους, ἔως, ἂν γε συνθεωρήσωσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ

βουλεύσασθαι καὶ ἀναθαρρήσαι καιρὸν λάβωσι, κατὰ μικρὸν ἀναγκάζονται καταφρονεῖν· οὕτως ἐνίοτε τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀρχόμενα φοβερωτέρα τῶν χρονιζομένων εἶναι δοκεῖ.

[6] For unexpected appearances of an enemy, because they are unforeseen, terrify their opponents, even should the latter be stronger; but at length, if those who have been taken by surprise should observe their own forces or get the chance to plan and renew their courage, they gradually and of necessity come to despise their foes; in this way the beginning of a war sometimes seems more terrible than the latter part.

[7] διὸ πολλάκις ἤδη τινὲς τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐπιφανείας καταπληξάμενοι τοὺς ἐναντίους ἢ ταχὺ καὶ ἄκοντας ὑπέταξαν ἢ ποιεῖν ἐκόντας ἠνάγκασαν τὰ προσταττόμενα.

[7] On this account, armies have often so terrified their opponents by the unexpectedness of their appearance that they have either quickly subdued them against their will or else have forced them to agree to comply with their own demands.

XL. Περὶ πολιορκίας

XL. SIEGES

[1] Πολιορκία δὲ στρατιωτῶν ἀνδρίαν ἐπιζητεῖ καὶ στρατηγικὴν ἐπίνοιαν καὶ μηχανημάτων παρασκευήν· ἀσφαλῆς μέντοι καὶ μὴ ἥττον ἀπροόρατος τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἔστω· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιβουλευόμενον, ὅτ' ἂν οἱ κακοῦ τυγχάνει γινώσκη, τηρεῖ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐπιβουλευόν·

[1] A siege demands courage on the part of the soldiers, military science on the part of the general, and equipment of machines of war. The general must take no fewer precautions and be no less observant than the enemy; for the army attacked, when it knows just what its danger is, guards especially against the army attacking.

[2] ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔξω κινδύνου δοκῶν εἶναι πράττει τι τῶν προκειμένων, ὁπότε ἂν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὁ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ κινδυνεύειν ὑπάρχων ζητεῖ φθάσας δρᾶσαι, ὁπότε ἂν καιρὸν λάβῃ· διὸ χρὴ τὸν πολιορκοῦντα καὶ τάφρῳ καὶ χάρακι καὶ φυλακαῖς τὸ ἴδιον ἀσφαλιζέσθαι στρατόπεδον.

[2] The army that believes itself out of danger does what work is at hand when it pleases, but that which is in danger strives to surprise its enemy by dealing him a blow whenever it has an opportunity. Hence it is necessary for the besieging general to fortify his camp with trenches, palisades, and guards.

[3] καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν πολιορκοῦντες, ὅ τι ἂν μέλλωσι πράττειν, ὁρῶνται τοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους, οἱ δὲ πολιορκούμενοι πρόβλημα τὸ τεῖχος ἔχοντες ἀόρατοι πολλάκις ἐκχυθέντες διὰ πυλῶν ἢ μηχανὰς ἐνέπρησαν ἢ στρατιώτας ἐφόνευσαν ἢ, ὅ τι κατὰ χεῖράς σφισιν εἴη, τοῦτο ἐποίησαν.

[3] For whatever the besiegers intend to do can be seen from the walls; but the besieged, with the wall as a shield, often without detection pour through the gates and burn the machines or kill the soldiers or do whatever damage comes to their hands.

XLI. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐνέδρας τὸν πολιορκοῦντα πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν

XLI. AMBUSH LAID BY THE BESIEGER BEFORE THE GATES OF A TOWN

[1] Ἦκιστα δ' ἂν τοῦτο τολμήσαιεν, εἰ παρὰ πύλαις καὶ πυλίσιν μικραῖς λόχους ὁ πολιορκῶν προκαθίσῃ στρατηγὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰφνιδίους ἐκδρομὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκωλύσοντας, ἐπεὶ καὶ πολλάκις λάθοιεν ἐπιθέμενοι τοῖς ἐκτός.

[1] The besieged would by no means attempt this if the besieging general should post at both large and small gates companies of soldiers to prevent sudden sallies, since otherwise the defenders might without warning attack the besiegers.

[2] χρήσιμοι δὲ τὰ πολλὰ νύκτωρ τοῖς πολιορκοῦσιν αἱ προσβολαί· τοῖς γὰρ ἔνδον οὐ δυναμένοις ὁρᾶν τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὸ σκότος δεινότερα δοκεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα, καὶ τὴν πρόληψιν ἀναγκάζονται χαλεπωτέραν ἔχειν τῶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐνεργουμένων, ὅθεν ταραχαί τε καὶ θόρυβοι γίνονται οὐδενὸς δυναμένου σωφρονεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν οὐ δρωμένων ὡς γίγνεται λεγόντων, οὗθ' ὅπῃ προσβαλοῦσιν εἰδέναι δυναμένων, οὗθ' ὅποσοι, οὗθ' ὁποίοις μέρεσι, διαδρομαὶ δὲ δεῦρο κάκεῖσε καὶ βοαὶ καὶ θάμβη Πανικὸν ἔχοντα τάραχον.

[2] Attacks by night are generally advantageous to the besiegers, since the besieged are unable to see what is happening, on account of the darkness, and everything seems more terrible to them, and they are compelled to regard the attack as more dangerous than it really is. Hence tumult and confusion arise; no one is able to use sober judgement in such circumstances, but many things that are not happening are said to be happening; and the besieged is not able to know from what direction the enemy is attacking, nor in what numbers, nor with what forces, and men run hither and thither, while the shouting and consternation cause disorder and panic.

XLII. α'. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ὁ φόβος ψευδῆς μάντις ἐστίν

XLII. (1) FEAR IS A FALSE PROPHET

[1] Ὁ γὰρ φόβος ψευδῆς μάντις, ἃ δέδοικε, ταῦτ' οἰήσεται καὶ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐν νυκτί, κἂν μικρὸν ᾗ, φοβερώτερον τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις· οὐδεὶς γάρ, ὃ βλέπει, λέγει διὰ τὸ σκότος, ἀλλὰ πᾶς, ὃ ἀκούει· καὶ ἐνός που φανέντος ἢ δυεῖν ἐπὶ τείχους πολεμίων τὸ πᾶν ἤδη στράτευμα τῶν τειχῶν ἐπιβεβηκέναι δόξαντες ἀπετράπησαν, ἐρήμους καταλιπόντες ἐπάλξεις καὶ πύλας.

[1] Fear is a false prophet and believes that what it fears is actually coming to pass. At night every trifling occurrence seems more terrible to the besieged, for on account of the darkness no man tells what he sees but always what he hears. If one or two of the enemy appear somewhere on the walls, the defenders, believing that the whole army has already mounted the walls, turn and flee, leaving the battlements and gates undefended.

β'. Ὅτι αὐτὸν χρή παράδειγμα τὸν στρατηγὸν γίγνεσθαι τοῖς στρατιώταις

(2) THE GENERAL MUST SET A GOOD EXAMPLE TO HIS SOLDIERS

[2] Εἰ δέ τι διὰ χειρὸς ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐξεργάσασθαι σπεύδοι, μὴ ὀκνεῖτω πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὀφθῆναι ποιῶν· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπειλαῖς ἀναγκαζόμενοι τι ποιῶσιν, ὥς ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν σεμνοτέρων διατροπαῖς· ἰδὼν γάρ τις τὸν ἡγεμόνα πρῶτον ἐγχειροῦντα καὶ ὅτι δεῖ σπεύδειν ἔμαθε καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ἠδέσθη καὶ ἀπειθεῖν ἐφοβήθη· καὶ οὐκ ἔθ' ὥς δοῦλον ἐπιταττόμενον διετέθη τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐξ ἴσου παρακαλούμενον διетράπη.

[2] If the general is in haste to finish some enterprise that he has on hand, he should not hesitate to be prominent in the work, for soldiers are not forced to activity so much by the threats of their immediate superiors as by the influence of men of higher rank. For a soldier seeing his officer the first to put his hand to the task not only realizes the need of haste too but also is ashamed not to work, and afraid to disobey orders; and the rank and file no longer feel that they are being treated as slaves under orders but are moved as though urged by one on the same footing as themselves.

γ'. Περὶ πολιορκητηρίων μηχανημάτων

(3) SIEGE ENGINES

[3] Πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ποικίλων ἐκ τῶν μηχανῶν πολιορκητηρίων χρήσεται κατὰ δύναμιν ὁ στρατηγός. οὐ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐμοὶ τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι δεῖ κριοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἐλεπόλεις ἢ σαμβύκας ἢ πύργους ὑποτρόχους ἢ χελώνας χωστρίδας ἢ καταπέλτας· τῆς γὰρ τῶν πολεμούντων τύχης καὶ πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεως ἴδια ταῦτα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἐπομένων ἀρχιτεκτόνων ἐπινοίας εἰς τὰς ὀργανικὰς κατασκευάς.

[3] Of the many and various siege engines the general will make use according as he has opportunity. It is not my part to say that he must use battering rams or 'city-destroyers' or the sambuca, or wheeled towers or covered sheds or catapults; all this depends upon the luck, the wealth, and the power of the combatants, and upon the skill of the workmen who accompany the army for the purpose of building engines.

[4] στρατηγοῦ δ' ἰδίας ἀγχινοίας ἔργον τοιόνδε ἂν εἴη, εἰ βούλοιτο προσβάλλειν μηχανάς· καθ' ἓν μὲν ἀποχρήσθω μέρος τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλως ἂν τις εὐπορήσειεν ἐν κύκλῳ παντὶ τῷ τείχει περιστῆσαι μηχανάς, εἰ μὴ πάνυ μικρὰ πόλις εἴη — , εἰς πολλὰ δὲ τάγματα διελὼν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ τείχους μέρη κελευέτω τὰς κλίμακας προσφέρειν· οὕτως γὰρ εἰς ἀμχανίαν οἱ πολιορκούμενοι πολλὴν ἐμπίπτουσιν·

[4] The task of a general's peculiar skill, if he wishes to employ engines, is to use them at some one locality — for he would not have a sufficient supply of engines to place them in a circle completely about the wall unless the city were very small, — and, dividing his army into many parts, he should [station his engines at certain points and should] command his men to bring forward their ladders against the other parts of the wall, since in this manner the besieged are rendered helpless.

[5] ἂν τε γὰρ ἀμελήσαντες τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὰς προσβολὰς τῶν μηχανῶν ἀμύνωσιν, ἅπαντες οἱ κατὰ τὰς κλίμακας μηδενὸς ἀποκωλύοντος ραδίως ἐπιβαίνουνσι τῶν τειχῶν, ἂν τε διελόντες σφᾶς αὐτοῦς ἐπιβοηθήσωσι κατὰ μέρη, σφοδροτέρας ἐνεργείας γιγνομένης κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς τῶν ὀργάνων οἱ καταλειφθέντες οὐδὲ μάχεσθαι τούτοις τολμήσαντες ἀδυνατήσουσι τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον κακὸν ἀποκρούεσθαι.

[5] For if the besieged disregard the other parts of the wall and only make a defence against the attacks of the engines, all the besiegers who attack with ladders will easily climb over the wall without opposition, but if the defenders divide their forces and send aid to each part as the battle grows more violent through the attack of these engines, those who are left and who do not venture to fight with them will be unable to repel the advancing menace.

[6] διόπερ καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν παλαιστὴν προδεικνύειν μὲν καὶ σκιάζειν εἰς πολλὰ μέρη δεῖ περισπῶντα καὶ ἐπισφάλλοντα δεῦρο κάκειῖσε πρὸς πολλὰ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους, ἐνὸς δὲ ζητεῖν ἐγκρατῶς λαβόμενον ἀνατρέψαι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα τῆς πόλεως.

[6] On this account, just as a good wrestler, the general must make feints and threats at many points, worrying and deceiving his opponents, here and there, at many places, striving, by securing a firm hold upon one part, to overturn the whole structure of the city.

δ'. Πῶς χρή διατελεῖν ἐπείγοντα τὰ τῆς πολιορκίας

(4) ON ENDING SIEGES BY VIGOROUS ACTION

[7] Εἰ δ' ἐν τάχει σπεύδοι τις ἐξελεῖν φρούριον ἢ πόλιν ἢ χάρακα καὶ αὐτῶ κάμνοι ἢ δύναμις μηδὲ μίαν ὥραν ἀποστῆναι βουλομένῳ τῶν ἐρυμάτων, εἰς τάγματα διελὼν τὸ στράτευμα, ὅς' ἂν ἱκανὰ εἶναι οἱ δοκῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ πλήθους καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πολιορκουμένης πόλεως, νυκτὸς ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ προσβαλλέτω τάγματι τῷ δευτέρῳ κελεύσας ἐφεδρεῦναι καὶ ἐτοίμῳ εἶναι, τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ, καὶ εἰ τύχοι πέμπτον ὄν, παραγγελλέτω τρέπεσθαι κατὰ κοῖτον·

[7] If a general desire quickly to capture a fort or city or camp and his force grow weary, while he wishes not to spare one hour from attacking the defences, he should split his army into divisions, as many as he considers sufficient, according to the number of his men and the extent of the besieged city, and then he should attack immediately at nightfall with the first division, ordering the second to remain near in readiness, but the third and fourth and fifth, if there chance to be a fifth, he should order to sleep.

[8] εἴτα, ὅταν τῷ πρώτῳ καταπειράσῃ τινα χρόνον, τούτους μὲν ἀνακαλεσάμενος ἀποπεμπέτω κοιμησομένους, σημαινέτω δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ

προϊέναι τοῦ χάρακος, ὁ δὲ τρίτος ταγματάρχης ἀναστήσας ἐν τούτῳ καθοπλιζέτω τὸ ὕφ' ἑαυτὸν τάγμα·

[8] Then when the first division has attacked for some time, he should recall it and send it to its quarters to sleep, but he should give the signal to the second division to march out from the camp; at this point the commander of the third division should arouse and arm his troops.

[9] καὶ μετὰ τοὺς δευτέρους τὴν ἴσην ὥραν τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἄξει τὸ τρίτον, κοιμάσθω δὲ τὸ δεύτερον τάγμα, μετὰ τοῦτο δ' αὖ τὸ τέταρτον, εἴθ' ἐξῆς τὸ πέμπτον, ἐν μέρει τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀναπαυομένων.

[9] After the second division has fought as long a time as the first, he will lead out his third division and order the second to rest; after this the catapults, then in order the fifth, while the soldiers in turn rest from fighting.

[10] ὁμοίως δ' ἐπισυναπτούσης τῆς ἡμέρας οἱ πρῶτοι τῇ νυκτὶ προσβαλόντες ἔωθεν πάλιν πρῶτοι προσαγόντων· εἴθ' ὥρας, εἰ μὲν ἐξ εἴη τάγματα, δύο κινδυνεύσαντες, εἰ δὲ πέντε, δυσὶν ἔτι μικρὸν ἐπιθέντες, εἰ δὲ τέτταρα, τρεῖς, εἰ δὲ τρία, τέτταρας, ἀπionτες ἀριστοποιείσθων, ἐξῆς δ' οἱ μετ' αὐτοὺς καὶ πάλιν οἱ μετὰ τούτους ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων, ὥστε κύκλον τινὰ περιάγεσθαι.

[10] Thus, at daybreak, those who attacked first at night should again attack first at dawn, remaining at the front two hours, if there are six divisions, but a little longer if five; three hours if four divisions, and four hours if three divisions; on their return they should receive their rations in order, the first division, then the second, and so on to the last, like the revolution of a wheel.

[11] τούτου γὰρ συμβαίνοντος ἀμφοτέρα ἂν γίγνοιτο. καὶ αἱ προσβολαὶ καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μέθ' ἡμέραν ἀδιάλειπτοι προσαχθήσονται, καὶ οἱ προσβάλλοντες ἀκμῆτες καὶ νεαροὶ τὰς ἀναπαύσεις ἐν μέρει ποιοῦμενοι μαχοῦνται.

[11] With this plan, there are two results: unceasing attacks by night and day, while the attackers, taking their turns at rest, will fight freshly and vigorously.

[12] τοὺς μέντοι πολιορκουμένους, μηδ' ἂν πάνυ πολλοὶ τυγχάνωσιν, οἰέσθω τις τὸ αὐτὸ στρατήγημα ἀντεισοίσεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ κινδυνεῦον, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπιτρέπη τις, ὕπνω χαρίζεσθαι βούλεται· φόβῳ γὰρ τῷ δεινοῦ, παρ' ὃν ἀναπαύεται χρόνον, ὥς ἀλωσομένης τῆς πόλεως ἐγρήγορε· καὶ τὸ πολιορκούμενον, κἂν ὀλίγον ἢ τὸ πολιορκοῦν αὐτό, πασσυδὶ προσαμύνει, καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἐντειχιδίων ἐστι κεκίνηται, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον φοβερώτερον, ὥς, εἰ παρὰ μικρὸν

ἀμελήσαιεν, ἀπολούμενοι πάντες.

[12] But no one should believe that the besieged, even if very numerous, could use this same stratagem, for in danger no one would wish to enjoy sleep even if it were permitted, since from fear of peril, during the time at which one is resting, he lies sleepless, as though the city were on the point of capture. The besieged, moreover, even if their assailants are few, defend themselves with all their strength, and everything within the walls of the city is in a state of excitement, in even greater terror of the future, as though if one minute detail were overlooked, they would all be lost.

[13] ὅθεν δὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τρυχομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ μηδὲ μίαν ὥραν ἀναπαύλαν ἴσχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγρυπνίας καὶ πόνοις κάμνοντας, εἴτα καὶ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τεταλαιπωρηκότας ἀσθενέστερον τοῖς σφετέροις προσαμύνειν ἢ τοὺς δεησομένους καὶ παραδώσοντας τὴν πόλιν ἐκπέμπειν.

[13] On this account there is every reason why men wearied, without an hour's rest, tired by guard-duty and labour, and fearful for the future, should defend themselves more weakly, or should send out messengers to discuss the surrender of the city.

ε΄. Πῶς χρὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀναπαύεσθαι

(5) HOW THE GENERAL SHOULD REST

[14] Αὐτὸς οὖν ὁ στρατηγός, ἴσως φήσῃ τις, ἐξ ἀδάμαντος ἢ σιδήρου κεχάλκευται μόνος ἄγρυπνος ἐστὼς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔργοις; οὐ δῆτα· ἀλλὰ παρ' ὃν ἀναπαύεται χρόνον — οὗτος δ' ὀλίγος ἔστω καὶ σύντομος — , ἕνα τῶν ἐν δόξῃ πιστοτάτων καὶ ἀνδρειοτάτων ἡγεμόνα τῶν καὶ τὰ δευτέρα τῆς στρατηγικῆς ἀρχῆς ἐχόντων ἐπιστησάτω τοῖς ἔργοις.

[14] “But has the general himself, then,” some one may perhaps say, “been made of adamant or iron to have remained alone without sleep throughout all these deeds?” Certainly not; but during the time that he sleeps — and this must be little and cut short — he should hand over the command of the army to one of his most trusted and courageous officers, who is also second only to himself in military rank.

ς΄. Πῶς τὰ δοκοῦντα τῆς πόλεως μέρη ἀνάλωτα εἶναι πολλάκις εὐάλωτα

(6) PARTS OF A CITY SEEMINGLY MOST IMPREGNABLE ARE OFTEN EASY TO CAPTURE

[15] Ἐνίοτε δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα μέρη πόλεως εἶναι κρημνώδη καὶ πέτραις ἀποτόμοις ὠχυρωμένα τῶν διὰ χειρὸς ἀνεστηκότων τειχῶν ἔδωκε τοῖς πολιορκοῦσιν ἀφορμὰς μείζονας εἰς τὸ νικᾶν· εἶωθεν γάρ πως ὥς τὰ πολλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πόλεων, ὅσα φύσει πιστεύεται τὸ ἐρυμνόν, ἀφυλακτεῖσθαι καὶ ἥκιστα φροντίδι παραγρυπνεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.

[15] Sometimes those parts of a city that seem precipitous and are fortified by the sheer rocky cliffs, offer the besiegers greater chances for victory than do fortresses erected by human hands, for those places whose fortification relies upon natural strength are wont to be less carefully watched and guarded by soldiers.

[16] ἔνθα στρατηγὸς ἀγαθὸς ἐνόησεν ὁ δεῖ ποιῆσαι, καὶ τινας τῶν εὐτολμοτάτων παρακαλέσας ἐπαγγελίαις καὶ τιμαῖς ὀλίγους, οἷς ῥᾶον ἀναβαίνειν εἴτε δι' αὐτῆς τῆς δυσχωρίας, εἴτε διὰ κλιμάκων, ἐκράτησε τῆς πράξεως ὑποκαταβάντες γὰρ ἐντὸς τείχους ἢ πυλῖδα διέκοψαν ἢ πύλην ἀνέωξαν.

[16] Then the wise general considers what he must do, and encouraging a few of his bravest soldiers with promise of reward, men who are best able to climb up by using either the natural unevenness of the ground or else ladders, he accomplishes his attempt; for descending stealthily within the walls they break down a postern or open a gate.

ζ'. Περὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν σαλπύγγων ὠφελείας

(7) THE ADVANTAGE OF TRUMPETS

[17] Μέγα δ' ἂν ὀνήσειε καὶ τι τοιόνδε συνεπινοηθέν, εἰ καὶ σαλπικτὰς οἱ φθάσαντες ἐπιβῆναι τοῦ τείχους ἀνιμήσαιεν· ἀκουσθεῖσα γὰρ πολεμία σάλπιγξ ἀπὸ τειχῶν ἐν νυκτὶ πολλὴν ἑκπληξιν ἐπιφέρει τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις ὥς ἡδὴ κατὰ κράτος ἐαλωκόσιν, ὥστε τὰς πύλας καὶ τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπολιπόντας φεύγειν· ὅθεν δήπου συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἔξω στρατιώταις ῥαδίαν τὴν τε τῶν πυλῶν ἐκκοπὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ τεῖχη διὰ τῶν κλιμάκων

ἀνάβασιν, οὐδενὸς ἔτι τῶν πολεμίων ἀπείργοντος· οὕτως που δυνατόν ἐνὶ καὶ ἀνόπλῳ σαλπικτῇ πόλιν ἁλῶναι.

[17] Some such device as this would be of great assistance — if those who have succeeded in mounting the walls draw up trumpets after them. For a hostile trumpet heard at night from the walls brings great terror to the besieged, as if they had already been overcome by force, so that abandoning the gates and fortifications they flee. The result is that breaking down the gates and meeting the walls by ladders is easily accomplished by soldiers on the outside since no one of the enemy resists any longer. Thus in some such way it is possible that one trumpeter, even without arms, can capture a city.

η΄. Τί χρὴ ποιεῖν τὸν στρατηγὸν μετὰ τὸ ἐλεῖν τὴν πόλιν

(8) CONDUCT OF A GENERAL AFTER THE CAPTURE OF A CITY

[18] Εἰ δὲ δὴ τινα ἀκμάζουσιν ἔτι πλήθει τε καὶ δυνάμει πόλιν ἐρρωμένως ἔλὼν εἰς φόβον ἢ ὑπόνοιαν ἦκοι, μὴ ποτε κατὰ τάγματα καὶ συστροφὰς ὑπαντιάζοντες ἀμύνωνται τοὺς ἐπεισπίπτοντας ἢ τὰ μετέωρα καταλαμβάνόμενοι καὶ τὰ ἄκρα τῆς πόλεως ἔνθεν ἀντεπίοιεν ἐπὶ πολὺ κακώσοντες τοὺς πολεμίους, κηρυττέτω τοὺς ἀνόπλους μὴ κτεῖναι.

[18] If the general capture by force some city, flourishing in power and in the number of its citizens, and if he fear or suspect that the inhabitants advancing in companies and crowds may defend themselves against the invaders, or that seizing the heights and the citadel of the town they may advance from there and cause great loss to their opponents, he should command his own soldiers not to slay unarmed men of the enemy.

[19] ἕως γὰρ ἕκαστος ἐλπίζει ληφθεὶς τεθνήξεσθαι, βούλεται φθάνειν δράσας καὶ πάσχων ἀλλὰ τι καὶ δρᾶν, πολλοὶ τε ἤδη πολεμίους εἰσκεχυμένους ἐξήλασαν ἢ καὶ μὴ δυνηθέντες εἰς ἀκρόπολιν ἐρυμνὴν κατελήθησαν, ἔνθεν αὖθις εἰς πόνον καὶ ταλαιπωρίαν κατέστησαν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὥστε δευτέραν ἐπαναιρεῖσθαι πολιορκίαν . . . ἢ καὶ πολυχρονιωτέραν, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε καὶ ἐπαλγεστέραν μετὰ πολλῆς πείρας κακῶν.

[19] For so long as every man expects to be killed after capture, he wishes first to do some deed of bravery, and even though he suffer, yet to accomplish something, and many inhabitants of towns have driven out enemies even

when introduced into the town, or, failing in this, have crowded into the fortified citadel from which they have caused great labour and loss to their adversaries, who must enter into a second . . . and longer siege, one that is sometimes more distressing and attended by great hardships.

[20] εἰ δὲ διαβοηθείη τόδε τὸ κήρυγμα, τάχα μὲν καὶ πάντες, ὥς δὲ πρόδηλον εἶπεῖν, οἱ γε πλείους τὰ ὄπλα ρίψουσι· τῶν τε γὰρ βουλομένων δι' ὀργῆς ἕκαστος εἰς ἄμυναν ἰέναι δεδιὼς τὸν πέλας, μὴ ποτε οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ταῦτα φρονή, ρίπτειν ἀναγκασθήσεται, ὥστε, κἂν πάντες βούλωνται τὰ ὄπλα φυλάττειν, διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπόνοιαν αὐτὸν ἕκαστον δεδιότα, μὴ μόνος ὀπλισμένος ληφθῇ, σπεύδειν ἀποτιθέμενον — οἱ γὰρ ὀξεῖς καιροὶ τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην φανεράν οὐκ ἔωσι γίγνεσθαι — , οἱ τε ἔτοιμοι πρὸς τὸ σῶζεσθαι, μέχρι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλπίδα κεκήρυκται σωτηρίας, εἰ καὶ μὴ γνώμη, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐπιὸν ἀμύνονται κακόν, ἐπειδὰν δὲ μικρὰν ἐλπίδα τοῦ σῶζεσθαι λάβωσιν, ἰκέται τὸ λοιπὸν ἀντὶ πολεμίων ὑπαντῶσιν.

[20] But if the above-mentioned command should be published, quickly all the inhabitants, or, needless to say, at least the majority, would throw down their arms. For every one who through anger wishes to defend himself, will be compelled to lay down his arms for fear that his neighbour may not be of the same mind, so that even if all should wish to keep their weapons, on account of this suspicion of one another, each one fearing that he alone may be taken with arms on his person, hastens to give up his weapons. For a sudden emergency does not give time for the common opinion to become known. And those who are ready to protect their own lives so long as no hope of safety has been announced, strive to avert the imminent danger, if not as they wish, then as they must, but when they perceive a small hope of safety, they become suppliants instead of enemies.

[21] οὕτως τε ὁ μὲν κηρύξας καὶ τοὺς τὰ ὄπλα φυλάττειν βουλομένους ρίπτειν αὐτὰ ἀναγκάζει· στρατιωτῶν δὲ θάνατος ἐν μὲν μάχαις εὐπαραμύθητος — δοκεῖ γὰρ τοῦ νικᾶν ἔνεκεν γεγονέναι — , ἐν δὲ νίκαις καὶ καταλήψεσι πόλεων τοῖς νικῶσιν οἰκτιστος, ἀφροσύνης τε μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνδρίας μαρτύριον·

[21] Thus this proclamation compels even those who wish to keep their arms to throw them down. The death of soldiers in battle admits of easy consolation, for it seems to have been the price of victory, but in victory and the

occupation of cities it is a matter of sorrow to the conquerors, as an evidence of thoughtlessness rather than bravery.

[22] εἰ μέντοι μνησικάκως ἔχοι τοῖς ἡττημένοις στρατηγός, μὴ παρὰ τούτοις οἰέσθω τι φέρεσθαι βλάβος, ὅτι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μὴ εὐθὺς κτενοῦσι· σχολῇ γὰρ βουλευσεται μετὰ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου τὴν ἄμυναν ἀνανταγώνιστον ἔχων, τί χρὴ διαθεῖναι τοὺς ἐαλωκότας.

[22] If, however, the general is revengeful toward the conquered, he should not think that no harm is done them if his men do not slay on the spot all whom they meet, since at his leisure he will be able to plan in perfect safety his uncontested vengeance and the fate that the conquered must undergo.

θ'. Τὸν λιμῷ μέλλοντα πόλιν αἰρήσειν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἀσθενεῖς εἰς αὐτὴν χρὴ πέμπειν

(9) NECESSITY OF SENDING WOMEN AND CHILDREN INTO A CITY TO CAPTURE IT BY FAMINE

[23] Εἰ δὲ τὴν κατὰ κράτος ἀπεγνωκὼς ἐκπόρθησιν εἰς χρόνιον καταβαίνοι πολιορκίαν οἰόμενος λιμῷ πίεςας τὴν πόλιν αἰρήσειν, ἃ τίνα ἂν ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας ἔτι καταλάβῃ σώματα, τούτων τὰ μὲν ἐρρωμένα καὶ ἀκμάζοντα ταῖς ἡλικίαις εἰς ἄμυναν πολέμου λαβὼν, ὃ τι περ ἂν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, διαθέσθω, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρια καὶ ἀσθενεῖς ἀνθρώπους καὶ γεγηρακότας ἐκὼν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἀποπεμπέτω· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄχρηστα μὲν εἰς τὰς πράξεις ἔσται, τὰς δὲ παρεσκευασμένας τοῖς ἔνδον τροφὰς θάττον συναναλώσει, καὶ πολεμίων μᾶλλον ἢ φίλιων ἐφέξει τρόπον.

[23] If the general should despair of sacking a city by force and should settle down to a prolonged siege, believing that he will capture the city if he has pressed it hard by famine, he should take prisoners whatever persons are still in the country. Of these, to the men in the prime of life he should assign work on the defences such as seems best to him, but the women and children and feeble men and old people he should send of his own accord into the city. These will be useless in action but will consume more quickly the supplies of the besieged and will serve the purpose of enemies rather than friends.

ι'. Ὅποῖον εἶναι χρὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν μετὰ τὴν νίκην

(10) CONDUCT OF THE GENERAL AFTER VICTORY

[24] Εἰ δέ τῳ πάντα κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ νοῦν χωρήσειεν, ὥστε τοῖς ὅλοις ἐπιθεῖναι τοῦ πολέμου πράγμασι τέλος, ἔστω μὴ βαρὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐπραγίαις, ἀλλ' εὐφορτος, μηδὲ τυφὸν ἀπήνη περιφέρων, ἀλλ' εὐμένειαν προσφιλεῖ ἔχων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φθόνον ἐγέννησε, αὕτη δὲ ζῆλον ἐπεσπάσατο.

[24] If the war should chance to turn out in everything according to the general's desire, so as to put a complete end to the enemy's activity, he should not be overweening in his good fortune, but gracious; he should not show violent stupidity but kindly goodwill; for the former excites envy, the latter causes emulation.


[25] φθόνος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁδύνη τῶν πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀγαθῶν, ζῆλος δὲ μίμησις τῶν παρ' ἄλλοις καλῶν, τοσοῦτόν τε διενήνοχεν ἀλλήλων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φθονεῖν εὐχὴν εἶναι τοῦ καὶ παρ' ἄλλω τι καλὸν μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ζηλοῦν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς τῶν ἴσων κτήσεως.

[25] Now envy is a pain of mind that successful men cause their neighbours, but emulation is imitation of the good qualities of others; such is the difference between them that envy is the desire that another may not have good fortune, but emulation is the desire to equal the possessions of another.

[26] ἀνὴρ οὖν ἀγαθὸς οὐ μόνον πατρίδος τε καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ πλήθους ἄριστος ἡγεμὼν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν εἰς αἰεὶ εὐδοξίας ἀκινδύνου οὐκ ἀνόητος στρατηγός.

[26] A good man, then, will be not only a brave defender of his fatherland and a competent leader of an army but also for the permanent protection of his own reputation will be a sagacious strategist.

The Biography



Roman copy of a portrait bust of Plato by Silanion for the Academia in Athens, c. 370 BC — Onasander was a Platonic philosopher, who composed a lost commentary on the 'Republic'.

Introduction to Onasander by William A. Oldfather



OF ONASANDER, the author of the present *Στρατηγικός* (*sc. λόγος*), or *The General*, we know from the biographical article in Suidas that he was a Platonic philosopher who, in addition to a military work,¹ composed a commentary upon Plato's *Republic*.²

Traces of Platonic philosophy have been sought in the present work, especially in the admonition that friends should fight beside friends (Ch. 24), and in the distinction made between φθόνος and ζήλος (Ch. 42.25). But the essence of the first idea is as old as Nestor's advice in the *Iliad* (B 362 f.); it was practised among the Eleans, Italic Greeks, Cretans, and Boeotians, being characteristic of the Sacred Band of Thebes, and something similar may not have been unknown at one time in Sparta,³ hence it can hardly have escaped the attention of military writers. The same topic is treated also in extant literature from before the time of Onasander by Xenophon in his *Symposium*, VIII.32, 34, 35, so that, although Onasander can hardly have been ignorant of the famous passage in Plato (*Symposium*, 178E ff.), it is hardly necessary to assume that this was its immediate source.

As for the discrimination between φθόνος and ζήλος there is no real parallel in Plato, whereas an almost exact counterpart exists in Aristotle (*Rhet.* II.11.1), a circumstance which escaped Schwebel.⁴ Such definitions, however, were the stock in trade of philosophers,⁵ and do not presuppose a specific source unless there is some marked similarity in expression. On the contrary, one would rather be inclined to wonder that, in an ethical study of warfare like the present, a commentator upon Plato's *Republic* should have failed to show at any point some trace of the not infrequent references to war and its basic cause, the character of the good soldier, the need of constant military exercise, the style of life of the soldier, the professional aspect of successful military preparation, mathematics as a necessary element in an officer's education, proposals looking toward the elimination of certain of the more cruel aspects of warfare, at least between civilized states, and similar topics discussed in that great work. Such silence on the part of Onasander, although not

sufficient, perhaps, to cast doubt on the identity of our author with the writer mentioned by Suidas, would more naturally suggest that in *The General* we have a study anterior to a period of preoccupation with Plato.

The only other references to Onasander from antiquity are in Johannes Lydus, *De magistratibus*, I.47, who names an Ὀνήσανδρος among Greek military writers, and in the *Tactica* of the so-called Leo,⁶ XIV.112, Ὀνήσανδρος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς στρατηγικὸν συντάξας λόγον. In this connexion some conclusion must be reached about the proper form of the name, which has been much in doubt. The reading of all known MSS. except F and D (see below under ‘MSS.’ and ‘Symbols’), supported by Suidas, is Ὀνόσανδρος and so the majority of editors print the name. On the other hand the earliest authorities, Johannes Lydus and the so-called Leo, of whom the latter must have had access to better sources than Suidas in this matter, give the form Ὀνήσανδρος.⁷ Scholars have been divided, Schwebel (in his commentary), Fabricius, Koraes, M. Haupt, von Rohden, Jähns, Bechtel (*à propos* of an inscription, *Bezz. Beitr.*, 1896, XXI.236) favouring Ὀνήσανδρος, while the early editors and translators uniformly, Haase, Köchly, K. K. Muller, Christ-Schmid, and works of reference in general employ Ὀνόσανδρος. As far as the then available evidence went it favoured slightly the spelling with η, for all the MSS. but F go back to but a single source of the tenth century,⁸ the period to which Suidas belongs, while the *Tactica* of Leo⁹ and the work of Johannes Lydus are respectively two and four centuries earlier. If the literary evidence is about evenly divided, then one feels inclined to decide in favour of the form Ὀνήσανδρος, because this, especially in its Doric form Ὀνάσανδρος, was a relatively common name,¹⁰ while Ὀνόσανδρος seems to occur but once, and then, as Bechtel (*loc. cit.*) and others have thought, by a mere stone-cutter’s error.¹¹

Such was the status of the question until Dr. Rostagno’s collation of the Florentinus, which is incomparably the best MS., showed that it had the following subscription:

Ὀνασάνδρου στρατηγικός
Plut. IV.4 f. 215v

a form of the name, which had been known, indeed, before, but because it appeared only in the late MS. B, had been rejected by Köchly with a “sic!” I

have not, however, hesitated to accept it as the correct form of the name, partly because of the high value of the testimony of the Florentinus, but especially because it affords the best explanation of the other two forms, for Ὀνόσανδρος is an easy corruption of Ὀνάσανδρος, and Ὀνήσανδρος merely the Attic (or Koine) spelling.

With reference to the period in which Onasander lived, it can scarcely be doubted that the Quintus Veranius to whom the present work is dedicated was the consul of A.D. 49 who died while in command in Britain ten years later, so that 59 is the *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the treatise.¹² If we are inclined to press a little the author's own characterization of his work as παλαιῶν τε ἡγεμόνων κατὰ τὴν σεβαστὴν εἰρήνην ἀνάθημα (prooem. 4), and see in these words a reference to the time of composition being a moment of universal tranquility, we might accept Zur-Lauben's suggestion (preface,) that the treatise was composed in the year 53, this being perhaps the only one in the period for which there exists no record of military operations. But the expression employed, while certainly appropriate at a time of complete peace, does not necessarily imply quite so much, and it is better to rest content with a date shortly anterior to A.D. 59.¹³

The treatise consists of forty-two chapters upon various aspects of a commander's duties, notably ethical considerations regarding the character, social status, bearing, behaviour, and attitude of a general towards his troops, the enemy, and his fellow-citizens; the morale of the troops, the effect of particular policies and tactics upon morale, and the like; together with much sound advice about elementary matters. In two respects Onasander differs markedly from other Greek and Roman military writers. He regards everything from the point of view primarily of the commanding officer, to the question of selecting whom he devotes a long and valuable passage, and he lays uncommon stress upon the *imponderabilia*, especially ethical and religious considerations. There is nothing very philosophic nor technically military in the treatise, which is intended to give merely the broad principles of generalship (στρατηγικαὶ ὑφηγήσεις, prooem. 3), and lays no claim to originality (*ibidem*).¹⁴

One feels no more inclined to extol the treatise as being "the most learned, concise, and valuable to be found upon the art of war,"¹⁵ than to decry it as "useless and pedantic," and the author as one who "talks Greek like a doctor

of the Sorbonne,”¹⁶ or to regard it as a mere “wilderness of general phrases,” whose “useful observations are but grains in the chaff of trivialities.”¹⁷ The truth, as often, lies here between extremes: κρατίστη δ’ αἴρεσις ἡ τοῦ μέσου, as Onasander himself says (A.10).

Actual performance falls below the statement in the prooemium that the study has drawn merely upon those arts and practices employed by the Romans in the establishment of their empire, for specifically Roman institutions are regularly neglected even when appropriate, and in only one instance (Ch. 19) is a manoeuvre recommended, which, though perhaps not impossible in a Greek phalanx, is certainly suggestive of the Roman manipular tactics. Elsewhere only general principles are proposed which apply to almost any army at any time, or else, although very rarely, if ever, is a custom peculiar to the Greeks described.¹⁸ In particular many of the qualities which Onasander requires of a commander-in-chief, are, *mutatis mutandis*, quite as applicable to-day to higher officers in general, as they were in the reign of Claudius.

The burden of the treatise is really ethics, morale, and the general principles of success in arms. As such, a good deal of it will necessarily sound commonplace, some of it even trivial, for the principles of success in war have often been declared by experts to be very simple, and the difficult matter in war, as in many sports and occupations, is not the principles, but their application. Nevertheless every failure is easily traceable to the neglect of some important principle, and these can hardly be inculcated too often. If a manual expresses the principles of the art clearly and pointedly, one can hardly in fairness demand more of it. Estimates of value regarding a work of this kind will necessarily differ, but when so great a commander as Prinz Moritz von Sachsen, Marshal of France, and author likewise of a classic work on the art of war, *Mes Rêveries*, “declared with pleasure that he owed his first conceptions of the conduct of a commander-in-chief to Onasander” (Zur-Lauben, preface,), no mere closet philologist, at all events, may deny the possibility that it may prove useful to the professional soldier. The little treatise is merely a plain tale simply told, and it is the better part of criticism to express appreciation of the work that is valuable and well done rather than to strain to find what is useless or inappropriate.

The style of Onasander is straightforward and not ill adapted to the subject

matter. Although it is not so fluent and simple as that of Xenophon, whom he seems to have admired and followed,¹⁹ it nevertheless stands comparison with that of Polybius or Plutarch, but only an enthusiast like Zur-Lauben could speak of its “*beauté majestueuse, élégance nerveuse, et clarté perçante.*”

The influence of Onasander in antiquity was considerable. Most subsequent military writers are indebted to him, notably the so-called Mauricius and Leo, of whom the latter in a large measure paraphrases Onasander, turning him into “wretched Byzantine Greek.”²⁰ In the Renaissance he enjoyed a remarkable popularity. Translations, beginning with that of Sagundinus in 1493, appeared in rapid succession in Latin, Spanish, German, French, Italian, and English, and such a demand, for these were no mere philological exercises, shows that many a practical soldier took to heart his counsel, and that much of it has passed thereby into the common body of military science. Towards the end of the next century the first Greek text appeared, a fairly good piece of scholarship, by Rigaltius, which held its place until Schwebel’s elaborate study, more than a century and a half later. Since that time Onasander has been known to few beside professional philologists, but it may be hoped that others outside the ramparts of scholarship may have their attention drawn to his work by the present unpretentious publication.

A few words seem to be necessary by way of explaining this edition. It would have been much easier to reprint Köchly’s text, but inasmuch as only one of the four old and really valuable MSS. of Onasander was adequately known (namely the Parisinus 2442), the great Laurentian MS. of the Tacticians had never been really collated, and the Vatican and the Neapolitan MSS. never examined at all, it would have been scarcely proper merely to reproduce an old and occasionally imperfect, though in the main most admirable, text. The apparatus aims to give all the MS. readings that have any critical value, or may throw light upon the tradition of the text, and all the valuable emendations of modern scholars, especially those of Köchly. Knowledge of the inferior MSS. and readings of earlier editors have been drawn generally from Köchly, whose work in this respect is most exact and thorough, although we have been able to use the work of Rigaltius from the edition of 1600 in a privately owned copy, as well as Schwebel’s edition of 1762, and that of Koraes, 1822, lent by the courtesy of the libraries of Harvard University and Princeton University respectively. Departures from Köchly’s

text have generally been recorded except in matters of elision (where Köchly nearly always elided with or without MS. authority), and of movable nu (which Köchly added somewhat arbitrarily). In these points the best MS. authority (F, and frequently FGH) has been followed. Cases where FGH merely run preposition and substantive together have not been recorded, or where iota subscript (without indication of a different construction) has been omitted, or movable nu has been added or left off (except for F), or compound words written as two (unless such a usage is occasionally recognized), or obviously erroneous accents or breathings occur, or where GH have trivial misspellings. The punctuation of FGH has likewise not been recorded, although it has been duly regarded in constructing the text.

The bibliography, which is more complete perhaps than any to be found elsewhere, has been drawn up with especial care, and omits, we trust, no title of substantial value for the criticism of Onasander.

Editions

Nicolaus Rigaltius: Ὀνοσάνδρου Στρατηγικός. Onosandri Strategicus. Sive de imperatoris institutione. Accessit Οὐρβικίου Ἐπιτήδευμα. Paris, 1598 and 1599. This is the *editio princeps*.²¹ It was republished in 1600 at Heidelberg by the Commelin Press with the notes of Portus and Gruterus, and again in 1604 with the notes of Portus, with which edition the more elaborate observations of Gruterus, published separately in the same year, were sometimes bound. See below.

[Henricus Monantholius: Onosandri et Aristotelis Mechanica cum commentariis. Paris, 1599. Fabricius, *Bib. Graeca*, vol. IV.339, quotes this entry from a Leyden catalogue, but the title itself is absurd, and the entries in the catalogues of the Brit. Mus. and the Bibl. Nat. under the Monantholius edition of Aristotle do not mention Onasander. We have here probably a cataloguer's error, due possibly to two different works being bound together. The Onasander was probably the edition of Rigaltius.]

Aemilius Portus and Janus Gruterus: Ὀνοσάνδρου Στρατηγικός. Accedit seorsim in eundem Onosandrum Jani Gruteri uberior commentarius. Item Aemilii Porti . . . breues . . . observationes. Ex Officina Commeliniana [Heidelberg], 1600; also the work of Rigaltius and Portus alone, *ibidem*, 1604. Gruterus' notes were published also by the same firm in *Varii discursus*, sive

prolixiores commentarii ad aliquot insigniora loca Taciti et Onosandri, Part I, 1604, and Part II, 1605.²² These observations of Gruterus seem to have been bound occasionally with the edition of Rigaltius, and also with the notes of Portus, but not always, since the latter combination alone was used by Schwebel (preface). On the somewhat complicated relations of these three works see Schwebel, *loc. cit.*; Fabricius, *op. cit.* 338; Haase: 1835, 98. The copy of the edition of 1600 owned by Mr. A. S. Pease, although its title-page professes to have Gruterus' notes, does not contain them. The *notae* of Rigaltius are dated in both preface and colophon 1598.

Joannes à Chokier de Surlet: Onosandri Strategicus, sive de imperatoris institutione . . . , without place or date, but the preface is dated Rome, 1611. It contains the text and translation of Rigaltius. Its only value lies in the "political dissertations" added by Chokier. The *Thesaurus* (containing Onasander) was republished at Mainz, 1613 and 1619 (third ed.; Cat. Bibl. Nat.); Frankfurt, 1615; Liège, 1643; Köln, 1649, 1653, and 1687. The editions of Liège and Köln do not contain the Greek text (Cat. Bibl. Nat.)

Nicolaus Schwebelius: Onosandri Strategicus, sive de imperatoris institutione liber, etc., . . . notis perpetuis criticis emendatus. . . . Accedunt duo indices, etc. . . . Nürnberg 1762. This is commonly bound with the translation of Zur-Lauben, Paris, 1757.

A. Koraes (Korais, Corais, or Coray): Ὀνοσάνδρου Στρατηγικὸς καὶ Τυρταίου τὸ πρῶτον Ἑλεγεῖον, μετὰ τῆς Γαλλικῆς ἐκατέρου μεταφράσεως. Παρέργων Ἑλληνικῆς βιβλιοθήκης τόμος πέμπτος, Paris, 1822. The French translation is that of Zur-Lauben, which Koraes reproduces even when it is based upon readings different from those which he prints.

Arminius Koechly: Ὀνοσάνδρου^ο Στρατηγικός. Onosandri de imperatoris officio liber. Leipzig, 1860. This is the most valuable edition of the text. It completely supplants the earlier editions, using all the critical materials previously collected, and adds new manuscript readings, especially from one of the oldest MSS., Paris. 2442.

Translations

Latin

Nicolaus Sagundinus: Onasander ad Q. Verānium de optimo imperatore

eiusque officio per Nicolaum Sagundinum (*sic*),²³ e Graeco in Latinum traductus. Rome, 1494.²⁴ This publication was in the well-known and frequently reprinted *Rei militaris scriptores*, which included among others Vegetius, Frontinus, Modestus, and Aelian. Only the 1494 edition, however, contains Onasander. This translation of Onasander was reprinted at Paris, 1504 (colophon) or 1506 (preface); at Basel, 1541, 1558, and 1570.²⁵

Joachimus Camerarius: Onosandri Graeci autoris de re militari commentarius in Latinum sermonem conversus . . . Nürnberg, 1595. This was an independent work made from a mutilated MS. It was published after the death of Camerarius by his sons. Max Jähns, *Gesch. der Kriegswiss.* 93, is certainly in error in speaking of this edition as containing also the Greek text.

Nicolaus Rigaltius. For his translation and reprints of it, see under *Editions*, Rigaltius, Portus, and Chokier. The Latin translation by itself was published at Helmstadt in 1619.²⁶

Spanish

Al. de Palencia: Tratado de la perfeçion del triunfo militar. Printed about 1495, but without indication of place or date. The translation was composed in 1459.²⁷

Iac. Dieg. Gracian de Aldarete: Onosandro Plátonico^o de las calidades y partes que ha de tener un excellente capitan general y de su officio y cargo. Barcelona, 1567.

German

Anon.: Onexander^o von den Kriegsshandlungen und Räthen der hocherfarn guten Hauptleut sampt iren Zugeordenten. Mainz, 1524 and 1532.²⁸

A. H. Baumgärtner: Onasanders Unterricht eines Feldherrn, übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen erläutert; in Vollständige Sammlung aller Kriegsschriftsteller der Griechen. Mannheim, 1777,²⁹ and separately in 1786. This is said to be a poor piece of work, based on Schwebel's text.

French

Jehan Charrier: L'art de la guerre composé par Nicolas Machiavelli; l'état aussi et charge d'un lieutenant général d'armée, par Onosander, ancien

philosophe platonique . . . , Paris, 1546.³⁰

Blaise de Vigenère: L'art militaire d'Onosender,^o auteur grec, où il traicte de l'office et devoir d'un bon chef de guerre, etc., Paris, 1605. The translation seems to have been completed in 1593, but was not published until after the author's death (Jähns, *op. cit.*, 93). The commentary and essays were so extensive as to make the whole work extremely bulky.³¹ It by means of this translation that Prinz Moritz von Sachsen made his acquaintance with Onasander (Zur-Lauben, preface, 5).

Baron de Zur-Lauben: Le général d'armée, par Onosander. Ouvrage traduit du Grec, etc. Paris, 1754 and 1757. The reprint of 1757 is bound with Schwebel's edition of 1762. Another edition appeared in vol. I of Zur-Lauben's *Bibliothèque militaire historique et politique*, Cosmopolis [Paris], 1760. It was also reprinted by A. Koraes in his edition, Paris, 1822, *q.v.*

Charles Guischart:³² Les institutions d'Onosandre pour servir à l'instruction d'un général. Traduites du Grec. In his *Mémoires militaires sur les Grecs et les Romains*, vol. II, 49-106. The Hague, 1757,³³ and Lyon, 1760. This translation was reprinted by Liskenne and Sauvan; see below.

[A. Koraes: Paris, 1822. See *Editions*.]

F. C. Liskenne et J. B. B. Sauvan: Bibliothèque historique et militaire. In eight vols. Paris, 1835-46; and 1851 ff. The translation of Onasander, by Guischart, is in vol. III, 405-35.

Italian

Fabio Cotta: Onosandro platonico dell' ottimo capitano generale e del suo officio. Tradotto di Greco in lingua volgare Italiana. Venezia, 1546 and 1548. This work was translated into English by Peter Whytehorne. It was republished by G. Daelli in *Biblioteca rara*, Milano, 1863, vol. IV.

English

Peter Whytehorne: Onosandro Platonico, of the generall captaine and of his office, translated out of Greke into Italyan by Fabio Cotta, a Romayne; and out of Italyan into Englysh by Peter Whytehorne. London, 1563.

Modern Greek

G. Apostolos Skalasteras: Bucharest, 1832. M. Konstantiniades (see next item) claims that this version was not made from the original Greek, but only from a translation.

Michael Konstantiniades: Ὀνησάνδρου Στρατηγικός, μεταφράσεις ἐκ τῆς ἀρχαίας εἰς τὴν καθ' ἡμᾶς Ἑλληνικὴν. Athens, 1897.

Criticism

Anon.: *Acta litteraria*, vol. I, part I, 22-8; *Nova acta erudita*, 1763, 201-11; *ibid.*, 1768, 313-19. The last two articles are devoted to a critique of Schwebel's edition. The first is not accessible to me.

H. Delbrück: *Geschichte der Kriegskunst in Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*. Berlin, 1921, vol. II, 200.

Christ-Schmid-Stählin: *Griechische Literaturgeschichte*, 6th ed., München, 1921, vol. II, 422.

Th. Crenius: *De eruditione comparanda*. Leyden, 1699, 470, 570 ff. Crenius seems to have added some observations of his own to the work of Naudaeus which he republished. See Schwebel, pref.

J. A. Fabricius: *Bibliotheca Graeca*. Leipzig, 1795, vol. IV, 336-40.

Fr. Haase: "Über die griechischen und lateinischen Kriegsschriftsteller," *Jahrb. für Philol.*, 1835, 14: 86-118.

De militarium scriptorum Graecorum et Latinorum omnium editione instituenda. Berlin, 1847.

M. Haupt: *Varia* (including a brief note on Onasander). *Hermes*, 1871, 5:175. Reprinted in *Opuscula*, 1876, vol. III, 518 f.

Max Jähns: *Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften*, etc., München und Leipzig, 1889, vol. I, 5-10; 90-94.

Herman Köchly: *Index lectionum in literarum universitate*. Zürich, 1854. A discussion of MSS. of Onasander, principally Bern. 97 and Paris. 2522.

H. Köchly and W. Rüstow: *Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller*, Leipzig, 1855, vol. II, 1, 84 f.

K. K. Müller: "Ein griechisches Fragment über Kriegswesen," in *Festschrift für L. Ulrichs*, Würzburg, 1880, 106-38. On the Laurentian MS. of Onasander. "Eine griechische Schrift über Seekrieg", in *Festgabe zur dritten Säcularfeier*

der Universität Würzburg, Würzburg, 1882. On the general classification of the MSS.

Gabr. Naudaeus: *Syntagma de studio militari*. Rome, 1637. Republished as *Naudaei bibliographia militaris*, Jena, 1683 and included in Thomas Crenius, *De eruditione comparanda*, Leyden, 1699.

G. Rathgeber: Article “Onosandros,” in Ersch and Grüber’s *Encyklopädie der Wissenschaften und Künste*, series III, vol. IV, 9-12.

H. von Rohden: “Quas rationes in hiatus vitando scriptor de sublimitate et Onesander secuti sint,” in *Commentationes in honorem F. Büchelieri et H. Useneri* . . . Bonn, 1873, 68-94.

Cl. Salmasius: *De re militari Romanorum*, Leyden, 1657. Republished in J. G. Graevius: *Thesaurus antiquitatum Romanarum*. For Onasander see vol. X, 1389.

Manuscripts

The MSS. of Onasander are much more numerous than those of the other Greek military writers, and thus testify to his abiding influence throughout antiquity, but only a few of them, and these mainly copies from existing codices, have ever been collated, and two of the very oldest seem not to have been used at all prior to this edition.³⁴ As K. K. Müller has observed (*Festgabe, etc.*), the MS. tradition of Greek military authors falls into three main groups, the first of which is composed of the Florentinus LV. 4, s. X, and its descendants (especially A and B, see below); the second, of the Parisinus 2442, s. XI, the Vaticanus Graecus 1104, s. XI, and the Neapolitanus III C 26, s. XI, and their descendants (e.g., M and Vat. 2201 are direct copies of the Vaticanus) or closely related MSS.; the third, of the Ambrosianus 139 (old no. B 119), s. X (or XI according to an older dating).

The Florentinus is incomparably the best MS. for Onasander, so that the disagreements of other MSS. need be considered only in the relatively few passages where it has obviously suffered from corruption. MSS. A and B are faithful copies of the Florentinus, and Köchly collated these two MSS. himself, so that this branch of the tradition was fairly well known even before the collation of the parent MS. In view of this fact and of the rare critical acumen of Köchly it is but natural that the present edition will be found to

differ in only a few places, and generally in points of minor importance (but uniformly along the line of closer adherence to the Florentinus), from the text as constituted by that great scholar.

The second family represents a markedly inferior text, but probably one of wider circulation, and so presumably the vulgate of Leo's time. It is valuable primarily only when the Florentinus is corrupt. I have given, however, in the *apparatus criticus* all the important variations of the three leading MSS. of this family from the printed text, so that the material upon which a judgement must be based may not be withheld from others.

The third group, represented by the Ambrosianus, gives us a text varying so widely from that of the other lines of tradition that both K. K. Müller and the editors of the catalogue of the Ambrosian Library, Drs. Martini and Bassi, regard it as no longer a recension but as a Byzantine paraphrase. I have taken, therefore, no cognizance of it, not, of course, because I am unaware of the value which a close paraphrase like this, and even a much freer one like that of many passages in Leo's *Tactica*, have in attesting the direct MS. tradition, but merely because it has been impossible in the time available, because of the delay and uncertainty of communication with Italy, to secure photographs of the Ambrosianus and present this secondary material in a form suitable for a volume of this series.³⁵

To sum up: we have in F an excellent, old, uninterpolated, but not faultless text; in PGH and most other MSS. a Byzantine vulgate; in the Ambrosianus 139 a Byzantine paraphrase; in Leo a Byzantine plagiarism.

Symbols

I give here, in addition to the symbols for the four great MSS., those used by Köchly for the MSS. from which readings were given by his predecessors. The names Rigaltius, Schwebel, Koraes, and Köchly in the *apparatus* refer to the texts, or notes as the case may be, and those of Sagundinus and Camerarius, to the translations produced respectively by these scholars.

A Parisinus 2522, s. XV, a copy of F. The corrector, A m2, is derived from R, or a very closely related MS. (Köchly)

B Bernensis 97, s. XV-XVI, a copy of F, but with some emendations. (Köchly)

C Morellanus, once in the possession of F. Morellus at Paris. It seems to be

descended from F but has many deviations and peculiar readings. (Rigaltius)

D An inferior seventeenth century MS. (Koraes)

E In the library at Munich in the eighteenth century; it agrees closely with the late MSS. of Rigaltius. (Schwebel)

F Florentinus LV.4, s. X, collated by Prof. Dott. Enrico Rostagno for this edition. The symbol F is used by Köchly for a very few readings from a Florentine MS. (presumably LV.4) furnished Schwebel by Dom. Mar. Manni. For these the designation F (*sic*) is used.

G Vaticanus Graecus 1164, s. XI. See H. Photographs of this MS. were used. Two leaves are missing (for details see *apparatus* on 10.27 and 35.3). Some portions, especially of fol. 11r, are illegible. For a description see Wescher, *Poliorcétique grecque*, pp. xxiv ff.

H Neapolitanus III C 26, s. XI. H and G agree so closely that they are certainly copies of the same archetype, probably uncial. Photographs of this MS. were used.

K A late and inferior MS. owned by Koraes. (Koraes)

M “Cod. Mediceus, ex Bibl. Reg. Catharinae”, a direct copy of G. (Rigaltius)

N A late MS. owned by Joh. Nagel, agreeing generally with the late MSS. of Rigaltius. (Schwebel)

P Parisinus 2442, s. XI, collated for Köchly by Jakob Huntziker. For a description see Wescher, *Poliorcétique grecque*, pp. xxvi f. (Köchly)

R A late and extensively interpolated MS. of Rigaltius, the probable source of the readings of the second hand of A. (Rigaltius)

V “Vet. Membranae” or “Vetusta Macrocola,” seldom reported upon. (Rigaltius)

v Vulgate reading of the MSS. used by Köchly and his predecessors. With this A m2 (although Köchly quotes the latter separately) nearly always agrees, and when it does so is included under that symbol. Because of its age and importance P is cited separately, even if agreeing with v, when specially reported by Köchly.

Ω All MSS. or all other MSS. (including FGH).

Note. — The quoted phrases “alii codd. ut vid.”, “ceteri codd. ut vid.”, etc., are taken from Köchly’s *apparatus* (based upon inferences from the earlier editions), unless some other authority is cited.

¹ The MSS. of Suidas give Τακτικά περὶ στρατηγημάτων. Bernhardt (following Küster) puts a comma after τακτικά, as though different works were referred to, but it is much more likely that only one was meant, whether we take the words περὶ στρατηγημάτων as explanatory of τακτικά, or suppose that ἡ has fallen out. In any event the title given by Suidas is inexact, for the better MSS. of Onasander give Στρατηγικός (the inferior ones Στρατηγικά or Στρατηγική), which is undoubtedly correct, and is attested also by the so-called Leo XIV.112. Suidas exemplifies late usage which applied τακτικά to any military treatise.

² This has left no trace.

³ The evidence is collected and discussed by Erich Bethe, *Rhein. Mus.*, 1907, LXII: 445 ff. The φίλων ὕλη of the younger Scipio (Appian, *Hisp.* 84) seems to have been composed rather of friends of Scipio, than of mutual friends, so that I cannot agree with Wecklein, *Philol.*, 1876, XXXIV:413, who compares it with the ἱερὸς λόχος of Thebes. In Magna Graecia so closely connected was paederasty with war that it was even said to have been in origin a military measure. (Suidas s.v. Θάμυρις.)

⁴ The Pseudo-Platonic Ὅροι (which Schwebel, following a very dubious tradition, ascribes to Theophrastus) give a somewhat different definition of φθόνος, and of φθόνοϛ only.

⁵ Compare the scholium to Aristophanes, *Plutus*, 87, where the definition of the word as given by the philosophers (παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις) is contrasted with that given by the rhetoricians. The Stoics, of course, had their definition, see Diog. Laert. VII.111.

⁶ This work, long ascribed to Leo VI, is now known to antedate his period, and must go back to Leo III (A.D. 711-741), commonly, but incorrectly, called the Isaurian. This conclusion was first advanced by Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Byz. Zeitschr.*, 1894, III:437 ff., and the demonstration completed by K. Schenk, *ibid.*, 1896, VI:298 f. Of course the Emperor is only to be regarded as the one under whose auspices the work was composed. See also R. Helbing in his review of R. Vari's new edition of the *Tactica*, Budapest, 1917 (unfortunately inaccessible as yet), in *Berl. Philol. Wochenschr.*, 1919, 97.

⁷ It is worthy of note that the so-called Leo has the correct form of the title, while the designation in Suidas is markedly inexact.

⁸ See K. Krumbacher, *Byzant. Literaturgesch.*, 2nd ed., 1897, 638, and the literature there cited.

⁹ The author of this work must have had a MS. of Onasander before him, because he paraphrases a large part of the present treatise, and since he worked under the encouragement

of the Emperor it is to be supposed that he had the best available sources. No doubt the author of the archetype of the majority of our present codices, in the tenth century, also had good MS. material to work upon, but that was two centuries later, and besides this archetype clearly represents a seriously corrupt and interpolated vulgate. The testimony of D, a late interpolated MS., for Ὀνήσανδρος is worthless.

¹⁰ Approximately thirty-five instances have been noted, without making an exhaustive search, principally from Rhodes, Eretria, Athens, Laconia, and Ionia.

¹¹ Ὀνόσανδρος can hardly be derived from ὄνος, whatever one may think of the possibility of such a name among the Greeks, while the stem ὀνόσασθαι, as Bechtel observed, does not seem to appear in Greek nomenclature.

¹² Earlier but baseless conjectures are mentioned by Schwebel, p. 8. The year 58 might be more appropriately taken, as it is unlikely that Onasander would have dedicated his work to Veranius after the latter had gone to Britain in this year. For Veranius see the article in *Prosop. Imp. Rom.* III.399 f.

Thayer's Note: The *Prosopographia* is not online, so we should content ourselves with Arthur E. Gordon's *Quintus Veranius consul A.D. 49, A study based upon his recently identified sepulchral inscription* (University of California Press, 1952) — but that's not online either; we'll have to make do with a review of it, which in picking apart Prof. Gordon's book, gives us Veranius' career as a sort of by-product: *AJP*:75.206-210.

¹³ Some slight general confirmation of this approximate dating is supplied by von Rohden (see Bibliography), who finds approximately the same technique regarding the avoidance of hiatus in Onasander and in Ps.-Longinus, for the latter, it is now agreed, belongs to the period of the early empire. Von Rohden's results may, however, need modification, because they are based upon Köchly's text which departs at many places from the best MS. tradition in the matter of elision.

¹⁴ It seems unduly severe for Köchly and Rüstow: 1855, 84 and Max Jähns, 92, to denounce Onasander for lack of originality when he disclaims it himself.

¹⁵ Guilliman writing in 1583, as quoted by Zur-Lauben, preface, .

¹⁶ The Prince de Ligne, as quoted by Jähns, 94. One's respect for the prince's judgement is seriously qualified, however, by the circumstance that he has the highest admiration for the so-called Leo (*ibid.* 120), ranging him beside Napoleon, and far above a mere Caesar or Frederick the Great, whereas the *Tactics* of Leo are in part a watered paraphrase of Onasander himself, together with extensive extracts from the *Strategica* ascribed to Mauricius, and from other sources.

¹⁷ Köchly and Rüstow: 1855, 85.

¹⁸ Thus it has been noted that in Ch. 10.25 ff. the Greek inspection of victims before battle is mentioned, not the Roman augury with the sacred chickens. But the Romans also took auspices before battle, no less than the Greeks, at least during the Republic. In the same chapter (10.4) exercises for soldiers are mentioned, which are drawn from Xenophon (*Cyrop.* II.3.17 f.). But similar exercises were employed by the Romans (see the article “*Exercitus*” in Pauly-Wissowa, 1654), and although exercise in throwing clods is not recorded for the Romans, so far as I am aware, Vegetius (II.23) especially recommends that soldiers be trained to throw stones, and in a sham battle what better substitute for these could be desired than clods? It is true that the Roman legion is not specifically mentioned, but neither is the Greek, for that matter. The word *φάλαγξ* could be used of either, but Onasander is writing of armies in general and not of particular forms of organization.

¹⁹ He was especially indebted to the *Cyropaedia* and the *Anabasis*. He drew also from Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Polybius among extant authors, but is in no case slavishly dependent upon any particular source that has come down to us.

²⁰ Köchly and Rüstow: 1855, 85, note 198.

²¹ Max Jähns, *Gesch. der Kriegswiss.* I.9, note, who mentions an edition of the *Scriptores* (i.e., the *Rei Militaris Scriptore*, Rome, 1487, and frequently thereafter), Rome, 1499, in which the collection is enlarged by the addition of Onasander’s treatise, which, however, was again omitted in the edition of Bologna and the subsequent reprints, had no doubt in mind the Latin translation of Sagundinus, *q.v.*, which meets his description in every detail except that it appeared in the edition of Rome, 1494, only, not 1499.

²² The copy in the Brit. Mus. is described thus: “Another edition) [*i.e.*, of Rigaltius]. Accessit Urbici inventum, Graece et Latine; interprete N. Rigaltio, cuius item adjiciuntur notae: ut item J. Gruteri discursus varii. . . . In Bibliopolio Commeliniano: 1604, 1600-05.”

²³ There seems to have been some doubt as to the correct spelling of the name. The *editio princeps* and the Paris reprint have Sagundinus, the Basel reprints and editors use the form Saguntinus. Fabricius, *Bibl. Gr.* IV.337, and Haase, 1835, 99 give some references where the form Secundinus appears.

²⁴ So Haase, 1835, 98; Köchly in his edition, p. vii; and the catalogues of the Brit. Museum and the Bibl. Nat. and Hain* 15915. Fabricius, *loc. cit.*, gives 1493.

²⁵ A Latin translation in MS. exists in the Escorial library, iii. S. 11; also at London, 12 C. XIII, the latter under the name Nicolao Secundino, so that the Escorial translation is probably the same work; see Haase, 1835, 99.

²⁶ It is more than doubtful if the work of Dominicus Syllenus Graecus, described by Fabricius, *op. cit.*, 339, under the heading *Versiones*, as being “de vetere et recentiore scientia militari, omnium bellorum genera terrestria perinde ac naualia, nec non tormentorum rationes complectente. Venet. 1599”, contains a translation of Onasander.

²⁷ Max Jähns, *Gesch. der Kriegswiss.*, 93.

²⁸ Fabricius, *loc. cit.*, gives 1531. This translation is said to contain a chapter, otherwise unknown, upon the Athenians, Spartans, and Macedonians. See Zur-Lauben, quoted by Fabricius, *loc. cit.*; Jähns, *op. cit.*, 93. It can hardly fail to be spurious, since any such details would be alien to the general tenor of the work, as well as opposed to the express statement of the prooemium.

²⁹ Jähns, *op. cit.*, 94, gives the place of publication as Frankfurt and the date as 1779 (on , Frankenthal and München). This may have been a different edition but it is more likely that we have here only a different title-page.

³⁰ The catalogue of the Bibl. Nat. indicates that there were other editions of this translation, but the volume which would contain them has not yet appeared. The Brit. Mus. possesses only this edition of 1546.

³¹ Max Jähns, *op. cit.*, speaks of 1500 pages, but the Brit. Mus. cat. records only 734. The book is a quarto.

³² Thus Haase: 1835, 98, and the catalogues of the Brit. Mus. and the Bibl. Nat.: Guischart, Fabricius, *op. cit.*, 399, Brunet, Graesse; Guischart, Jähns, *op. cit.*, 93.

³³ Haase, *ibid.*, and the catalogues of the Brit. Mus. and the Bibl. Nat. give 1758.

³⁴ Most of them are listed by Zur-Lauben in the preface to his translation (from Montfaucon, *Bibl. Bibl.*); Haase, *De milit. script. Gr.*; and K. K. Müller, *Festgabe zur dritten Säcularfeier. Add to those mentioned in these works one at Perugia (Blume, Bibliotheca librorum MSS. Italica, in Supplementum itineris Italici, Göttingen, 1834, 122), and another at Turin (Fabricius, Bibl. Graeca, IV (1795), 337).*

³⁵ Similarly, in the case of Leo, it has been impossible to secure from Hungary the new critical edition of the *Tactica* prepared by Dr. R. Vari, and published by the Budapest Academy as long ago as 1917, while any extensive use of this work in the old editions would be unprofitable. It should be noted, however, that Leo agrees occasionally with F against all other MSS., which would suggest that the tradition represented by F and not the vulgate was the basis of his paraphrase, a condition apparently somewhat different from that which Wescher, *Poliorcétique grecque*, p. xxxix, presupposes for the tradition of the military

technicians.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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Ennius
Epic of Gilgamesh
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



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

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



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